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In this thesis I will discuss and criticize different legitimation for lawmaking, 
including ancient and contemporary Chinese theories, and Western representative 
perspectives on lawmaking. I will disclose disadvantages of Chinese lawmaking 
system. As a new research project of Chinese law, I argue that both the traditional 
and contemporary Chinese lawmaking lacked elements of communication. The 
top-down lawmaking mode was the reality as well as the dominant theoretical 
justifications of legislation in China. I believe that the top-down lawmaking mode in 
China was insufficient in its justifications for legitimacy; neither was it beneficial for 
increasing the degree of individual freedom and rights. Therefore it is better to 
absorb positive Western lawmaking elements, especial taking a shift from a 
non-communicative mode to a more interactive and cooperative mode. 
Western theories of lawmaking could contribute to Chinese future legal reform. 
Theories of disagreement and individual freedom have positive contributions to this 
proposed change. After my introduction and analysis of Western theories, I attempted 
to escape from pure theoretic discussion about law and legality, and try to provide a 
practical application of communicative lawmaking in China. Relying on the 
contributions of Western lawmaking theories, but at the same time realizing their 
difficulties in their application in Chinese contexts, I believe that Confucianism, a 
Chinese philosophy of love and law could contribute to a discourse theory of 
lawmaking. The core of Confucianism,  Ren (‘仁’ , loving the people, humanism) 
provided a possible theoretical background for a discourse theory. Professor 
Bankowski’s argument for the interplay of law and love, the inside and the outside 
systems, also initiated a debate for the communicative decision-making, and is thus 
employed to solve the difficulty of applying Western theories into Chinese contexts.  
The ‘appropriate’ lawmaking in this thesis refers to a communicative lawmaking 
mode, in contrast to the non-communicative mode that defended by Chinese legalism 
and contemporary justifications of lawmaking. I attempt to introduce this interactive 
and cooperative lawmaking structure to balance individual rights and state interests. 
This structure would go against the grain of the traditional top-down legislation. In 
this new structure individuals’ voice could be heard and paid attention to, which is a 





TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
PREFACE 
 
CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 9 
MAJOR ARGUMENTS AND BACKGOUNDS OF THE STUDY ..................................... 20 
CHINESE CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH ON LAWMAKING ...................................... 27 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS .......................................................................................... 30 
 
CHAPTER 2CHINESE CONTEMPORARY LAWMAKING:REALITY AND PROBLEMS
 ....................................................................................................................................................... 33 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 33 
CHINESE CONTEMPORARY LAWMAKING .................................................................. 34 
MARCOR-ECONOMIC POLICY ....................................................................................... 39 
EFFICIENT LAWMAKING ................................................................................................. 54 
BUREAUCRATIC LAWMAKING ...................................................................................... 65 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 73 
 
CHAPTER 3THE LEGITIMATION OF CHINESE LAWMAKING (I)............................... 75 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 75 
CONFUCIAN LAWMAKING ............................................................................................. 76 
FOUR JUSTIFICATIONS IN CHINESE MARXISM ......................................................... 84 
1. The revolutionists’ law: the first justification ............................................................ 87 
2.The people’s congress: the second justification ......................................................... 90 
3.The working class’ law: the third justification ........................................................... 93 
4.People’s democratic dictatorship: the fourth justification .......................................... 97 
THE HIDDEN RULE OF LAWMAKING ......................................................................... 100 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 107 
 
CHAPTER 4THE LEGITIMATION OF CHINESE LAWMAKING (II): .......................... 109 
CHINESE LEGALISM ............................................................................................................ 109 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 109 
CHINESE LEGALISM ....................................................................................................... 110 
CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER PRE-QIN SCHOOLS ................................................... 112 
A REVIEW OF LORD SHANG’S REFORM .................................................................... 115 
CHARACTERISTICS AND PROPOSITIONS OF CHINESE LEGALISM ..................... 122 
CHINESE LEGALISM AND WESTERN LEGALISM..................................................... 130 




CHAPTER 5LAWMAKING IN JURISPRUDENCE (I) ....................................................... 140 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 140 
BENTHAMNISM AND CHINESE UTILITARIANISM ................................................... 141 
HAYEKIAN LIBERAL LEGISLATION ............................................................................ 154 
DISAGREEMENTS OF MAJORITY DECISIONS ........................................................... 168 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 177 
 
CHAPTER 6LAWMAKING IN JURISPRUDENCE (II) ..................................................... 178 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 178 
LEGISPRUDENCE ............................................................................................................ 179 
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.............................................. 184 
CONCEPTUAL FREEDOM AND CONCRETE FREEDOM ........................................... 187 
VALUES OF/BEHIND FREEDOM ................................................................................... 191 
LIMITS OF FREEDOM AND LIMITED FREEDOM....................................................... 197 
THE OPPOSITE OF FREEDOM ....................................................................................... 200 
A CHINESE CASE ............................................................................................................. 203 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 206 
 
CHAPTER 7COMMUNICATIVE LAWMAKING IN CHINA ........................................... 210 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 210 
NECESSITY OF COMMUNICATIVE LAWMAKING .................................................... 211 
COMMUNICATION UNDER COMMUNITARIANISM ................................................. 213 
SOCIAL CONTRACT IN COMMUNITARIANISM ........................................................ 217 
FREEDOM, LIBERTY AND LAW .................................................................................... 222 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 232 
 
CHAPTER 8RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT .................................................................... 234 
 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 258 
Appendix I. ................................................................................................................................ 279 








LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
LLC2000: Legislation Law 2000: The Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of 
China 2000  
BCG: Boston Consulting Group 
ADB: Asia Development Bank 
MLSUR: System of Minimum Living Standard Security of the Urban Residents 
NPC: National People’s Congress of China 
SCNPC: the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China 
LAP1996: the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administrative Punishments 
1996 
LRTS2003: the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Road Traffic Safety 2003  
Measures 1982: the Administrative Measures of Accept and Dismiss Vagrants and 
Beggars with No Means of Support in Cities 1982 
Regulation 2001: The Regulation Governing Building Demolition and Resettlement 
2001 城市房屋拆迁管理条例 
CPC: the Communist Part of China 
PPC: the Paris Peace Conference  
cof: conceptions of freedom 







I would like to thank my PhD supervisor Professor Zenon Bankowski who has carried 
the weight of a long-lasting supervision and was at times difficult to co-ordinate especially when 
I was in China taking care of my family. Professor Bankowski introduced Professor Neil 
MacCormick and Professor Luc J Wintgens to me. I appreciate his arrangement to meet with 
them and absorb inspiring ideas from their thoughts. With encouragements from Professors 
MacCormick and Wintgens, I overcame difficulties I faced in research. During more than six 
year’s supervision, Professor Bankowski offered me useful resources such as Professor Wintgens’ 
and Professor Jeremy Waldron’s research on legislature. I also appreciate that during difficult 
times Professor Bankowski prayed for my mother, which means a lot to me and my family.  
 
Professor Bankowski also offered me ideas from his books and papers to structure the 
whole thesis. The brief introduction on Habermas was also added under his suggestions. He 
helped me to develop my analysis and criticisms on my chosen Western theories. Understanding 
my limits of expression, he even wrote down for me how to use quotes and how to lead and assist 
readers to understand my thinking. He was a very strict supervisor. Sometimes when I could not 
understand his criticism, I went to watch the Big Bang Theory played by Jim Parsons, because I 
thought my supervisor was also much like Sheldon in the play, who was a smart person but could 
hardly understand less talented persons. I had to exert my utmost efforts to write this thesis. 
Sometimes I felt struggling to extend my limits, but my supervisor ‘kicked’ me to go further. In 
such a strict way he helped me to grow up; to find my place in the academic world; and to remind 
me to form a strong but also humble character. I could not imagine how hard it was for him to 
tolerate a stubborn emotional and less talented student like me, until I became a teacher myself. 
Then I started to understand why a teacher would be so strict to a student: The teacher thought 
the student could do better. 
 
I also thank my Chinese teachers Professor Zhongxin Fan, Professor Jingliang Chen, 
 
 7 
Professor Handa Cheng, and Mr. Qian Wu. My colleagues and friends Dr. Chunxia Gong, Dr. 
Jian Huang and Dr. Jian Yang have been in contact with me and offered me inspiration on 
comparisons of Chinese history and English legal history. Thanks for the inspiring discussion 
with them, my comparative study Chinese legalism and Western legalism that published on 
Frontiers of Law in China (2011/4) became the foundation of chapter four in this thesis. Dr 
James Harrison helped me at the start of my PhD project. He offered information on legislation in 
the UK, especially the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006. With his help, I began to 
read the statutory instruments of the UK and trace the history of secondary legislation in the UK. 
I also thank him for proof-reading my first year report, which developed into chapters five and 
six of this thesis.  
 
My sincere friends Emily, Pierre, Michael and David did English proof-reading for the 
first draft of the dissertation for me two years ago. I especially thank my colleague Ms. Annie 
Morris who did the proof-reading for the last draft of my thesis. It was not an easy task but they 
kindly and patiently accomplished the work. I would also like to specially thank those who have 
continuously encouraged and supported me during my stay in the UK, especially Emily, Hao, 
Ogla and Yangyang Huang. With their company and help, life here has been much easier for me.  
 
I thank the University of Edinburgh which offered me the Overseas Research Student 
Award, which lighten the financial burden on my family, all of whom appreciate that very much. 
My mother, Defang Tan, my sister, Ling He, my aunt, Hong Tan and all other family members 
sacrificed a lot to support me to chase my dream of studying at Edinburgh. Without them, I could 
not have come this far to see a whole new world. 
 
I thank the Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, which offered and maintained 
my position during my study at the U.K. The Law School of the University also provided me the 




I also thank editor Ms. Xiyue Wu, Professor Lilian Jiang and the two anonymous 
reviewers of Frontiers of Law in China, editors Professor Zhongxin Fan and Jingliang Chen of 
Chinese and Western Legal Traditions, editors Mr. Mingshi Gao and Dengwu Cheng of Journal 
for Legal History Studies. All of them gave me precious comments and advices for my thesis.  
 
My husband Hao Chen and my parents in law, Jingfang Li and Ming Chen took care of 
me after my mother’s death in 2009. No words could fully express my gratitude for their love. 
 
I dedicate the work I put into this thesis to my parents, Rusheng He and Defang Tan, 









 On 25th December 2010, Mr. Yunhui Qian, a fifty three year old villager of 
Yueqing in Zhejiang province of China, with a long history of petitioning against 
alleged abuses by the local government, was crushed to death under the wheels of a 
heavy truck. Within hours of Qian’s death, images of his death were circulating on 
popular Chinese websites including Tinaya, Sina, 163 and Sohu. Rumors emerged 
stating that it was a murder rather than an ordinary traffic accident. However, the 
official report insisted that the photographs could show nothing but an unfortunate 
traffic accident. Eyewitnesses and villagers who questioned the police’s investigation 
were detained. The news of Qian’s death spread quickly and led to a political crisis.
1
  
Yunhui Qian became famous in China soon after his death, not only because 
the official explanation of his death was just opposite to the eyewitnesses’ primary 
statements and the photos of the spot, but also because he was a representative 
petitioner. He spent years petitioning against the compulsory acquisition of land by 
the local government in his village. A year ago, he was detained and put into prison 
because of his petitions, but villagers of Yueqing trusted him and elected him as the 
local representative. After Qian’s accidental death, villagers doubted the official 
investigation. They insisted that Qian was murdered by the interests groups behind 
the compulsory acquisition of land. During the whole event both the officials and the 
                                                        
1 See the news and detailed comments on http://news.163.com/10/1227/07/6OT4LON700014AEE.html, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/12/28/a-traffic-death-exposes-government-credibility-crisis/; 




people refused to listen to each other. The official statements ignored people’s doubts 
and the witnesses and the spot pictures. People also refused to accept the official 
investigation.  
This case illustrated the latest image of Chinese law: Although representative 
democracy was written in the Constitution, in the Chinese context a separation 
between the official law and the popular will was obvious. The Chinese lawmaking 
system is a typical top-down mode, rather than a bottom-up mode, which means laws 
in China are made from the bureaucracy rather than from the populace. As a result, 
when people found the law was not right, they went to upper official institutions to 
petition, requiring ‘the top’ to listen to ‘the down’. However, neither of the two 
modes (the top-down and the bottom-up) were about communication. They both 
emphasized the authority of law——one was the official authority; the other was the 
will of the people. This research aims at disclosing disadvantages of the 
non-communicative Chinese lawmaking mode in order to introduce a communicative 
mode into Chinese lawmaking, and is thus meaningful in enhancing communications 
between the two supposed opposite groups in China, the official and the people. 
Instead of abandoning the current top-down mode totally or simply supporting a 
bottom-up mode of lawmaking, I believe it is better to construct a communicative 
mode. 
Communicative democracy was not popular in the Chinese debate of 
lawmaking. As I will discuss in this thesis, in China, democracy is translated into a 
representative system, a system that the minority is subordinate to the majority. 
Although it is also a rule-based system, the people in this system have to follow the 
rules and have no choice about participating into lawmaking. As argued in Professor 
Zenon Bankowski’s book, ‘Democracy should be seen as to do with communication 
and not necessarily with representation’.1 Representative lawmaking is not equal to 
democratic lawmaking unless it makes communications possible. My thesis is to 
                                                        
1 Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001,p.221. 
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argue for a communicative lawmaking mode, in which people should be part of the 
construction of the ‘Enterprise of Law’. The traditional non-interactive and top-down 
lawmaking mode made contributions to the maintenance of the social order in 
traditional China. It also promoted efficiency in the execution of law. It, however, 
faces difficulties in the justification of the authority and legitimacy of law, especially 
‘the law of the society’ in contrast to the official law. The traditional Chinese legal 
system was a closed system that made rule-following the primary obligation of 
people. It, however, failed to justify the morality of rule-following. In the old system, 
rule-following was a plain fact of obligation rather than an individual’s moral 
decisions. Lawmaking therefore led to a fact of passive acceptance of law. The 
communicative lawmaking mode in this thesis aims at transforming this passive 
acceptance into an active ‘exchange’ mode. In this dynamic mode, lawmaking and 
‘the empire of law’ should not be a closed but an open system.      
Ideas from Professor Bankowski’s Living Lawfully (2001) and Bringing the 
Outside In (2007) are employed in this thesis to support my argument. In his legal 
theory, the moral autonomy could and should contribute to the construction of a legal 
system. The idea of living in a morally correct way was what legality should mean. 
In contrast with legality, legalism was a rigid rule-bound way of living without 
concern with the meaning of living under the law. Legalism was described as the 
legalistic attitude, and normative behavior to be a matter of rule-following. In 
legalism, law merely was a heteronomous system of rules.
1
 It was not only ‘an 
ideology internal to the legal profession as a social whole’ or ‘the operative ideology 
of lawyers’ and of those who have a ‘rule-oriented thinking’, but also a background 
theory of law, which implied a rule-based way of looking at things and a tendency to 
treat law as just ‘there’ and separated of non-law.
2
 Professor Bankowski described 
                                                        
1 Z. Bankowski, Living Lawfully—Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, (2001), p.43. 
2 J.N. Shklar, Legalism, Law, Morals and Political Trials, Harvard University Press, (1986), pp. vii-viii, ix-x, 
pp.2-3, p.5, p.35. also see Bankowski’s introduction of Shklar’s legalism in, Living Lawfully—Love in Law and 
Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, (2001), p.44. 
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this attitude as ‘it is the rules that are important, not how they are arrived at’.
1
 ‘No 
matter where the rules come from, the effect of legalism is to make them appear 
objective and unchangeable.’2 He criticized legalism, in which law was a net of rules, 
or heteronomy fact. In legalism, law was a closed system and in such a system, ‘you 
do not ask people not to break the law, you make it impossible for them to break it’.
3
 
It was a system where people take the fact that the law was as an automatic reason 
for behaviors, and in so doing they behave like automatons or robots. In such a 
system, law became ‘monological’: ‘it receives nothing except on its own terms and 
within its own protocols. There is no interactivity and no input from the outside’.4 As 
a contrast, Living lawfully was an enterprise through which people live a righteous 
life. Such conclusions in Living Lawfully, although not specifically referring to 
Chinese legal system, depicted an appropriate image of traditional Chinese legal 
system that I will criticize in this thesis. 
Three themes in Living Lawfully are related to my thesis, firstly, different sorts 
of system of rules can interact; and secondly, a normative system’s construction can 
depend on interactions; and finally there is law and love. The first theme indicates 
the possibility of exchange between official rules and other rules. The second theme 
refers to the practical solutions of building a system better than the system of rules or 
the ‘empire of law’. The third theme which is also the core theme pictures an image 
of life which is not under the net of rules but refers to a virtuous way of living under 
the rules. These three themes are inseparably interconnected. Professor Bankowski 
criticized the trend that legal scholars reduced life to the life under the rules. He 
disagreed with the legal scholars egocentric way of description and prescription. 
Their world was a closed system and they looked the world from the ‘inside’. In his 
valedictory lecture he reminded us that ‘ (in Law’s Empire) Law is everything and it 
                                                        
1 Z. Bankowski, Living Lawfully—Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, (2001), p.48. 
2 Ibid., p.59. 
3 Zenon Bankowski 'Bringing the Outside in: The Ethical Life of legal Institutions' in T Gizbert-Studnicki and 





swallows everything back into itself. There is no external skepticism.’ 
1
 The 
deficiency of the character (selfishness) and cognition (egocentricity) caused the 
problem of ‘incommensurable discourses’, and ‘the world breaks down into self 
absorbed circles, secure and confident in their righteousness’.
2
 To solve the problem, 
he thus proposed an open and dynamic perspective of the world, where life is 
re-evaluated by the outside.  
A life in law was not necessarily a closed prison of rules because to Bankowski 
a life in law did not reject a life in love. In Living Lawfully, he attempted to 
re-discover the relation between ethical life and a society under the law. He argued 
that the ethical life should be seen as not one or the other way of law and love, but 
interlinking and tension between them.
3
 In this way, he pointed out the possibility of 
‘continually recreating law’ by ‘being inside and dragging the outside in’.
4
 As we 
saw, the inside here referred to the empire of law, and the outside, love. The 
conception of ‘exchange’ was further proposed to connect the inside with the outside. 
‘Exchange’ was also the main line shared by the three themes stated above. 
‘Exchange’ was seen as a sort of ‘give and take’ process, ‘which opens us to creative 
transformation and our ethical lives and those of our societies become dynamic and 
can grow’.
5
 In this sense, the above three themes were coherent because they were 
all about the construction of a dynamic system. ‘Bringing the outside in’, and then 
people can live lawfully in a dynamic exchange system of love and law. 
I discovered that the relationship between law and love in Living Lawfully was 
debated in another way in ancient Chinese schools of philosophy, represented by 
Chinese legalism and Confucianism. I thus found it interesting to re-interpret ancient 
Chinese philosophies through a Western perspective. Although in Living Lawfully 
                                                        
1
 Zenon Bankowski, The Long Goodbye: (a) Life in and out of the Law, in Bankowski’s Valedictory Lecture. I 
thanks Professor Bankowski for sending his lecture to me. It lightened my burden of listening comprehension and 







communicative lawmaking was not the theme, it implied that a righteous life under 
the law should tolerate people’s participation in lawmaking. Especially in Bringing 
the Outside In, Bankowski softened the strict boundary of the inside and outside 
systems of law, which was also helpful for my argument for a communicative 
lawmaking.   
In this thesis, I will disclose the disadvantage of a closed system by using the 
Chinese mode as a case study. It is a new research project of Chinese law and could 
also be seen as a further compliment and concretization of Professor Bankowski’s 
project on legality. I, therefore, inevitably use Bankowski’s legal theory as my 
theoretical base and support. In my thesis, his theory of legality (or living lawfully) 
inspired me to re-discover the positive value of Confucianism and the meaning of 
Ren (仁，means humanity; love) in Confucianism. 
As a new research project of Chinese law, I disclosed that both the traditional 
and contemporary Chinese lawmaking lacked elements of communication. They 
were justified by requirements of efficient economic policies and administrative 
governance. Although lawmaking was for the goal of common prosperity in Chinese 
official announcements, as will be criticized in this thesis, it led to the unfortunate 
result that laws authorized and justified in-equality in opportunity among different 
groups of people. A top-down lawmaking mode was the reality as well as the 
dominant theoretical justifications of legislation in China. In this traditional mode, 
lawmaking transformed social problems into making legal rights and duties; the 
actual problems were not necessarily solved. Such a rule ‘transformation’, however, 
as Bankowski argued in Living Lawfully, was problematic:  
‘[T]he law translated questions of morals and politics into questions of 
legal validity…the law would translate a social problem into a series of legal 
problems which did not necessarily get at the actual problem. Thus problems 
of poverty and bad housing conditions were translated into questions of the 
rights of tenants. This did not address the question of lack of housing stock 
and the means to buy or rent it. Problems of crime and vandalism are seen as 
something to do with lack of enforcement of the law. This disregards the 




As we can see in the quote, in such a ‘rule transformation’, complex social 
problems were reduced to relatively simple solutions (legal rights and duties). 
Simplification promoted efficiency in problem-solving but it sometimes deviated 
from the truth. This deviation rather the simplification per se need us to pay attention. 
In other words, when legal arrangements could not solve the social problem, i.e., 
they deviated the purpose of having them, we should remain vigilant of the problem 
of the ‘rule transformation’: the simplification and deviation from the truth. The 
problem of the ‘rule transformation’ also existed in China. As I will disclose in this 
thesis, in China, the actual problems that lawmaking was supposed to solve were still 
there; while at the same time, other new problems appeared after the new laws were 
made in such a non-communicative system. Chinese lawmaking theories claimed the 
importance of economic reform and efficient administration. Real demands of the 
public, however, were hardly substantiated by the method and result of the 
contemporary lawmaking mode. A discourse theory, in my point of view, could 
contribute to solve the problem of ‘the rule transformation’ that Bankowski 
mentioned in his criticism of legalism. It provided a route of how to ‘bring the 
outside in’. In lawmaking a discourse arena would assist the people to express their 
genuine needs when making new rules, rather than accept what law tells them to do 
passively. Here I am not making an arbitrary conclusion that a discourse theory will 
directly lead to social justice. If I understand right, a theory is an internally consistent 
‘art of debate’; the effect it will cause to the reality, however, is difficult to justify 
during the debate because it needs further tests. China has not used the discourse 
theory for its lawmaking practice. Representative democracy overacted; deliberative 
democracy, however, was not absorbed.  
Although at present it is hard to test whether this theory is ‘better’ than the 
existing ideologies, it offers another perspective and another practical route for 
China’s further legal reform. This theory aims at disclosing the realistic problems as 
                                                        
1 Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001,p.57. 
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well as the defects of old Chinese legitimation theories. It attempts to provide 
another solution or ‘way of thinking’. It does not belong to the camp of ‘total 
Westernization’ but argues for the absorption of the Western elements on the premise 
of respecting the existing Chinese legal system. I agree with Bankowski’s solution 
for social problems: ‘We can…learn to interact with the institutions that we find 
ourselves in and not stand against them, seeking to construct them anew’.1 This 
thesis is such an attempt to offer different perspectives and solutions within the 
Chinese lawmaking system, rather than to argue for a substitution of a whole new 
Western congress system. 
When the tension between autonomy and heteronomy, love and law, freedom 
and regulation was softened, another problem of law and lawmaking appeared: It 
seemed that people could choose when to follow and when to disobey rules. If so, the 
Rule of Law became problematic because people’s behaviours were a kind of 
‘speculation’. Decision-making became a gambling house for self-interests. The 
result of unscrupulous lawmaking was not what we were looking forward to. As 
Bankowski also argued in Living Lawfully, ‘if we move to saying we will know when 
to apply the rule by looking at the circumstances of the particular case, then we start 
to lose connection with the meaning of the law.’
2
 He used the metaphor of the 
tension between the Antigone and Creon in the Greek tragedy the Antigone of 
Sophocles to describe the dilemma. 
The tension between Antigone and Creon in the tragedy was whether Polyneice, 
the rebel, the enemy of the city, ought to be given burial rituals; whether Antigone, 
the sister of the rebel, who buried Polyneice in defiance of state ought to be punished; 
and whether Creon, uncle of Polyneice and Antigone, the new ruler of the city, was 
entitled to the throne. The contrasting views of Creon and Antigone with regard to 
laws higher than those of state inform their different conclusions about civil 
disobedience. Creon demanded obedience to the law above all else, right or wrong. 
                                                        
1 Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001,p.84. 
2 ibid., p.139. 
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He believed that there was nothing worse than disobedience to authority. Antigone 
responded with the idea that state law was not absolute, and that it could be broken in 
civil disobedience in extreme cases, such as honoring the gods, whose rule and 
authority outweighs Creon's. As Bankowski observed, they were both blind of the 
other’s world: ‘They both try to protect themselves in the armour of the law but in 
doing so they lose the humanness that they are supposed to preserve.’1 Bankowski 
used the play to disclose the fact that in many times people like Antigone and Creon 
seek to follow their own rigid rule system but refuse to see the reason or values of the 
‘outside’ rules. Antigone and Creon both claimed to be the sole judge of them—— 
‘[T]hey both read them off from a set of values, a set of rules 
that are structured there for them; the rules of the city or the rules of the 
Gods. There is no conflict, there is no tension between law and love——
there are just rules. They both live the nomian life. So keen are they to 
avoid contingency, and the uncertainty and unpredictability of life, that 
they close it down and make things clear and predictable. They hide and 
cut out contingency, the things that welfare and love add in.’ 
2
 
As we can see from the above quote, the rules of the city were seen as the 
opposite of the god’s rules. Conflicts existed between the two systems of rules and 
there lacked ‘exchange’ or ‘communicate’ between each other. We saw a set of closed 
systems in the play: Firstly, the systems of rules were closed (therefore they both 
emphasized the strict submission to their own rules). Secondly, their love (love of 
law or love of family) were also closed to each other (and they both were blind to the 
other’s plight). And finally, law and love could not ‘exchange’ in the play. The 
question Bankowski asked in Living Lawfully was more than the morality of 
disobedience to law, but the possibilities of breaking the boundaries of these systems, 
and the exchange between law and love.     . 
It reminds me of a classical Chinese play, Chi Sang Zhen (a name of a small 
village 赤桑镇) the story of Mian Bao (包勉) in Song dynasty (960-1279), which 
appeared to be about the opposition between law and love, between rigidly following 
                                                        
1 Ibid., p.32. 




official laws and family love. It was quite similar to the play of Antigone and Creon 
that was discussed in Living Lawfully. In Chinese tradition, family love and filial 
piety were the core value of being a good person, or living rightfully. Family love in 
China was endowed with transcendent values: a good example was that Chinese 
people prayed to dead family members as they were their gods who could protect 
later generations. Chi Sang Zhen，or the Case of Mian Bao, was written in this 
special cultural background.  
The main protagonists, Zheng Bao (包拯 the other famous name is Bao Gong 
包公) and Mian Bao, were uncle and nephew. Zheng Bao was the famous (in many 
Chinese stories the most) upright judge in Chinese history.
1
 Zheng Bao was an 
orphan and was raised up by his sister- in-law Miaozhen Wu, the mother of Mian 
Bao. Mian Bao, Miaozhen’s son and Zheng Bao’s nephew, however, took bribes and 
broke the law when he was a county magistrate. Zheng Bao as the upright judge 
sentenced Mian Bao to death, according to the official law.  
The play began with the cry of Miaozhen Wu, the mother of Mian Bao, the 
sister-in-law and ‘foster mother’ of Zheng Bao. In Miaozhen Wu’s perspective Zheng 
Bao forgot family love and evaded his responsibility to his family. Miaozhen Wu 
blamed Zheng Bao because he as the judge could give Mian Bao a light sentence 
rather than death. Zheng Bao claimed that he as the judge should rigidly apply the 
law. In the climax of the play, Zheng Bao and Miaozhen Wu had an argument of 
‘whether upbringing was the reason of obedience’. Miaozhen Wu criticized that 
Zheng Bao was ungrateful to her kindness. She regretted parenting Zheng Bao. 
Zheng Bao answered that he was grateful to her love in his persistence of her earnest 
teachings. He said it was Miaozhen Wu who taught him to be an upright person and 
not to pervert the law. In the end of the play, Miaozhen Wu realized that Zheng Bao 
was right and she accepted his judgment. But Miaozhen Wu was so grieved because 
                                                        
1 Judge Bao (Bao Gong) is almost totally unknown in Western literature. But there are a series of novels by 
Robert Van Gulik, with a fictionalized Judge Dee as its central character, which is very loosely based on the real 




she had no son to support her in her weakness and illness, and to handle her own 
funeral affairs.
1
 Zheng Bao comforted Miaozhen Wu by saying that he would take 
all the family responsibilities like her son to support her. Therefore the relation 
between Zheng Bao and Miaozhen Wu was seen as son and mother, and Zheng Bao 
and Mian Bao as brothers. Establishing such close relations was very important in 
China, and in this way Zheng Bao showed final filial obedience to his ‘mother’ 
Miaozhen Wu by taking care of her and fulfilling his ‘brother’s family 
responsibilities. 
This classical Chinese play was popular and handed down to this day because it 
revealed a conflict of love and law in Chinese culture. From the case of Mian Bao we 
found that different rules did exist in reality (family rules and legal rules). Although 
following law or obedience to law was ‘right’ in ordinary circumstances, we may be 
blind to recognizing other rules that were also important. Or vice versa, we may be 
too biased to deny the justice of law when we found it had conflicts with our other 
values. Many laws were not perfect; imperfect laws needed to be improved by 
absorbing elements of other rules. The core of the play Chi Sang Zhen was to find 
solutions for the family. Zheng Bao changed his family status and responsibilities to 
take care of his sister-in-law and nephew, and in this way he obeyed both law and 
love. This play was about Miaozhen Wu’s compromise to the law, through a 
communication with the representative of the law (Zheng Bao). It was also about 
Zheng Bao’s recognition of the deficiency of the law, after the communication with 
his family. An exchange between law and love existed in the play, but the expedient 
solution Zheng Bao offered was still not enough for constructing an open and 




                                                        
1 In Chinese culture, raising childern for old age and for the funeral ceremony (养儿防老、送终) was extremely 
important to a person. 
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MAJOR ARGUMENTS AND BACKGOUNDS OF THE STUDY  
The possibility of the exchange between the law and love, between law and 
other systems of rules, between strict official norms and social customs and traditions, 
makes a communicative lawmaking possible. But we need to clarify this question 
first: When is it appropriate (or right) to break laws? Shall we leave it to any 
individual’s own conscience? If we leave this to anyone’s conscience, shall we 
tolerate decisions of the extreme self-interested antisocialists? Or, do we only 
consider requests from the ‘good’ people, or (at the least) from the ‘ordinary’ people? 
Practically speaking it would be difficult to justify individuals’ anti-law requests. We 
therefore need a standard, or ‘rule of recognition’ in Hart’s the Concept of Law, to 
discover and confirm people’s real and just requests.  
In this thesis, communication is the key word to understand such criterion for 
identifying real requests of the people. The ‘appropriate’ lawmaking in this thesis 
refers to a communicative lawmaking mode, in contrast to non-communicative mode. 
That means we need to break the boundaries between Creon and Antigone, and 
Zheng Bao and Miaozhen Wu, to let them communicate and pay attention to others’ 
voices and requests. In contrast to the studies on the legitimacy of non-interactive 
lawmaking represented by Chinese legalism and contemporary justifications of 
lawmaking, I argue for an interactive and cooperative lawmaking mode. Before I 
come to this conclusion, I will structure my arguments through the following 
sequence: 
1. The ‘old’ Chinese lawmaking mode lacked communication. Compared to the 
traditional Chinese lawmaking mode, contemporary Chinese lawmaking had 
absorbed Western ideas of democracy and the Rule of Law. It, however, was still a 
one dimensional pattern. Both the legitimacy of Chinese lawmaking and the 
authority of law were defended by a collective-interest-oriented theory, the Theory of 
Xiaoping Deng. Deng’s theory was a significant justification for the thirty year 
economic reform since 1979. Bureaucratic capability and economic efficiency were 
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the most focused values of Chinese lawmaking. A golden age of lawmaking appeared 
since 1976, right after the age of ‘vacuum lawmaking’ in the Great Cultural 
Revolution period (see figure 1.1).1 (Certain ideas are difficult to express in linear 
textual form. This thesis will therefore systematically try to translate some core ideas 
into graphical representations that are better suited to express multi-dimensional, 
dynamic interactions between key elements.) 
 
fig. 1.1 Chinese laws and regulations 1949-2008 
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2. Questions of the legitimacy of the legal and economic reform, however, were 
not debated hitherto in Chinese literatures. Most literatures stood by the official 
legitimation of lawmaking in Chinese Marxism represented by Deng’s theory. This 
thesis attempted to question the legitimacy of lawmaking from a jurisprudential 
perspective based on the analysis of realistic problems of Chinese lawmaking and its 
                                                        
1 Statistics in figure 1.1 from 1949 to 1999 are from Youmin Yu and Xiaoyang Qiao ed., A Bulletin of 50 Years 
Law (1949.9-1999.12), (2000), Beijing, Chinese Democracy and Rule of Law Publishing House (中国民主法制
出版社), pp.1-65; statistics of 1999 to 2008 are from the Law Committee of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress ed., Statistics of Lawmaking of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国立
法统计), Chinese Democracy and Rule of Law Publishing House, 2008, pp.269-270. 
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justifications. I will employ empirical studies to disclose disadvantages of the 
top-down and irreversible mode. In the old mode, common people’s livelihoods, 
individual rights and the degree of democracy influenced or shaped by lawmaking 
were not satisfying. I believe that although the reform achievements worth 
compliments, the legitimation thesis it based on, however, was problematic. Chapter 
two is an empirical analysis of the contemporary lawmaking. It aims to disclose the 
reality and problem of non-communicative lawmaking mode of China. 
3. I discover that the problem of Chinese lawmaking existed in the imperfection 
of subjective legitimacy, i.e., whether the de facto leadership of the authority is 
sufficient to justify lawmaking. In Chinese Constitution, ‘The People s Republic of 
China is a socialist state under the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the 
working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.’1 I will discuss the 
contrast between the majority-rule principle and Chinese ‘democratic dictatorship’ 
theory in chapter three, to figure out the major route of current justifications of 
lawmaking in Chinese literatures. The meaning of democratic dictatorship and the 
ruling class (as ‘the working class’ in the Chinese Constitution), as I will analyze in 
this thesis, had a close connection with the (exclusive) leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party. An irreconcilable conflict therefore appeared, between the means 
and ends of Chinese lawmaking. The ultimate purpose of Chinese socialistic 
lawmaking is the ‘common prosperity’; the approach, however, narrowed down the 
meaning of democracy.  
4. In chapter four, I will continue the discussion of Chinese justifications of 
lawmaking and focus on Chinese legalism. The traditional Chinese lawmaking, 
which was based on Confucianism and Chinese legalism, was a typical top-down and 
irreversible mode. In this mode, the control of the ruler and submission of the ruled 
were the core lawmaking purpose and the function of law. The crisis of faith of the 
Rule of Law also reflected the imperfect legitimacy of law and lawmaking in China. 
                                                        
1 The Constitution, article 1. 
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Formalism and instrumentalism imbedded in Chinese legalism and lawmaking 
should be responsible for the crisis of legitimacy. Chinese legalism also exposed an 
ideology of solving all kinds of social problems through formal laws without 
referring to moral norms.1 Law in those theories was described as the plain fact of 
social control and obligations. Governance was interpreted as Rule by Law rather 
than as a contract for automatic self-governance. The Chinese lawmaking mode 
could therefore be fit in with a typical ‘repressive law’ mode that introduced in Nonet 
and Selznick (1978).2  
5. In chapter five, I will go to Western jurisprudence for possible solutions for 
Chinese lawmaking problems. Western legal positivism was similar to Chinese 
legalism. In Chinese legalism, law was amoral official decisions and depended on the 
leadership’s policies. In Western legal positivism, law was the result of the 
authorities’ decision and the existence of law and legislature already justified its 
legality. The normative system of law or the legitimacy of law was self-sufficient; or 
depended on the rule of recognition or the existence of a particular political culture. 
Moral justifications were also not necessary in legal positivism. Legal positivism, 
however, led to the crisis of faith in law. Benthamnian utilitarianism influenced 
Chinese lawmaking and caused the problem of justification of law. Whether laws 
were ‘appropriate’ was reduced to a calculation of the collective good. People had an 
obligation to accept and follow law, and it caused that the legitimacy of law was 
unrelated to their rational choices. All were about the obedience to law. The 
legitimacy of lawmaking was reduced to the result that lawmaking could achieve.  
6. Different from legitimation theses in authoritarian theories, libertarian 
theories offered another route for justification. Hayekian dual conception of law was 
provided to interpret the crisis of trust in law. As a contrast to the recognition of the 
                                                        
1 Fuguo Wang and Qixiang Sun, On the Deficiencies and Contributing Factors of the Current ‘Pan-Legalism’ 
Trend of Thought, 当代‘泛法律主义’思潮的缺陷及成因, Journal of Fujian Education Institute, (2003), vol.4, 
pp.79-81. Yanying Zhu and Xiaobo Deng, An Analysis of the Influence of Modern Pan-lawism, 当代泛法律主
义思潮之分析 Journal of Yuxi Teachers College, vol.19, (2003), pp.48-51 
2 About repressive law, see Zenon Bankowski’s introduction in Living Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001,pp.61-62. 
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official law, the subjectivity of the common people was re-discovered. Spontaneous 
rules or customary law were defined as the real law in contrast with legislation. Law 
was the derivative of human interactions, rather than a plain fact of control and 
submission. Jeremy Waldron, another scholar who emphasized the process of 
lawmaking, argued that disagreements constructed the dignity of legislature. In their 
perspectives, law should not interfere actively with agencies’ self-decision-making 
progress. Interactional sociology and communicative reason also re-defined the 
social function of lawmaking: lawmaking should not be the instrument of control but 
an arena for discourse. The liberal contractualist theory therefore could support a 
communicative lawmaking mode. However, as I will discuss in chapter five, theories 
of Hayek and Waldron had their limits in Chinese contexts. Hayek did not discuss the 
possibility of communications between the official and the customary law; while 
Waldron avoided discussing the importance of agreements. Their theories thus could 
not be sufficient for a communicative theory of lawmaking for China. 
7. Another liberal contractualist theory represented by Luc J. Wintgens was 
different from Hayek and Waldron in his deliberation on an alternative social 
contract theory. The subjectivity of lawmakers was pre-supposed differently in 
libertarian theories. Following the Kantian metaphysical hypothesis, a moral subject 
was seen as a conceptual individual with unlimited free will. Legisprudence 
developed by Wintgens confirmed the fact of external limitations of a subject, but 
based justifications on arguing for conceptual individuals’ unlimited freedom. 
Legisprudence was therefore critical in describing reality while at the same time 
metaphysical in a construction of the legitimation chain of lawmaking. Realistic 
suggestions for lawmaking were interwoven with the metaphysical discussion of 
universal truth. Thus legisprudence was insufficient in solving problems in Chinese 
contexts, since the reality and the hypothesis in Chinese lawmaking were the 
opposite of those in legisprudence. I find it difficult to use the philosophical freedom 
as the principum of Chinese lawmaking because in a collective morality context like 
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China, there did not exist an isolated ‘conception of freedom’. I therefore choose 
another route for Chinese lawmaking: a discourse thesis. In this route of argument 
the subject was concrete and restricted. 
8. To argue for a discourse thesis of lawmaking, i.e., to defend that the process 
of lawmaking should include more elements of communication and negotiation, we 
would inevitably be involved into a differentiation between ‘autonomous law’ (where 
law is a differentiated institution capable of taming repression and protecting its own 
integrity) and ‘responsive law’ (where law facilitates the response to social needs and 
purposes)(both oppose to ‘repressive law’, where law is a servant of repressive 
power).
1
 The question would be rephrased like this: whether I would agree with the 
‘liberating lawmaking from politics’ as implied in Hayek’s argument for the free 
market; or would I agree with the ‘interactional sociology’ in Fuller’s the Morality of 
Law.
2
 As discussed in Bankowski’s book, in autonomous law, the independence of 
the judiciary needed a sharp line between legislative and judicial systems; 
‘procedure’ was the heart of law.
3
 I did intend to argue for procedural justice in my 
previous dissertation; however, I found it difficult in practice. The Chinese legal 
system did not involve a constitutional court or a judicial review procedure and the 
court system was not independent as in the Western legal system. Therefore ‘pure 
procedural justice’ was difficult to justify in the Chinese legal system.  
Another difficulty existed in conflicts between the requirement of substantive 
justice and the pursuit of procedural justice. The autonomous law could demand 
lawyers’ fidelity to the law. But it could not justify its requirement of people’s 
unconditional obedience to the law. Different from autonomous law, responsive law 
‘tries to get a kind of openness in institutions with its integrity by looking to social 
interests’.
4
 However, since in China law was from a non-interactive and strict 
                                                        
1 About the autonomous law, responsive law and repressive law, see Nonet and Zelznick (1978), quoted from 
Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, 
pp.61-62. 
2 See ‘interactional sociology’ from Fuller, The Morality of Law, Yale University, 1969, p.195. 
3 Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001,p.63. 
4 Ibid., p.65. 
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top-down lawmaking mode, rather than stemming from common people’s 
interactions, the idea of ‘responsive law’ was not ‘realistic’. We should then return to 
the starting point of ‘repressive law’. ‘Repressive law’ and ‘responsive law’ had 
essential differences. From the perspective of a ‘law-addressee’, repressive law 
meant primary heteronomy while responsive law embraced certain degrees of 
autonomy.  
Fuller’s suggestion of law as being interactive and communicative between 
citizens and between law receivers and law-givers therefore could contribute to the 
Chinese legal reform because old Chinese lawmaking mode emphasized too much on 
heteronomy, and was a lack of autonomy. If we agreed that law needs both of 
heteronomous and autonomous elements, we would agree to introduce more of 
autonomous elements into the Chinese mode. In Morality of Law, Fuller described 
law as interactive and communicative in contrast to law in positivism. In the 
communicative mode, the law-giver interacted with the law-receiver and therefore 
they no longer constituted an irreversible giver-taker relationship. They both 
contributed to the enterprise of ‘putting ourselves under the governance of rules’. As 
Bankowski emphasized, the concept ‘enterprise’ was important since ‘it has the 
connotations of a common journey, of something that we all take part in, more than 
just the technical rational framework for all of us to achieve our individual goods but 
becomes part of our common good as well.’
1
 In this sense, Fuller transformed an 
abstract and outside law system into a concrete and inside way of living, or what 
Bankowski specified, living lawfully. Chinese legal reform could benefit from such a 
specification of law and its meaning because the interactive theory would introduce a 
way to combine autonomy with heteronomy, and the inside morality with the outside 
rule. 
Arguing for a communicative lawmaking mode, we should not ignore the 
                                                        
1 Zenon Bankowski 'Bringing the Outside in: The Ethical Life of legal Institutions' in T Gizbert-Studnicki and 




communicative reason or communicative rationality deliberated by Habermas.
1
 
Communicative reason was employed in this thesis to interpret the possibility of a 
shift from a subject-object lawmaking mode to an inter-subjective mode. Lawmaking 
in the subject-object mode was a purposive action, which was supported by 
instrumental reason. In an inter-subjective mode, however, lawmaking becomes a 
purposive and interactive action, which transfers an instrumental reason to 
communicative reason. In Habermas’ discourse theory, what the idea of 
communicative ethics entails is something more than a mere respect for the 
autonomy of will formation and a public check on the imbalances of power. 
Communication is an approach to guarantee participation. In this thesis, Habermas’s 
communicative reason is positive to the Chinese lawmaking practice because it offers 
a possibility of applying democratic processes to the codification of laws without 
excluding morality from law arbitrarily.  
The principle of discourse implies that the validity of a decision is related to a 
‘rational consensus’. And norms are valid only if those affected can agree to them as 
participants in a rational consensus (Habermas 1998:138). The legitimacy of law is 
accordingly based on a communicative mechanism. In this thesis, the discourse 
principle is employed to rectify the inequality caused in the old Chinese top-down 
and non-interactive mode. I will discuss how and why the old lawmaking mode 
generated and tolerated inequality. I will argue that communicative interactivity can 
contribute to social justice and should be introduced to Chinese new lawmaking 
mode. 
 
CHINESE CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH ON LAWMAKING 
Chinese literatures on lawmaking seldom discussed the legitimacy of legislature, 
or the procedural justice of the legislative progress. Plenty books referred to the 
                                                        
1 JÜrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communictative Action, Thomas McCathy translated, Beacon Press, 1984. 
see also Michel Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato edited, Habermas on law and democracy: critical exchanges, 
Berkeley: Univerisity of California Press, 1998. 
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Studies of Legislation (Li Fa Xue 立法学). They were, however, descriptive works 
about the legislative sources and techniques.
1
 Before 1990s, books about 
comparative legislative studies, socialistic lawmaking, and studies on legislative 
power and procedures discussed Chinese lawmaking from different perspectives.
2
 A 
synthetic monograph on lawmaking appeared later as a branch of knowledge called 
Li Fa Xue.
 3
 Since then, the focus on socialistic lawmaking shifted to the discussion 
of the basic concepts of lawmaking.
4
 A historic review of the development of 
lawmaking was also a part of Li Fa Xue.
5
 Li Fa Xue included a comparative study of 
legislatures as well.
6
 Discussion on the legislative values and problems of 
globalization and lawmaking was a recent trend of Li Fa Xue.
7
 Other works on 
Chinese lawmaking were either specializing in comments on the legislative law (Liu 
Xin, 2008), or discussing the creation of specific branches of law (Wan Qigang, 
2006).
8
 Chinese texts books of lawmaking were similar in contents and structures 
and all of them were descriptive in the principles, institutions and procedures.
9
 None 
of these books focused on a general jurisprudential argument of the legitimacy of 
lawmaking.  
Related articles were either about specific branches of laws or local lawmaking 
practices.
10
 Few articles discussed the topic of legitimate lawmaking.
1
 The concept 
                                                        
1 Representative works are: Hehai Liu and Yufu Li ed., Li Fa Xue, (立法学 A Study of Lawmaking), (2001) 
Beijing, Zhongguo Jiancha publishing house 中国检察出版社,; Anliang Gu, Li Fa Xue, (1993), Beijing, Law 
Press,; Keyu Qiao and Xinyao Wu, Li Fa Xue, (1993) Beijing, China University of Political Science and Law 
Press; Jianfei Li, Li Fa Xue, (1992) Chongqing, Chongqing publishing house. 
2 Wangsheng Zhou, A Study of Chinese Lawmaking, (1988), Beijing, Beijing University Press, p.12. 
3 Wangsheng Zhou, To Set Up A Study on Chinese Socialistic Lawmaking, Law Review, (1988), vol.6, pp. 21-26. 
4 Wangsheng Zhou, On Legislation, (1994), Beijing, Beijing University Press. see also Zhou Wangsheng, (We) 
Should Pay Attention to the Basic Concepts of Lawmaking, Law Review, (1994), vol.3, pp.1-7. 
5 Wangsheng Zhou, 50 Years Lawmaking of China 1949-1999, Legislation Review of China, (2000), Beijing, 
Law Press, vol.1, pp.1-22. 
6 Lin Li, A Comparative Study on Legislatures, (1991), Beijing, People Daily Press. 
7 Lin Li, Lifa Lilun Yu Zhidu, (立法理论与制度)，(2005), Beijing, China Legal Publishing House, chapters 1 
and 9. 
8 Xin Liu, Legislative Law, (2008), Beijing, Beijing University Press; Wan Qigang, Lifa Linian Yu Shijian, 
(2006), Beijing, Beijing University Press, chapters 17 and 18. 
9 See Liyu Zhu and Shuguang Zhang, Li Fa Xue, 立法学, (2001), Beijing, China Renmin University Press; 
Wangsheng Zhou, 立法学，(2006) Beijing, Law Press; Huang Wenyi, 立法学, (2008), Beijing, High Education 
Press; and Zhang Yonghe, 立法学, (2009), Beijing, Law Press. 
10 Articles about the creation of branches of law include Xiaoming Dong, A Study on Lawmaking of Civil Public 
Welfare Lawsuit, MA thesis of Qingdao University(2009); Yong Pi, On Cyber-Crime Legislation in China, Hebei 
Law Science, (2009), vol.27, pp.49-57; Guoming Du, Legislative Studies of Quality and Safety of Agricultural 
Products, (2008) , Hebei Law Science, vol.26, pp. 107-111; Wanyi Zhao, Dawu Hu, A Study of Legislation of 
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of legitimacy was analyzed by referring to Western theories exclusively.
2
 Or 
traditional Chinese orthodoxy of legislation was analyzed by referring to 
Confucianism exclusively.
3
 The relationship between government control and the 
free market as a justification for economic lawmaking was discussed.
4
  
Contemporary Chinese law’s legitimation, however, was not debated.  
Even on the websites of three major domestic research institutions of legislation, 
we had limited resources of lawmaking.
 5
 On the website of the Peiking Legislation 
Centre, courses of lawmaking and fruits of research were ‘in construction’; abstracts 
of the articles of the four volumes of Legislation Review of China were reduced to 
titles and subtitles. On the website of the Theoretic Legal Study of Jilin University, 
the names of the researchers, topics they were doing and the fruits of their research 
were vacant. And there was only one page of introduction of the subject on the Jilin 
website. The best website of the three research centers was literally the Xiamen 
University research centre, on which the research fruits, including translations of 
Western researchers’ works, were published. However, six of the seven researches 
did not specialize in lawmaking and the sixteen published articles were not sufficient 
to cover the wide range of the subject.  
The above facts showed that contemporary articles, monographs, text books 
and research centers on Chinese lawmaking did not focus on theoretical debates on 
the legitimacy of lawmaking, including topics about people’s recognition of law, 
democracy and representativeness. The moral ground for justification of the state 
                                                                                                                                                             
Protection of Credit Right, (2008), Modern Law Science, vol.30, pp.165-171; Min Niu, Jie Jiang, The Legislative 
Study on the Law on Protecting Against Weather Disasters, Future and Development, (2008), vol.29, pp.45-47. 
Articles about local lawmaking practices include: Guanghui Wang, the Basic Principles of Local Lawmaking, 
Studies in Law and Business, 法商研究，(1996), vol.6, pp.81-85; Zhong Yu, Concept and Idea of City 
Lawmaking, Journal of Sichuan University (Humanities and Social Science) , (2002), vol.1, pp.124-129; Zhijian 
Liu, A Study of Creative Local Lawmaking, People’s Congress Studying, 人大研究，(2001), vol.8, pp. 18-21.  
1 Only three articles are about the legitimacy of lawmaking in my search of articles in journals, MA and PhD 
resources from 1979 to 2010 in China National Knowledge Internet. 
2 Gang Cao, the Legitimacy of Legislation and its Rationalization, Journal of Remin University of China, (2002), 
vol.4, pp.85-90. 
3 Gang Cao, Royal Legislation and its Moral Limits, A Look at the Orthodoxy of Legislation in History, Ethics 
Research, (2003), vol.2, pp.58-62. 
4 Jianshun Yang, On the Legitimacy of Legislation of Economic Regulations, Jurist Review, (2008), vol.5, pp. 
48-59. 
5 The three research centers websites are: http://w3.pku.edu.cn/academic/legislation/index_Chinese.htm; 
http://www.legal-theory.org/?mod=info&act=view&id=269, and http://amoylegis.xmu.edu.cn/.  
 
 30 
authority was largely neglected in the academic discourse. This thesis aims at filling 
this gap in the research of Chinese lawmaking. It is a critical but also constructive 
study aiming at providing a realistic and practical route for common Chinese 
people’s participation in lawmaking. Conflicts between different social classes 
increased and became acute in recent years. This project therefore has a positive 
meaning to Chinese future legislative reform. 
This thesis is based on an analysis of historical literatures as well as recent 
statistics, so that it differs from traditional jurisprudence that exclusively focuses on 
theoretic arguments. The method of logical deductions and analysis of empirical 
cases would be employed to support my arguments. Contemporary Chinese 
lawmaking had realistic problems in legitimation of the authority, procedure and 
purpose. In both of domestic and international research, Chinese theories were rarely 
studied in a topic of legitimation. Descriptions of Chinese historical and 
contemporary lawmaking reality and problems as well as interpretations of the 
ancient Chinese literatures of lawmaking were also rare in English literatures. This 
thesis thus provides a literature bridge for both the Western and domestic scholars to 
understand and study Chinese lawmaking.  
  
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
My argument for interactive and cooperative Chinese lawmaking is constructed 
in eight chapters, including the introductive first chapter, six core chapters and the 
last chapter of the conclusion. The second chapter aims to analyze the major 
characteristics and problems of the contemporary Chinese lawmaking. In that chapter, 
the significance of economic and administrative lawmaking will be analyzed. 
Macro-economic policies, the efficient lawmaking purpose and bureaucratic 
lawmaking characteristics will be criticized with the recognition of the requirements 
of improving common people’s livelihoods, democratic participation and 
representation as well as individual rights. The third chapter aims to interpret the 
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background legitimation theses of contemporary lawmaking as well as to offer a 
critical discussion of the design and purpose of those theses. It will interpret the route 
from Confucianism to Chinese Marxism, to picture the characteristic features of 
Chinese legitimation theses. Four justifications of the contemporary dominant theory 
of legitimation will be expanded and criticized. In chapter four, Chinese legalism as a 
background ideology of Chinese lawmaking will be discussed. I will also disclose the 
similarities and differences between Chinese legalism and Western legalism in that 
chapter. Chapters five and six provide comments and critiques on Western 
lawmaking theories represented by utilitarianism (Bentham), liberalism (Hayek), 
structuralism (Waldron) and soft legalism (Wintgens). Bentham’s theory was widely 
accepted in China since the modern legislative reform started in late 1900s and it had 
deeply influenced Chinese legitimation of lawmaking since then. The contemporary 
Chinese lawmaking mode and its purpose also reflected the principle of utility, 
though in the perspective of Chinese socialism. As a contrast, Hayek’s theory was a 
recent popular topic in China which had increased Chinese scholars’ interests in a 
debate of liberalistic legislation. Chinese academies were not familiar with Waldron’s 
and Wintgens’ jurisprudence of lawmaking. A critique on legisprudence will be 
especially expanded in chapter six because the discussion of the conceptual freedom, 
equality, social contract, principles of justifications and the legitimation chain were 
core to Western legitimation of lawmaking, but alien in Chinese legitimation. A 
Chinese translation on legisprudence
1
 regretfully did not lead to a thorough debate 
of the argumentations in China. Relying on the analysis of their works on lawmaking, 
and my criticisms of Chinese realities and difficulties that discussed in previous 
chapters, in the final two chapters I conclude that a communicative lawmaking mode 
can transform the ‘closed’ Chinese legal system to a more ‘open’ system. 
Communicative lawmaking is believed to make a positive contribution to Chinese 
legal reform.  
                                                        
1 Baomin Wang trans., Luc J. Wintgens Legisprudence as a New Theory of Legislation, 作为一种新的立法理
论的立法法理学, Journal of Comparative Law, 2008, vol.4, pp.144-160. 
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In short, I argue for a communicative structure for Chinese lawmaking because 
that would make the ‘closed’ legal system more ‘open’ to the people, and thereby 
contribute to the legitimacy of law by ensuring that some laws are created and helped 
by people, rather than by the authority exclusively. Lawmaking should be an 
enterprise that absorbs people’s input. This would go against the grain of the 
top-down legislation that is deeply embedded in Chinese legal theories and practices. 
I analyze and criticize Chinese theories and realities to initiate a new theoretical 
research on legislation in China. Western theories are employed to provide an 
‘outside’ perspective of Chinese lawmaking mode. After my analysis of Chinese 
realities and theories, and through a study of contemporary Western jurisprudence on 
legislation, I structure my argument through an analysis-criticism-construction 
sequence. My thesis is a new theoretical study of Chinese lawmaking. It also 
contributes to a deepened study and concretization of the theory of a righteous life 
under the law. Through the empirical and theoretical study of the Chinese lawmaking, 
this thesis attempts to avoid the mistake of jumping directly from legislation to 
legality. It uses the theory of legality as the background and base of argument rather 
than reducing a study of legislation to legality, and is thus different from other 




CHINESE CONTEMPORARY LAWMAKING:  
REALITY AND PROBLEMS 
 
——The English word ‘cosmos’ came from Greek 
‘kosmos’, which originally means ‘order’, in contrast with ‘chaos’. 
Cosmos was not only the result of stepping off chaos, but the process of 
transforming chaos to order. It was a verb also: kosmos means the 
action of lightening the darkness. Without light and order, cosmos did 
not exist. 




I aim to introduce the reality and problems of contemporary Chinese lawmaking 
in this chapter. This chapter is the empirical background and starting point of my 
thesis. It initiates my research interests on an argument for a communicative 
lawmaking mode. I will analyze why the current mode is not a communicative mode. 
I believe the ‘old’ mode is problematic in softening the tension between the ‘inside’ 
and ‘outside’ of the legislature. In this chapter, I will disclose realistic and theoretical 
problems that exist in Chinese lawmaking.  
At the beginning of this task, I would like to introduce Chinese legal system as 
the background information. Contemporary Chinese legal system is constituted by 
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the following major ‘branches of law’: the constitutional law, administrative law, 
civil and commercial law, economic law, criminal law, labor law, social security law, 
law for protection of natural resources and environment, and the laws of civil，
criminal and administrative procedures. Until March 2010, Chinese legal system was 
constituted by 231 laws, more than 690 administrative regulations, and more than 
8,800 local decrees.
1
 Apart from that, hundreds of administrative local rules, 
autonomous decrees, special decrees and the international treaties that China has 
acceded to were also sources of law. Among 231 basic Chinese laws, one third were 
administrative laws and more than one fifth were economic laws (see figure 2.1). 
Administrative and economic laws were more than 50% of the total laws; with 
regulations together were already more than 75% of the total (see figure 2.2).
2
 
Contemporary Chinese lawmaking therefore gave an obvious priority to 
administrative and economic laws. This characteristic of contemporary Chinese 
lawmaking was caused by the economic reform since 1979. As I will discuss later, it 
led to social and economic inequality. 
 
CHINESE CONTEMPORARY LAWMAKING  
Since 1949, China had 62 years of history of legislation. Economic policy was 
not obviously prior to other goals in the first 30 years (1949-1979). Economic laws 
were not acknowledged by Chinese scholars until the economic and legal reform 
started from 1979.
3
 Legislations for economic laws appeared since then.
4
 Economic 
laws were not officially recognized important until the Chinese economic reform 
                                                        
1 Bangguo Wu’s ‘Report on the Work of the Government about Administrative Regulations and Local Decrees’ 
made at the third session of the eleventh NPC, 09 March 2010. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-03/09/content_13133496.htm ; see also 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/zgzx/2009npc/2009-03/09/content_7556715.htm  
2 Numbers of laws and regulations, see the Legislative Affairs Work Committee of SCNPC ed., Statistics of 
Legislation of People’s Republic of China, Chinese Democracy and Rule of Law publishing house, (2008), 
pp.490-570. 
3 Wenhua Liu, Economic Laws Are the Result of the Thought of Economic Reform, Beijing, Juridical Science 
Journal, (1999), vol.2, pp.4-5. 
4 Handong Wu ed., General Theories of Law, Beijing, Beijing University Press, (2008), p.384. 
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under Xiaoping Deng’s leadership.
 1
 From 1949 to 1979, socialistic planning 
economy was the major policy of China.
 
During Deng’s decades, Western market 
economy was firstly officially acknowledged. Deng confirmed the meaning of 
market forces:  
‘Planning and market forces are not the essential difference between socialism 
and capitalism. A planned economy is not the definition of socialism, because there 
is planning under capitalism; the market economy happens under socialism too. 
Planning and market forces are both ways of controlling economic activity.’2  
 
Chinese lawmaking shifted from planning economy to market economics in 
Deng’s reform. The economic reform caused an increase of economic laws directly.
 
The amount of economic laws was continuously increasing. It reached to the peak in 
the period 1993-1997 (see figure 2.3). Average speedy rates of the increase for the 
period were 49%.3 
 
Fig.2.1 Basic laws of China until March 2010 
 constitutional civil 
and 
commercial 
administrative economic others total 
 no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % 
laws 39 16.88 33 14.29 80 34.63 54 23.38 25 10.82 231 
regulations 13 1.88 47 6.81 251 36.38 308 44.64 71 10.29 690 
total 52 5.65 80 8.69 331 35.94 362 39.31 96 10.42 921 
 
                                                        
1 Deng Xiaoping, the leader of the CPC after Mao’s age, served as the paramount leader of China from 1978 to 
the early 1990s. Deng was named as ‘the great designer’ or ‘the general designer’ of the economic and legal 
reform, see Wang Xiangping, Why did the International News Media named Deng Xiaoping the general designer 
of China, CCP’s news, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-02/19/content_10847245.htm. 
2 See Deng’s talks in http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/69113/69116/5396465.html. From 15th February to 22nd 
March 1991, Shanghai Liberation Daily published three editorials of Deng’s speech in Shanghai, and discussed 
Deng’s understanding of the essential differences between capitalism and socialism. Deng’s future speech in 
January and February of 1991 was published in Shenzhen Special Zone Daily and caused nationwide discussion 
on the economic reform.  





Fig.2.2 Components of basic laws and regulations of China until March 2010 






















































Administrative rules were the major body of Chinese legal system. The 
dominant role of administrative laws in Chinese legal system was rooted in the 
tradition. One typical example of ancient Chinese codes was the Tang Dynasty Code, 
Tang Lu, or Tang Lu Shu Yi,
1
 or Yong Hui Lu Shu, promulgated in A.D. 563, which 
summarized the achievements of previous codes derived from the anterior dynasties.
2
 
Tang Code was based on public law primarily including administrative law, criminal 
law and procedural law.
3
 In addition, Tang Dynasty had series of mature 
administrative law codes, i.e., Tang Liu Dian (six codes of administrative law).
4
 
Laws in Tang Dynasty were also the paradigm of Chinese traditional laws. They 
influenced the lawmaking characteristics of the subsequent empires greatly.
5
 From 
the Tang Dynasty to the Ch’ing dynasty (from the first to the last empire of ‘old’ 
China), the form and content of subsequent codes did not alter much. The significant 
role of administrative law was a representative characteristic of Chinese legal 
system.  
However, administrative law’s dominant role disappeared at the beginning of 
the ‘new’ China that started from 1949. The power of the administration was 
relatively weak during 1900 to 1949 because of the chaos caused by wars and the 
unstable governments. Administrative laws were one sixth of the legal system of the 
Republic of China during 1900 to 1949.
6
 After 1949, administrative laws and 
                                                        
1 Tang Lu Shu Yi is combined with the law (Tang Lu, the law of the Tang Dynasty) and the legal interpretations 
(Shu is the legal interpretations of the law, Yi is the explanations of Shu). The Tang Dynasty Code had twelve 
sections (Pian), thirty tomes and five hundred and two items. Sections include: ‘the general rules’ (Ming Li, 57 
items); the safety of the empire (Wei Jin, 33 items); the setup of national institutions and offices (Zhi Zhi, 59 
items); residence and marriages (Hu Hun, 46 items); livestock stalls and storage of weaponry (Jiu Ku, 28 items); 
the master of the army and the construction of public works (Shan Xing, 24 items); theft and robbery (Ze Dao, 53 
items); unlawful fights and litigant proceedings (Dou Song, 60 items); fraud and forgery (Zha Wei, 27 items); 
‘other items’ (Za Lv, 62 items); the arrest of escaped criminals or soldiers (Bu Wang, 18 items); and the rules of 
trial and  prison management (Duan Yu, 34 items). 
2 Shude Cheng, Laws of Nine Dynasties, Beijing, Zhonghua Book Company, (1927), p.3. 
3 In contrast, the famous coetaneous code, Corpus Juris Civilis (529-534), was based primarily on private law. 
4 Tang Liu Dian, 唐六典, Beijing, Zhonghua Book Company (1983). 
5 Shude Cheng, Laws of Nine Dynasties, Zhonghua Book Company, 1927, p.3. 
6 In this period, new laws were codified in a short period of time to adjust the urgent need to learn from the west 
and be strong: the Regius Constitutional Precis 1908 (the first constitutional law of China), the Nineteen 
Constitutional Credendum 1911, the Existing Criminal Law of the Qing Dynasty 1910 (it is actually a re-edition 
of the Code of the Qing Dynasty), the New Criminal Law of the Qing Dynasty 1911 (the first modern criminal 
law of China), the Draft of the Civil Law of the Qing Dynasty 1911 (using the German Civil Law as reference), 
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regulations increased for a short period, and then the amount dropped drastically 
because of the unstable political situation during 1966 to 1976, in the Great Cultural 
Revolution movement. In 1958, the amount of promulgated administrative laws and 
regulations was 147, and then most of them were abolished and dropped to 50 in 
1960, 8 in 1966, 1 in 1975, 0 from 1966 to 1974, and 0 in 1976.
1
  
After the Great Cultural Revolution period, from 1978 the amount of 
administrative laws and regulations had been continuously rising and reached to 921 
in 2010. The economic reform re-stressed effective administrative power in law. 
From Chinese modern history we can see that political stability and economic 
development contributed to the strengthening of administrative power. The free 
market economy was acknowledged and accepted in Chinese law gradually. 
Macro-policies and administrative laws in turn promoted the development of the 
economy. From the 5
th
 to the 8
th
 National People’s Congresses, after nineteen years 
economic reform, administrative regulations made by the State Council were over 
750; local decrees made by local people’s congresses exceeded 5,300; rules made by 
committees and ministries were more than 8,000; and local government regulations 
exceeded 17,000.
2
 Administrative and economic laws were obviously increased.  
Some problems appeared, however: Over speed lawmaking caused legislative 
inflation and imprudent legislation; bureaucratic lawmaking ignored common 
people’s participation in the lawmaking procedure; the legitimacy of administrative 
legislation had conflicts with democracy. In the 8
th
 National People’s Congress 
(hereinafter NPC), on 28 February 1995, seven laws were passed in one day. During 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Draft of the Commercial Law 1908, the Law of the Framework of Da Li Yuan ( the supreme court ) 1906, and 
the Law of the Framework of the Court 1910 appeared successively. After the Qing Empire being rapidly 
overthrown by revolutionists because of the desperate diplomatic political situation of the time, another new legal 
system was instituted by the Nanjin Government in 1927, named as a six-law-system, which contained six major 
branches of law: constitutional law, criminal law, civil law, commercial law, civil procedure law, and the criminal 
procedure law. In less than 30 years, in 1949, the new government of the whole country announced the 
abolishment of the six codes made by the Nanjin Government. 
1 Jun Feng, A Brief Summary of The Three Stages of Development of the Administrative Laws in China, selected 
from Yong Xia, Guangxing Zhang, Jun Feng, Mingyuan Wang and Yuzhang Wu, etc., the Report on the 
Development of Chinese Rule of Law 2003, Social Science Academic Press, (2005), the general report, p.10.  
2 Jun Yu, The Introduction of the Cost-benefit Ratio of Law, Journal of Gansu Social Science, (1999), vol.5, 
pp.62-72. see also Chuntian Jiang, A Study on Contemporary Chinese Social Transformation and Legislative 
Transformation, (2007) MA thesis of East China University of Political Science and Law, p.16. 
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that year, NPC and the Standing Committee of the NPC’s (hereinafter SCNPC) 
average rate for passing a law was thirteen-day; the State Council made a regulation 
in six days.
1
 Large amounts of laws were made during the short period of time, 
which caused a limitation for a relatively prudent deliberation. Legislative inflation 
although did not necessarily mean low quality of law, the over speed lawmaking 
caused that some laws, regulations, decrees and rules were in conflicts with each 
other.
2
 The courts were also in a dilemma situation applying conflicting laws. Since 
conflicting laws should not be applied, part of those laws became invalid. It was a 
waste of the legislative resources. It also weakened the authority and credibility of 
law. Executive institutions faced difficulties too. Large amounts of new laws were 
made in a short period and left them with limited time to prepare for changes. Their 
understanding of the law could not keep up with the speed of lawmaking, not to 
speak to support them to execute the law accurately. Conflicts also existed between 
macro-economic policy and common people’s livelihoods; between efficient 
lawmaking and democratic representation system; and between bureaucratic 
lawmaking and individual rights. 
 
MARCOR-ECONOMIC POLICY 
‘Keep economic construction as the central task’ was written in The Legislation 
Law of the People’s Republic of China 2000 (hereinafter the LLC2000). This rule 
implied that legislative work should serve the aim of economic development. In 
Chinese Legislation Law, lawmaking was a safeguard measure for macro-economic 
reform. Chinese lawmaking emphasized on the state rather than on individuals. The 
interest of the whole country was prior to that of the individual. Collective interests 
substituted individuals’ diverse interests. It thus shaped a bureaucratic and utilitarian 
                                                        
1 Bin Wang, The Market Economic Legal System is Becoming Complete, Legal Daily, 19 October 1995.  
2 In the last section of this chapter, cases will be analyzed to disclose conflicts between laws. An obvious 
example was that The Regulation Governing Building Demolition and Resettlement 2001 was in conflict with the 
Constitution and the Property Law of China 2007. 
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lawmaking. It became a problem to balance the macro-economic policy and specific 
individual rights. 
Absolute equality, i.e., egalitarianism was once the dominating ideology of 
China. In 1958, the People’s Communes appeared and developed rapidly in China. At 
that time, there was a popular saying ‘communism is the heaven; the People’s 
Communes are the bridge to heaven’.
1
 In the system of People’s Communes, five 
hundred million peasants in a million villages had free meals.
2
 Egalitarianism, 
however, caused universal poverty in China. From 1958 to 1959, Hubei, Guangdong, 
Hebei, Shangdong, and Henan provinces appeared widespread famine one after 
another. The national famine that happened during 1958 to 1961 was one of the 
serious famine disasters in human history. It caused thirty million deaths (Peng, 1987; 
Ashton, 1984). Some scholars believed that the great famine was caused by the 
decrease of crops and natural disasters including drought and flood (Lin Yifu, 1990). 
Nobelist Amartya Sen argued that unreasonable mode of distribution was the 
significant cause.
3
 Xiaoping Deng also linked the cause of national poverty to 
egalitarianism: ‘We used to practice egalitarianism, with everyone eating from the 
same big pot. In fact, that practice meant common backwardness and poverty, which 
caused suffering’.4 And Deng believed that we should abandon egalitarianism:‘The 
reason we should not practice egalitarianism was that it would never be possible to 
raise the people’s standard of living and stimulate their initiative’.5  
A theory to reconcile macro-economic policy with individual requirements was 
proposed in 1983. In the new theory, it was reasonable for some people to become 
                                                        
1 Laiqing Wang, The Rise and Decline of the First People’s Communes, Centuries Appearance, 纪实之窗，
(2010), vol.1, p.35. 
2 Yi Xin, A Historic Examination of ‘Great Leap’ and People’s Commune, Hebei Academic Journal, (2008), 
vol.28, p.74.  
3 Ziying Fan and Lingjie Meng, New Explanations and Test to Sen’s Entitlements: Evidence from China, 
Economic Studies, 经济研究, (2006), vol.8, pp.104-113. Xin Zi Peng., Demographic Consequences of the Great 
Leap Forward in China’s Provinces, Population and Development Review, (1987), vol.13, pp. 639-670. Ashton, 
B., K. Hill, A. Pizza & R. Zeinz, Famine in China, 1958-1961, Population and Development Review, (1984) 
vol.10. no.4; Yifu Lin, Fang Cai, and Zhou Li 中国的奇迹：发展战略与经济改革，(1994), Shanghai, Sanlian 
publishing house. 




richer than other people. In Deng’s economic and legal reform, economic inequality 
was permitted: 
 ‘The purpose of allowing some regions and some people to 
become prosperous before others is to enable all of them to prosper 
eventually. We have to make sure that there is no polarization of 
society—that is what socialism means’.
1
 ‘When some people and 
some regions get rich first, others will be brought along and through 
this process, common prosperity of the entire population will be 
gradually achieved…this is our policy. And it will be the 
responsibility for the first prosperous regions to bring along other 
less developed places.’
2
 ‘I have consistently maintained that some 
people and some regions should be allowed to prosper before others, 
always with the goal of common prosperity.’3  
In this ‘let some people become rich first’ theory, the purpose (the ends) was the 
common prosperity. The means was allowing or confirming economic inequality. 
The idea of economic inequality was officially acceptable after the People’s 
Commune movement. Deng criticized the People’s Commune movement and stated 
that if equality meant everyone was suffering in poverty, it was worse than (partial) 
inequality. He also proposed that when China would realize the common prosperity, 
economic inequality was acceptable and necessary for the development of productive 
forces. 
The realization of common prosperity was proposed in three steps: Firstly, to 
allow part of the people become rich. Secondly, to let the rich people bring along 
others and help others getting rich. And thirdly, to realize the whole nation’s common 
prosperity. From recent thirty years reform, Chinese lawmaking since 1979 had 
contributed to the first step of Deng’s theory: Some persons and some regions of 
China became rich. But how to implement the second step, i.e., let the rich bring 
along the poor, by law? Was it right to let the law play an active role of adjusting 
people’s wealth in the second step?  
                                                        
1 See Deng’s speech in meeting with a delegation including senior American entrepreneurs organized by Time 
Inc. on 23 October 1985. Deng Xiaoping, Selected Words of Deng Xiaoping, Beijing, the People’s Publishing 
House, (2001) vol.3, p. 142. 
2 See Deng’s speech in his interview with Prime Minister David Lange of New Zealand on 28 March 1986. ibid. 
3 See Deng’s talk in his visit at Tianjin during 19 to 21 of August 1986. ibid. 
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In the beginning of the economic reform, Deng’s theory affirmed free market’s 
positive function and criticized the planned economy. Law was put into a passive 
position when individuals’ livelihoods were concerned. In the first step, individual 
autonomy was the driving force for becoming rich. The legal system was designed to 
protect such autonomic self-arrangement of life. If in the second step, the value of 
individual autonomy were still in the core of lawmaking, i.e., law should remain 
silent in economic inequality, the adjustment of social wealth therefore would rely on 
the rich persons’ moral obligation.  
Following this logic, law should not interfere into the rich person’s right of 
donation; and rich persons could refuse to assist the poor since they did not have a 
legal obligation to. In this perspective, the second step of Deng’s reform should rely 
on the kindness of the rich. Was such morality of the rich persons what Deng’s theory 
about? At least from Deng’s literatures, it was not obvious. To Deng, economic 
inequality was a means to the end, (common prosperity as the end). Deng criticized 
extreme inequality and polarization of society.
1
 In his design of the new structure of 
the society he stressed that ‘it will be the responsibility for the first prosperous 
regions to bring along other less developed places.’
2
 How to understand the concept 
of ‘responsibility’ in this statement? Considering Deng’s ‘partial rich’ suggestion 
with his purpose of ‘common prosperity’ (or ‘collective prosperity’), the 
responsibility should be an obligation for those who became richer earlier than others. 
The reason for the obligation was in a ‘tacit consent’ of Deng’s economic reform 
design. Those who became richer first were supposed to have signed a contract with 
the nation: They would become the most beneficial group from the economic reform 
and they would possess more wealth than others, so they had an obligation to assist 
with the nation to improve other people’s livelihoods. This tacit contract did not refer 
to specific persons but offered a macro-environment for gathering wealth through 
                                                        
1 See Deng’s speech in meeting with a delegation including senior American entrepreneurs organized by Time 
Inc. on 23 October 1985. Deng Xiaoping, Selected Words of Deng Xiaoping, Beijing, the People’s Publishing 
House, (2001) vol.3, p. 142. 




The responsibility therefore was an obligation for the first prosperous group to 
bring along others. The second step of economic reform therefore should shift from 
exclusive autonomy to a theory of obligation. The rich persons should have an 
obligation to assist the nation to achieve the purpose of common prosperity. Chinese 
theorists also tended to justify this interpretation. From the perspective of productive 
forces, the first step in Deng’s theory emphasized the emancipation and development 
of productive forces. The second step of Deng’s justification should focus on 
elimination of exploitation and polarization. Both the first and second steps should be 
understood as means. The end was always common prosperity.
1
 Wealth possessed by 
few rich persons could not bring socialism. The economic reform was not for some 
persons but ‘the people’, i.e., the whole population. Therefore, the wealth should be 
re-distributed between the rich and the poor to realize common prosperity.  
From the perspective of social justice, the common prosperity should include 
both economic development and social justice.
2
 Common prosperity in this 
perspective was not circumscribed as a purely economic concept. It should contain 
values of justice. In a humanistic point of view, Deng’s purpose was 
people-oriented.
3
 Injustice caused by extreme polarization was unacceptable. 
Common prosperity referred to the prosperity of the people rather than few rich 
persons. Economic inequality should not justify other kinds of inequality. If common 
prosperity were interpreted as an advanced equality in the end, economic polarization 
became a temporary stage and should be eliminated in the end. 
The tacit consent to the economic reform and the lawmaking related practices 
therefore should subject to a condition: those who become richer should have an 
obligation of bringing along the others. However, we were uncertain of the particular 
persons who would become richer than others. Should the obligation of assisting the 
                                                        
1 Mengqing Lin, A Study of Deng Xiaoping’s Theory and the Practice of Common Prosperity, Academic Forum, 
(2009), no.3, pp.5-8. 
2 Chaohui Jiang, the Principle of Justice in A Socialistic Harmonious Society, Studies of Theories of Mao Zedong 
and Deng Xiaoping, vol.3, (2006), pp.41-46. 
3 Zhenhua Zhang, A Study of Deng Xiaoping’s Theory, Journal of Xihua University, (2004), no.3, pp.18-19. 
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poor be determined? A moral philosopher may disagree with this legalizing 
(verrechilichung, 法律化) of the moral obligation of assistance. In his perspective, 
‘help’ should always be offered voluntarily to others. People (the rich in this case) 
should not be forced to do good to others. This was a concern of individual free will. 
Individual freedom and autonomy were good excuses for the rich to evade their 
responsibilities: as long as they did not harm others, they did not have to care about 
other people because it was not their legal obligations. ‘Freedom’ and ‘autonomy’ 
was employed to confirm the result of the economic reform (some people became 
rich earlier than others). They were, however, against the reason for the economic 
reform (common prosperity). If the rich refuse to comply with their duty of 
assistance of the poor people, the legitimation of the supposed contract (the 
economic reform) became problematic. The rich person’s promise or tacit consent to 
the first contract (a contract for common prosperity) was broken. The first contract 
then was no longer in force. An ‘individual-interest-oriented’ contract (the second 
contract) substituted the first ‘collective-interest-oriented’ contract.  
The second contract, however, was from the beginning an unjust and unfair 
contract, even in the name of individual freedom and autonomy. The rich had already 
accepted the conditions of the first contract, and obtained great profits because of the 
first contract. Their wealth did not come exclusively from their own efforts. The 
society and other people also offered the macro-environment to assist their success as 
well. The poor and the rich in the second contract had originally equal economic 
status when they sign the first contract. But they (especially the poor) probably 
would not sign the contract (i.e., let some became richer first) if the richer broke their 
promises. Without the support of the majority, the economic reform could not be 
realized and legitimized at all. The common people’s agreement of the first contract 
was the starting point of the legitimation of the economic reform. Therefore few rich 
persons should be abided by their commitment to the first contract: to assist the less 
rich persons to develop. The economic reform was not aiming at the wealth of few 
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rich persons but prosperity of the whole people. The economic reform was not 
individual-oriented directly: It was driven by the intention to improve the poverty of 
the whole country in the beginning. It was designed to maximize the people-nation 
combined interests. Collective interests were prior to individuals, especially when 
they were in conflicts. The obligation of the rich to assist the collective in this tacit 
consent was therefore stricter than a moral obligation like ‘help’. 
‘If our policy results in polarization, our reform fails’, Deng said.
1
 However, 
the polarization started to take shape. Statistics showed the effects of Deng’s 
economic reform: According to the Boston Consulting Group (BCG)’s report on 
Chinese Wealth Markets 2005, in China the degree of wealth centralization was very 
high. Less than 0.5% families possessed over 60% of the whole nation’s personal 
wealth. Within this rich group, 70% of wealth was held by the few families with 
more than 5 million dollar assets. It meant that 99.95% family held two fifth of the 
total wealth of the society. In addition, those rich Chinese families held large 
amounts of cash: 71% of their wealth was held by cash. The amount was far much 
higher than the average global level (34.6%).
2
  Personal financial assets were also in 
the hands of very few persons.  
In 2009, China Merchants Bank published a report with Bain & Company on 
Chinese personal wealth. This report showed that until the end of 2008, 300,000 
persons had investment assets exceeded 10 million Yuan. The number exceeded 
320,000 in the end of 2009 which was 6% up over 2008. These few rich persons 
possessed over 9 trillion (9,000,000,000,000) Yuan investment assets, which were 
almost half of the total deposits of the whole nation’s urban and rural residents. 
320,000 rich persons, however, was only 0.2‰ of the whole population.3 In 2010 
April, Hurun Luxury Business Portal published new statistics about Chinese rich 
                                                        
1 Xiaoping Deng, Selected Words of Deng Xiaoping, Beijing, the People’s Publishing House, (2001) vol.3, pp. 
110-111. 
2 Statistics from Junhao Deng, Luesi Guo, and Deming Ou, Chinese Wealth Markets, December 2005, published 
on BCG official website: 
http://www.bcg.com.cn/cn/files/publications/reports_pdf/Wealth__Markets_China__Dec2005.pdf 




people’s wealth. It showed that there were 875,000 multimillionaires (0.67‰ of the 
whole population) and 55,000 billionaires (0.04‰).1 The escalate polarization gave 
rise to discussion of the further policies of the economic reform: Whether to insist on 
the present legal system which focused mainly on the economy, or make some 
changes in the macro-economic policy for the sake of social justice? 
Arguments for the present economic-oriented legal system differentiated 
‘wealth gap’ with ‘polarization’. Some scholars recognized the wealth gap among 
people but denied that it was the same thing as ‘polarization’. Polarization in their 
concerns was a classification of classes, which was not about the absolute standard of 
different economic status.
2
 Some scholars argued that the polarization was the result 
of capitalistic private ownership, which did not possibly exist in the public ownership 
system of China.
3
 Recent research adjusted the argument and recognized socialistic 
private ownership. A new concept, ‘virtuous polarization’ appeared in lately 
discussion.
4
 However, ‘virtuous polarization’ was still based on a simplified 
differentiation between capitalism and socialism. In their perspectives, ‘vicious 
polarization’ (rather than ‘virtuous polarization’) existed in capitalistic countries; a 
socialistic system only had ‘virtuous polarization’.
5
   
I disagreed with their comments on Chinese polarization. From the statistics I 
analyzed above, we could see that the polarization in China was vicious. Its negative 
effects should be noticed. If the polarization was ignored and over-indulgent, the 
majority’s enthusiasm for production would be harmed. Social morality might 
corrupt because of ‘the worship of money’. It would further influence the average 
consumption level and add burdens to maintain the social order. The polarization 
would make the purpose of economic reform meaningless and shake the Communist 
Party of China (hereinafter CCP)’s leadership to its foundations. The continual 
                                                        
1 Statistics from Hurun Luxury Business Portal report 2010, http://www.hurun.net/listreleasecn450.aspx 
2 Anyi Li, Yingtian Li, Common Prosperity Is Not Only An Economic Concept: A Study of the Content and 
Realization of Common Prosperity, Theoretical Investigation, (2006), vol.6, pp.52-55. 
3 Chunjiao Qu, Xiaoping Deng’s Arguments for Common Prosperity and against Polarization, Journal of China 
Youth University for Political Science, (1994), vol.4, pp.1-5. 




growth of Gini coefficient could illustrate the great disparity between the rich and 
poor.
1
 From 1992 to 2007, the average Gini index was 0.415.
2
 Since 1994 the Gini 
coefficient was continuously over 0.4 (which was the alert line). In less than 20 years 
development, China changed from an equal-income-distribution country (in 1970s) 
to an extreme unequal-distribution country (since late 1990s). Economic polarization 
in China was an irrefutable fact. 
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The amount of low-income citizens was increasing continuously. Since 1997 
China started to institute the System of Minimum Living Standard Security of the 
Urban Residents (hereinafter MLSUR). At that time, less than two million urban 
residents were under the minimum living standard who needed the allowance. 
However, the amount had been rising continuously. In 1999, it was 2.8 million; in 
2000, it raised to 4 million; in 2001, the amount was over 11.7 million; in 2002 it was 
again doubled to above 20.5 million; and the amount reached to 23.3 million in 
2009.
3
 The actual amount of the poor was more than the above official numbers 
                                                        
1 The Gini coefficient can range from 0 to 1; it is sometimes multiplied by 100 to range between 0 and 100. A 
low Gini coefficient indicates a more equal distribution, with 0 corresponding to complete equality, while higher 
Gini coefficients indicate more unequal distribution, with 1 corresponding to complete inequality. Chinese Gini 
coefficient was 0.160 in 1978, 0.288 in 1981, 0.297 in 1984, 0.349 in 1989, 0.282 in 1991, 0.407 in 1993, 0.415 
in 1995, 0.456 in 1998, 0.457 in 1999, 0.458 in 2000, 0.473 in 2004, and 0.496 in 2006. Statistics in 1991，1998，
1999 and 2000 are from Hu Peizhao, Common Prosperity and Virtuous Polarization in Wealth, Theory Front, 
(2003), vol.22, pp. 27-29; 1981,1984,1989,1995 are from Tao Chunhai, A Thought about Increasing Gini 
Coefficient in China, Jiangxi Social Sciences, (2003), no.3, pp. 183-185; statistics in 2006 are from Zhang Kui 
and Wang Zuxia, Measurement and Control of Income Inequality and Polarization, Statistical Research, (2009), 
vol.26, pp.76-80; statistics of 1993 and 2004 are from ADB (Asia Development Bank) report from 
http://xxhs2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/commonnews/200708/20070804972531.html.   
2 Statistic refers to Human Development Report 2009 gini index, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/161.html. 
3 Statistics from Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
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because not all the poor were covered by the MLSUR system. In a research, the 
numbers of urban poor from 2000 to 2004 were at least 22.95 million, 28.83million, 
37.66 million, 39.12 million and 40.17 million.
1
  
As a contrast, the rural population in poverty was decreasing in the recent 10 
years, (the official numbers of the rural poor in 1993 was over 80 million; in 2002, it 
decreased to 28 million). However, the number of the poor in rural areas was still 
enormous. The minimum living standard (625 Yuan per person per year) was much 
lesser than that of the cities of China. It did not reach to one fourth of the standard of 
developing countries (the standard of the World Bank was 1 dollar 1 day; that was 
2,800 Yuan per person per year). According to the World Bank’s standard, there were 
126 million poor in the rural areas of China.
2
 From China Foundation for Poverty 
Alleviation’s statistics, the rural poor were about 90 million, which were 11% of the 
whole population of the rural residents.  
More than 145 million peasant-labors were not included in the official number 
of the rural population in poverty (nor were they included into the low-income 
citizens since they were not citizens).
3
 However, the peasant-labors living standard 
was far below the citizens and their income were at the bottom of the society, so they 
should be included into the category of people in poverty. If the numbers of the 
low-income citizens, rural populations in poverty and the peasant-labors were added 
together, the total impoverished population was around 150 million to 210 million, 
which was 11.54% to 16.15% of the whole population. From the above analysis of 
statistics, we can see that the economic polarization was serious in China. 
 
The economic polarization and poverty already caused social problems. In the 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/mxht/mtgz/200908/20090800034009.shtml; 
http://dbs.mca.gov.cn/article/csdb/llyj/200711/20071100003469.shtml;  
1 Luo Zhuoyan, Re-estimate China’s Urban Poor Population, Finance & Economics, (2006), vol.9, pp.82-89 
2  Statistics from Global News, http://china.huanqiu.com/society/2007-12/37451.html, and the World Bank 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/CHINAEXTN/0,,cont
entMDK:21639761~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:318950,00.html 





beginning of the economic reform, people were in a relatively fair competition 
environment and were in a relatively equal starting point for gathering personal 
wealth. After thirty years reform, under the great disparity of rich and poor pattern, 
the approach to acquiring wealth through capital was much easier. But it was more 
difficult to earn money through labor. The social environment was more beneficial to 
the rich rather than the poor, which formed a Matthew Effect already. In 1980s, the 
‘rich standard’ was 10 thousand Yuan savings. Therefore the gap between the rich 
and poor was not too wide. A bidirectional transformation between the poor and rich 
was possible. Later on, however, the ‘rich standard’ became unattainable. The rich 
stratum held millions and billions of wealth so that the standard of becoming rich 
was extremely difficult. With the continuously widened gap of wealth, the temporary 
poor (for one generation) became diachronic poor (for several generations). The 
offspring of the poor and the rich had totally different opportunities for education, 
work, and distribution of wealth. And the poverty or prosperity easily transferred 
from one generation to another. The polarization and the social structure thus became 
stable and institutionalized. And a bidirectional transformation between the poor and 
the rich became impossible.  
Apart from the above analyzed 0.5% very rich families (who possessed more 
than 60% wealth), and very impoverished population (which was 16.15% of the 
whole population), the middle, the common people or the majority (83.35%) had 
limited financial capability, especially facing with the high cost of medical treatment, 
education, and high price of living. The common people's life standard was just basic: 
in China, 80% common rural people (the rural residents were 80% of the whole 
population) could not get cleaned drinking water. From the official statistics of the 
National Bureau of Statistics, in the second national investigation of common rural 
people's living standard, 10.3% people had difficulties in getting drinkable water; 
48.6% got pipe water; only 23.1% got cleaned water; 41.8% depended on deep well 
water; 27.8% depended on shallow well water; 2.8% directly used river water; 1.4% 
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used pond water; 1.4% depended on rain; and 1.7% through other resources.
1
 44.3% 
of the common people had dry latrines; 42.9% did not have toilets and have to use 
the outdoor toilets; only 12.8% had flushing toilets.
2
 The common rural residents' 
living standard was far behind that of urban residents. The per capita net income of 
rural people in 2009 was five thousand Yuan. The per capital disposable income of 
urban residents was over seventeen thousand, which were more than three times of 
that of the rural people's income, not to speak of the gap in the net income.  
The common people in both of the rural and urban spent more than one third of 
the income for food. Engel coefficients (referring to the proportion of expenditures 
on food to the total consumption expenditures of households) of the rural and urban 
residents were 41.0% and 36.5%,
3
 which also disclosed the fact that the common 
people's living standard in China was not comparable to that of the developed 
countries. Referring to my own experience of living at W city in China and E city in 
the U.K., the proportion on living costs to income had obvious difference: suppose a 
common people's income was 1500 unit (1,500 RMB at W and 1,500 GBP at E), the 
proportion of expenses in most indexes of W was higher than E (Appendix I ). Since 
the common people’s living standard was just on a subsistence level in China, and 
the proportion on living costs to income was so high, it was not reasonable to add 
legal obligation for this group to assist the poor. The law should not impose this 
obligation to them. 
Then which group should be responsible to bring along the poor, the whole 
population in the rich region, the local governments’ of the rich region, or the rich 
group exclusively? It certainly was not reasonable for the poor in the rich region to 
have such responsibility. In Deng’s ideal, ‘When some people and some regions get 
rich first, others will be brought along and through this process, common prosperity 
of the entire population will be gradually achieved…this is our policy. And it will be 
                                                        
1 Statistics from http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/nypcgb/qgnypcgb/t20080226_402464495.htm 
2 ibid. 
3
 see Statistical Communique on the 2010 National Economic and Social Development Report of the National 
Bureau of Statistics, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/ndtjgb/qgndtjgb/t20100225_402622945.htm 
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the responsibility for the first prosperous regions to bring along other less developed 
places.’
1
 From the first half of the expression, ‘others will be brought along’ seems 
to be a social prediction (the rich will help the poor) rather than a legal obligation 
(the rich have an obligation to help the poor). Some scholars also argued for this 
point and stated that the existence of the rich group per se benefited the poor because 
the rich provided more work opportunities for the poor. In this perspective, the rich 
should not be blamed.
2
  
With special reference to the local finances this argument could be right, 
because rich entrepreneurs contributed to the main source of the local finances. 
According to statistics exposed by Sheng Huaren, the vice-chairmen of the National 
People’s Congress, local governments’ income from Real Estate industry was 
50%-80% of the general property price; and the income from Land Grant Fee 
increased from 670 billion to 91,000 billion Yuan from 1998 to 2003; the Real Estate 
industry became a role of ‘economic mainstay’ of local governments.
3
 When the 
common people, i.e., the majority, were concerned, however, the argument was not 
sound because this economic achievement was based on the exploitation of the 
majority especially the majority of the rural residents. Local governments got 
requisition lands from the rural residents in a low price, then sold them ten times of 
the requisition price, and invested in urban infrastructure or corruption. Since 1980s, 
the total amount of requisition lands was 98 million mu (1 mu=0.067 hectares). In a 
conservative estimate, if the peasants lose 50,000 Yuan for 1 mu, then the total loss 
since 1980 exceeded 5,000,000 million.
4
 The peasant as the disadvantaged group 
                                                        
1 See Deng’s speech in his interview with Prime Minister David Lange of New Zealand on 28 March 1986. ibid. 
2 In 2007, a domestic famous economist Mao Yishi published an article ‘Speak for the Rich; Serve for the Poor’ 
and brought a national debate on the argument whether the poor benefit from the rich. See the original article at 
Mao’s blog: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_49a3971d01000b48.html. In this argument, the rich was the main 
source of social wealth and should be more respected. Other well-know economist and scholars including Wu 
Jinglian and Jia Jinjing supported this argument; Xian Yan, Cao jianhai, Zhong Dajun, Yan Yu, Huang Zhong, 
Wang Congsheng, and Li Chunlin criticized this argument and pointed out that the rich were over-protected rather 
than over-looked. Zhang Xingshui and Zhang Ming stated that both of the rich and the poor should be protected 
equally from the legal perspective. See the articles of the seminar ‘speak for the rich’,  
http://bbspage.bokee.com/zhuanti/2007maoyushifuren/. 
3  See Jian Yuan: the Real Estate Industry Kidnaps China, from scholars’ Utopia net, 
http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class4/200611/11472.html. Also see Shiwei Zhang, The Effects of the Public 




lost more than they gain. Local governments and rich people should be responsible 
for paying compensation to the less favored group because the latter was the majority 
of the population in this case. Even if they were not responsible for the wealth they 
gathered from exploitation of the less and least favored group, they should at least be 
responsible for future improvements of the living standards of the poor.  
Local governments should have an obligation to improve people’s lives and this 
responsibility was written in the legitimacy of governmental management. However, 
how to deal with the rich people’s responsibility? Put this argument differently, even 
if the rich should be responsible, why should the responsibility a legal one rather than 
a moral one? Why could not we have some trust in their conscience? Some scholars 
criticized that a legal obligation was ‘resentment of the rich’: ‘Chinese rich people 
are not that rich… the responsibility should be the nation’s not the rich people’s… 
rich people pay high tax so they already assist the improvement of other people’s 
living conditions …in short, the society should not force the rich to donate’.
1
 This 
argument, as far as I was concerned, however, was not true. Chinese rich people were 
indeed very rich (possessed over 9 trillion Yuan investment assets, which was almost 
half of the total deposits of the whole nation’s urban and rural residents); the rich 
should also take the responsibility because they were the most beneficial group of the 
economic reform and should comply their duty of the ‘social contract’.  
From the statistics of Chinese taxation we could see that the rich individuals’ tax 
were not the major source of individual income tax. On the contrary, the common 
wage earners were the principal source of it. According to the analysis of the 
Ministry of Finance, in 2009 the total individual income tax was 3,949, 270 million 
Yuan, in which the common-wage-earners contributed to 62.87% (2,483,090 
                                                        
1 See Zhiqiang Ren, Taxation and Donation, Resources Inhabitant and Environment, 2008, vol.15, pp. 69-71. see 
also Ren Zhiqiang, the Society Should Not Force the Rich to Donate, 
http://bbs.soufun.com/1010253663~-1~10429/77934988_77934988.htm. Ren is a domestic famous representative 
of the rich, who is the president of Beijing Huayuan Real Estate Limited Company, the president of Huanyuan 
Group, a commissioner of Beijing Commercial Bank, a director of Xinhua Life Insurance Agency. According to a 






 According to statistics from State Administration Taxation, since 2002 the 
average common-wage-earners annual contribution was more than half of the total.
2
 
The very rich group who possessed more than 80% social wealth contributed to less 
than 10% of the individual income tax.
3
 Since 2007, those whose annual income was 
higher than 120,000 Yuan should declare taxable income by themselves. However, 
only 1/6 of the high income group declared.
4
 The proportion of payments that high 
income individuals evaded was 30% of the total individual-tax.
5
  
As referring to rich people’s donations, the facts were more eloquent than 
arguments: there were over ten million registered industrial and commercial 
enterprises, but less than one tenth had the record of donations. 99% enterprises had 
no record of donations. The fund of donations was only 0.1% of GDP.
6
 Statistics 
already showed that the rich did not fulfill their legal responsibility of tax, nor were 
they willing to donate. It was not what Mr. Ren Zhiqiang declared, that ‘the society 
forced the rich to donate’. On the contrary, the rich did not take their legal and moral 
responsibilities. 
 In my point of view, the priority to efficiency in Chinese laws should change to 
the priority to justice.
7
 The present legal system should provide practical 
institutions to narrow down the wealth gap between the rich and poor people and to 
improve the majority’s livelihood. Chinese lawmaking should shift from 
                                                        
1 See the Structural Analysis of the Increase of Tax 2009 by the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of 
China, http://szs.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/gongzuodongtai/201002/t20100211_270552.html  
2 Statistics from the State Administration Taxation, 
http://202.108.90.130/n480462/n480513/n480934/2011979.html. see also 
http://www.chinanews.com.cn/cj/cj-plgd/news/2009/06-19/1741312.shtml 
3 See http://www.zaobao.com/special/newspapers/2005/09/dayoo050912.html; see also Zheng Guozhong, the 
Chinese Rich People Evade to Taxation, Finance and Economy, (2002), vol.9, pp.9-10. 
4  Analysis is based on Feng Junxian’s statistics in his Suggestions on Intensifying Tax Collection and 
Management of the High Income Group, Chinese Enterprise Accounting of Villages and Towns, (2009), vol.4, pp. 
66-67. see also http://news.cctv.com/20070425/106125.shtml, in this official report, the proportion is 1/4. 
5 Jingli Wu, A Study on the New Scheme of Individual Income Tax, Economics and Trade Update, (2008), vol.15, 
p.61. 
6 See the official of National Development and Reform Commission, Xinnian Chen’s talk, published on 14 
November 2005, Beijing Youth Daily, see also Xiaoming Liang, Maybe It is too Harsh to Force the Rich to 
Donate, Financial View, (2006), vol.4, p.35. Xi Muyu, Why the Chinese Rich People Are not Benevolent? 
Government Legality (2006), vol.13, p.21. 
7 See also the arguments of Quanrui Dong, Deming Tan, Xihou Zhang, Han Li, and Fan Yang, in Teng Peng’s 




economic-oriented to social-justice-oriented. The thirty years economic and legal 
reform was worthy of a compliment because it achieved its first stage objective, i.e., 
let some people become rich. The economic reform, however, needed institutions to 
safeguard its second stage objective, i.e., let the rich bring along the poor for the 
sake of the ultimate goal of common prosperity. Chinese lawmaking should stress 
the legal responsibilities of both the government and the rich. Rich people obtained 
great profits from the economic reform already and were the prime beneficiaries of 
the reform. Individual autonomy, freedom and right should not become excuses for 
them to evade their legal and moral obligations to assist the poor. The economic 
reform could be seen as a social contract to which they had signed, so that they had 
to comply with their duties that regulated in the contract.  
 
EFFICIENT LAWMAKING  
 According to The Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China 2000 
(hereinafter LLC2000), the formal law of lawmaking, the lawmaking authority 
belongs to the Chinese congress (National People's Congress of the People's 
Republic of China—hereinafter NPC) and its standing committee (hereinafter 
SCNPC), and is partly shared by the State Council after NPC or SCNPC’s 
authorization.
1
 The legislative process of the NPC (and SCNPC) includes: (1) 
                                                        
1
 The Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China 2000, section one, article 7: ‘…the National People’s 
Congress and Standing Committee thereof shall exercise state legislative power.’ The State Council can also share 
the legislative power authorized by the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Standing Committee (SCNPC). 
see article 9:‘In the event that no national law has been enacted in respect of a matter enumerated in Article 8 
hereof, the National People's Congress and the Standing Committee thereof have the power to make a decision to 
enable the State Council to enact administrative regulations in respect of part of the matters concerned for the 
time being, except where the matter relates to crime and criminal sanctions, the deprivation of a citizen's political 
rights, compulsory measure and penalty restricting the personal freedom of a citizen, and the judicial system.’ The 
necessary precondition for the authorization is that the former have not enacted laws for some less important 
issues. Matters relating to crime and criminal sanctions, the deprivation of a citizen's political rights, compulsory 
measure and penalty restricting the personal freedom of a citizen, and the judicial system, however, still require 
the former. The State Council can make law in the name of NPC or SCNPC’s authorization. The enabled body 
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 and (3) Voting.
3
  
                                                                                                                                                             
may not re-delegate its authority to any other body. See The Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China 
2000, section one, article 9-11. The main contents of lawmaking by and only by the NPC and NPCSC are ‘(i) 
state sovereignty;(ii) the establishment, organization and authority of various people's congresses, people's 
governments, people's courts and people's procuratorates;(iii) autonomy system of ethnic regions, system of 
special administrative region, and system of autonomy at the grass-root level;(iv) crimes and criminal 
sanctions;(v) the deprivation of the political rights of a citizen, or compulsory measures and penalties involving 
restriction of personal freedom;(vi) expropriation of non-state assets;(vii) fundamental civil institutions;(viii) 
fundamental economic system and basic fiscal, tax, customs, financial and foreign trade systems;(ix) litigation 
and arbitration system;(x) other matters the regulation of which must be carried out through enactment of national 
law by the National People's Congress or the Standing Committee thereof.’ See The Legislation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China 2000, section one, article 8. Those important political and legal issues can only be 
enacted as national law rather than administrative regulations or decrees. 
1
 The institutions or organs that can introduce a bill to the National Congress and its Standing Committee are the 
presidium of the Congress or the Chairman’s Committee of the Committee, or the State Council, the Central 
Military Committee, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the specific 
committees of the National Congress (the Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China 2000, article 12 and 
24). To introduce a bill is the preliminary stage of creating a law. The right to introduce a bill therefore gives 
influence and power in the lawmaking process. In addition to the bill introducers mentioned above, another way 
to introduce a bill is to announce a bill by a delegation of the session or by delegates of at lease 30 people acting 
jointly during the NPC, or by ten or more members of the SCNPC acting jointly in the Standing Committee. 
According to the introducers, it is naturally divided into three levels of introducing a bill. The first level is that the 
presidium of the NPC and the Chairman’s Committee of the SCNPC; the bills introduced by them are 
spontaneously included into the agenda of the current session for deliberation (article 12, 24). The second level is 
that the State Council, the Central Military Committee, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate, and the specific committees of the National Congress: whether bills introduced by them can be 
included into the agenda of the current session is a decision for the presidium of the congress or the chairman’s 
committee. (article 12, 24). The third level is the delegation or jointed delegates: the presidium of the congress or 
the chairman’s committee decides whether such bills can be discussed in the current session, or whether to refer 
such bill to the relevant special committee for deliberation, with such special committee making a 
recommendation as to whether such bill shall be put onto the agenda of the current session (article 13, 25). 
2
 After the bills being put on to the agenda of the current session of the Congress, the delegations and relevant 
special committee shall begin deliberation. After gathering their deliberation opinions, the Legislative Committee 
shall conduct a uniform deliberation, and afterwards shall deliver to the presidium a deliberation report and the 
amended draft law. Then after the presidium has deliberated and passed the deliberation report and the amended 
draft law, they shall be printed and circulated to the delegates attending the session. Following that, the amended 
draft law shall be further amended by the Legislative Committee based on the deliberating opinions of the 
delegations.  
3
 Then the Legislative Committee shall present a voting version of the draft law to be submitted by the presidium 
to the plenary session for voting, and if it receives affirmative votes from more than half of all delegations, such 
version shall be adopted. Under the following circumstances a bill may fail to become a law. Firstly, the sponsor 
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Since 1978, comparing the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress (SCNPC) with the National People’s Congress (NPC), the former played a 
dominant role in lawmaking, although according to the Constitution and LLC2000 
the latter should take the dominant role.
1
 As figure 2.6 showed, in the 9
th
 session 
(1998-2002) SCNPC passed 72 laws. New laws, interpretations and decisions were 
101 in total. The amount of laws passed by SCNPC was more than five times of 
NPC’s legislations (NPC passed 13 laws). In the 10
th
 session (2002-2008), NPC’s 
legislations were still far less than SCNPC’s. NPC passed 39 basic laws which were 
17.03% of the total laws. In contrast, SCNPC passed 190 laws which were 82.97% of 
the total. Besides, SCNPC’s legislations were also in a general rising trend since 
1980s. Numbers of laws that made by SCNPC only dropped slightly in the 10
th
 
session (see figure 2.7).  
 
Fig.2.6 laws passed by NPC and SCNPC from 1978 to 2008 
sessi
on 
year NPC SCNPC total 
Basic laws Other Interpretations In all 
                                                                                                                                                             
of a bill itself has the right to withdraw the bill which has been put onto the agenda of the session. If the bill 
sponsor withdraws the bill subjected to the consent by the presidium of the NPC or the Chairman’s Committee of 
the NPCSC, the deliberation on the bill shall terminate (article 20, 37). Secondly, the voting on the bill may be 
postponed to be ‘dead’ if great different opinions exist on the major issues. If there are major disagreements on 
the major issues of the bill, further deliberation is needed. The NPC may authorize its Standing Committee to 
have further deliberation (article 21). If after three deliberations by the NPCSC session, a bill’s major issues still 
require further study, voting on the bill may be postponed. When it has been postponed for two years, the 
deliberation on the bill shall terminate (article 39). Thirdly, if less than half of the affirmative votes of all 
delegates are received, the bill cannot be adopted as a law (article 22, 40). If a bill introduced to the NPC and 
NPCSC has been voted on the plenary session and fails to pass, the bill sponsor may re-introduce it in accordance 
with all legally prescribed procedures (article 50). 
1 Statistics of this section are from the Legislative Affairs Work Committee of SCNPC ed., Statistics of 
Legislation of People’s Republic of China, Chinese Democracy and Rule of Law publishing house, 2008, 
pp.490-570.  
See also Wu Bangguo’s ‘Report on the Work of the Government about Administrative Regulations and Local 
Decrees’ made at the third session of the eleventh NPC, 09 March 2010. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-03/09/content_13133496.htm ; 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/zgzx/2009npc/2009-03/09/content_7556715.htm  
And Zhou Jing, Statistical Indicators of the Current Effective Nation Legislation, Journal of Comparative Law, 
China University of Political Science and Law Press, vol. 5, (2009), pp.147-160. 
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laws and decisions 
no. % no. no. no. % 
5th 1978-1982 28 38.36 22 23 45 61.64 73 
6th 1983-1987 12 18.46 36 17 53 81.54 65 
7th 1988-1992 27 30.68 38 23 61 69.32 88 
8th 1993-1997 26 21.85 70 23 93 78.15 119 
9th 1998-2002 13 11.40 72 29 101 88.60 114 
10th 2003-2008 12 12.00 69 19 88 88.00 100 
Total 1978-2008 118 21.11 307 134 441 78.89 559 
Still 
Valid 
 39 16.88 192 83.11 231 
 
 





















NPC 28 12 27 26 10 12
SCNPC 45 53 61 93 101 88





Fig.2.8 laws amended since 5th to 10th session NPC 
session year constitution law Legislative decision total 
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  code amendment new amend total interpretation 
5th 1978-1982 1  33 4 37  28 66 
6th 1983-1987   37 5 42  23 65 
7th 1988-1992  1 44 5 49  38 88 
8th 1993-1997  1 62 16 78 1 39 119 
9th 1998-2002  1 35 40 75 8 30 114 
10th 2003-2008  1 31 41 72 5 22 100 
Total 1978-2008 1 4 242 111 353 14 180 552 
now 
valid 
 1 4   228 14 87 330 
 
From figure 2.8 we also see that in the 6
th
 NPC, 37 laws were made and 5 laws 





 NPC, the new laws and amended laws were 88.90% and 10.20%; 79.49% 
and 20.51%; 46.67 and 53.33%. In the 10
th
 NPC, new laws were 43.06% of the total 
passed laws; amended laws were 56.94% of the total. From these statistics, we can 
see that from the 6
th
 NPC to 8
th
 NPC, the amount of new laws became less and in a 




 NPCs, the amounts of the amended laws were 
more than the new laws. From the 8
th
 NPC, legislative interpretations appeared and 
increased. From 1983 (the 6
th
 NPC) to 1997 (the 8
th
 NPC), the total amount of laws 
was in an upward trend. It reached to the peak in the 8
th
 NPC. Then it appeared a 
downward trend. After 2002, the number of NPC’s law rose although that of 
SCNPC’s fell. 
In a statistical study of the speed of legislation, the average increase of laws was 
-3.29% in the first 30 years (1949-1978). In the following 30 years (1979-2007), the 
average increase was 13.06%. Total increase speed in these 60 years was 7.24%.
1
 
Laws made in the first 30 years were mostly amended or abolished. And the average 
                                                        
1 Jing Zhou, Statistical Indicators of the Current Effective Nation Legislation, Journal of Comparative Law, 
China University of Political Science and Law Press, vol. 5, (2009), pp.147-160 
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amount of the validity was 12.94%. In the following 30 years, the laws were less 
amended or abolished, and the average amount of the validity rose to 41.36%. The 
total amount of the validity was 37.18.
1
 From these data, we can see that China 
entered into an era of high speed increase of legislation since 1979.  
However, there was a theoretical conflict between the democratic representation 
system of NPC and the dominant legislative institution of SCNPC. Different from a 
unicameral system, both SCNPC and NPC shared the lawmaking power. Their 
positions were different from a bicameral system also, because they did not make 
laws together at the same conference. SCNPC’s lawmaking power came from and 
was bound to NPC. During NPC’s session, SCNPC could not make laws. SCNPC 
could make laws during the closed days of NPC. SCNPC and NPC were 
‘homologous’ but different institutions.  
From 1949 to 1982, the ultimate lawmaking power was held exclusively by the 
NPC. SCNPC was specially authorized to make laws in 1955 and 1959, and had the 
power to make regulations and to change and interpret laws during the closed days of 
the NPC gradually.
2
 After the Constitution 1982 was promulgated, both SCNPC and 
NPC shared the legislative power.
3
 The LLC 2000 extended SCNPC’s lawmaking 
power further to its special lawmaking sphere, legislative interpretation, adjudication 
of conflicts of laws and its opinions of controversial acts passing by the NPC.
4
 
SCNPC was thus called ‘the Congress of the Congress’ because of its expanding 
power and its dominant role in lawmaking.
5
  
For the sake of efficiency, SCNPC was an appropriate institution to help NPC to 
deal with numerous and arduous lawmaking because SCNPC had more frequent 
sessions than NPC.
6
 The NPC representatives were about three thousand in every 
                                                        
1 Ibid. 
2 Wangsheng Zhou, 50 Years Lawmaking History, Studies on Lawmaking, vol. 1, Law Press (2000), quoted from 
Yang Lijuan, The Relation of Legislative Competence Between National People’s Congress and its Standing 
Committee, Journal of Guangxi Administrative Cadre Institute of Politics and Law, (2004), vol.19, p44. 
3 See the Constitution, article 62 and 67. 
4 See the LLC 2000, articles 8, 42, 85 and 21. 
5 Lijuan Yang, The Relation of Legislative Competence Between National People’s Congress and its Standing 
Committee, Journal of Guangxi Administrative Cadre Institute of Politics and Law, 2004, vol.19, p43. 
6 NPC is held once in a year; while the SCNPC is normally held once in two months. 
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session since 1983. An average session was fifteen days including two weekend days. 
So there were thirteen working days per session. The working time of each session 
was about 6,240 minutes. So every representative had 2.08 minutes including the 
plenary report time to discuss a bill.
1
 Every NPC representative had about 2 minutes 
in total to discuss, deliberate, question, debate and vote on a bill. Chinese NPC 
representatives had less time in a session than members of parliaments and congress 
in other countries.
2
 SCNPC’s frequent sessions can make up for the deficiency of 
working days for NPC’s lawmaking.  
However, SCNPC’s lawmaking lacked democratic legitimacy because members 
of SCNPC (which were less than 200) were not chosen directly by the people. They 
were voted by representatives of NPC. Although lawmakers in most countries were 
the minority of the population, Chinese proportion of lawmakers to the population 
was too small: 0.23‰ (NPC/whole); and 0.012‰(SCNPC/whole).3 It was therefore 
a doubt about the lawmakers’ representativeness. If the SCNPC did not gain the 
representative nature, the legitimacy of lawmaking was questionable. In practice, 
local electorate could hardly participate in the vote for the representatives of NPC, 
not to speak of SCNPC.
4
  
The members of SCNPC did not communicate directly with the local electorate. 
They were not responsible to the local electorate but NPC, so it was problematic to 
take SCNPC decisions as the will of the people. People were not acquainted with 
SCNPC’s work performance. So it was difficult for people to decide whether 
members of SCNPC were eligible for re-election. Actually, members of SCNPC were 
                                                        
1 See Number of Deputies to All the Previous National People’s Congresses, China Statistical Yearbook 2010, . 
2 Parliaments of the World: A Comparative Reference Compendium, second edition, Gower Publishing Company 
Limited, (1986), pp269-275, especially table 8b, average number of plenary sittings. See also Lin Li, Insist to and 
Complete the Session System of the National People’s Congress, Theoretical Trends, (2005), vol.3, pp.8-18. 
3  Chinese lawmaker / population is 3000/1,335,962,133; U.S: 535/306,221,000; Japan: 720/127,630,000; 
Germany: 667/82,062,200; France: 920/65,073,482; UK: 1378/61,612,300; Canada: 413/33,617,000. see data 
from <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WPP2004/WPP2004_Volume3.htm> (World Population 
Prospects); and <http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm> (Inter-parliamentary Union). 
4 For the author’s own experience, she only had one chance to participate in one election of representatives of W 
district of W city of China since 1998 to 2010; at that election, she had the opportunity to choose one 
representative from two people she never heard of. She was never informed of the political views of the two 
candidates, nor did she hear of the result of that election. The author had this opportunity because she was among 
the high educated group; other common urban residents were seldom involved in the elections.  
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chosen from four indirect elections: The county-level representatives chose city-level 
representatives; the city-level representatives voted for the province-level; the 
province-level representatives elected the national-level; and finally the national 
representatives chose the members of SCNPC. Through these four indirect elections, 
distance between the will of the people and of the representatives became wider and 
wider. 
If the NPC representatives could elect the SCNPC in an open democratic and 
free-will based fair procedure, the members of SCNPC could represent the will of the 
NPC, and in the end could arguable represent the people. However, NPC 
representatives could not nominate SCNPC candidates. The candidates were decided 
and introduced by the presidium of NPC exclusively. In the introduction of NPC 
presidium, information of the candidates’ work performance was lacked. The 
candidates did not have to express a will of joining the SCNPC and plans for future 
work. Therefore NPC representatives were not offered sufficient information and 
solid standards to choose SCNPC representatives.
1
 If were not nominated by the 
presidium, NPC representatives could not be recommended to join into SCNPC, even 
they were reliable and capable. The representativeness of the SCNPC was therefore 
problematic.  
Another problem was: the members of SCNPC represented the collective and 
national interests rather than the multiple interests of different electoral districts. 
They were elected by the representatives of NPC, who were the national-level 
representatives. The Regulations of the Members of SCNPC clearly stipulated that 
the members of SCNPC should preserve the fundamental interests and common will 
of the whole nation.
2
 They were therefore the representatives of a nationwide district 
rather than from different local districts. The disadvantage of such a nationwide 
district electoral mode was obvious: It was unfavorable to the common people to 
                                                        
1 According to Jingsong Jiang’s study, the criteria of election were ‘unwilling’ choices because there lacked open 
and fair standards. Jiang Jingsong, Discussion of The Representativeness of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, Tribune of Political Science and Law,(2004), vol.6, pp.18-30. 
2 See article 2 of the Regulations of the Members of SCNPC 1993. （全国人大常委会组成人员守则） 
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know, participate, choose and supervise their representatives. The representatives 
were responsible to ‘the top’ (the presidium of NPC) rather than to ‘the down’ 
(people). An effective supervision from both people and NPC representatives other 
than the presidium was difficult. In practice, direct communications among the 
members of SCNPC, common people and NPC representatives were rare. In a 
conservative estimate on the communications between common people and 
parliament members, less than 0.001% local district elector met members of SCNPC. 
During the closed days of NPC, less than one fifth of the members of SCNPC 
communicated with the representatives of NPC.
1
 The representativeness of the 
SCNPC was again problematic. 
Apart from the questionable representativeness of SCNPC, the conflicts in NPC 
lawmaking and SCNPC lawmaking were also difficult to solve. The following case 
could illustrate well about the conflicts in different lawmaking. On 27 January 2005, 
Jiahai Liu traveled out of the motorcycle lane and was thus fined 100 Yuan according 
to a summary procedure by a traffic police. Liu was unhappy with the results and he 
brought a suit against the traffic police on 18 March. He believed that according to 
Article 33 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administrative 
Punishments 1996 (hereinafter LAP1996), the summary procedure should apply only 
to fines less than 50 Yuan and warning. Article 3 of LAP1996 claimed that all related 
administrative punishments should be regulated by this law. Liu claimed that the fine 
by the traffic police was an administrative violation.  
The defendant (i.e., the police), however, argued that according to clause 1 of 
article 107 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Road Traffic Safety 2003 
(hereinafter LRTS2003), and clause 2 of article 7 of the Procedural Regulations on 
Violation on Road Traffic Safety 2008 (hereinafter Regulations 2008《道路交通安全
违法行为处理程序规定》), the fine was in accord with law. Plus LRTS2003 was 
promulgated later than LAP1996, the administrative practice was therefore in accord 
                                                        
1 Jingsong Jiang, Discussion of The Representativeness of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress, Tribune of Political Science and Law, (2004), vol.6, pp.25. 
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with the constitutional principles ‘new laws are prior to old laws; special laws are 
prior to general laws’.  
The court of first-instance supported the defendant’s request and rejected the 
plaintiff (Mr. Liu)’s requests. Liu appealed to the court of second instance. His 
request was dismissed again. The court of second instance stated that this case was 
about the application of laws. It claimed that LRTS2003 made by SCNPC was not in 
conflict with LAP1996 made by NPC because the former was the special rules and 
the latter was the general rule. The court believed that SCNPC and NPC were not 
inferior-superior institutions but a same institution so that the laws they made were in 
a same level in the hierarchy of laws in LLC 2000. According to Article 83 of 
LLC2000, special rules were prior to general rules so the defendant did not break the 
law. The crux of the problem, as concerned by the court, was whether NPC and 
SCNPC were the same institutions, and whether laws of NPC and SCNPC were in 




I disagree with the courts’ opinion because firstly LRTS2003 and LAP1996 had 
conflicting contents. It was a simple case, but the conflicts in the case were difficult 
to solve. The Constitution did not offer solutions to the conflicts between the two 
laws. According to the Constitution, NPC made ‘basic laws’ while SCNPC made 
‘other laws’. The contents of ‘basic laws’ and ‘other laws’, however, were not 
clarified. In LLC 2000, although the differentiation between basic and other laws 
were maintained, the classification criteria were still missing.
2
 The basic laws and 
other laws were in a same level in the hierarchy of laws of LLC2000, so that when 
basic laws and other laws had conflicts, a superior law, i.e., the Constitution should 
be referred to judge their validity. In this case, however, the Constitution could not 
offer a clear standard for the validity LAP1996 and LRTS2003 so that both the 
                                                        
1 See Jiahai Liu vs. the 2nd group of Nanning traffic police Nanning, 
http://bbs.chinacourt.org/index.php?showtopic=242371&st=0 
2 Xiaoyang Qiao, The Talks on The Legislative Law of People’s Republic of China, China Democracy and Rule 
of Law Publishing House, (2008), p.88. 
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plaintiff and the defendant had valid legal grounds.  
Secondly, I disagree with the reasons offered by the second instance court 
because the constitutional principle ‘new laws are prior to old laws; specific laws are 
prior to general laws’ should be applied exclusively to the condition that the laws 
were made by a same institution. NPC and SCNPC, however, were different 
institutions. As analyzed in a previous section, they were homologous but 
independent institutions. The principle (‘new laws prior to old laws; specific laws 
prior to general laws’) was inapplicable here.  
Thirdly, according to Article 85 of LLC2000, if there were conflicts between 
new general rules and old specific rules, the SCNPC could decide which rule was 
valid. However, in this case conflicts were between new specific rules and old 
general rules, the SCNPC therefore was not entitled to solve the problem.  
Fourthly, SCNPC’s legislative interpretation could not apply in this case 
because according to LLC2000, when the contents of a law were ambiguous or the 
grounds of the law were uncertain, the court should apply the SCNPC’s legislative 
interpretation. In this case, however, the contents of LRTS2003 and LAP1996 were 
clear and the administrative fine was made in accord with LRTS2003. Therefore we 
could not refer to SCNPC’s legislative interpretation in this case.  
Fifthly, according to the Constitution and LLC2000, NPC should change and 
annul inappropriate rules made by SCNPC. However, the Constitution and LLC2000 
did not clarify which and in what degree a rule was inappropriate. In this case, the 
court and the police believed that the new law (LRTS2003) was appropriate. The 
plaintiff, however, believed that the old law (LAP1996) was appropriate. NPC as the 
representative institution of the people should investigate which opinion represented 
the people’s interests indeed. In this solution, Mr. Liu should wait for nationwide 
discussion of the two laws, a decision of NPC afterwards, and then to appeal against 
the previous decisions made by the courts. It was not a satisfying solution to the 
plaintiff because it would cost him too much time waiting. 
 
 65 
   
BUREAUCRATIC LAWMAKING  
Chinese laws put too much emphasis on administrative power. Administrative 
laws became protective umbrellas of bureaucracy and the official monopoly. In this 
section I will discuss representative cases that highlight problems of bureaucratic 
lawmaking. The first example was about the freedom of assembly, procession and 
demonstration. After the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Assemblies, 
Processions and Demonstrations 1989 were made, local governments made related 
rules one after another. A Chinese local government regulated that processions 
should be prohibited in fifteen streets of that city—but there were only fifteen major 
streets in that city.
1
 Therefore the rule made processions impossible. It did not 
protect the right or freedom of processions. Before the publication of this law, the 
lawmakers did not hold any legislative hearings to discuss the law with the public. 
 The second lawmaking example was about the conflict between a modern 
administrative order and a Chinese convention. On 12 October 1993, Beijing 
People’s Congress Standing Committee passed the Prohibition of Fireworks. Other 
200 Chinese cities made similar regulations in succession. The lawmakers, however, 
did not pay attention to the customs and conventions. The regulation faced 
difficulties in execution everywhere. In every spring festival, marriage and funeral 
ceremonies, and other important customary celebrations, people chose to break the 
law to let off fireworks. Local governments had to invest a large amount of budgets 
to reiterate the law. In 2004, Beijing municipal government published 53 notices of 
Prohibition of Fireworks; distributed 4,030,000 pieces of publicities; made 5,857 
banners, 31,240 slogans and 3,818 pieces of newsletters; sent 660 mobile 
loudspeakers; held 9,895 advertising activities; and sent 297,446 policemen during 
                                                        
1 Duanhong Chen, Democratic Legitimacy and Supremacy of Legislation—Critiques on Chinese Legislation, 





 These activities, however, had little effect. After eight years of 
insistence, Beijing municipal government decided to change the rule in August 2005. 
In the legislative hearing of the regulation, absolute majority declared for the repeal 
of the regulation. Then 272 cities abolished the prohibition of firework one after 
another. In this example, the cost of lawmaking would be far less if the legislative 
hearing were held earlier.  
The third example of ‘bad’ lawmaking was about the violation of basic human 
rights. The death of Zhigang Sun, a common college student, initiated nationwide 
discussion on the legitimacy of the Administrative Measures of Accept and Dismiss 
Vagrants and Beggars with No Means of Support in Cities 1982 (hereinafter 
Measures 1982). On the evening of 17
th
 of March 2003, Sun was detained by 
Guangzhou police because he could not provide his residential permit and an identity 
card. He requested the police to ask his friend to send his identity card but his request 
was rejected. Three days later he was found dead in the house of detention. He was 
beaten to grievous bodily injury by the officers and was not treated until death. After 
his death, three famous domestic scholars Professor Jiang Yu, Professor Biao Teng 
and Professor Zhiyong Xu wrote a letter to SCNPC, and requested the SCNPC to 
review the constitutionality of Measures 1982. In this well-known letter, they wrote: 
‘According to the Legislation Law of People’s Republic of China 2000, Article 
88 Clause 2, SCNPC has the authority to cancel any administrative regulations 
that violate the Constitution or national law. According to Article 90 Clause 2, 
where any state organ and social group, enterprise or non-enterprise institution or 
citizen deems that an administrative regulation, local decree, autonomous decree 
or special decree violates the Constitution or a national law, they may make a 
written proposal to the SCNPC for review. The operation office of SCNPC shall 
study such proposal, and where necessary, it shall distribute such proposal to the 
relevant special committees for review and comments. We as citizens of the 
People’s Republic of China believe that the Administrative Measures of Accept and 
Dismiss Vagrants and Beggars with No Means of Support in Cities 1982 
contravenes to the Constitution. We therefore request SCNPC to review the 
constitutionality of the Measures 1982…According to the Constitution article 37, 
freedom is inviolable. No citizen should be arrested without the approval of the 
                                                        
1 Quan Tan and Xinning Zhang, The Possibility of Abolishing the Prohibition of Fireworks in Beijing, 
Engineering Blasting, 2004, vol.3, pp.86-89. 
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People's Procuratorate or the decision of a People's Court. The Arrests must be 
implemented by the public security organs exclusively. Unlawful deprivation or 
restriction of citizens' freedom by detention or other means is prohibited by law. 
The unlawful search of the person is also prohibited. According to the Law of the 
People ’ s Republic of China on Administrative Punishments, Article 9, 
administrative punishment that restrains personal liberty should be authorized by 
law. According to the Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China 2000, 
articles 8 and 9, the deprivation of the political rights of a citizen, or compulsory 
measures and penalties involving restriction of personal freedom should be enacted 
according to national law exclusively…we therefore believe that the State Council 
does not have the authority to make laws restricting citizen’s freedom…and the 
part of restrictions on citizen ’ s freedom in Measures 1982 violated the 
Constitution.’
1
   
Professors Weifang He, Hong Sheng, Kui Shen, Han Xiao and Haibo He of 
Beijing University also wrote a proposal to SCNPC and requested SCNPC to 
establish a special committee to investigate Sun’s case. Later on, Professor Anming 
Jiang and other four well-known domestic scholars were invited to discuss the 
Measures 1982 with the major officials of the State Council. Scholars stated that the 
Measures 1982 should be annulled immediately rather than to be amended. Law 
should protect and help common people, rather than restrict their freedom. The 
measures to accept and dismiss vagrants and beggars should help rather than force 
vagrants and beggars ‘to be helped’. The institutions providing this service should 
respect human rights and should not charge vagrants and beggars any fee.
2
 Three 
months after Sun’s death, the State Council annulled the Measures 1982. New 
administrative measures put emphasis on providing services to the vagrants and 
beggars rather than keeping control of them.  
Another example highlighted unfortunate results of ‘bad’ lawmaking also. 
The Regulation Governing Building Demolition and Resettlement 2001 (城市房屋拆
迁管理条例 hereinafter the Regulation 2001) was controversial in its execution. 
Administrative institutions used the law to violate people’s property rights. The local 
                                                        
1 See the original Chinese literature by Jiang Yu, Biao Teng and Zhiyong Xu, A Proposal on Constitutional 
Review of the Administrative Measures of Accept and Dismiss Vagrants and Beggars with No Means of Support 
in Cities 1982, Nanfang Daily, 17th May 2003. English here was translated by Peng He. 
2 See more details from Zhigang Sun: the Milestone of the History of Citizen’s Rights, XiaoXiang Morning 19 
December 2008, http://www.xxcb.com.cn/show.asp?id=938509 
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administrative institutions executed the policy of land expropriation in a brutal way 
that led to people’s violent resistance to the law. On 13
th
 November 2009, Ms. 
Fuzhen Tang burnt herself on the roof of her house to stop the official representatives 
tearing down her house in the name of the district renovation. She was sent to 
hospital but at the same time her house was razed to the ground by excavators. Ms. 
Tang Fuzhen’s self-burning behavior was officially defined as ‘a violent fight against 
law’.
1
 The officer that in charge of the demolishment, Mr. Changlin Zhong, was 
suspended from duty because of Tang's death. In an interview with Mr. Zhong, the 
reporter asked him whether he felt sorry for Tang, he replied that: ‘This is a tragedy 
of a legal-illiterate (refers to Fujun Tang)...I don’t feel sorry, because I am the 
law-executor and I have to work according to the law strictly. A law-executor should 
not have any regrets.’ 
2
 The Constitution and the Property Law of People’s Republic 
of China 2007(hereinafter the Property Law 2007), however, announced that the 
private property was inviolable. In this case, the law-executor ignored the 
Constitution and the Property Law and the dignity of life. He relied on Regulation 
2001 exclusively. It seems to me that Mr. Zhong (the officer) rather than Ms. Tang 
was the legal-illiterate. Tang was fighting for law rather than against the law. 
According to LLC 2000, the validity of Regulation 2001 was inferior to the 
Constitution and the Property Law 2007. Regulation 2001 should not be in conflict 
with them. The legal executor, however, chose Regulation 2001 as the exclusive 
legal ground but ignored basic rights in Chinese basic laws. In fact, when the 
Property Law 2007 was made, Regulation 2001 should be void at the same time. 
Regulation 2001 should be supposed to aim at protecting people’s rights of obtaining 
reasonable compensation from the government land expropriation, rather than a 
reason for mandatory control. In reality, however, Chinese legal executors 
emphasized the obligation to obey orders, but ignored governmental duties of 
compensation in wrong lawmaking events.  
                                                        
1 See reports and videos of Tang’s death: http://news.sohu.com/20091203/n268635575.shtml  




Tang’s case disclosed wrongs in the application of law and the problem of 
lawmaking. The law on land management stipulated that governments could 
expropriate collectively owned land for public interests. But there was no specific 
definition of ‘public interests’ in the law. It thus left space for governmental 
rent-seeking.
1
 Jiyang Liang, a researcher of the Institute of Geographic Sciences and 
Natural Resources Research under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, stated that the 
term ‘public interests’ should be defined clearly to restrict the arbitrary land 
acquisition. Compensation for land acquisition should be paid in full. Other scholars 
believed that the public interests should refer to service for public transit, public 
health, disaster prevention and control, science, education and cultural diffusion, 
environmental protection, preservation of cultural and historical relics, protection of 
public water source and diversion and draining, protection of forests, and other 
public infrastructure and social services.
2
 Regulation 2001 if violated the public 
interests should be void. It should write clearly about compensations for land 
acquisition. 
Compensations should be paid in full in Tang’s case. The price of land was 
many times the compensation the government paid for expropriation. The huge 
difference of prices lured Chinese local governments to seek profits from the land. 
Local governments transformed the arable land to commercial districts, and thus 
gained a high price from selling land to the real estate developer. A result was 
government corruption. Unrestricted land expropriation would harm the interests of 
the largest group in China, the peasants. The acreage of arable land in China was 
121.8 million hectares, 0.09 hectares per person, which was less than 40 percent of 
world’s average level, and decreased respectively 8.3 million and 0.11 hectares from 
1996.
3
 According to Dr. Chunxia Gong’s research on the farm land problems of 
                                                        
1 See the Property Law 2007, article 42: ‘for the purpose of satisfying the needs of public interests, it is allowed 
to requisition collectively-owned lands, premises ouned by entities and individuals or other realities in 
accordance with the statutory power limit and procedures.’  
2 Qilin Fu, the Real Estate Law, law press, (1997), p. 191 
3 Statistics from the report: Chinese Political Advisor Calls for Stricter Control in Land Expropriation, Xinhua 
News Agency, March 8, 2008. 
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China, excessive expropriation already led to the decrease of arable land. The result 
would be devastating: if 900 million peasants lost their land with no or very low 
compensation, it would lead to extreme poverty. The land expropriation already 
turned nearly 50 million farmers to a vulnerable group. It was prone to mass 
incidents and threatened social stability. Dr. Gong argued further that even when the 
peasants got compensation, since they lost their land they would become paupers in 
the end because they gained no skills for life other than farming.
1
 The Property Law 
2007 was a landmark of better protection of arable lands, which put strict restrictions 
on the ‘land acquisition’. Regulation 2001 should not be the legal ground for the 
violent execution because it was in conflict with the Property Law 2007. When the 
Property Law 2007 was made, the lawmaker should announce the abolition of 
Regulation 2001. 
Another case that disclosed Chinese lawmaking problems was a peasant-labor’s 
fight for his compensation for industrial injuries. Haichao Zhang, a 28 year old 
peasant, worked for Zhendong Wear-resistant Materials Company of Xinmi City of 
Henan province during the slack farming season. He worked day and night and was 
surrounded by industrial dust, but the company did not provide any facilities to 
improve the work environment. In 2007, Zhang was diagnosed with pneumoconiosis, 
a lung disease caused by long-continuous inhalation of dusts, especially minerals or 
metallic dusts. Unfortunately, Zhengzhou Prevention and Treatment Institute of 
Occupational Disease (hereinafter PTIOD), the official appraisal institution, 
diagnosed Zhang’s disease as tuberculosis. Zhang could not get any compensation 
because of this official appraisal. 
On 22 June 2009, Zhang requested the Hospital of Henan University to open his 
chest and take pictures of his lungs. In this extreme way Zhang provided irrefutable 
evidence of serious pneumoconiosis. PTIOD had to change its previous decision and 
confirmed that Zhang was entitled to apply for the industrial injury compensation. 
                                                        
1 Chunxia Gong’s 2010 PhD thesis, The Supply of the Rural Public Goods and the Choice of Farm Land System, 
Hua Zhong University of Science and Technology.  
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However, the hospital that provided irrefutable evidence was criticized harshly by the 
Henan Health Department, the superior of the hospital. It criticized that the hospital 
did not gain the qualification to diagnose occupational diseases.
1
 The criticism did 
not mention Zhang’s right for compensation, but concentrated on the authority of 
PTIOD.  
According to the Report of Ministry of Health 2009, 14,495 persons had 
pneumoconiosis, 748 died. Pneumoconiosis was the most serious occupational 
disease  (which was 79.96% of the total occupational disease).
2
 The 16,000,000 
enterprises caused occupational diseases directly because of bad working 
environment. 200 million people were affected and 140 million of them were 
peasant-labors.
3
 It would cost too much for every peasant-labor to fight for 
compensation. Why was it so difficult for Zhang to get the official certification of 
pneumoconiosis? Why was the hospital blamed for the diagnosis? The underlying 
cause was that Zhang as a ‘peasant’ was not involved into the social security 
insurance system. Chinese medical insurance and subsistence allowances were not 
applicable to rural areas so that 900 million peasants had to pay for their own 
medical treatments. In the design of social security insurance system, the majority 
(90% of the Chinese population) was unfortunately put into the least benefit situation. 
If, however, they could participate into the lawmaking system, the situation might be 
different. 
Another example showed the flaws and blanks in hasty legislation. On 16 
September 2008, the National Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine published the Report on the Sampling Inspection on the Composition of 
Milk Products: In the inspection of 491 products of 109 enterprises, 69 products of 
                                                        
1 See Haichao Zhang stated, Hui Liu wrote, The Truth of My Chest, Shangjie Chengxiang Zhifu 商界城乡致富, 
(2009), vol.9, pp.30-32. Qiao Zheng, Expose the Inside Story of Official Appraisal for Occupational Diseases, 
Law and Life, (2009), vol.19, p35. see also http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2009-07-10/032718191682.shtml, 
http://news.sohu.com/20090729/n265556646.shtml, and 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/employment/2009-07/22/content_11753354.htm 
2 See the Report of Ministry of Health 2009: 
http://www.moh.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/mohwsjdj/s5854/201004/47129.htm 
3 Hao Zhou, Nan Wang and Deqiang Wang, A Study of Peasant-Labors Occupational Diseases Reality and Legal 
Protections, Legal System and Social Society,(2009), vol.10, pp. 346-347.  
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22 enterprises contained melamine, an industrial chemical used to produce plastic.
1
 
Before this investigation, the products of domestic well-known brands were ‘national 
inspection-free products’. Illegal milk dealers knew those products did not need 
inspection, so they used melamine as a protein powder to boost false protein readings 
of the milk products.
2
 Contaminated milk products killed more than six babies and 
infected 294,000 infants; and the milk crisis started two years ago.
3
 Food Safety 
Law of the People’s Republic of China was made in 2009 after controversial debates 
on the food safety and public health. However, the law included no standards, no 
timeline, no budget, no procedure for obtaining the input of regulated parties and no 
clear way to resolve disputes. Like Mr. Steven M. Dickinson remarked, 
‘without…effective private sanctions, the standards imposed by the new food-safety 
law are unlikely to have any real effect’.
4
 
The above six examples were not isolated and marginal cases, but typical cases 
relating to the masses. From the above representative cases, we may catch a glimpse 
of the major problems of Chinese lawmaking: laws were made in a bureaucratic 
thinking mode; lawmaking lacked public participation; the majority’s genuine 
requests and individual rights were less concerned; laws were made hastily to 
assuage popular indignation after the crisis. Realizing those problems, the public 
started to influence legislation. Common people’s rights were more stressed and 
valued in new legislations including the Property Law of the People s Republic of 
                                                        
1 About the milk crisis see reports on http://news.sohu.com/20080917/n259590366.shtml, see also 
http://www.un.org.cn/cms/p/news/27/826/content.html 
2 Yili Zhang, The Ignored Infants affected by Sanlu Milk crisis, People Digest 2010, vol.2, pp.32-33. After this 
milk crisis the China Dairy Industry Association announced that 22 Chinese producers would provide one-time 
compensation payments to victims whose infants contracted kidney stones and urinary problems from milk. 
Victims of tainted milk-powder could receive up to 200,000 Yuan ($29,000) compensation from major dairy 
companies. Families of hospitalized babies would receive compensation around 30,000 to 50,000 Yuan. 
3 Since December 2007, Sanlu Group co., ltd, the milk company which was first disclosed of adding melamine to 
milk power, had received several consumers’complaints about infants adverse reactions of the Sanlu milk power. 
Sanlu Company did not pay much attention to their complaints until April 2008 when the complaints continually 
rising. In mid May Sanlu Company had already tested their products and was aware that abnormal compositions 
existed but not until July did they send their products to the official quarantine organs for inspection. When they 
were told by the official quarantine organ that 15 of the 16 product samples contained melamine, they did not 
warn the public and recall their products; they did not stop selling their products.See serious reports on Lianhe 
Zaobao (singapore) http://www.zaobao.com/special/china/milk/milk.shtml; see also 
http://news.sohu.com/20090101/n261527075.shtml 




China 2007, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Employment Contracts 
2007, the Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China 2009, and the Draft of 
the Social Insurance Law. These lawmaking activities showed a shift from the 
national-economy-centered to the people’s-livelihood-centered. Law became more 
than ‘a rubber stamp’ or something symbolic. It should not be the rulers’ mechanism 
for social control exclusively. It could contribute to the improvements of people’s 
livelihoods also.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I disclosed the major characteristics of Chinese lawmaking. In 
the Chinese legal system, administrative and economic laws were the main body of 
the system. They were more than four times of the civil and commercial laws. I 
interpreted the priority of economic and administrative laws that were designed to 
rectify mistakes of egalitarianism which appeared in the movement of People’s 
Communes in late 1950s. After discussing the background theory, Deng Xiaoping’s 
theory of the economic and legal reform, I pointed out that the reform had obvious 
achievements. It was worthy of compliments in the justification of the first stage that 
illustrated in the theory, i.e., letting some people become richer than others. The 
economic reform, however, did not accomplish its second and third stages, i.e., 
letting the rich to assist the others to reach common prosperity. The government as 
well as the rich should take ‘the responsibility of assistance’ as a legal obligation in 
the Chinese context because this obligation was a pre-supposed condition of the 
economic reform. And the rich should be abided by this social contract (the 
economic reform in the Chinese context) to which they ‘signed’. Wide gaps between 
the rich and poor, however, showed the fact that the rich took benefits from the social 
contract but refuse to comply with their duties. After pointing out the problems 
existed in the Chinese lawmaking mode, I believed that the purpose of lawmaking 
should shift from the economic-centered to social justice-centered.  
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I discussed the legitimate problem in Chinese lawmaking system. In my 
research I disclosed that SCNPC as the representative of the elite was the dominant 
institution of lawmaking. Laws made by SCNPC were more than that made by the 
National Congress, NPC, or, the representative of the people. The legitimacy of 
representativeness of SCNPC thus needed to be justified further. Conflicts in laws 
made by NPC and SCNPC also led to difficulties in the application of law. Besides, 
conflicts in macro-economic policies and common people’s livelihoods; efficient 
lawmaking and democratic representation system; and bureaucratic lawmaking and 
individual rights added difficulties to lawmaking and the application of law. It 
became a dilemma of Chinese lawmaking: Which is more important, to promote the 
development of the state or that of the individual? The official justifications put more 
emphasis on the state than on the individual. This problem was caused by the 
top-down and irreversible and non-interactive lawmaking mode. After discussing and 
criticising the problems of the reality, I will turn to the background theses of the 













From the previous chapter we can see that the Chinese lawmaking mode is not 
communicative. The most important lawmakers, representatives of SCNPC, are 
nominated exclusively by the presidium of NPC. And NPC as the top legislature are 
constituted by less than 0.23‰ of the whole population from four indirect elections. 
The structure of the legislature is a top-down mode. Since the legal reform 1997, 
Chinese society is a typical pyramid structure also. The few rich persons have more 
privileges in society and have more ‘power of discourse’. What is the background 
ideology of this top-down lawmaking mode? In this chapter I will discuss the 
background themes of Chinese non-communicative lawmaking.  
I will start from the traditional Chinese philosophy Confucianism, to disclose 
Chinese ideology of ‘order’. Then I will go to contemporary dominant ideology, 
                                                        
1. The Master said, ‘He who rules by means of his virtue is like the north polar star, which remains in its place and 
all the other stars turn towards it.’ ‘If the people are guided by law, and kept in order by punishment, they may try 
to avoid crime, but have no sense of shame. If they are guided by virtue, and kept in order by the rules of 
propriety, they will have a sense of shame, and moreover will come to be good.’ The Analects of Confucius, Book 




Chinese Marxism, to analyze the logic of legitimation thesis in Chinese lawmaking. 
After my criticism of these two ‘official’ ideologies, I will also introduce and analyze 
a legal conception with Chinese characteristics, the hidden rule (Qian Gui Ze 潜规
则), which represents Chinese social recognition of law. From these three ideologies 
we can see that the supporting value of ‘non-communicative’ lawmaking were 
‘order’ and ‘submission’. 
 
CONFUCIAN LAWMAKING 
Confucianism established a humanistic concept of ‘order’ which confirmed the 
rationality of differences of people in relation to their different status. ‘Order of 
different status’ (Cha Xu Ge Ju, 差序格局) was one of the most important themes of 
Confucianism. This recognition of ‘order’ supported a top-down mode lawmaking. 
In traditional China, orders from Tian (天 sky)，Di (地 land)， Jun (君 emperor)，
Qin (亲 patriarch)，and Shi (师 teacher) were five legitimated authorities.1 People 
should be subordinate to these five powers. Orders from these five authorities were 
absolute commands and people should obey them strictly. Tian and Di regulated 
natural rules. Jun regulated political and legal rules. Qin was in charge of the social 
order that was constituted by families. Shi was about the education, which could also 
be seen as the procedure of learning and obeying the rules. The meaning of ‘order of 
different status’ here means a person’s different status when confronting these five 
authorities: one is a Cang Sheng (苍生 creature) to Tian and Di,  Chen Ming (臣民 
subject) to Jun, Wan Bei (晚辈 successor) to Qin, and Di Zi (弟子 student) to Shi. In 
these five relationships, one is always in a status of submission. 
In Confucianism, people should obey to the natural rules and live a harmonious 
life. Confucius was a sage and founder of Chinese culture. He became ‘the secular 
                                                        




lawmaker’ in his seventies.
1
 Through editing chronicle Chun Qiu (春秋 Spring and 
Autumn Annals), making collation of ancient literatures Li, Yue, Shi, Shu (礼乐诗书
rites, music, poetry and other official literatures), and teaching his theory of virtue, 
politics and knowledge, Confucius introduced and established a set of normative 
discourse to the whole society. In his summary of his life, Confucius made a 
well-known statement, which was also the ideal life mode for every Chinese: 
子曰：‘五十有五而志于学，三十而立，四十不惑，五十而知天命，六十而
耳顺，七十而从心所欲，不逾矩。’  
（The Master said, ‘At fifteen I set my heart on learning. At thirty I could stand 
firm. At forty I had no doubts. At fifty I knew the Tian Ming (the natural rules). At 
sixty I was already obedient (to these rules). At seventy I could follow the desires of 
my heart without overstepping the boundaries (of natural rules).’2 
In the above quote, Tian Ming (天命 the natural rules, the order of Tian) was 
translated as Decree of Heaven in Pan Fuen and Wen Shaoxia’s edition of the 
Analects of Confucius. But we should notice that Tian Ming was different from the 
will of God in Western philosophy. Tian Ming was Confucius’ positivistic 
observation and interpretation of natural rules. It was the ultimate source of his ideal 
morality. Tian (天) literately referred to sky in Chinese. In Confucianism Tian (天) 
was not a religious concept or a transcendental realm, but referred to the objective 
existence of natural rules. In a question of the rule of Tian, the Master said, ‘Does 
Heaven speak? The four seasons run their courses, and all things are continually 
being produced. Does Heaven speak?’ Tian He Yan Zai? Si Shi Xing Yan, Bai Wu 
Sheng Yan, Tian He Yan Zai? (‘天何言哉？四时行焉，百物生焉，天何言哉？’)3 In 
such a question and his answer, he supposed that Tian spoke in the natural rules: four 
seasons and all creatures spoke for Tian. He in another dialogue with a scholar stated 
that no one could deceive Tian, or disobey the natural rule. ‘Wu Qi Shei? Qi Tian 
Hu?’ (‘吾欺谁？欺天乎？’ …whom do I deceive? Do I deceive Heaven?)4  
                                                        
1 Zhong Yu, 喻中， Confucius and Socrates, 自由的孔子与不自由的苏格拉底, (2009), Beijing, China Renmin 
University Press, p.12. 
2.The Analects of Confucius, Book II, Wei Zheng. 论语·为政第二 
3 The Analects of Confucius, Book XVII, Yang Huo. 论语·阳货十七. 
4.The Analects of Confucius, Book VIIII, Zi Han. 论语·子罕第九(When the Master was very ill, Zilu had some 
discilies to act as retainers to prepare for funeral affairs. During a better spell the Master said, ‘Long has the 
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Ming (命) literally means destiny in Ming Yun (命运) or decree in Ming Ling 
(命令). In Confucianism Ming (命) also referred to natural rules. A friend of 
Confucius was dying, Confucius was very sad and referred the result of death as 
Ming (命): ‘Wang Zhi, Ming Yi Fu!’ ( ‘亡之，命矣夫！’ Death is Ming, which is a 
natural rule).
1
 Different from Western ideals of eternally and revival of life, 
Confucianism represented an empirical observation of life. Every creature 
experiences birth, old age, sickness and death. These experiences were Ming (命) 
(the destiny and the natural rule) of human beings.  
Confucius knew Tian Ming after thirty-five years learning and observing the 
nature and the society. He learnt to obey Tian Ming since then and found freedom in 
his late years. He could follow the desires of his heart without overstepping the 
boundaries of natural rules. In Confucian freedom, natural rules (as the external 
limits) and desires of the heart (as the internal limits) should be respected and obeyed. 
When he knew and accepted these boundaries or limits of life, he found freedom. 
The Confucian summary of the natural rules and morality was also accepted and 
respected by his students, who popularized his theory in China. Tian Ming (天命) 
was not exclusive external rules. Everyone followed Tian Ming, and everyone 
experienced Tian Ming. For example, one should put more clothes on in winter is 
following Tian Ming; one should rest in his sickness and old age is following Tian 
Ming. Following Tian Ming one could be more free, and going against it one would 
suffer. 
From the discussion of Tian Ming we can see that in Confucianism one is not 
free because of Tian Ming. But one can be freer when he recognizes, accepts and 
obeys it. Confucius as ‘the secular lawmaker’ advised us to submit to rules for 
freedom. Tian Ming disclosed the relationship between man and the nature. 
Confucianism also provided a normative system based on the observation of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
conduct of Zhong You been deceitful! By pretending to have retainers when I have done, whom do I deceive? Do 
I deceive Heaven? Moreover, is it not better to die in the hands of you disciples than to die in the hands of 
retainers? And if I may not have a grand burial, shall I die by the roadside?’) 
1.The Analects of Confucius, Book VI, Yong Ye. 论语·雍也第六 
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interpersonal relationship, which was stated in a hierarchical order. In Confucian 
system, one’s rights and duties were decided according to his family and social status. 
The status was not absolute therefore his rights and duties were relative. One in a 
family can enjoy his patriarchy powers but he at the same time may be the son of his 
father, and therefore he should submit to another one’s patriarchy powers. The 
Confucian hierarchical order was provided to put the complex relationships into an 
ordered system. 
‘Order of different status’ (Cha Xu Ge Ju, 差序格局) emphasized the values 
‘order’ (Xu 序) and ‘difference’ (Bie 别). Apart from the five ‘natural’ relations (of a 
person with Tian, Di, Jun, Qin, Shi) that discussed previously, Confucian law 
expanded around five basic human relations, that between the ruler and the ruled 
(Jun Chen 君臣), that between parents and children (Fu Zi 父子), that between 
siblings (Xiong Di 兄弟), that between husband and wife (Fu Fu 夫妇), and that 
between friends (Peng You 朋友). The order emphasized that the juniors should 
respect and obey the elders, and the elders should love and take care of the juniors; 
that there should be differences between men and women, and women should obey 
men; that the ruled should be loyal and the ruler should be benevolent; and that 
friends should keep faith.
1
 If people obeyed this order, then the ruler was the (real) 
ruler (Jun Jun 君君), and the ruled was the (real) ruled (Chen Chen 臣臣). 
Otherwise, if they disobeyed the order, the ruler was not the ideal ruler (Jun Bu Jun 
君不君), and the ruled was no longer the ideal ruled (Chen Bu Chen 臣不臣). 
‘Order of different status’ in Confucianism emphasized submission (Cong 从) 
and love (Ai 爱) also. The respected person (the ruler, parents, husband, elder) 
should love the humble person (the ruled, children, wife, junior); the humble should 
submit to the respected. People were firstly differentiated from each other (Bie 别), 
and then put in a hierarchical order (Xu 序). In this order, the people at the top of the 
hierarchy should love (Ai 爱) people of a lower grade, and ‘the lower’ should submit 
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to (Cong 从) ‘the higher’. In this Chinese traditional ethics, love (Ai 爱), difference 
(Bie 别) and submission (Cong 从) constituted the order (Xu 序).  
In this ‘order of different status’, love (Ai) was a core value. It softened the 
other three values: difference, submission and order. Without love, the ‘order of 
different status’ would lead to plain inequality, exploitation and oppression. Love (Ai)   
was also known as humanity (Ren 仁).1 Ren, ‘to love people’, started from one’s 
close blood relationships, especially from loving one’s father and brother. In an 
interpretation of Ren,  ‘Xiao Di Ye Zhe, Qi Wei Ren Zhi Yu Yi’ (‘孝悌也者，其为仁
之与欤’), filial piety and brotherhood were seen as the root of Ren.2 Love in 
Confucianism was differentiated by different status in one’s relationships with others. 
Ren (仁 humanity) was interpreted by second-order values further, including Xiao (孝
filial piety)、Di (弟 brotherhood)、Zhong (忠 loyalty)、Shu (恕 forbearance)、Li (礼
courtesy)、Zhi (知 wisdom)、Yong (勇 braveness)、Gong (恭 respect)、Kuan (宽
tolerance)、Xin (信 faithfulness)、Ming (敏 agility)、and Hui (惠 kindness).3 Those 
second-order values were all related to one’s multiple relationships with other 
persons, especially their family members. Confucian laws were to protect different 
status in these relationships and to punish disobedience. 
Loving people (Ai Ren) or humanism in Confucianism were different from 
Western humanism. Western humanism valued individuals’ freedom and personality, 
especially the natural inborn individual rights. In Chinese literatures, Western 
humanism was translated as Ren Wen Zhu Yi (人文主义)，Ren Dao Zhu Yi (人道主
义)，or Ren Quan Zhu Yi (人权主义).4 Chinese humanism was Ren Ben Zhu Yi (人本
主义). In Western humanism, Ren in Ren Quan Zhu Yi (人权主义) referred to 
independent isolated individuals. In Chinese humanism, Ren in Ren Ben Zhu Yi (人本
主义) referred to social beings. In Chinese humanism, a person was born and lived in 
                                                        
1 Zhongxin Fan 范忠信, The Basic Spirit of the Tradition of Chinese Law, 中国法律传统的基本精神 
Shandong, Shandong Renmin Publishing House, (2001), p.404. 
2 The Analects of Confucius, Book I, XueEr. 论语·学而第一. 
3 Hegao Yang, History of Chinese Legal Thoughts, (2000). Beijing, Beijing University, p.51. 
4 Zhongxin Fan 范忠信, The Basic Spirit of the Tradition of Chinese Law, 中国法律传统的基本精神 
Shandong, Shandong Renmin Publishing House, (2001), p.20. 
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relationships and was never isolated from the society. A person’s responsibilities to 
the relationship that he belonged were more important than his personal desires.      
Another characteristic of Chinese humanism was that its practical route was 
from the inside to the outside in a structure of ‘concentric circles’, or a ‘water wave’ 
structure (figure 3.1): firstly, Confucianism emphasized Wei Ren You Ji (‘为仁由己’), 
which means ‘virtue comes from yourself to the outside, not from the outside to 
you’.
1
 And secondly, the closer the relationships, the more rights and responsibilities 
one had. In Confucianism, relationships are classified by one’s status to another in 
the ‘hierarchical order of different status’. Accordingly, the law regulated that the 
closer the relationship, the respected persons (the ruler, parents, husband, elder of a 
family) had lighter punishments, while the humble persons (the ruled, children, wife, 
junior) had more severe punishments.
2
 As a contrast, in the well-known metaphor of 
Western humanism, ‘you shall love your neighbor as yourself’, we see a parallel 
structure of love, or love on the basis of equality. This parallel structure implied an 
equal treatment to others and a dichotomous classification between the self (or the 
inside) and the others (the outside).  
fig.3.1 a water-wave structure  
Transcendental values in Western philosophies were from the outside (the will 
                                                        
1 The Analects of Confucius, Book I, Yan Yuan.论语·颜渊第十二.颜渊问仁.子曰：‘克己复礼为仁.一日克己
复礼，天下归仁焉.为仁由己，而由人乎哉？’ 
2 The according punishment system was also known as Zhun Wu Fu Yi Zhi Zui, 准五服以制罪. Regulated since 
Laws of Jin Dynasty (267A.D.). Chinese system of kinship concealment, Qin Shu Rong Ying 亲属容隐制度 also 
reflected this ‘water-wave’ structure of practicing humanism. 
 
 82 
of God did not exist in ignorant people in Socrates’ argument). Chinese humanism 
emphasized ‘to put oneself in another’s position’ (Tui Ji Ji Ren, 推己及人), which 
was a ‘deduction’ from the inside to the outside. By comparing Confucius with 
Socrates, interesting contrasts between Chinese and Western philosophies appeared. 
Socrates was put into prison in his seventies when Confucius became ‘the secular 
lawmaker’ at the same age. As a messenger of God, Socrates faced difficulties with 
other people’s acceptance of his theory because Socrates supposed that the will of 
God did not exist in people but him. Socrates believed that he had a responsibility to 
enlighten others. However, he supposed that the belief of others was the antithesis of 
his. Therefore he had to impose his belief on others and wake up others because to 
him others were ‘in their sleep’ and ignorant. The result was that he faced attacks 
from those ‘ignorant’ people and was punished to death. The Socrates’ dilemma 
existed in the difficult choice between freedom and virtue: He chose to be abided by 
the command of God and to practice virtue. However, he attempted to persuade 
others to give up their free will (freedom in a conceptual sense): 
‘Men of Athens, I honour and love you; but I shall obey God rather than 
you, and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and 
teaching of philosophy, exhorting any one whom I meet and saying to him after 
my manner: You, my friend,--a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of 
Athens,--are you not ashamed of heaping up the greatest amount of money and 
honour and reputation, and caring so little about wisdom and truth and the 
greatest improvement of the soul, which you never regard or heed at all? And if 
the person with whom I am arguing, says: Yes, but I do care; then I do not leave 
him or let him go at once; but I proceed to interrogate and examine and 
cross-examine him, and if I think that he has no virtue in him, but only says that 
he has, I reproach him with undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the less.  
And I shall repeat the same words to every one whom I meet, young and old, 
citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my brethren.  
For know that this is the command of God; and I believe that no greater good 
has ever happened in the state than my service to the God.’1   
The Socrates’ argument was widely accepted in Western philosophy. ‘Wisdom’ 
was believed better than ‘ignorance’ in Western philosophy. We see such famous 
                                                        
1 Plato, Apology, Benjamin Jowett trans. Online text from http://www.gongfa.com/apology.txt 
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words from John Stuart Mill: ‘It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig 
satisfied. Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool or the 
pig is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their side of the question’.
1
 
When wisdom was accepted, those ignorant people in Socrates judgment should give 
up their own insistence of desires. The freedom of being ignorant was thus criticized 
and abandoned.  
The Socrates’ argument was different from Confucian way of persuasion. 
Confucius made distinctions in teaching different students. He developed a teaching 
principle: teaching students according to their abilities. He never forced others to 
accept his standard and knowledge so that Confucius relationships with people and 
the ruler were not so tense as Socrates’ with the ignorant. In a reply to a criticism, 
Confucius showed his humorous: A man of Daxiang said, ‘Great indeed is the 
Master Kong (Confucius)! His learning is extensive, and yet he has no speciality to 
render his name famous.’
 2
 The man implied that Confucius knew lots of things but 
could do nothing to make a living. Indeed, Confucius and other Chinese scholars did 
not know how to cultivate the land, or raise live stocks, or do business, or fight as a 
soldier. When the Master heard this he said to his disciples, ‘What shall I take up? 
Shall I take up chariot-driving? Or shall I take up archery? I think I will take up 
chariort-driving.’ 
3
 Confucius did not blame the man. He thought the man was right 
and he thought he could learn chariot-driving to support his life. He absorbed advices 
from the man rather than retorted upon him. Confucius’ students thus summarized 
four characteristics of Confucius: ‘From four things the Master was entirely free. He 
made no arbitrary conjectures. He was never stubborn, obstinate, and egotistic.’
4
 A 
high minister asked why Confucius had various abilities. Confucius replied that 
when he was young he was in humble circumstances, so he learnt many things 
                                                        
1 Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1906, p.260. 
2.The Analects of Confucius, Book VIIII, Zi Han. 论语·子罕第九: 达巷党人曰：‘大哉孔子！博学而无所成
名.’子闻之，谓门弟子曰：‘吾何执？执御乎？执射乎？吾执御也.’ 
3 Ibid. 





 Different from Socrates who worried that other people did not 
know the truth ( that only Socrates knew), Confucius worried that he did not know 
(the truth of) other people.
2
 Western philosophies represented by Socrates discussed 
external limitations imposed to a subject (from the outside to the inside). Chinese 
philosophies represented by Confucius stressed an individual recognition of the 
world (from the inside to the outside). 
In this section I discussed Confucian ‘hierarchical order of different status’ and 
‘water-wave’ structure of humanism. I believe that they supported Chinese traditional 
top-down lawmaking ideology because both the Confucian order and the structure of 
Chinese humanism emphasized the submission from the humble persons to the 
respected in social relationships. Although Ren (love) in Confucianism stressed the 
benevolence of the persons of higher status, it did not alter the top-down structure of 
the order. 
 
FOUR JUSTIFICATIONS IN CHINESE MARXISM 
Confucianism, however, was no longer the dominant philosophy of China since 
the New Culture Movement in 1919. The legitimation of authority was justified by 
Chinese Marxism officially (especially represented by thoughts of Chinese leaders 
Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping) since then. Legitimate lawmaking was no longer 
justified by status or virtue that emphasized in Confucianism. The ‘different love’ in 
Confucianism was substituted by equality in Chinese Marxism. In this section I will 
discuss Chinese Marxism. I will disclose the inner logic of four justifications in 
Chinese Marxism, by doing so I aim to interpret the top-down lawmaking mode in 
Chinese Marxism.   
A direct cause of choosing Marxism as the theoretic support for Chinese modern 
                                                        
1.The Analects of Confucius, Book VIIII, Zi Han. 论语·子罕第九: 太宰问于子贡曰：‘夫子圣者与？何其多
能也？’子贡曰：‘固天纵之将圣，又多能也.’子闻之，曰：‘太宰知我乎？吾少也贱，故多能鄙事.君子
多乎哉？不多也.’ 
2.The Analects of Confucius, Book I, XueEr. 论语·学而第一: 子曰：‘不患人之不己知，患不知人也.’ 
 
 85 
construction of the state was the disappointment of the result of the Paris Peace 
Conference. In January 1919, the Paris Peace Conference (hereinafter PPC) was held 
to set the peace terms for Germany and other defeated nations. China was a 
victorious nation and she sent a delegation led by Lu Zhengxiang, to attend the 
conference. Instead of rewarding China for its contribution to the Allies’ victory, the 
conference passed the Versailles Treaty of April 1919, and transferred German 
colonial privileges in Shangdong Province to Japan. The Chinese delegation required 
that Shandong province should be returned to China. It called for an end to colonial 
institutions including extraterritoriality, legation guards, and foreign leaseholds. 
These requests were refused by the conference. The Chinese delegation was the only 
one that did not sign the Treaty of Versailles at the signing ceremony.  
‘Might overcome right’ was the lesson that Chinese learnt from the conference. 
Chinese territory was carved up by the powerful states. Even when China was a 
victorious nation of the World War I, the powerful states still refused to listen to 
China’s rightful requests. This conference was unfair to China, and it directly caused 
the May Fourth Movement (Wu Si Yun Dong 五四运动), which was also named as 
the New Culture Movement (Xin Wen Hua Yun Dong新文化运动). Chinese scholars 
realized that the Western concepts of the right and peace were not applied universally 
to all states. They were slogans for the imperialistic states to carve up the world. 
Chinese scholars started to pay attention to the Russian Revolution of 1917 and its 
supporting philosophy, Marxism. After the Great October Socialist Revolution, many 
articles of Marxism appeared in Chinese journals.
1
 The earliest leaders and founders 
of the Communist Party of China, including Dazhao Li, Duxiu Chen, and Qiubai Qu, 
all published articles about the Russian Revolution, Socialism and Marxism in that 
era.
2
 Marxism was used to justify the revolution against imperialism, 
                                                        
1 Yuanpei Cai 蔡元培, The Political Works of Cai Yuanpei, 蔡元培政治论著，Heibei Remin Publishing House, 
(1985), p.197. 
2 Yuan Liu 柳媛, the Enlightenment of Marxism in China, 论中国的马克思主义启蒙, Journal of Ideological 
and Theoretical Education, 2008, vol.3, p.36. Liqun Zhang, 张立群, the Cultural Self-realization of Marxists in 
May Fourth Era, 五四时期中国马克思主义者的文化自觉, Journal of Shengli College China University of 
Petroleum, (2008), vol.1, pp.30-32. 
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bureaucrat-capitalism and feudalism in China. It was also used to legitimate the 
leadership of the working class. At that time, Marxism-Leninism was the source of 
thoughts to guide the Chinese revolution. 
From 1949 to 1980s, Chinese research of Marxism tended toward 
‘fundamentalism’. And the topics discussed were about productivity, relations of 
production, the economic base and superstructure, contradiction, the identity of 
opposites, the struggle of opposites, objectivity and subjective capability.
1
 Criticisms 
of fundamentalism appeared in 1980s. Discussion at that time re-discovered the 
practical materialism in Marxism. In 1978, a national debate on ‘the standards of 
examining truth’ became the focus of the criticism of the fundamentalism Marxism in 
China. The criticism re-emphasized the importance of testing a theory through social 
practice rather than through ideological allegiance.
2
 Since then, Chinese Marxism 
concerned specific and realistic social problems more. ‘Problem consciousness’ 
appeared in this period.
3
 The color of the socialistic political ideology was relatively 
blurred. Western theories (or the capitalistic ideology in some literatures) and 
multi-cultural elements were absorbed in China.
4
 Western Marxism or Neo-Marxism 
and Postmodern Marxism were also introduced and absorbed into Chinese Marxism 
since then. Works of Lukács, Korsch, Gramsci, Sartre, Lefebvre, Adorno, Marcuse, 
Della Volpe, Colletti, Althusser, Habermas, Derrida, Barry; Bourdieu, Mann, 
Runciman; Stiglitz, Sen, Dasgupta were introduced widely in China. They were also 
the theoretical resources of Chinese Marxism.
5
 Topics of humanism and human 
                                                        
1 Xinyan Wang, The Paradigm for Research on Marxist Philosophy in Contemporary China, Social Sciences in 
China, (2008), p.9.  
2 The national discourse was caused by an article by Hu Fuming, Practice is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth, 
实践是检验真理的唯一标准, Guangming Daily, 11 May 1978. This famous event is also named as a favorable 
turn in Chinese modern history. 
3 Zhengli Sun 孙正聿, Studies on Contemporary Chinese Marxism, Journal of Henan University (Social Science) 
(2005) vol.4, pp.6-8. 
4 Zhen Li, 黎珍，A Study of Contemporary Chinese Marxism CPC Ideology, Journal of Xue Xiao Dang Jian Yu 
Si Xiang Jiao Yu, 学校党建与思想教育, (2009), vol.9, pp. 14-26. 
5 Xiaomei Huang and Zelin Lei, Issues of Chinese Marxism Philosophy since Thirty Years of Enforcing the 
Opening and Reform, Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law Yanjiusheng, 中南财经政法大学
研究生学报，(2008), vol.3, pp.91-92. See also Yuepeng Ren, 任岳鹏 Introduction of Western Marxism, in 




dissimilation, modernity and postmodernity, multiple values and win-win 
negotiations were all inspired by the development of Marxism.  
A widely accepted interpretation of Chinese Marxism was that it was the 
Chinese practice of Marxism, or an integration of Marxism and the Chinese 
practice.
1
 The representative Chinese Marxism theories were Thoughts of Mao 
Zedong, Theories of Deng Xiaoping and the Three-represent (San Ge Dai Biao Li 
Lun 三个代表理论) Theory. The core of Chinese Marxism was stated as ‘the 
scientific concept of development’ （Ke Xue Fa Zhan Guan 科学发展观）.2 Chinese 
Marxism valued practical and realistic attitude. It proposed seeking truth from facts.
3
 
The facts referred to the historical and traditional roots of Chinese culture as well as 
the realistic problems of contemporary China. Chinese Marxism aimed to disclose 
and examine truth relying on legacy and reality.
4
  
As far as I am concerned, the legitimization of Chinese lawmaking was 
constituted by the following four justifications in Chinese Marxism: the 
revolutionists’ law; the people’s congress; the working class’ law; and the 
‘democratic dictatorship’. I will introduce their meaning and their inner logic in this 
section. I will also disclose the deficiencies of these four justifications. 
1. The revolutionists’ law: the first justification 
The legitimacy of lawmaking in Chinese Marxism was interpreted as the 
contributions of the revolutionists including the leading party, i.e., the Communist 
Party of China (hereinafter CPC) and its instructive philosophies, i.e., 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought. In the preamble of the Constitution, 
CPC’s historic contributions were confirmed:  
‘After waging protracted and arduous struggles, armed and otherwise, along a 
                                                        
1 Laigui Feng, From the Localization of Marxism in China to Chinese Marxism—the Transformation of the 
Research Visual Angle and the Transfer of the Focal Point of Research, Journal of Shangrao Normal College, 
(2008), vol.4, p.1. 
2 The Speech of Hu Jingtao on 28 July 2003 at the 17th CPC national congress. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/24/content_6938568_2.htm  
3 Xiaoping Deng, Works of Xiaoping Deng, vol.2, Beijing,People’s Publishing House, (1993), p.278. 
4 Zedong Mao, Works of Zedong Mao, vol.2, Beijing, People’s Publishing House, (1991), pp.533-534. also see 
Xinyan Wang, The Paradigm for Research on Marxist Philosophy in Contemporary China, Social Sciences in 
China, (2008), p.5.  
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zigzag course, the Chinese people of all nationalities led by the Communist Party of China with 
Chairman Mao Zedong as its leader ultimately, in 1949, overthrew the rule of imperialism, 
feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, won a great victory in the New-Democratic Revolution 
and founded the People's Republic of China. Since then the Chinese people have taken control 
of state power and become masters of the country.’ ‘Both the victory in China's 
New-Democratic Revolution and the successes in its socialist cause have been achieved by the 
Chinese people of all nationalities, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and 
the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, by upholding truth, correcting 
errors and surmounting numerous difficulties and hardships.’
1
 
This affirmance contributed to the legitimacy of lawmaking by the 
revolutionists of the new legal system. The logic of this justification was that the 
lawmakers were legitimate to make new laws because they were ‘the benefactor’ of 
the new socialistic legal system. And their laws were still legitimate because they 
were supported by the majority and they represented the will of the majority.  
 ‘Three-represent theory’ was the recent illustration of this justification. 
‘Three-represent theory’ was introduced by the former CPC general secretary and 
Chinese former President Zemin Jiang on 25 February, 2002, on an inspection tour in 
Guangdong province. He summarized the seventy year history of CPC and 
concluded that 
‘Our party has always won the support of the people because in revolution, 
construction and reform over the various historical periods, the Party has always 
represented the developmental needs of China's advanced production capacity, represented 
the progressive direction of China's advanced culture, and represented the fundamental 
interests of the broad majority; in establishing the development of the correct lines, 
principals and policies, the Party has untiringly struggled to realize the Nation and 
People's fundamental interests’ 2  
As we can see from the above quote, the Three-represent Theory contained 
three arguments: firstly, in the economic aspect: the CPC represented the 
development trend of China’s most advanced productive forces; secondly, in the 
cultural aspect: it represented the orientation of China’s most advanced culture; and 
thirdly, in the political aspect: it represented the fundamental interests of the 
overwhelming majority of Chinese. The previous seventy-year contribution was used 
                                                        
1 See the Constitution, preamble. 
2 Zeming Jiang, To Execute the Three Represents in a New Historical Circumstance, Anthology of Jiang Zeming, 
vol.III, The People’s Publishing House, 2006, p.1. 
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to justify the CPC’s leadership and its lawmaking. This revolutionists’ logic was also 
used in the justification of the legitimacy of its future leadership: the CPC should be 
legitimate for its continuing leadership and future lawmaking. This logic implied that 
the lawmaking power was authorized to CPC. The legitimacy of lawmaking, 
however, was justified by the profits that the CPC could bring to the people, rather 
than relied on any transcendental values like justice and fairness.  
In the following metaphor I will discuss the problem of this justification. Let us 
suppose there was a very poor but big family which was bullied by other rich and 
strong families. A son (I named him Carl Zhong) of the family led the other family 
members to fight against the oppressors and he brought honors and fortunes to this 
family. The members of the family voted Carl as the head of the family. Carl then 
signed a contract with the family to guarantee that his offspring would be the 
exclusive candidates for the head of the family. The family members all agreed 
because they appreciated Carl’s great contribution to the family. Without Carl the 
family could not survive that special period.  
The second and third generations of this family accepted the leadership of the 
offspring of Carl. After several generations, the great great great great great… 
grandson of Carl, Carl XI was still the head of the big family Zhong, although he 
lacked the capacity of leadership. Another young man of the family wanted to 
candidate for the leadership and he asked for a democratic vote. Carl XI, however 
refused this proposal because according to the contract that signed by his 
great…father Carl with the family, only the direct blood offspring of Carl was 
eligible for the position. The young man argued that ‘we need a democratic 
decision!’ Carl XI replied that ‘it was a democratic decision! Our ancestors made law 
and lawmaking procedure democratically.’ Other family members agreed with their 
head and stated that ‘according to the law and the Rule of Law principle, only Carl 
XI and his direct blood offspring can be our head.’ 
The above metaphor showed the problem of the justification: Should the absent 
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offspring be abided by a (social) contract that signed by their ancestors. Could the 
offspring redeem the relinquished rights that were given up by their ancestors? What 
was the reason for the legitimacy of the contract? Is it the plain fact of its existence, 
or the people’s habitual obedience, or other reasons? In Carl XI’s story, the offspring 
could not change the law because a fair contract was signed by their ancestors. And 
the plain fact of the existence of the law self-attested its legitimacy.  
In the preamble of the Chinese Constitution, we could see similar justification 
logic for the unchanging leadership. The constitution authorized the revolutionists’ 
priority that gained through their contributions to the state. In this context, the 
legitimacy of the social contract was the plain fact of ‘offsprings’ habitual obedience 
to the contract. If, however, some transcendental values including freedom, justice or 
fairness, were adhered to the contract, this exclusive justification on ancestors’ 
contributions was not sufficient.   
In the Three-represent theory, CPC started to justify the legitimacy by referring 
it to representativeness. It was a historical progress in Chinese constitutional theory 
because CPC started to relate the legitimation to the value of democracy, rather than 
a plain fact of the existence of authority. The relationship between the 
Three-represent theory and democracy, however, was an indirect relation because the 
claimed representativeness needed to be verified. If we still pressed for the 
legitimacy of revolutionists’ law from the perspective of ‘the absent offspring’, a 
further justification of the representative democracy was needed.  
 
2.The people’s congress: the second justification 
The representative democracy in China was supported by the theory of people’s 
congress. The Chinese lawmaking authority belonged to the congress, i.e., National 
People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter NPC) and its 
standing committee (hereinafter SCNPC), and was partly shared by the State Council 
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after the authorization of NPC.
1
 The legislative process of the NPC (and SCNPC) 
included introduction of a bill, deliberation and voting.
2
 The justification of the 
legitimacy of NPC’s lawmaking therefore was whether NPC represents the 
majority’s interests. This justification, however, was in conflicts with the first 
justification in which the majority’s interests were represented by the CPC (not NPC). 
In the Three-represent theory, the CPC’s leadership was regarded as to represent the 
will of the majority. Therefore the CPC’s leadership should be consistent with the 
system of the people’s congress.  
Therefore, a logical and practical solution for the consistency of the two 
justifications was to make members of CPC the majority of the congress. In the 11th 
SCNPC, the chairman and seven of the thirteen vice chairmen of the SCNPC were 
members of CPC (61.5%); in the 10
th
 SCNPC, the chairman and nine of fifteen vice 
chairmen were members of CPC (66.7%); in the 9
th
 SCNPC, the chairman and 
eleven of the nineteen were members of CPC (63.2%).
3
 If it were also the case of the 
representatives of the SCNPC and NPC, then the majority of the congress was 
members of CPC.
4
 Then the majority was indeed represented by CPC. In this sense 
the second justification (the representativeness of the congress) could be compatible 
with the first justification (the representativeness of CPC).  
However, we should notice that the nature of the second justification was 
representative democracy. Even if the members of CPC in the congress were the 
majority, this fact could not directly justify the representativeness of the congress 
                                                        
1 See LLC2000, article 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. 
2 See LLC2000, article 12, 13, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 37, 39, 40, and 50. 
3 Statistics were from resume of the chairman and vice chairmen of SCNPC,  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-11/15/content_2221419.htm.  
4 The information of representatives of SCNPC and NPC was published only about the name, gender and 
nationalities (ethnic groups).The proportion of members of CPC to the whole representatives could not be exactly 
investigated through official published resources. Some resource estimated that the percentage was about 60%, 
however, it did not offer the data source. Through the 2007 White Paper on Political Party System, we could see 
an official statistics that from 2003 to 2007, 1,770,000 Democratic Party members and personages together were 
voted as representatives of local and national congress. I did not find the total numbers of the whole 
representative from 2003 to 2007, however, from a 1994 statistics, there were 3,501,811 representatives for local 
and national congress for 1994, see (http://paper.dic123.com/paper_144736981/) the original source from the 
citation of SCNPC from the People’s Daily (the official newspaper). If we suppose 2003 to 2007 the number was 
5 times than the number of 1994, then the Democratic Party members were 0.10% of the total representatives in 
NPC and SCNPC. 
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because the majority of the NPC (as CPC members) could not prove that the majority 
of the whole population was represented by CPC or NPC members. According to the 
statistics of the Organization Department of the CPC, members of CPC were seventy 
six million until the end of 2008, which was seventeen times of the number in 1949.
1
 
Therefore by 2008 the proportion of members of CPC to the population was about 
5.77%. From the amount, members of CPC were not the majority of the people.  
In fact, in my view, the status of CPC membership should not be a necessary 
requirement for the NPC and SCNPC elections. The information published in the 
official websites was about names, genders and nationalities of the representatives. 
According to the Chinese constitution and the Electoral Law, all citizens of China 
who reached the age of 18 shall have the right to vote and stand for election, 
‘regardless of ethnic status, race, sex, occupation, family background, religious 
belief, education, property status or length of residence’.
2
 So the legal age was the 
only requirement of the candidates of representatives. The party membership was not 
a standard for the eligibility of candidates.  
The second justification (the people’s congress) therefore should refer to the 
representatives of the people rather than of the CPC. If this argument was tenable, 
then the first justification (the representativeness of CPC) should be adjusted to the 
quality of representativeness rather than the quantity, since the CPC members were 
not the majority in the amount. In Chinese Marxism the representativeness shifted 
from quantity representativeness to the advanced productivity representativeness (as 
I will discuss in the next section in Chinese Marxism the working class represented 
the advanced productivity). Chinese Marxism provided the third justification: the 
representativeness of the working class. 
 
                                                        
1  http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-06/30/content_11626985.htm; see also the Statistics of the 
Organization Department of CPC, Jun Dui Dang De Sheng Huo (军队党的生活), (2009), vol.8, p.82. 
2 See the Constitution, article 34; and the Electoral Law of the National People’s Congress and Local People’s 
Congresses of the People’s Republic of China, article 3.  
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3.The working class’ law: the third justification 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought were the officially recognized 
ideology of Chinese legal practice.
1
 In Marxism, equality was something the law 
could not help; the law only served to legitimate and mystify.
2
 The law was defined 
in Marxism as part of the superstructure. The law should be made by the ruling class, 
the working class in Chinese Marxism, (or the people; therefore ‘enemies of the 
people’ were excluded from lawmakers). The ‘enemies of the people’, those who 
were deprived of political rights officially, did not have the right to vote.
3
 The law of 
the ruling class was based on the ideology that the law was the instrument of the 
dominant class against the ruled. Therefore the law was not for the whole citizens of 
the country, but for a part of it. Un-freedom and inequality of the ‘public enemy’ 
before the law was thus constitutionally allowable.  
The Cultural Revolution happened from 1966 to 1976 exhibited well of a 
radical and unequal class-struggle that was tolerable in such a justification. On June 
1 1966, People’s Daily (人民日报) published the editorial ‘Wipe Out the Black 
Sheep!’ (Sao Chu Yi Qie Niu Gui She Shen 横扫一切牛鬼蛇神). The title of the 
editorial became the slogan of the subsequent tyranny of the majority.
4
 The ‘black 
sheep’ referred to the politicians who were categorized as capitalists, landlords, rich 
persons, and whoever against the people. In an estimation, more than 100,000 of 
such ‘public enemies’ were confiscated of possessions, and were assaulted and killed 
during the decade.
5
 Another coeval well-known slogan: ‘Like Father, Like Son!’ 
（Lao Zi Ying Xiong Er Hao Han, Lao Zi Fan Dong Er Hun Dan 老子英雄儿好汉，
                                                        
1 See the Constitution, preamble. 
2 M.D.A, Freeman, Marxist Theories of Law and State, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 7th ed., Sweet and 
Maxwell Ltd., (2001), p.972. 
3 See the Electoral Law of the People’s Republic of China1953, article 5. 
http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=65901 
4 Zhaogeng Meng, The Historical Background of the People’s Daily editorial ‘Wipe Out the Black Sheep’ in 
1966, Culture and History Monthly, (2008), vol 8, p.81. 
5 The source of amount is from the online literature documents for the 40th anniversary of the Cultural 
Revolution, http://www.stnn.cc/global/wg/wg10/t20060511_210361.htm 
http://www.hudong.com/wiki/%E6%96%87%E5%8C%96%E5%A4%A7%E9%9D%A9%E5%91%BD. In R.J. 
Rummer’s China’s Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900, Transaction Publishers, 1991, the 
amount of total death is about 7,730,000. Chinese scholars believed the amount should be no less than 2,000,000. 
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老子反动儿混蛋）represented the pedigree justification of the ruling class.1 The 
ruling class was legitimated relating to the first justification: the ruling class was the 
successor of the foremost lawgiver. The working class came from the people, 
represented the people, and fought against the enemies of the people. Although faults 
of the Cultural Revolution were rectified in 1979, the logic of pedigree domination 
and class-struggle was still remained in the preamble of the Constitution. 
The ruling class (the working class) in Chinese Marxism was referred to the 
industrial workers exclusively. The proletarian in the ‘old China’ (China before 1949), 
however, included both the industrial workers and the large amount of peasants. 
When CPC practiced Marxism in China, the force of the industrial workers was not 
strong enough to support the revolution, so the founders of Chinese Marxism started 
to include the peasants, the absolute majority of China, into proletarian. After several 
failures of city revolutions, CPC relied on the force of peasants, and made the 
strategy of ‘encircling the cities from the rural’. This practice led to the final victory 
of the Chinese socialistic revolution.
2
  
This practice was different from the original Marxism (which set an opposition 
between proletarian and bourgeois; between the oppressed and oppressors) and 
Russian Revolution (which was based on the industrial workers revolution). CPC 
announced to represent the proletarian and be the vanguard of the proletarian.
3
 At 
that time, the peasants were the major force of the Chinese revolution and the major 
body of Chinese proletarian. However, peasants were not recognized as the leading 
class of the revolution. In the first article of the Chinese Constitution, the working 
                                                        
1 In 1966, Luoke Yu wrote an article, On Parentage, and published on Shou Du, Zhong Xue Wen Ge Bao Press 
(首都中学文革报), vol.1,1967. This article was the rare theory arguing against the dominating parentage theory, 
and represented a political request for equality. Yu, however, was arrested in 1968 and sentenced to death in 1969. 
About Luoke Yu and the article, see Xiao Xu, Dong Ding, and Youyu Xu ed., Works and Memories of Yu Luoke, 
China Federation of Literary and Art Circles Publishing Corporation (hereinafter CFLACPC), 1999.  
2 Zhongping Chen and Hongbiao Liu, Rearch on the Forming Process of Theories of the Road of Village 
Surrounding the City, Journal of Chongqing University (Social Science), (2003), vol.9, pp.67-70. see also 
Shaoqun Huang and Hong Lai, The Comment on Zedong Mao’s Theory and Practice of ‘the countryside 
Encircling the Cities’, Journal of China Executive Leadership Acadmy Jinggangshan, (2008), vol.1, pp.76-84. 
3 On 25 June 1922 the CPC was firstly defined as the vanguard of the proletariats in the CPC’s Assessment of the 
Situation, see http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/8956/8967/20020914/822374.html. Also see Daming 
Gong, On the First Issue of the Communist Party of China’s Proposition to the Current Political Situation, Journal 
of Guizhou Normal University (Social Science), (2001), vol.4, pp.75-78. 
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class (industrial workers) was the leading class: ‘The People s Republic of China is a 
socialist state under the people s democratic dictatorship led by the working class 
and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.’
1
 The alliance of workers and 
peasants was the base for the socialist state and the working class was established as 
the ruling class in the Chinese Constitution.  
However, according to the Electoral Law of People’s Republic of China 1953, 
the population that represented by a rural delegate was eight times that of a citizen 
delegate in the election of national congress delegates. It meant every rural delegate 
had 1/8 vote comparing that of a citizen delegate.
2
 In the election of provincial and 
county congress delegates, the rural delegate had 1/5 and 1/4 vote.
3
 In the 1979 
amendment of the Electoral Law, these regulations still remained. In the amendment 
1995, every rural voter had 1/4 vote of a citizen.
4
 In the fourth amendment 2004, the 
1/4 vote regulation of the rural delegation was remained. The rural voter’s right of 
vote was 1/4 of a citizen’s. Therefore the rural residents did not have national 
treatment of the right of vote. Peasants (rural residents) were 70% population of 
China. Their total right of vote was less than 3/5 of the citizens [(1/4 x 70%) / (1 x 
30%) = 0.58]. Since the alliance of workers (in the city) and peasants (of the rural) 
was the base of the socialistic legal system, the unequal quota of votes should be 
changed. Otherwise it was in conflict with the national treatment principle in the 
Chinese Constitution. CPC as the vanguard of both of the working class and Chinese 
people and nation should pay more attention to the rural residents because they were 
the majority of the people.
 5
  
Even if we focused on the industrial workers of the production line exclusively, 
we found that they were not the major parties of NPC (Chinese congress) either. The 
cadres and intellectuals had been increasing since the 4
th
 NPC. They were almost half 
                                                        
1 The Constitution, article 1. 
2 See the Electoral Law of the People’s Republic of China1953, article 22. 
3 ibid, article 14 and 11.  
4 See the Electoral Law of the People’s Republic of China 1953 (1995 amended edition), articles 12, 13, 14, and 
16. 
5 See Constitution of the Communist Party of China, general program. 
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of the total representatives since the 6
th
 session (figure 3.2). Workers increased to the 
peak (28.2% of the total) in the 4
th
 session but then the number had been decreasing. 
In the 10
th
 session only 10.79% were worker representatives. Together with the 
peasants they were less than 20% of the total delegates.
1
 Statistics showed that the 
working class and the peasants were not the majority of the representatives. In the 
recent NPC (the 11
th
 session), according to the official record, worker delegates were 
double and the peasants delegates increase 70%. From Appendix II (A summary and 
analysis of the official position and occupation of the major provincial groups of the 
11th NPC representatives) we can see that in major provinces and cities, the majority 
of the NPC representatives were officials and the middle class of the society. The 
long titles after their names were the labels of success. Through the shift from 
proletarian to working class to the successful persons, the structure of the Chinese 
congress was changed accordingly. Therefore, the third justification, i.e., the law of 






workers peasants cadres intellectuals 
no % no % no % no % 
1 1226 100 8.16 63 5.14     
2 1226 69 5.6 67 5.46     
3 3040 175 5.75 209 6.87     
4 2885 813 28.2 662 22.9 322 11.2 346 11.99 
5 3500 935 26.71 720 20.59 468 13.38 523 14.96 
6 2978 443 14.9 348 11.7 636 21.4 701 23.5 
7 2970 684 together, 23% together 733 24.7 697 23.4 
8 2978 332 11.2 280 9.4 842 28.3 649 21.8 
9 2981 323 10.8 240 8 988 33.2 628 21.1 
10 2985 332 10.79 229 7.67 968 32.44 631 21.15 
 
                                                        
1 Statistics were from People’s Daily, New Characteristics and New Structure: Changes from 10 NPCs, 新的变
化新的构成—从十届全国人大代表名单看变化 4 March 2003. also see Guo Qingzhu, A Constitutional 
Consideration of the Occupation Structure of the NPC—A Case Study of a Xinjiang Event of Prohibition of 
Official Representatives, People’s Congress Study, (2009), vol.6, pp.11-15. 
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4.People’s democratic dictatorship: the fourth justification 
Chinese Marxism then provided the fourth justification of people’s democratic 
dictatorship. The fourth justification was also clearly stated in the preamble of the 
Constitution. In Chinese legal theory democratic dictatorship came from and was 




‘‘You are dictatorial.’ My dear sirs, you are right, that is just what we are. All the 
experience the Chinese people have accumulated through several decades teaches us to 
enforce the people's democratic dictatorship, that is, to deprive the reactionaries of the 
right to speak and let the people alone have that right.  
Who are the people? At the present stage in China, they are the working class, 
the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. These classes, led 
by the working class and the Communist Party, unite to form their own state and elect their 
own government; they enforce their dictatorship over the running dogs of imperialism -- 
the landlord class and bureaucrat-bourgeoisie, as well as the representatives of those 
classes, the Kuomintang reactionaries and their accomplices -- suppress them, allow them 
only to behave themselves and not to be unruly in word or deed. If they speak or act in an 
unruly way, they will be promptly stopped and punished. Democracy is practiced within 
the ranks of the people, who enjoy the rights of freedom of speech, assembly, association 
and so on. The right to vote belongs only to the people, not to the reactionaries. The 
combination of these two aspects, democracy for the people and dictatorship over the 
reactionaries, is the people's democratic dictatorship.’2 
 
The premise of the people's democratic dictatorship was that CPC represented 
people. They, on behalf of people, possessed and applied the dictatorial power to 
fight against ‘the reactionary forces’. In this justification, an implicit argument was 
that the democratic dictatorship was better than a complete dictatorship. This idea 
was also in accordance with Karl Marx’s idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It 
was unlike ‘dictatorship with absolute power’. 
3
 In Mao’s theory, the concept 
‘dictatorship’ was morally neutral. It did not contain a negative connotation like 
                                                        
1  Meisner, Maurice, Mao's China and After, 3rd Edition, New York: The Free Press, 1999, pp.58-60; 
MacFarquhar, Roderick; Fairbank, John King, Cambridge History of China: The People's Republic, Part 2 : 
Revolutions Within the Chinese Revolution, 1966-1982. Cambridge University Press (1991), p. 6. 
2 Zedong Mao, On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. IV, The People’s 
Publishing House (1961). 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_65.htm 
3 In Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Program 1875, dictatorship of the proletariat is at the political transition period, 
a stage between capitalist and communist society.  
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Western concepts of ‘dictator’ or ‘hegemon’. The democratic dictatorship in Mao’s 
theory referred to people’s democratic decisions and people’s dictatorship on their 
enemies. However, as Professor Bankowski also noticed, if the ‘democratic 
dictatorship’ referred to the dictatorship of the proletariat, then it is neither the 
proletariat nor is it democratic. 
Chinese lawmaking was interpreted by this democratic dictatorship principle: 
only the people had the democratic right to make laws; the enemies of the people 
were the object of the dictatorship so that they could not make laws. This idea was 
obviously different from the discussion on the universal equality of human beings. In 
democratic dictatorship two classes were presupposed and they were the ruling class 
as the people and the ruled class as the enemies. Inequality status of the ruling and 
the ruled was not obvious in the law. The content of the ruled class was changing and 
obscure. The democratic dictatorship was not equal to the majority decision principle 
or  democracy unless ‘the people’ was the majority. How to classify the people and 
the enemy? We lacked concrete standards in law. ‘The people’ in the context was a 
political concept and was not referring to the whole citizens of the country. The 
majority decision in the democratic dictatorship thus implied a moral judgment: the 
people’s decision should be superior to their enemies even when the latter was also 
the citizens of the country. The right to differentiate the people from the enemy of the 
country was therefore a vital privilege. The law, however, did not establish the 
standard of obtaining this privilege of classification.  
Who should get this privilege, and how? Was it appropriate to let ‘the people’ to 
decide who their enemies were? But who and how to decide which one belongs to 
the people? Can democracy principle be used in this democratic dictatorship? These 
questions let me think of the ostracism of ancient Greece. If the people had the 
decisive votes for the enemy, it certainly was not ‘democratic dictatorship’ any longer, 
but was indeed democracy. Even if the result of the democracy was wrong, or what 
we call the tyranny of the mass, the form was still the majority’s democracy. It was a 
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procedural or formal democracy. In a substantial democracy, however, the minority’s 
will should be respected also, in which presupposed Kantian value of morality and 
Rawls’ value of justice imbedded. The value of humanity required that we should not 
sacrifice the least advantaged group for the majority’s utility. In this sense, Chinese 
democratic dictatorship was dangerous because it could lead to a result that the law 
overlook the minority’s request, and put the least advantaged group into the category 
of ‘the enemy’. 
However, we should notice that the minority in the Chinese democratic 
dictatorship was not ‘the weak’ or the least advantaged group. The purpose of 
Chinese democratic dictatorship was to restrict great landlords and capitalists in the 
early stages of Chinese socialistic reform. In Mao’s speech, ‘the reactionaries’ (the 
enemy of the people) referred to those rich persons and corrupt officials who 
oppressed people and wanted to obstruct the socialistic reform. The number of these 
reactionaries was small but they possessed large amount of social wealth so that they 
could interfere with the reform greatly. Mao’s theory of democratic dictatorship was 
proposed 60 years ago. The theory could also be used for Chinese contemporary 
legal reform because the similar situation happened again: most social wealth was in 
the hands of few people. However, from the changing structure of NPC I disclosed 
that the majority of NPC were no longer the proletarian. Most of the representatives 
of NPC possessed official positions and were in the middle class (see Appendix II). 
Were they still representing ‘the people’? Or was it the opposite situation: that the 
people were losing their discourse power? From my point of view, it was 
unfortunately the latter situation. As discussed in the previous chapter, a hundred and 
fifty million poor people, who were more than 11% of the whole population, were 
not represented in NPC. Workers and peasants together were less than 20% of the 
NPC representatives. More than 70% of the representatives were officials and middle 
class (see Appendix II). Comparing with the discourse power in Mao’s age, common 
people and the least advantaged persons’ discourse power decreased in lawmaking. 
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The democratic dictatorship theory therefore faced difficulties in application because 
the proletarians were no longer the majority or the influential class of the Chinese 
lawmaking procedure.  
 
THE HIDDEN RULE OF LAWMAKING 
As analyzed in the previous section, none of the above four justifications was 
sufficient in the legitimation of Chinese lawmaking. In this section I will discuss ‘the 
hidden rule of lawmaking’, which interprets the legitimacy of lawmaking from 
another route. There was a Chinese concept that referred to common persons’ 
recognition of law: Qian Gui Ze（潜规则 the hidden rules）. ‘The hidden rule of 
lawmaking’ in China refers to the people’s moral judgment on the power and 
procedure of lawmaking. It is not about the recognition of plain powers and the 
factual publication of laws. It means a shift from the focus on the official law to the 
people’s recognition of the law. The question of the legitimacy of law was no longer 
exclusively about the existence of the official rules. People’s recognition of the law 
could be different from the official law although their judgments were often 
influenced by the latter.. As I will explain later in this section that the existence of 
hidden rules disclosed that we distorted the meaning of the Rule-of-law: We saw it as 
a plain fact of control by legal forces since interactive elements were lacked in 
Chinese lawmaking.  
Qian Gui Ze, the hidden rules, although literally means ‘lurking’ or ‘underneath’ 
rules, were  apparent and obvious rules indeed in China. A hidden rule in the 
Chinese context was not a rule underneath or simply imbedded in a formal rule. It 
was the opposite of the official rule. It was recognized and chosen by the people. 
Hidden rules were formed from custom and conventions. The term ‘hidden rules’ in 
the Chinese context had a derogatory meaning. It implied a negation of the legality. 
The efficacy of hidden rules was uncertain: some of them were illegal from the 
beginning, some of them were in the grey zone of the law. Different recognition of 
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rules led to diverse behavior patterns: People holding the recognition of the official 
rules behaved lawfully. Those who chose hidden rules, however, broke the law or 
acted in a grey zone.  
The Rio Tinto case illustrated well about a debate on a hidden rule. On 12 
August 2009 Chinese official media, China Daily and Xinhuanet reported the news 
that China’s Supreme People’s Procuratorate had announced the arrest of four 
employees of the Anglo-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto. The four were detained  
on July 5 on charges of stealing commercial secrets and bribery. At a press 
conference, Vice Minister of Commerce Fu Ziying said ‘…this is an isolated judicial 
case…China is ruled by law and the judicial decision on the case would undoubtedly 
be fair’.
 1
 The Australian government and Rio Tinto spokesmen disagreed with the 
Chinese ‘rule by law’ approach. Rio Tinto called the allegations surprising and 
denied their awareness of any evidence to support an investigation.
 2
 It became 
important to ascertain whether the Chinese judicial jurisdiction was exclusive and 
whether bribery was illegal in the present commercial environment, or on the 
contrary was assumed as a well-known hidden rule by which most companies abide. 
The answer to the first question was certain: China had exclusive judicial jurisdiction 
in this case. The second question was controversial. 
In the Criminal Law of People’s Republic of China 1979, commercial bribery 
was a crime. In reality, however, commercial bribery was adopted by traders in China 
including Rio Tinto and thus became a trade hidden rule. This contradiction was 
exemplified well in the Rio Tinto case. In this case there was a written legal norm 
which regulated that bribery in commercial activities should be punishable. Yet the 
hidden rule was that commercial bribery was ‘ok’. The legal norm regulated that 
traders should not bribe, otherwise they should be punished by law. But the hidden 
                                                        









rule was opposite: the bribe was the ‘guild regulation’. Through the Rio Tinto case, 
Chinese government expressed the attitude of rectifying the hidden rule of 
commercial bribery. Chinese authorities also stressed in the recent legislations and 
interpretations that those inglorious hidden rules such as public official corruption, 
sexual bribery, official appointment by favoritism, should all be abolished by law.
1
  
Another kind of hidden rules, however, was in the gray zone of the law and 
some of the rules were morally neutral. They were less serious than the criminal 
offences that stated above, but related to individuals’ recognition of the law. These 
hidden rules were not regulated by law directly. A no-passing-permitted sign beside 
the East Lake scenic spot of the W city of China, pointed out, ironically, a free 
short-cut to the park. When people saw such a sign they recognized a fact that some 
people entered the park for free previously. Then they had a choice: whether to 
follow the hidden rule (free entrance) discovered by other people; or to obey the rule 
(no entrance). They took a risk of being caught (and fined) by the park keeper, if they 
entered from the short-cut. But they also knew that, more often than not, they might 
go there free from charge. In this case, when most people were following the hidden 
rule, the formal normative rule became nominal. If the park keeper dedicated to 
eliminate the hidden rule, he could either add a charge spot or add inspectors to stop 
the free entrance practically. In this case, the sign of ‘no entrance’ of the public park, 
however, should not be referred to as the legal cause to punish ‘trespasser’, because 
according to the Law of Land Administration of the People’s Republic of China 1999, 
the socialist public ownership of the land was the ownership by the whole people. 
And thus all people had the right to enter the public land freely. Therefore in this case, 
the hidden rule was not against the basic law. The official sign of ‘no entrance’ was, 
however, illegal (although it was consistent with other laws relating to public 
property management, such as the Regulation of Management of Scenic Spots 2006, 
                                                        
1 Since 2005, the Chinese legislature has been working on legislations on anti-corruption. In July 8 2007, the 
supreme court and supreme procuratorate published an official interpretation (《关于办理受贿刑事案件适用法
律若干问题的意见》) on official bribery and regulated specified bribery crimes with ‘people with special 
relationships with the officers’ （特定关系人）. 
 
 103 
we should notice that regulations was inferior to basic laws according to LLC2000. 
So the official sign was against Chinese basic laws and should be changed). 
A well-known ‘hidden rule’ about legislation in Chinese legal practice was: ‘law 
is less useful than its judicial interpretation; judicial interpretation is less useful than 
the Party’s forum note; a forum note is less useful than a red-headline-document; a 
red-headline document is less useful than (the Communist Party of China, 
hereinafter CPC) leaders’ instructions’.
1
 This hidden rule was in conflicts with the 
normative rules regulated in the Legislation Law 2000. LLC2000 established the 
hierarchy of the validity of legal rules. It put the national law above decrees and 
other local rules.
2
 The hidden rule of legislation that stated above, however, put 
orders of CPC above law. If the hidden rule represented the reality, and the legal rule 
referred to the normative order, then there existed a gap between the reality and the 
formal law: When people chose to obey the hidden rule, their behavior deconstructed 
the legitimacy and validity of official laws. A paradoxical phenomenon appeared: this 
hidden rule was the ‘real’ rule but people who followed the hidden rule were 
disobedient to the official formal law. The legitimacy of the official lawmaking was 
questionable. 
The above hidden rule of lawmaking influenced legal practice greatly. This 
hidden rule was not in the gray zone of the law because it was not against the spirit 
of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 1982 (hereinafter the 
Constitution) necessarily. In the 7
th
 paragraph of the preamble, the basic task of the 
nation was ‘to concentrate its effort on socialist modernization. Under the leadership 
of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao 
                                                        
1 ‘Red-headline documents’ refer to the official documents of the Chinese Communist Party because their titles 
are always written in red. Translated by Peng He. See the original Chinese literature of Tao Yang, New Lawyers 
Law and the Hidden Rules, Xinjing News, June 02, 2008; also see Zhibo Hai, Why is Law Less Useful Than 
Documents? Procuratorial Daily, June 11, 2008.  
2 ‘The Constitution has the highest legal authority, and no national law, administrative regulation, local decree, 
autonomous decree and special decree, or administrative or local rule may contravene the Constitution.’; 
‘National law has higher legal authority than administrative regulations, local decrees and administrative or local 
rules. Administrative regulations have higher legal authority than local decrees and administrative or local rules.’; 
‘A local decree has higher legal authority than local rules issued by governments at the same level and lower level. 
Local rules enacted by the People's Government of a province or autonomous region have higher legal authority 
than local rules enacted by the People's Government of a major city located in its jurisdiction.’(LLC2000, articles 
78, 79, and 80). 
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Zedong thought, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the 
people’s democratic dictatorship and the socialist road…’
1
 The hidden rule of 
lawmaking emphasized the CPC’s authority and legitimacy, and put the validity of 
law under the CPC’s instruction. Therefore the hidden rule of lawmaking was 
consistent with Chinese Constitution. But apparently it was opposite to the LLC2000: 
in LLC 2000, the law rather than orders of any party was in the highest level of the 
hierarchy of rules. If the hidden rule of lawmaking was legal, the legality of 
LLC2000 was questionable. The relationship between Chinese Constitution and the 
constitutionality of LLC2000 needed to be clarified.  
Ironically, however, even if the hidden rule lacked legality, the constitutionality 
of LLC2000 was still problematic. The clauses about the CPC’s leadership and the 
democratic dictatorship principle that were regulated in the Chinese Constitution 
were excluded by LLC2000. When the hidden rule’s legitimacy was confirmed, the 
constitutionality of LLC2000 was problematic. Thus a normative theory was 
especially necessary for the affirmance of the legitimacy of lawmaking. An 
interpretation of the constitutionality of LLC 2000 could clarify further the obscure 
provisions about the ultimate authority of both CPC and law in the Chinese 
Constitution. A question was: which was the ultimate ‘rule of recognition’ in Chinese 
lawmaking: the CPC’s instructions, or the legislature’s formal law, or the Chinese 
Constitution?  
Theoretically, Chinese constitution should have a peerless status in the Chinese 
legal system. ‘No laws or administrative or local rules and regulations may 
contravene the Constitution. All state organs, the armed forces, all political parties 
and public organizations and all enterprises and institutions must abide by the 
Constitution and law.’
2
 LLC2000 re-affirmed this principle also.
3
 However, in the 
                                                        
1 the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 1982, 
http://www.ahga.gov.cn/government/fagui/xianfa1/low_view1.htm 
2 See Article 5 of the Constitution. 
3 See Article 78,79,and 80 of LLC2000: ‘The Constitution has the highest legal authority, and no national law, 
administrative regulation, local decree, autonomous decree and special decree, or administrative or local rule may 
contravene the Constitution.’; ‘National law has higher legal authority than administrative regulations, local 
decrees and administrative or local rules. Administrative regulations have higher legal authority than local 
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Chinese Constitution, the CPC’s leadership had a supreme status: According to the 
Chinese Constitution, CPC should be abided by the constitution and law also; but the 
constitution did not admit that the law should have an authority independent to 
CPC’s leadership. Under such logic, the rule of recognition in the Chinese context 
was simplified as: formal rules under the CPC’s leadership. Therefore, in extreme 
cases, CPC’s instruction was the ultimate rule of recognition. In normal situations, 
the legislature’s laws represented the authority. If, however, the ultimate rule of 
recognition in the Chinese legal system was the CPC’s instruction, then the hidden 
rule of lawmaking was consistent with this ‘rule of recognition’. This hidden rule 
confirmed that the leaders’ instructions were the ultimate authority of the Chinese 
legal system and the origin of legitimacy. If this argument was tenable, then the four 
justifications of lawmaking stated previously in this chapter could be consistent with 
the justification of the hidden rule. The validity of this hidden rule of lawmaking 
could contribute to the legitimation of Chinese lawmaking. However, was this hidden 
rule right? 
To answer this question, we need to differentiate further between the hidden rule 
and the sincere requests of people. Although hidden rules were different from 
official rules, they were not necessarily genuine requests from the people. In my 
previous analysis of Chinese lawmaking I concluded that common people’s right of 
discourse was not equal: there were differences between rural peasants and citizens; 
poor and rich; common people and successive persons. The existence of the hidden 
rule was a passive reactive response in an unequal discourse rather than a sincere 
choice in an equal discourse. People accepted the hidden rule of lawmaking because 
it could be compatible with the actual official legitimacy of lawmaking. And it was 
more direct and practicable. If we ignored the fact that there lacked discourse 
between the people and the lawmakers, we mistook the hidden rule for the real 
                                                                                                                                                             
decrees and administrative or local rules.’; ‘A local decree has higher legal authority than local rules issued by 
governments at the same level and lower level. Local rules enacted by the People's Government of a province or 
autonomous region have higher legal authority than local rules enacted by the People's Government of a major 
city located in its jurisdiction.’ 
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request of the people.  
Here I would like to refer to the meaning of ‘living lawfully’ again in Professor 
Bankowski’s argument on the relationship between following law and breaking law, 
to support my argument of absorbing some ‘hidden rules’ into lawmaking. As 
argued in Living Lawfully, ‘to live lawfully means living a life where the law is 
constantly interrogated and renewed, it is broken but from within and not from 
outside.’
1
 Living lawfully was not the literal sense of just following the law but 
both following and breaking the law as appropriate. In circumstances where people 
obeyed ‘hidden rules’ rather than ‘formal rules’ in China, the problem of ‘hidden 
rule’ seemed to slide into a problem of anarchism, although some of the ‘hidden 
rules’ could be moral and represented the will of the people. The trust of ‘hidden 
rule’ rather than ‘legal rule’ would lead to a sort of ‘legal nihilism’. From this 
perspective, ‘hidden rule’ was ‘bad’ and should be removed from the Chinese legal 
system. But from another perspective, where hidden rules as the opposite of formal 
rules can renew the latter, the ‘hidden rules’ could be deemed as a part of the law 
also.  
The existence of hidden rules and the recognition of them could contribute to a 
discourse between lawmakers and common people. But it would cause difficulties 
in respect of the application of law for Chinese lawyers and judges because hidden 
rules were not the official rules but the common people’s creative discovery of 
principles behind laws. Such creativity was at the same time ‘risky’ since it always 
open to the outside of the law. In order to stick to the rules, we have to make the 
boundary of discretion. The problem was how to apply hidden rules and formal 
rules separately. When shall we follow the formal rules? When shall we ignore the 
formal rules but apply the hidden rules? In Professor Bankowski’s argument, the 
way to maintain in the rigid limits of the law without losing the ‘outside’ justice, 
was to ‘pay attention’ to the outside. Law and love were not the two opposing 
                                                        
1 Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001,p.186. 
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contradictories and it was better stay ‘in the middle’.
1
 Now the picture might be 
clearer if we look at people’s own choice, the hidden rules in China, as the outside 
rules; as in contrast to the formal law, the inside rules. We need both of them but we 
should respect the inside rules in the beginning. However, we should pay attention 
to the outside rules also because they renew the law. People following the hidden 
rules seemed to break the law, the inside system. At the same time, they were 
creating the law, from absorbing elements of the outside system to the inside. In this 
perspective, there were reasons to keep the hidden rules. What we need to do was to 
‘pay attention’ to their application rather than reject them exclusively. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the beginning of this chapter I discussed Confucian lawmaking and 
concluded that the Confucian hierarchical order supported a top-down lawmaking 
ideology. Although it also stressed humanity, the principle of love, it did not alter 
the unequal structure of lawmaking and law-application. It emphasized the internal 
restrictions of desires of a self, but this conception of freedom based on different 
status of social communication, in which the social being was emphasized but the 
autonomy of an individual was not so much stressed. Confucianism was substituted 
by Chinese Marxism since 1919. In Chinese Marxism four justifications were 
provided to argue for the legitimacy of law, including the revolutionist law, the 
people’s congress, the working class’ law and people’s democratic dictatorship. I 
disclosed and analyzed the inner logic and meaning of the four justifications. I 
criticized their practice in China and concluded that none of the four justifications 
was sufficient in the legitimation.  
I also interpreted Chinese legitimacy thesis from another route, i.e., from the 
people’s active acceptance of the power and procedure of lawmaking instead of a 
passive recognition of the law. I analyzed a special Chinese concept of the legal 




phenomenon, ‘hidden rules’, which was ignored in Chinese academic research. In 
my research, the hidden rule of lawmaking, i.e., the CPC’s ultimate and peerless 
authority and legitimacy, instead of the four justifications, were the ultimate 
justification. The problem was how to introduce ‘hidden rules’ into ‘formal rules’. I 
employed Bankowski’s paradigm of ‘bringing outside in’ to solve this problem. My 
conclusion was that the recognition of hidden rules could contribute to the 
constitution of an open legal system. The Chinese legal system should absorb rather 
than exclude ‘hidden rules’. 
In the next chapter, I will focus on Chinese legalism, the opposite theory of 
Confucianism. It was another legitimation route of Chinese lawmaking. Chinese 
legalism as an ancient school of philosophy influenced the major characteristics of 















In this chapter I will discuss Chinese legalism. I will summarize and analyze the 
origin of Chinese legalism, its major propositions and its characteristics. This chapter 
compares the difference between Chinese legalism and other Chinese philosophies 
including Confucianism, Taoism and Mohism. It also discloses the difference 
between Chinese legalism and Western legalism in their concerns with morality. 
                                                        
* about the background knowledge of Chinese legalism, see also Peng He, Chinese Legalism and Western 
Legalism, Frontiers of Law in China, Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag, vol.6.no.4, (2011).  
1  Shang Yang (B.C.390-B.C.338), Shang Jun Shu, Prince and Minster, see online texts: 
http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/text.pl?node=47249&if=en&remap=gb  
(In the days of antiquity, before the time when there were princes and ministers, superiors and inferiors, the 
people were disorderly and were not well administered, and so the sages made a division between the noble and 
the humble; they regulated rank and position, and established names and appellations, in order to distinguish the 
ideas of prince and minister, of superior and inferior. As the territory was extensive, the people numerous and all 
things many, they made a division of five kinds of officials, and maintained it; as the people were numerous, 
wickedness and depravity originated, so they established laws and regulations and created weights and measures, 
in order to prohibit them, and in consequence there were the idea of prince and minister, the distinctions between 
the five kinds of officials, … The way in which an intelligent prince administers the empire is to do so according 
to the law, and to reward according to merit.) 
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Western legalism defended the Rule-of-Law but argued against the morality of law. 
In contrast, Chinese legalism, especially in the early Pre-Qin era, did not separate 
morality from law. However, the fidelity to law in Chinese legalism was interpreted 
as the fidelity to the monarch, and was thus different from the Western Rule-of-Law. 
Chinese legalism (Fa Jia Si Xiang 法家思想) argued for the legitimacy of 
political relationships. It claimed that law was more important than ethical morality.1 
In Western theories, analytic positivism, and positivism in general, have a close 
connection with legalism.
2
 Professor Bankowski explained from a Western 
perspective that Chinese legalism belonged to legal formalism.
3
 In this perspective, 
a distinction between law and morality was quite clear-cut. Chinese legalism, 
however, was different from Western legalism in its historical background. Chinese 
legalism had close ties with Confucianism, Taoism and Mohism in its origin. As will 
be discussed later in this chapter, Chinese legalism did not exclude morality in its 
early form.  
 
CHINESE LEGALISM 
Chinese legalism was one Pre-Qin (先秦) school of thoughts in Chinese history. 
It originated and developed from the period 475 B.C. to 221 B.C, the Warring States 
Period.
4
 During that time, three other Pre-Qin schools of thoughts (Confucianism, 
Mohism and Taoism) were also significant. These four major schools held different 
propositions and political suggestions. Confucianism claimed that the state was better 
to be governed by virtue rather than by coercive laws.
5
 Mohism advertised 
                                                        
1 See Zhongxin Fan, 中国法律传统的基本精神 (The Basic Spirit of the Tradition of Chinese Law,), Shandong 
Renmin Publishing House (Shandong), at 143 (2001). 
2 Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001,p.49. 
3 We had discussion of Chinese legalism and formalism and I disagree with this equation. But our interesting 
debates inspired this comparative study of Western legalism and Chinese legalism. 
4
 See Honglie Yang, History of Chinese Legal Ideology, China University of Political Science and Law Press 
(2004), p.51. The period was named after wars among the states in China at that time. Plato, Aristotle, Kyng 
Alisaunder and Maurya Dynasty existed around the same period in other places of the world. 
5
 The Master said, 'if the people are guided by law, and kept in order by punishment, they may try to avoid crime, 
but have no sense of shame. If they are guided by virtue, and kept in order by the rules of propriety, they will 
have a sense of shame, and moreover will come to be good.' The Analects of Confucius, Book II Wei Zheng, Qi 
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‘impartial care’ and ‘universal love’ and was thus object to wars among states.
1
 The 
key concept of Taoism was about ‘men-cosmos correspondence’, which was in a way 
similar to the natural law in Western legal theory.
2 
 
Chinese Legalism, however, focused on strengthening the political power of the 
ruler. Different from the other three schools, Chinese legalism emphasized that the 
function of law was to control the society. It argued for a society ruled by law. It 
valued legal rules (法 Fa), art of control (术 Shu) and force of control (势 Shi) as 
three ‘trumps’ of the ruler. 
3
 Liu Shao in Ren Wu Zhi Liu Ye Pian (人物志·流业篇) 
said that ‘legalists (法家 Fa Jia) were those who attempted to establish laws and a 
legal system to make the state strong and rich. ’
4
 Si Matan in his introduction of six 
Pre-Qin major schools stated that ‘Legalists were strict and were not mercy’; ‘[They] 
clarified, established and strengthened the difference between the emperor and his 
ministers, i.e., their superior and subordinate relationship’; ‘[They] treated persons of 
close and distant relationship equally, regardless of their noble or humble social 
status; they treated all according to the law.’
5
 Liang Qichao, a scholar of the 
Republic of China (1912-1949) defined Chinese legalism as  
‘[A thought] started from materialism. It noticed social and economic 
circumstances. It believed the all-powerful government and denied the sanctity of 
human nature. [Chinese legalists] argued for strict interferences from the 




The representative Chinese legalists (法家代表人物) were Guan Zhong (管仲), 
                                                                                                                                                             
Lu Press (2004), p.11. 
1 
The Master said, 'if every one in the world will love universally; states not attacking one another; houses not 
disturbing one another; thieves and robbers becoming extinct; emperor and ministers, fathers and sons, all being 
affectionate and filial -- if all this comes to pass the world will be orderly. Therefore, how can the wise man who 
has charge of governing the empire fail to restrain hate and encourage love? So, when there is universal love in 
the world it will be orderly, and when there is mutual hate in the world it will be disorderly. This is why Mozi 
insisted on persuading people to love others.' Mohism, Book IV Universal Love, Chinese Text Project, 
http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/text.pl?node=1069&if=en&remap=gb 
2 The Master said, 'man takes his law from the Earth; the Earth takes its law from the Heaven; the Heaven takes 
its law from the Tao; the law of the Tao is its being what it is.' Tao Te Ching, chapter 25. Chinese Text Project, 
http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/text.pl?node=11591&if=en&remap=gb 
3 Han Fei, Han Fei Zi, 定法 Ding Fa, 奸劫弑臣，Jian Jie Shi Chen, 难势, Nan Shi，南面，Nan Mian at Chinese 
Text Project, http://ctext.org/hanfeizi/ens 
4 Liu Shao, Ren Wu Zhi, Si Bu Cong Kan, Shanghai Book Store Publishing, 1989, vol. 74, p.12.  
5 Si Matan, Liu Jia Yao Zhi, 司马谈谈六家要旨，in Si Maqian, Historical Records,史记, Wang Bojun ed., 
Volumes Publishing Company, (2008), p.560. 
6 Qichao Liang, Political Ideology of Pre-Qin Period, Tianjing Ancient Books Publishing House, (2003), p.79. 
 
 112 
Zi Chan (子产), Deng Xi (邓析), Li Kui (李悝), Wu Qi (吴起), Shen Buhai (申不害), 
Shang Yang (商鞅), Shen Dao (慎到), Han Fei (韩非) and Li Si (李斯). Most of 
them had literatures handed down from ancient times, including Guan Zi (管子)，Fa 
Jing (法经)，Shen Zi (申子), Shang Jun Shu (商君书)，Shen Zi (慎子), Han Fei Zi(韩
非子). Those legalists could be classified further as Qi legalists (齐法家) and Jin 
legalists (晋法家). Qi legalists, who led the legal reform in state Qi (Qi was named 
after an ancient state of China; was referred to the area also), stressed the law but did 
not abandon morality exclusively. Jin legalists (legalists of the Jin area; or Jin state), 
however, argued for absolute monarchy and believed that morality should be 
substituted by legal norms. Jin legalists even believed that law was the [only] 
textbook and the [legal] official were the [only] teacher (以法为教，以吏为师).1 A 
contemporary scholar, Zhang Dainian concluded that Jin legalists were too strict and 
were against humanity. Qi legalists’ statesmanship was better than Jin legalists in 
their inclusiveness of morality.
2
 Legalists of early Pre-Qin did not exclusively deny 
the role of morality (Guan Zhong was the representative). In early legalism, law was 
referred to an alternative conception: the ‘force’ or ‘art of control’ (Shen Dao and 
Shen Buhai were the representative defenders). Legalists of late Pre-Qin represented 
by Han Fei made a comprehensive expression of law: Law should be supported by 
force as well as the art of control.  
 
CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER PRE-QIN SCHOOLS 
The rose of Chinese legalism was no later than the other Pre-Qin schools. 
Legalists Guan Zhong and Zi Chan were earlier than Confucius (the founder of 
Confucianism). Deng Xi and Confucius were at the same period. Li Kui, Wu Qi and 
Shen Buhai were earlier than Mencius (another representative of 
Confucianism).Shang Yang was earlier than Zhou Zhuang (the founder of Daoism). 
                                                        
1 Lin Yang, A Comparative Study of Pre-Qin Legalism, PhD dissertation of Zhe Jiang University, (2005), pp.1-2. 
2 Jiacong Hu, Guan Zi Xin Tan, China Social Science Press, (1995), pp.2-3. 
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Their thoughts were more or less influenced by the other schools. Shen Buhai, Shen 
Dao and Shang Yang studied Daoism (Taoism) before legalism, while Han Fei and Li 
Si studied from a Confucian, Xun Zi (a representative of Confucianism).
1 
Han Fei 




Legalism was related to Confucianism. Guan Zhong, a representative early 
legalist valued livelihood of the commons and righteousness of the liege. Unlike later 
legalists who focused on law exclusively, Guan Zhong regarded morality and 
education as the positive methods besides law. Many legalists even studied from 
Confucians directly. Li Kui studied from Zi Xia, Shang Yang studied from Shi Jiao, 
and Han Fei studied from Xun Kuang. Zi Xia valued talents (and merits) over 
favoritism. He also classified the external form and the internal spirit of rites. Those 
thoughts were absorbed by legalism. Shi Jiao like Confucius stressed the importance 
of ‘name’ (‘name’ means the concept or reason in Chinese), but he further connected 
‘name’ (concept) with rewards and punishments. The proper ‘name’ of an action 
therefore came from proper rewards and punishments. Shang Yang studied from Shi 
Jiao and inherited his thoughts on the relationship between the ‘name’, rewards and 
punishments. Han Fei also developed the theory of ‘establishing the name by rites’ in 




Legalism had similarities with Mohism and Daoism also. On the argument of 
equality and the sole standard of law, legalists were influenced by Mohists.
4 
Legalists inherited Mohists’ theory of autocracy and pragmatism.
5 
Theses of Shang 
                                                        
1 Si Maqian, Shi Ji (史记 Historical Records), (Wang Bojun ed.), Volumes Publishing Company, (2008), see 
records of each legalist. 
2 Long Chuan Zheng Ci Lang, 泷川政次郎，History of Chinese Legal Thoughts, p.20; quoted from Yang 
Honglie, History of Chinese Legal Ideology, China University of Political Science and Law Press, (2004), p.76. 
3 About the relations of legalists and their teachers, see Si Maqian, Shi Ji (史记 Historical Records), (Wang 
Bojun ed.), Volumes Publishing Company, (2008), records of each legalist. 
4 Honglie Yang, History of Chinese Legal Ideology, China University of Political Science and Law Press, (2004), 
p.70. 




Tong (尚同 arguing for conformity), Shang Xian (尚贤 arguing for virtuous and 
talented persons), Fei Ming (非命 arguing against unchanging mandates from 
heaven), and the positivistic attitude of Mohism were more or less absorbed by 
legalists. In Daoism, no-intervention was better than the positive interference from 
the ruler. Legalism, however, stressed the active interference from the ruler. From the 
surface, Daoism and Legalism were absolutely different. However, Daoism 
developed into two different Daoism. Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi represented an 
‘exclusive’ Daoism which focused on metaphysics and argued for detachment from 
the society. Tian Pian, Shen Dao and Yin Wen, represented the other Daoism, or an 
‘inclusive’ Daoism which argued for governance through less intervention (but they 
argued against detachment from the society). Inclusive Daoism was believed to be 
one of the earliest origins of legalism.
1
 In Guan Zi, three significant articles, Fa Fa 
(法法), Ren Fa (任法) and Ming Fa (明法) were believed to connect legalism with 
Daoism.
2 
Legalist Shen Dao argued for legislation according to the nature and less 




Nevertheless, Chinese legalism differed from other Pre-Qin schools in the 
following aspects: Law was employed to approach Chinese legalists’ purpose of 
constructing a mighty state, together with (political) trickery and (military) force in 
Chinese legalism.
4 
As a contrast, Confucianism required (and attempted to justify) 
the ruler’s morality. Mohism argued against wars .Taoism believed that ruling 
without rules was the best way to strengthen a state. Legalism, however, proposed 
that a state should be ruled by strict and severe rules. Unlike the other three schools 
of thoughts, Chinese legalism put an emphasis on the function of law as an effective 
social control mechanism. Different from Li Zhi (rule by rites 礼制) in Confucianism, 
                                                        
1 Bozan Jian, History of Qin and Han Dynasties, Beijing University Press, (1999), p.88. 
2 See Moruo Guo, Dejian Jin, Jiacong Hu and Yuanming Ding’s arguments in Zhang Guye, Criticisms on the 
Three Arcitles of Guan Zi, Social Science Front, (2006), vol.5. 
3 Si Maqian, Shi Ji (史记 Historical Records), (Wang Bojun ed.), Volumes Publishing Company, (2008), pp. 
295-298. 




legalists argued against the order based on patriarchal relations. They argued for 
political subordination; and using political relations to substitute patriarchal relations. 
They suggested sever punishments instead of morality and education. Punishments 
were supposed to guide individuals’ behaviors. In Chinese legalism, law means 
punishments and rewards; and they came exclusively from the official (Guan Zi Fa 
Jing 管子·法经). Law was created by the official and publicated to the common 
people (Han Fei Zi Nan San 韩非子·难三). Law was written by the authorities (Han 
Fei Zi Ding Fa 韩非子·定法). Therefore law was the official mandates from the 
emperor and governors, which were separated from social morality or the natural 
law.  
Fa (Law 法) in Chinese legalism was thus different from Li (礼, which includes 
social conventions) in Confucianism, Dao (道, Chinese natural law) in Daoism, and 
Tian Zhi (天志, Chinese natural law) in Mohism. Legalists specified the concept of 
law and standardized the recognition of law (law as official orders). They also drove 
the movement of codification of Pre-Qin era and attempted to make laws clear and 
certain. Law was applied as the manipulative and coercive measurement so that law 
could make all behaviors and movements in order ( ‘Qi Tian Xia Zhi Dong’ 齐天下
之动).1 Law became ‘the formula of the world and the instrument of everything’ 
（‘Tian Xia Zhi Cheng Shi, Wan Shi Zhi Yi Biao’天下之程式，万事之仪表）.2  
 
A REVIEW OF LORD SHANG’S REFORM 
Lord Shang Yang’s reform disclosed the legalists’ argument against the other 
Pre-Qin schools.
3
 Old aristocrats of Qin resisted Shang Yang’s reform. They claimed 
                                                        
1 Shen Zi, Shen Zi Yi Wen 慎子·佚文. http://ctext.org/shenzi/ens 
2 Guan Zi, Guan Zi Ming Fa Jie 管子·明法解 http://ctext.org/guanzi/ming-fa-jie/ens 
3 Shang Yang, A representative legalist of Chinese legalism, was a retainer of the prime minister of Wei state. 
Before the prime minister’s death, the minister told his king that Shang Yang was a very talent man. The king 
could use him as the succeed prime minister, or kill him just in case he would bring troubles to the state of Wei. 
The king, however, did not listen to the minister’s words. He neither employed nor killed Shang Yang. Another 
king, the king of Qin state, appreciated Shang Yang’s talents and invited him to serve for Qin. Later on, Shang 
Yang led the legal reform of Qin and assisted Qin to become the most powerful state in the Warring State period. 
Qin eliminated other states, unified China, and in the end built the first empire in Chinese history——All these 
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that it was necessary to obey ancient laws and it was just to follow old observances, 
Li (礼).   
‘Unless the advantage be a hundredfold, one should not reform the law; 
unless the benefit be tenfold, one should not alter an instrument...in taking 
antiquity as an example, one makes no mistakes, and in following the established 
rites one commits no offence.’
1 
 
A Western scholar Joseph Needham recognized Li (礼 courtesy) as the Chinese 
natural law (Needham, 1980).
2
 However, Li should not be simplified as natural law; 
and the differentiation between Li and Fa (法，law) should not be simplified as the 
Western division of the natural law and positive law. The Western natural law theory 
and its background religious and cultural sources were entirely different from the 
Chinese tradition. In Chinese ancient literatures, discussion of ‘natural law’ in the 
sense of Western natural theory could hardly be found.
3
 In Chinese traditional legal 
culture, Li was a set of rules centered on the order of the clan system. The content of 
Li was more than the official [legal] rules. Li was also a set of positive rules and 
abstract principles above the positive rules, or legal principles (like obedience to the 
ethical relations Jun Chen Fu Zi ‘君臣父子’). Li did not gain its authority from God 
but from positive and natural blood relationships.
4 
Confucianism focused on the 
relationship among people. At first Li and Xing (刑 criminal law; penalty) were 
opposite concepts: Li Bu Shang Shu Ren, Xing Bu Shang Da Fu (‘礼不上庶人，刑不
上大夫’).5 Li(礼)and Xing(刑) were supposed to cover all the norms: Li Zhi Suo Qu, 
Xing Zhi Suo Qu, Shi Li Ze Ru Xing, Xiang Wei Biao Li (‘礼之所去，刑之所取，失
                                                                                                                                                             
historic achievements should owe to Shang Yang’s successful legal reform, according to Si Maqian’s records and 
comments. Book of Lord Shang, Reform of the Law, Chinese Text Project, 
http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/text.pl?node=47113&if=en&remap=gb. Si Maqian, Shang Jun Lie Zhuan, Shi Ji (史
记 Historical Records), (Wang Bojun ed.), Volumes Publishing Company, (2008), pp. 312-315. 
1
 Book of Lord Shang, Reform of the Law, Chinese Text Project, 
http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/text.pl?node=47113&if=en&remap=gb 
2 See J. Needham, Science and Civilization in China, History of Scientific Thought, vol.2, the Syndics of the 
Cambridge University Press, (1980), pp.521, 532, 539, 544. 
3 Zhiping Liang, Searching for the Harmony of the Natural Order: Studies on Traditional Chinese Legal Culture, 
China University of Political Science and Law Press, (1997), p.326 
4 As a contrast, Chinese philosophy Taoism concentrated on the harmonious relationship between the nature and 
the human world.Dao De Jin ( or Tao Te Ching), 1. See English translation: 
http://acc6.its.brooklyn.cuny.edu/~phalsall/texts/taote-v3.html. 
5 Ruan Yuan ed., Li Ji 礼记·曲礼上, Shi San Jing Zhu Shu, 十三经注疏，Zhonghua Book Company, 中华书
局，(1980), p. 1249. 
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礼则入刑，相为表里’). It meant Xing (刑) should be used in situations where Li (礼) 
could not be used. Xing(刑) and Li(礼) were interdependent.1 Li was social rules 
based on the patriarchal culture. To a certain extent, both Li and Xing were legal 
norms. But from the above old aristocrats’ argument we could see that Li akin to 
natural law stressed the (relative) permanency and unchangeable character of ‘old’ 
norms: People should always abide by Li made by former sages. But Shang Yang 
argued against this unchanging law conception in Confucianism:  
‘Former generations did not follow the same doctrines, so what antiquity 
should one imitate? The emperors and kings did not copy one another, so what 
rites should one follow? Fu Xi and Shen Nong taught but did not punish; Huang 
Di, Yao and Shun punished but were not angry; Wen Wang and Wu Wang both 
established laws in accordance with what was opportune and regulated rites 
according to practical requirements; as rites and laws were fixed in accordance 
with what was opportune, regulations and orders were all expedient, and weapons, 
armour, implements and equipment were all practical. Therefore... there is more 
than one way to govern the world and there is no necessity to imitate antiquity, in 
order to take appropriate measures for the state. Tang and Wu succeeded in 
attaining supremacy without following antiquity, and as for the downfall of Yin 
and Xia - they were ruined without rites having been altered. Consequently, those 
who acted counter to antiquity do not necessarily deserve blame, nor do those 
who followed the established rites merit much praise.’
2
  
Lord Shang thus criticized the old aristocrats’ static law idea and argued for a 
dynamic conception of law. This argument was a preparation for the implementation 
of his later reform. In historical records, Qin’s agricultural production, economic and 
military forces were greatly enhanced because of Shang Yang’s reform.
3
 Shang 
Yang’s reform illustrated a story of a legalist who made efforts to persuade people to 
believe in and accept new legal reform. More than two thousand years ago, Shang 
Yang realized that if people lost their fidelity to law, law would fail in practical 
effects. Shang Yang believed that if the law was credible and just, people would obey 
it, and the society would be better. Thus an important proposition of Chinese 
                                                        
1 Ban Gu, the Bibliography of Chen Chong, Chronicles of the Han Dynasty, Zhonghua Book Company Press, 
(1962),p.1554. 汉书·陈宠传, 汉书 first published around 79-105 A.D.. 
2
 Ibid. 
3 Han Feizi, He Shi 和氏, and Jian Jie Shi Chen 奸劫弑臣，Literatures of Historical Chinese Legal Thoughts, 
Law Press, (1996), p.119. 
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legalism was stated like this: It was not about people but the law. If the law were 
credible, people could have more faith in it.  
I would like to interpret this proposition further. It started from the first premise: 
human nature was amoral (even worse, some legalists held that human nature was 
evil or corrupted). In Chinese legalism, all people in nature were utilitarian: They 
tended to pursue interests and advantages, and at the same time aimed to avoid 
danger and disadvantages. The relationships between people, the monarch and the 
officials, were all maintained through interests: 
‘[H]uman beings don’t have feathers. Without clothes they would 
catch cold. Human beings need to eat; otherwise they will starve to death. All 
of those are natural rules. Human beings' selfishness is also a natural thing. 
Doctors' work is to cure disease. They suck the blood of the wounded part not 
because they like to, but because of the benefit they will get from the patients. 
Craftsmen who make vehicles look forward to wealthy customers; craftsmen 
who make coffins are expecting customers who have a dead relative. We 
cannot say that the vehicle-maker have a higher standard of morality than the 
coffins-maker. The vehicle-producer wishes people wealthy because otherwise 
his vehicles cannot be sold; the coffin-maker wishes people dead because 
otherwise his coffins cannot be sold. It is hard to conclude that the former 




From the above quote we can see that human beings' selfishness nature in 
Chinese legalism was seemed as a fact, or a rule of nature. This rule was seen as 
existed everywhere: The relationship between the monarch and the subject was seen 
as a ‘buyer-seller’ relationship. Between the ruler and the ruled, ‘the ruler sells 
nobility and salary; the ruled sell their intelligence and strength’.
2
 Neither morality 
nor law was necessary for ancient societies because people in the very ancient time 
did not have to fight against each other for the plenteous resources.
3
 Later on, law 




                                                        
1





 Han Fei Zi, 五蠹，Wu Du, http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/text.pl?node=2660&if=en&remap=gb 
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Then Chinese legalism provided the second proposition: Law was the result of a 
corrupt society.
1
 From Chinese legalists’ point of view, morality was not the 
necessary condition of law. The idea of benevolent law held by Confucianism was 
unrealistic to legalism. Law was believed amoral in nature. Amoral facts in Chinese 
legalism referred to the existence of law. Holding this epistemology of human nature 
and law, Chinese legalists developed a strict duty-first philosophy: Law was not for 
the protection of rights but for submission to orders. It led to the third proposition: 
The disobedience to law was immoral. 
In Shang Yang's era corporal punishments were applied to trifling misbehaviors 
like throwing dust onto the road.
2
 The reason of establishing severe punishments for 
unimportant matters, in Chinese legalism, was that people would be afraid of 
breaking law, so that there would be no crimes in the end.
3
 Critics might question 
the effect of those severe punishments. From historical literatures we saw examples 
of strict obedience to law influenced by severe laws: The reformer Shang Yang 
himself swallowed the result of his law—after the death of his king, the king’s 
successor ordered to arrest Shang Yang because the new King was previously 
punished by Shang Yang's law. Lord Shang run to a small inn near the border and 
asked for temporary lodging. The innkeeper, however, told Lord Shang that he could 




The innkeeper’s reply was unfortunate news for Lord Shang. But it showed an 
honorable result for his legal reform. The fact of Qin's rapid growth seemed to also 
prove legalists hypothesis: Severe laws would benefit a state's rapid growth.
5
 
Chinese legalists Shang Yang, Han Fei, and Li Si assisted the state Qin’s 
                                                        
1 Ibid. 
2 Han Fei Zi, Nei Chu Shuo (shang) 33, 内储说上，
http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/text.pl?node=2141&if=en&remap=gb 
3 Ibid. 
4 Si Maqian, Wang Bojun ed., Shang Jun Lie Zhuan, Shi Ji (Historical Records), Volumes Publishing Company, 
(2008), pp. 312-315. 
5 Han Feizi, He Shi 和氏, and Jian Jie Shi Chen 奸劫弑臣，Literatures of Historical Chinese Legal Thoughts, 
Law Press, (1996), p.119. 
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development. Qin strengthened in force in decades. In history, Qin unified the other 
strong states and established the first empire of China. Later on, the political 
institutions and the structures of Qin’s legal system were carried forward for more 
than two thousand years. Confucianism, Taoism and Mohism were all well-known 
philosophies, but Chinese legalism was more than a school of philosophical thoughts; 
it was practiced and succeeded indeed in the history.  
Relying on the above three propositions, Chinese legalism reached to its 
conclusion and the fundamental premise of the argument of the fidelity to law: 
People should obey law because law was credible. Now we may understand the 
profound meaning of Lord Shang’s well-known experiment before his promulgation 
of the new laws in 359 B.C. Shang Yang firstly sent an officer to erect a thirty feet 
high wood at the south gate of the capital city, and declared that whoever moves the 
wood to the north gate would be rewarded 10 gold coins. It was a great fortune at 
that time so the news spread over quickly. The masses gathered at the south gate and 
discussed about this decree. People could not believe that such an easy work would 
worth so much. They wondered whether it was a joke made by the government. No 
one tried to move the wood and all were waiting for the government’s reaction. 
Shang Yang raised the reward to 50 gold coins then. The crowd was more curious. 
Finally a man came out and carried the wood from the south to the north gate. Shang 
Yang paid him the reward as promised. This story spread over the whole state 
immediately and people were all aware of the credit of Shang Yang’s law. They 
started to believe that Shang Yang’s law would be enforced strictly.  
Nevertheless, the Great Qin Empire also collapsed because of its severe laws. 
The peasant uprising peasant leaders, Cheng Sheng and Wu Guang, were 
rule-followers (they were low rank officers) at the beginning. They were ordered to 
guard the border. On their way to their destiny they encountered heavy rains so as to 
postpone their march. According to a law of Qin, deferring the march would face the 
death penalty. Sheng and Guang had no other ways to save their lives but led the 
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peasants’ revolt against Qin. Their revolution spread over the whole country and 
overthrew the empire Qin.
1
 Severe laws assisted Qin’s growth but also ruined the 
empire. The successors, however, still employed legalism as an effective social 
control ideology, although they start to pay attention to soften legalism by combining 




Confucianism, in contrast to Chinese legalism, did not necessarily support the 
argument of the fidelity to law. In Confucianism the ruler and lawman would be 
blamed if they did not practice law properly. However, it was about the nature of the 
ruler rather than people’s fidelity to law. In Confucianism, human nature was good.
3
 
According to Li, the legitimacy of law came from legitimate ruler (in a patriarchal 
pedigree), the morality of law therefore referred to a justification of legitimacy of the 
supreme authority. 
If we compared the first and second presuppositions of Confucianism and 
Legalism, we discovered that they were contrary to each other. In Chinese legalism, 
the nature of human beings was corruptive and should be guided by sever coercive 
norms; while in Confucianism, human nature was good and could be moralized 
through Li. In Chinese legalism, the fidelity to law was rather a legal obligation than 
morality; while in Confucianism, the fidelity to the legitimate ruler was a content of 
morality. We thus see different solutions that Confucianism and Legalism offered. To 
Confucians, people should learn Li, rules of proprieties; legalists, however, 
emphasized that people should learn Fa, law, rules of the ruler.    
Thus Confucianism and Legalism showed different attitudes on the morality of 
law and human beings. Confucianism had more optimistic judgments on human 
nature, and had more faith in the morality of law. Chinese legalism, as a contrast, had 
pessimistic opinions on human nature, and doubted the morality of law. Anarchists, 
                                                        
1
 Si Maqian, Chen She Shi Jia, Shi Ji, Volumes Publishing Company, (2008), pp. 249-253. 
2 Fan Zhongxin, the Spirit of Chinese Legal Traditions, Shandong People’s Publishing House, 2001, pp.340-354. 
see also Yu Ronggen ed., History of Chinese Legal Thoughts, Law Press, (2000), pp. 345-347 
3 Meng Zi, Gao Zi I, Gong Sun Chou I, Teng Wen Gong I, http://ctext.org/mengzi/gong-sun-chou-i/ens  
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legal nihilists, the skeptic and radical reformers also held a pessimistic view of law, 
but they abandoned law. Chinese legalists although did not claim law as moral rules, 
put emphasis on law as the effective social control mechanism. Law in Chinese 
legalism was thus empirical and amoral.  
Confucian would argue that those who practiced law should take the 
responsibility because law was lifeless—to rely on something lifeless was unrealistic. 
Confucians would further claim that in every legal system, if there were ‘bad’ laws, 
ultimately it was the person who made, executed and practiced ‘bad’ law. Those who 
refused to follow ‘bad’ laws were not necessarily disobedience to Li (the ultimate law 
in Confucianism). Legalists could hardly deny the fact of injustice of ‘some’ law. The 
essential difference between Confucians and legalists, however, was that the former 
had more faith in human’s goodness. Confucians expected a morally good governor 
to manage the society and emphasized benevolent love especially the governor’s love 
of the ruled. Legalists, on the contrary, disclosed the selfish nature of all people 
including the governor. Legalists based their theory on the awareness of human's 
badness. Human being’s selfishness, rather than their morality was seen by legalists 
as the necessary pre-condition of establishing the authority of law.  
 
CHARACTERISTICS AND PROPOSITIONS OF CHINESE LEGALISM 
In Shang Yang's legal reform, people were praised for military exploit and 
agricultural work.
1
 The obedience to officers' orders in the army and the rules of 
agriculture therefore constructed the essential content of people's behavior paradigm: 
submission to rules. Law in Chinese legalism therefore meant submission; and was 
recognized as an obligation and was applied (exclusively) to the subject. In Chinese 
legalism, before conquering an empire, the emperor should conquer his subjects 
                                                        
1 Si Maqian, Wang Bojun ed., Shang Jun Lie Zhuan, Shi Ji (Historical Records), Volumes Publishing Company, 





 The best tool to assist him was the law. An emperor’s attitude to his people 
was similar to facing enemies in wars. The relation between law and the subject in 
this perspective was therefore antagonistic. In Shang Yang’s work, the reason of 
establishing the authority of law was described as the requirement of the conquest:  
‘Of old, the one who could regulate the empire was he, 
who regarded as his first task the regulating of his own people; the one 
who could conquer a strong enemy was he, who regarded as his first 
task the conquering of his own people. For the way in which the 
conquering of the people is based upon the regulating of the people is 
like the effect of smelting in regard to metal or the work of the potter in 
regard to clay; if the basis is not solid, then people are like flying birds 
or like animals. Who can regulate these? The basis of the people is the 
law. Therefore, a good ruler obstructed the people by means of the law, 
and so his reputation and his territory flourished.’
2
 
 The way of making law effective in this perspective was to put severe 
punishments to minor offences. Legalists believed that severe punishments would 
establish the authority of law because people were forced to obey it; and that it would 
also benefit for the ruler’s control of the ruled.
3
 In Chinese ancient literatures, there 
were records of tattooing in the face of the people who threw dust on the street： 
 ‘If a person threw dust on the street, it might irritate 
other persons and caused quarrels and fights among them. 
According to the law, those who had fights on the street may be 
punished to death, and his relatives would be punished associated. 
Comparing with the cruel results, it would be better to punish the 
dust-throwing behavior at the beginning. ’
4
  
This was a severe and insulting corporal punishment. Legalists attempted to 
justify such severe punishment on minor offences: they used a hypothetical premise 
(the person who threw dust might cause quarrels with others) to justify an established 
rule (people should be punished severely). Such a deduction was inconsequent 
because the person who threw the dust should not necessarily have fights with other 
                                                        




3 See works of Shang Yang, Han Fei, Li Si and Lü Buwei, in Si Maqian, Shi Ji, pp. 312-315, pp.295-298, 
pp.386-393, pp.378-380; see also Chen Yanqing, A Comparative Study of the Aristotelian Rule-of-Law idea and 
Chinese Legalism, Journal of Gansu Social Science, (2001), vol 3, pp.19-22. 
4
 Han Fei Zi, Nei Chu Shuo, http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/text.pl?node=2141&if=en&remap=gb 
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people in reality! The reasons for putting sever punishments on a minor offence was 
to establish people’s dread of law. Shang Yang argued that: 
 ‘If there are severe penalties that extend to the whole 
family, people will not dare to try (how far they can go), and as 
they dare not try, no punishments will be necessary. The former 
kings, in making their interdicts, did not put to death, or cut off 
people's feet, or brand people's faces, because they sought to harm 
those people, but with the object of prohibiting wickedness and 
stopping crime; for there is no better means of prohibiting 
wickedness and stopping crime than by making punishments heavy. 
If punishments are heavy and rigorously applied, then people will 
not dare to try (how far they can go), with the result that, in the 
state, there will be no people punished. Because there are no 
people punished in the state, I say that if one understands 
punishments, there is no capital punishment.’
1
  
The legalist believed that establishing severe punishments could prevent crimes 
in the end, and thus nobody would be punished. It was a theory of prevention of 
crime. Related topics were proposed including: the objectivity, fairness and publicity 
of law; the equal application of law; law should not have retrospective effects; a legal 
system should be stable; and what law requires should be possible.  
Firstly, about the objectivity of law: Chinese Legalists looked law as the 
objective and the just criterion of judging and normalizing people’s behaviors. In 
Guan Zi, law was compared to measurement: ‘law is the measurement of people’s 
behaviors…(law) is the compass for everything and every procedure.’
2 
Shen Dao 
also used this metaphor to state that law could measure behaviors just like a scale 
could weigh heavy and light.
3 
Shang Yang described law as the scale of the state.
4
 
Han Fei employed this metaphor as well. He proposed that law was the scale for 
judging behaviors and also the mechanism to normalize behaviors.
5
 Those legalists 
emphasized the objectivity of law to persuade the ruler to employ law, and the ruled 
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to believe in the fairness of law.  
Secondly, about the fairness of law: The fairness was embodied in the division 
of public and private affairs. In Chinese legalism, law represented the public. Han Fei 
stated that law was used to prevent selfish motives (of the ruler).
1 
Chinese legalists 
further proposed their famous statement that everything and everyone should be 
judged by law, based on the fairness of law.
2
 This was totally different from 
Confucians’ ethical philosophy that differentiated a person’s rights and duties 
according to his status in his family and in the society. The fairness of law in Chinese 
legalism meant that law should be equally applied to everyone.  
Thirdly, for the equal application of law: Legalists argued against inequality 
order held by Confucians. Confucianism argued that ‘rules of the ceremony do not 
go down to the common people. The penal statutes do not go up to great officers.’ 
3
 
In the order of Li (礼 rules of propriety) in Confucianism, rules should:  
‘[Rules should] furnish the means of determining (the 
observances towards) relatives, as near and remote; of settling 
points which may cause suspicion or doubt; of distinguishing 
where there should be agreement, and where difference; and of 




‘The course (of duty), virtue, benevolence, and righteousness 
cannot be fully carried out without the rules of propriety; nor are 
training and oral lessons for the rectification of manners complete; 
nor can the clearing up of quarrels and discriminating in disputes 
be accomplished; nor can (the duties between) ruler and minister, 
high and low, father and son, elder brother and younger, be 
determined; nor can students for office and (other) learners, in 
serving their masters, have an attachment for them; nor can 
majesty and dignity be shown in assigning the different places at 
court, in the government of the armies, and in discharging the 
duties of office so as to secure the operation of the laws; nor can 
there be the (proper) sincerity and gravity in presenting the 
offerings to spiritual beings on occasions of supplication, 
thanksgiving, and the various sacrifices. Therefore the superior 
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man is respectful and reverent, assiduous in his duties and not 




Therefore in Confucianism rules should not be applied equally but should be 
applied differently to the commons and the noble. Chinese legalists argued against 
this differential treatment and defended the equality of law. Han Fei, Guan Zhong, 
and other legalists criticized Confucianism and stated that punishments and rewards 
should be applied equally to the commons and the noble.
2
 In Shang Jun Shu (Book 
of Shang Yang), Lord Shang stated that  
‘What I mean by the unification of punishments is that 
punishments should know no degree or grade, but that from 
ministers of state and generals down to great officers and ordinary 
folk, whosoever does not obey the king's commands, violates the 
interdicts of the state, or rebels against the statutes fixed by the 
ruler, should be guilty of death and should not be pardoned. Merit 
acquired in the past should not cause a decrease in the punishment 
for demerit later, nor should good behaviour in the past cause any 
derogation of the law for wrong (that was) done later. If loyal 
ministers and filial sons do wrong, they should be judged 
according to the full measure of their guilt, and if amongst the 
officials who have to maintain the law and to uphold an office, 
there are those who do not carry out the king's law, they are guilty 
of death and should not be pardoned, but their punishment should 
be extended to their family for three generations. Colleagues who, 
knowing their offence, inform their superiors will themselves 
escape punishment. In neither high nor low offices should there be 




Fourthly, about the publicity of law: Since law should be applied equally to 
everyone, it should be known by everyone. Legalists argued that the law should be 
proclaimed publicly. Early in the Spring and Autumn Period, there were discussions 
                                                        
1 Ibid. 
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about whether laws should be written and published among famous scholars.
1
 A 
milestone in Chinese legal history was the penal-code-casting event in 536 B.C. in 
the Zheng Kingdom and 513 B.C. in the Jin Kingdom. A legalist, Zichan, had a 
famous debate with Confucius and Shuxiang about whether the penal code should be 
cast on the vessel, the entity that symbolized the supreme authority.  
Confucius believed that a country should be ruled by morality rather than law; 
and that the publication of law would nourish disputes about justice and would 
demolish the harmonious relationships among people. Zichan’s response was that he 
did not have the wisdom (as Confucius had), and he did not cast the penal code for 
himself or for the future generation, but rather as a way to save their era. Zichan then 
published the law by casting it on the vessel. 
2 
Han Fei stated that law should be 
published so that people could know how to conduct, and officials would dare to 
bend the law for personal gain.
3 
Shang Yang also argued that  
‘Indeed, subtle and mysterious words, which have to be 
pondered over, cause difficulty even to men of superior knowledge. 
There may be one case in ten millions, where the directing 
guidance of the law is not needed and yet it is correct in everything. 
Therefore, a sage governs the empire for the ten million cases. For, 
indeed, one should not make laws so that only the intelligent can 
understand them, for the people are not all intelligent; and one 
should not make laws so that only the men of talent can understand 
them, for the people are not all talented. Therefore did the sages, in 
creating laws, make them clear and easy to understand, and the 
terminology correct, so that stupid and wise without exception 
could understand them; and by setting up law officers, and officers 
presiding over the law, to be authoritative in the empire, prevented 
the people from falling into dangerous pitfalls. So the fact that 
when the sages established the empire there were no victims of 
capital punishment, was not because capital punishment did not 
exist, but because the laws which were applied were clear and easy 
to understand. They set up law officers and government officials to 
be the authority, in order to guide them; and they knew that if the 
ten thousands of people all knew what to avoid and what to strive 
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for, they would avoid misfortune and strive for happiness, and so 
restrain themselves. Therefore, an intelligent prince follows the 
existing conditions of order and so makes the order complete, with 
the result that the empire will enjoy great order.’
1
  
Law should be known to the common people. It was an argument against 
Confucian’s idea of mysterious law. Chinese legalists believed that although the 
purpose of having law was to control the subjects, the subjects should at least know 
what they were required to do by law; otherwise it was unjust to use mysterious laws 
to punish them afterwards. Therefore law should be published, clear in content and 
easy to understand. 
Fifthly, about the retrospective effects: Relating to the publicity of law, Chinese 
legalists proposed that law should not have retrospective effects. In Chinese legalists’ 
point of view, the function of law was to lead people living lawfully and punish the 
offender; law therefore should not have retrospective effects. Guan Zi stated that if 
law were not publicized but people got rewards or punishments, the ruler rather than 
the people should be responsible for the results.
2 
This proposal was similar to 
Confucius prospective law conception: 
 ‘To put the people to death without having instructed 
them - this is called cruelty. To require from them, suddenly, 
the full tale of work, without having given them warning - 
this is called oppression. To issue orders as if without 
urgency, at first, and, when the time comes, to insist on them 
with severity - this is called injury.’
3
  
Both Confucians and Chinese legalists argued for the non-retrospective rules. 
The difference between them was that Confucians put emphasis on the education and 
generalizing Li (礼 rules of propriety); legalists, however, focused on the general 
knowledge of Fa (法 law).4   
Sixthly, about the stability of a legal system: Chinese legalists argued against 
the statistic conception of law that defended in Confucianism. Chinese legalists 
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argued that law should be changed according to the spirit of the age. This was the 
statement Shang Yang proposed before his legal reform. Nevertheless, Chinese 
legalists also stated that law should be stable: they compared law to measurement 
and stressed its objective and its stable characteristics. Guan Zhong concluded that if 
the law were made but then changed all of a sudden, people would not follow the law 
even if the rewards were generous; and people would not be afraid of the law even if 
the punishments were severe.
1
 Han Fei also agreed that ‘law should be unified and 
stable; then people could know law’.
2
 Otherwise, ‘if laws were changed frequently, 
people would suffer from the result’
3.
 They proposed that if laws were paradox, or 
the law was changed too frequently, people could not comprehend law; neither could 
they make appropriate judgments on the legal results of their behaviors.  
Seventhly, what law requires should be possible. Chinese legalists illustrated the 
objectivity of stable law to increase the credibility of law. They also realized that if 
the law’s requirements were impossible, people would not obey law. As stated in 
Guan Zi,  
‘A wise ruler would consider the ability of his subjects. He 
would not require them to achieve impossible tasks. His orders 
should be in the range of their capabilities so that his laws could 
be applied. If a ruler required his subjects obey laws which were 
impossible to obey, his law would be inefficacious. So a wise 
ruler would never force his subjects obey impossible rules.’
4
 
The above seven propositions were the major topics of law argued in Chinese 
legalism.
5
 As a legal thought, it presupposed human beings’ corrupted nature, and 
proposed a duty-centered philosophy. It put emphasis on the coercive nature of law 
and was thus different from Confucians’ moral propositions. In its debates with the 
other three major thoughts in Pre-Qin era of China, legalism became a unique and 
significant ideology because of the successful legal reforms led by Chinese legalists 
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in the Warring State period.
1
 Chinese legalism efficiently supported the rapid growth 
of the state Qin, assisted it to unify the whole country and to build the first great 
empire in the history of China.  
 
CHINESE LEGALISM AND WESTERN LEGALISM 
In history, Chinese legalism as a philosophy had a formidable adversary, 
Confucianism, because of their divergence of opinions on law and ethics. At present, 
Chinese legalism faced another antithesis, The Western Rule of Law ideology. 
Western theorists might misunderstand Chinese legalism. They might use the concept 
of Western legalism to cover Chinese legalism incorrectly because of the English 
translation. If relying simply on the definition per genus et differentiam Chinese 
legalism could be (but was incorrectly) interpreted as a branch of legalism: Chinese 
legalism in this approach was understood as a kind of legalism.
2
 However, Chinese 
legalism differed from Western legalism not only in its geographic origin and 
historical development, but also their theoretic grounds. Chinese legalism developed 
originally from its debate with Confucianism about the functions of coercive norms 
from the state and the government; Western legalism was rather a modern ideology 
about the justification of rule-following.  
Western legalism was described as the legalistic attitude, and normative 
behavior to be a matter of rule-following. In legalism, law merely was a 
heteronomous system of rules.
3
 It was not only ‘an ideology internal to the legal 
profession as a social whole’ or ‘the operative ideology of lawyers’ and of those who 
have a ‘rule-oriented thinking’, but also a background theory of law, which implied a 
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rule-based way of looking at things and a tendency to treat law as just ‘there’ and 
separated of non-law.
1
 Professor Bankowski described this attitude as ‘it is the rules 
that are important, not how they are arrived at’. 
2
  
‘For legalism the power of natural law would lie in the 
rules that it generates and not in the nature, God or practical 
reason that might be said to produce them.’ and ‘no matter where 
the rules come from, the effect of legalism is to make them 
appear objective and unchangeable.’
3
  
The ‘thereness’ of law entailed that within a legalistic form of thinking, there 
was no need for a theory about rules, since the only thing that was to be taken into 
account is the rule. Legalism in this definition was a rule-centered attitude, which 
focused on the legitimacy of rule-following rather than the source of law and its 
content.  
Different from the Rule of Law principle that developed from the Western legal 
tradition, Chinese legalism focused on the legitimacy of the ruler’s control. Chinese 
legalism emphasized the source of law (from the legitimate political ruler) and its 
content (to strengthen the state). Chinese legalism was not only rule-centered, but 
most importantly, a ruler-centered philosophy. Apart from the authority and the 
dignity of law, Chinese legalists also stressed the authority of the emperor: the logic 
was that if the law were respected, the emperor’s honorable status could be certain; if 
the law were belittled, the emperor’s honorable status could not be ensured. And 
most importantly, if people were incredulous about the emperor’s honorable status, 
the state would be unstable—therefore law should be valued!
4
 Law in this 
philosophy could ensure the honorable status of the emperor as well as the stability 
of the state. The emperor should therefore regard his first task as conquering his 
subjects through law.
5
 The ultimate source of law in Chinese legalism was the 
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emperor. The source of legalism was in contrast with Dao (道 the nature; the natural 
law) in Daoism, Ren (仁, mercy) in Confucianism and Ai (爱 love) in Mohism. The 
emperor was recognized as the ultimate creator and interpreter of law:  
‘The tasks of creating law, practicing law and obeying law 
should be differentiated. The emperor is in charge of legislation; 




Thus the Chinese legalism implied a top-down and unidirectional lawmaking 
mode. In this irreversible dimensional mode, the ruler’s major responsibility was to 
make law. Rule-following was the duty of his subjects including his officials. This 
top-down lawmaking model did not emphasize the lawmakers’ responsibility of 
rule-following, and did not involve the possibilities of proposing new laws by people. 
In practice, people did not have such a lawmaking right indeed, because the privilege 
of lawmaking represented the authority of the ruler and should belong to the ruler 
exclusively.
2
 The lawmaker, i.e., the emperor was born in the highest status above all 
the law-accepters. His privileges of lawmaking were justified in this model.  
In Western legal history, the sovereign’s lawmaking privilege was similar to the 
above model in the early periods but different in its later development. As Thomas 
Hobbes described in Leviathan and Jean Bodin in Six Books of the Commonwealth, 
the most evident identification of the lawgiver in Western history was the sovereign, 
or the conqueror of a territory.
3
 The sovereignty theory indicated that the 
sole-and-ultimate lawmaking power was one of the central powers of the sovereign, 
and that the sovereign in turn was self-explanatory ‘lawmaker’. The question of ‘who 
is the lawmaker’ therefore transformed to ‘who is the sovereign’. Lawmaker was the 
other name of the sovereign. In pre-modern societies, a controller or conqueror 
attached great importance to the announcement of his supreme lawmaking power. 
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His legislation was called declaratory legislation.
1
 A wholesale rule-setting, ordering 
and making of laws occur under the absolute power of a King or Emperor. So, ‘no 
sovereign no law’. 
2
 The power to make law was the most obvious expression of the 
supreme authority. The sovereign announced and confirmed its supreme status, 
power and its legitimacy through lawmaking. ‘Lawmaker’ was therefore the other 
name of the sovereign in history.  
The sovereign’s supreme status was also symbolized as the lawmaking power. 
However, the content of the ‘sovereignty’ in Western history changed.
3
 It therefore 
increased difficulties in the recognition of the lawmaker. As a matter of fact, the unity 
of sovereign and (actual) lawmaker began to separate although countless ties 
between them could still be found. ‘Parliamentary sovereignty’, (in this sense, the 
sovereignty refers to the ‘lawmaker’s sovereignty’ rather than the ‘monarch’s 
sovereignty’) appeared in English legal history during the time when the monarch 
had less power, and the actual lawmaker was no longer the monarch.
4
  
The concept ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ was made to cover the fact that the 
actual lawmaker and the sovereign began to separate in England. Parliamentary 
sovereignty established the supreme status of a collective organization, the 
legislature (Parliament). The role of the Parliament was different from that of the 
sovereign in history. The classical theory on ‘legislative sovereignty’ represented by 
Dicey differentiated the theoretical uppermost power with the actual limited power of 
parliament. Sovereignty was accordingly divided into two kinds: the ‘legislative 
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sovereignty’ and the ‘political sovereignty’.
1
 Parliamentary sovereignty meant the 
parliament had the unrestricted power of lawmaking. It should, however, obey the 
will of the people, which meant that the electorates were the political sovereignty. 
Therefore, parliamentary sovereignty was regarded as a legislative sovereignty in 
theory, but was like the ‘popular sovereignty’ in politics. In this sense, although the 
parliamentary lawmaking power was exclusive and should not be restricted, it should 
be under the control of ‘the people’.  
Thus the theoretical backgrounds of Chinese legalism and Western legalism 
were different. When legalism developed in Western societies after the 17
th
 century, 
laws and theories about laws were already there. Laws were relatively mature. 
Chinese legalism was proposed in a unique historical and cultural background during 
475 to 221 B.C., when law was not recognized necessary for social control before 
that era. Ethical norms supported by Confucianism were the official and mainstream 
norms to manage the society.
2
 Legalism in Western contexts was an ideology lacking 
of awareness for the justification of rule-following behaviors because ‘law is simply 
there’. Chinese legalism as a practical philosophy, however, was from the beginning 
proposed to construct (rather than to justify) the fidelity to (rulers’) law.  
Is the difference between ‘rule-centerd’ (of the Western Legalism) and 
‘ruler-centered’ (of Chinese Legalism) a real difference? Professor Bankowski 
pointed out that in the Politics of Jurisprudence Cotterrell defended Austin saying 
that his theory of law was also based on a top down authoritarian society. In Luc J. 
Wintgens’ Legislation in Context and Legisprudence, (Western) strict legalism was 
also criticized. So what is the real difference between ‘rule-centered’ of a top-down 
authoritarian society and ‘ruler-centered’ in ancient China?  
To answer this question, we should better recall theories of Bentham and Austin, 
which were the foundation of the ancient Western top-down authoritarian legal 
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system. Bentham’s theory was to justify utilitarianism, i.e., to promote the greatest 
good for the greatest number. Therefore it was not necessarily ‘ruler-centered’ but the 
result-centered. Austin also stressed the coercive nature of law from a 
consequentialist moral reasoning, so that the coercive nature of law was not 
necessarily ‘ruler-centered’ but force-centered. Although Austin’s theory was 
apparently referred to a top down authoritarian society,  we do not need to justify 
the status of the ruler from a consequentialist moral reasoning, but the force behind 
the status as the reasoning for others’ obedience to the law.  
Ruler-centered in Chinese Legalism, however, was not merely a 
consequentialist philosophy. It also put an emphasis on the legitimate status of the 
ruler, rather than the recognition of the force of the ruler. In a well-known Chinese 
classic, Romance of Three Kingdoms, the reason that Lord Liu Bei should be the 
legitimate King was that he had a blood relation with the previous emperor. He did 
not have force in the beginning. The other two comparative Lords, Sun Quan and 
Cao Cao, although had the force, were not recognized to have legitimated status to be 
the King. The other two Lords therefore were not recognized as legitimate rulers.
1
 
Fidelity to Liu’s law led to just behaviors while the laws of the other two Lords were 
coercion norms that people ‘had to’ obey. The legitimacy of a ruler was different 
from the force of the ruler. Chinese legalism stressed the necessity to strengthen the 
ruler’s force. It also defended that the ruler’s status should be legitimate. It therefore 
differed from Western legalism in which coercion rather than legitimacy was the 
necessary premise of law. In Western legal history, as stated previously, the 
sovereign’s status was much stressed before rather than after the growth of the 
ideology of legalism after the 17
th
 century. Such a transformation (from status to 
contract) was stated clearly in Maine Ancient Law: ‘The movement of the progressive 
societies has hitherto been a movement from status to contract’.
2 
Chinese legalism as 
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an ancient philosophy did not go through this transformation.  
 
CONCLUSION 
As an important ancient legal thought, Chinese legalism emphasized the ruler’s 
authority and the subjects’ obedience to law. It aimed at a pursuit for the order and 
security of the society. It differed from the other Pre-Qin schools of thoughts. In 
Confucianism rights and duties of the family were analogously applied onto the 
society as well as the nation.
1
 Chinese legalism, as a contrast, distinguished the rules 
of the nation and the society. It focused on the function of law in controlling the 
nation. It did not deny the ethical morality but stressed that ethical norms and 
morality should remain in the realm of family and private fields.
2
 It, however, 
denied the morality of law of the nation indeed—law and nation in Chinese legalism 
were in nature something bad, although they could lead to something good. Taoism 
and Mohism also held this classification: they claimed that Dao (道，rules of the 
nature) and Ai（爱，love）should be applied universally to everyone; rules of the 
nation although should be harmonious with Dao or Ai，were different norms.3  
Indeed, Confucianism, Legalism and Daoism (with Mohism) had argued for 
diverse norms of different fields: Confucianism—the norms in private interaction; 
Legalism—norms of the nation; and Daoism—norms of the nature (universal norms 
or transnational norms). Focusing on the norms of the nation, Chinese legalism 
excluded the other two kinds of norms, i.e., norms of the private interaction and of 
the nature, and provided a formalistic and coercive concept of law: Rule-by-Law. 
Chinese contemporary scholars had a debate on the Rule-by-Law concept in 
Chinese legalism. Shuchen Wu in his reply to Shiqun Yang’s criticisms on Chinese 
legalism argued that the differentiation between Li (礼, rules of propriety) and Fa (法, 
                                                        
1 Ibid. 
2 Hairen He, The Enemy of the Legalists in Pre-Qin Era: The Normative Theory on Ruling the Country through 
the Law, Tribune of Political Science and Law, (2007), Vol.25, pp.36-50. 
3 Ronggen Yu ed., History of Chinese Legal Thoughts, Law Press, (2000), pp. 67-79. see also Hegao Yang, 
History of Chinese Legal Thoughts, Beijing University Press, (2000), pp. 84-125. 
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law) in Pre-Qin era represented by Confucianism and Legalism, represented two 
different social controlling models: rule by the sage or rule by law. ‘Chinese 
Rule-of-Law’ in his perspective originated from Pre-Qin era and was connected with 
the power of the sovereign from the beginning. ‘Chinese Rule-of-Law’ was natural 
and conformed to the trend of the times. Comparing to the Aristotelian Rule-of-Law 
tradition, Chinese Rule-of-Law was not based on the value of freedom or the check 
and balance of powers, but emphasized other basic values including equality and 
equal application, order and obedience to law.
1
 Shiqun Yang, Ronggen Yu, Zhiping 
Liang and Zhongqiu Zhang argued that the rule-by-Law in Chinese legalism was 
totally different from the Western Rule-of-Law idea. Professor Liang wrote that ‘in 
ancient China, there did not exist or have the possibility of an existence of the 
Rule-of-Law’.
2
 Professor Zhang Zhongqiu also held that ‘in ancient China there 
never existed the Rule-of-Law’.
3
 Professor Yang Shiqun stated that rule-by-Law was 
indeed rule-by-the emperor. Although it was different from Confucian rule by the 
sage, it was still Rule-of-Man.
4
 In a comparative study on Aristotelian Rule-of-Law 
and Chinese legalism, the differences between the two conceptions were concluded 
as: diverse recognitions of the relationship between morality and law; different 
treatments of law (law as public norms or as the emperor’s controlling instrument); 
emphasis on the right or the duty of the commons; balanced powers or concentration 
of powers; and whether they aimed at a governance of virtue.
5
 Their different 
comments on Chinese legalism reflected different attitudes on modern legislative 
construction. Other scholars held an apprehensive attitude of understanding the 
traditional legal culture. They criticized the trend of separation present and past.
6
 
                                                        
1 Shuchen Wu, Discussion on Rule-of-law in Chinese Legalism: A Reply to Shiqun Yang, Journal of the East 
China University of Politics and Law, (1998), vol.,1, pp.54-63. 
2 Zhiping Liang, Searching for the Harmony of the Natural Order: Studies on Traditional Chinese Legal Culture, 
Shanghai People’s Publishing House, (1991), p.60, 83. 
3 Zhongqiu Zhang, A Comparative Study on Western and Chinese Legal Cultures, Nanjing University Press, 
(1991), p.278, 290. 
4 Shiqun Yang, Further Discussion on Rule-by-law in Chinese Legalism: A Reply to Shuchen Wu, Journal of the 
East China University of Politics and Law, (1999), vol. 2, pp.50-54. 
5 Yanqing Chen, On Similarities and Differences between Aristotelian Rule-of-law and Rule-by-law in Chinese 
Legalism, Gansu Social Science, (2001), vol.3, pp.19-21. 
6 From Zhongxin Fan, Chen Jingliang and Wuqian’s lecture notes (1999 -2005). 
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Some scholars believed that Chinese legalism could contribute to the modern 
legislative construction in present China.
1
 Others, however, held a rather radical 
attitude and denied any values in Chinese legalism.
2
  
As discussed previously in this chapter, I believe that the Chinese Rule-by-Law 
concept contained topics akin to Western ideas of Rule-of-Law. They both defended 
the objectivity of law, fair treatment and equal application, non-retrospective law, a 
stable legal system and ‘the possible law’. Those seven propositions were similar to 
Lon L. Fuller’s principles of legality. 
3
 However, Chinese legalism and Western 
legalism had fundamental distinctions from their historical backgrounds, theoretical 
hypotheses, their starting points and their ultimate purpose.  
Chinese legalism was the major ‘competitive’ of Confucianism. Western 
legalism was the opposite of the natural law theory. Major concerns of Chinese 
legalism were to break the authority of hierarchical patriarchal system that defended 
by Confucianism. Western legalism argued against the morality of law that defended 
by the natural law theories. In Chinese legalism, the morality of law was not a 
necessary premise of law, but morality was not exclusively denied, especially in the 
early Pre-Qin legalism. And in general, unlike Western legalism, Chinese legalism 
did not make the classification of morality and law a necessary premise of law. 
However, in Western legalism, especially ‘strict’ or ‘hard’ legalism, the morality and 
law were exclusively uncompetitive. The starting point and the ultimate purpose of 
Chinese legalism were for the strengthening of the authority of the ruler and the state. 
Western legalism was for the authority of the law (therefore the authority of the ruler 
was another topic). Although both theories emphasized the fidelity of law, in Chinese 
                                                        
1 Zhouya Li, The Legal Theory of the Legalists in Ancient China and its Influential Significance in Modern 
Times, Modern Law Science, vol.25, (2003), pp.36-39. 
2 Shiqun Yang, Further Discussion on Rule-by-law in Chinese Legalism: A Reply to Shuchen Wu, Journal of the 
East China University of Politics and Law, (1999), vol. 2, pp.50-54. 
3 See my previous discussion on the seventh major propositions of Chinese Legalism. In Fuller’s The Morality of 
Law, eight principles of legality, or, ‘eight routes of failure for any legal system’ were stated as: 1. the lack of 
rules or law, which leads to ad-hoc and inconsistent adjudication; 2. failure to publicize or make known the rules 
of law; 3. unclear or obscure legislation that is impossible to understand; 4. retroactive legislation; 5. 
contradictions in the law; 6. demands that are beyond the power of the subjects and the ruled. 7. unstable 
legislation (ex. Daily revisions of laws). 8. divergence between adjudication/administration and legislation. 
Fuller, The Morality of Law, pp.33-94. 
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legalism the topic was transformed to the fidelity of ruler, while in Western legalism 
it referred to the promise to the social contract (Wintgens), the rule of recognition 
(Hart), the creative chain of norms (Kelsen), or the authority of social norms (Raz).  
Therefore, we should be very cautious in constructing a modern legal system for 
the recognition of Chinese legalism. I disagree with the argument that Chinese 
legalism was a kind of legalism in Western perspective. Neither Chinese legalism nor 
Western legalism could be the sole reference for Chinese legal system. In my opinion, 
we should recognize the Chinese native legal contexts formed by Chinese legalism 
and other Chinese philosophies, and rebuild Chinese legal culture by absorbing 
positive elements of Western law. In the next chapter, I will turn to Western 






LAWMAKING IN JURISPRUDENCE (I) 
 
——Act always so that you treat humanity whether in your 
person or in that of another always as an end, but never as a 
means only. (Kant) 
——The end of the law is peace. The means to that end is 
war…The life of the law is a struggle, ——a struggle of nations, 




In previous chapters I discussed Chinese theories of legislative legitimation 
including Confucianism, Chinese Marxism and Chinese Legalism. None of those 
theories emphasized on communication. In this chapter I will turn to Western 
theories about lawmaking. Lawmaking was a marginal topic in Western 
jurisprudence. Classic materials on this topic such as Bentham’s Theory of legislation 
and Maitland’s study on the early history of institutions were written centuries ago.
1
 
The Science of Law and Law Making was published over one hundred years ago 
also.
2
 Other works explored the historical evolution of law.
1
 But those literatures 
                                                        
1 Bentham was seen as the father of the theory of legislation. His Science of Legislation was major expressed 
through his three books: The Theory of Legislation, Tru ̈bner, 1864; A Fragment on Government, F.C.Montague 
ed., 1891; An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Hafner Publishing Co., (1948). The Theory 
of Legislation was written two hundred years ago. F. W. Maitland and F. C. Montague, A Sketch of English Legal 
History, G.P.Putnam’s sons, (1915), was written a hundred years ago. 
2 Floyd C. R., the Science of Law and Law Making, Macmillan, (1898). 
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referred to a specific branch of law exclusively.
2
 Comparative studies attempted to 
interpret the relationship between law and politics.
3
 Communicative lawmaking 
although existed in Western legislative practice, lacked jurisprudential debate.  
In this and the next chapters I chose four representative Western theories of 
lawmaking. I attempted to analyze Western theories of lawmaking from a Chinese 
perspective. To me, theories of Bentham, Hayek, Waldron and Wintgens offered four 
different paradigms in the research of lawmaking. The four different theories showed 
the width and depth of Western theories on lawmaking. Bentham and Hayek 
represented a classical debate on the nature of law and legislation, i.e., a utilitarian 
lawmaking in contrast to liberalistic lawmaking. Waldron and Wintgens offered 
solutions for the crisis of contemporary legitimation of lawmaking. Waldron studied 
lawmaking from the structure and procedures of legislatures, while Wintgens 
discussed the values behind the legitimacy of lawmaking.  
 
BENTHAMNISM AND CHINESE UTILITARIANISM 
Let us see such expressions: If a policy could promote economic development, 
it was good; if law could promote GDP, it was good; if the sacrifice of the minority 
could promote the welfare of the majority, it was good. These were particular 
expressions of the consequentialist moral reasoning. As disclosed in previous 
chapters, most Chinese lawmaking theories were justifications for consequentialism 
in the legitimacy of lawmaking. Therefore it was natural for us to think of a 
representative classical and positivistic theory of law and lawmaking, Bentham’s 
theory of legislation, which was famous for its consequentialist moral reasoning. The 
principle of utility in Bentham’s philosophy of law was used widely to justify 
modern legislations. Chinese scholars were influenced by Bentham’s theory deeply 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 Such as Anderson J.S., Lawyers and the making of English Land Law 1832-1940, Oxford University, (1992). 
2 Such as Buergenthal T., Law–making in the International Civil Aviation Organization, Syracuse University 
Press (1969). 
3 Such as Miller M. C.  and Barnes J.  ed., Making Policy, Making Law—an interbranch perspective, 
Georgetown University Press, (2004) . 
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during late 1902, the modern legal reform era of China, when Liang Qichao 
introduced Bentham to Chinese for the first time.
1
  
Except for the rather late translation of four works of Bentham including A 
Fragment on Government （政府片论 1995），An Introduction to the Principle of 
Morals and Legislation（道德与立法原理导论 2000），The Theory of Legislation（立
法理论 2004）and Of Laws in General（论一般的法律 2008），other works of 
Bentham has not been translated and introduced to Chinese yet including An Essay 
on Political Tactics and Deontology or Science of Morality.
 2
 In my research of the 
recent ten years theses on Bentham in China, I did not find any doctoral theses on 
Bentham’s theory. Only three of fourteen master theses on Bentham were about his 
legislative ethics.
3
 The highest level of Chinese academic articles about Bentham 





However, Bentham’s principle of utility has been known and accepted widely 
by Chinese lawmakers and scholars. Ideas of common prosperity, collective interests 
and the principle that the sovereignty belongs to the people in Chinese legitimation 
of lawmaking were all similar to Bentham’s theory of lawmaking. Comparing with 
other Western theories, Bentham’s theory was closer to Chinese contemporary 
understanding of law: law was legislation; and legislation was law. Law in both 
theories was positivistic and man-made order.  
The principle of utility was considered to be the foundation of law and morality 
in Bentham’s theory. The principle of utility was proposed to answer questions such 
as: (a) what was law?  (b) Why was law necessary? (c) What should be law? 
                                                        
1 See Zhongxin Fan and Peng He, The Contributions and Characteristics of the Legal Works of Liang Qichao (梁
启超的法学贡献及其法律思想特征), Journal for Legal History Studies (法制史研究), vol.16, 2009. see also 
Qichao Liang, 梁启超, Le Li Zhu Yi Tai Dou Bian Qing Zhi Xue Shuo, 乐利主义泰斗边沁之学说，Xin Min 
Cong Kan，新民丛刊，no.15, (1902), pp. 11-25.  
2 The four translation works are: 边沁：《政府片论》，沈叔平等译，商务印书馆 1995 年版; 《道德与立法
原理导论》，时殷弘译，商务印书馆 2000 年版;《立法理论》，李贵方等译，中国人民公安大学出版社 2004
年版;边沁：《论一般法律》，毛国权译，上海三联书店 2008 年版.  
3 My search was from the PhD and Master theses data base of 万方数据库 Wanfang Data and 中国知网 CNKI 
Data. 
4 About Qichao Liang’s contribution, see Zhongxin Fan and Peng He, 梁启超的法学贡献及其法律思想特征
The Contributions and Characteristics of Liang Qichao’s Legal Thoughts, 法制史研究 Journal for Legal History 
Studies, vol.12 , (2009), Angle Publishing, pp.329-359. 
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Utilitarianism answered these three questions like this: (a) law was a coercive rule. 
‘Every law when complete is either a coercive or un-coercive nature. A coercive law 
is a command. An un-coercive, or rather a dis-coercive law, is the revocation in 
whole or in part of a coercive law.’
 1
 Law was used to punish the disobedient, and it 
operated by imposing a psychological dread on potential wrongdoers.
2
 (b) Law was 
necessary because it enabled the members of a community to be happier than they 
could be without it: 
 
‘the greater part of men is neither of sufficient strength of mind 
nor sufficient moral sensibility to place their honesty above the aid of the law. The 
legislator must supply the feebleness of this natural interest by adding to it an 
artificial interest steadier and more easily perceived’.
3
 Law could contribute to the 
happiness of a community by reinforcing moral and religious sanctions against 
harming other people as well as by creating institutions which were compatible to 
utility.
 4




Bentham mentioned concepts of un-coercive law or dis-coercive law. Those 
concepts, however, were ‘the revocation in whole or in part of a coercive law’.
6
 
Therefore the primary criterion to differentiate law from non-law was its imperative 
nature. The imperativalist acknowledged that legal systems contained provisions that 
were not imperatives, for example, permissions and definitions; but these were 
regarded as part of the non-legal material that was necessary for, and part of every 
legal system.  
The legitimacy of a legal system was examined from its purpose, i.e., the 
happiness of the community. To justify the legality of law from the existence of law 
                                                        
1 J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Hafner Publishing Co., 1948, p.302. 
2 A.J.M. Milne, Bentham and Legal Theory, ‘Bentham’s Principle of Utility and Legal Philosophy’, Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly, 1973, pp.14-15.  
3 Bentham, The Theory of Legislation, Trübner, 1864, p.64. 
4 Two examples he gave were (1) legislation protects private property; (2) legislation resists other morally wrong 
acts as the offences against the state. Bentham’s theory therefore does not totally exclude morality from a positive 
theory of law. See Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Blackwell, 1948, p.292. 
5 Otherwise ‘the evil of the punishment [by law] would be greater than the evil of the offence’, Bentham, The 
Theory of Legislation, p.60. 
6 J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Hafner Publishing Co., 1948, p.302. 
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was insufficient; law should also achieve its purpose, public welfare for example. 
Bentham was therefore distinct from other positivists such as Austin, Kelsen and 
Hart—he did not exclude morality entirely from a legal study as those positivists 
did.
1
 There was an implicative proposition, however: law was regarded as a fruit of 
evil rather than a result of natural justice, which denied the moral dimension of 
positive law. If the evil that law prevented was greater than it created, i.e., when law 
was conformable to utility, a legal punishment could be justified. Therefore the 
principle of utility although connected with morality, did not change the nature of 
positive law, i.e., amoral law. The purpose of lawmaking in Bentham’s theory should 
be understood as creating law conformable to utility. Bentham was thus different 
from natural law theorists: to him, law was not something ‘good’ by nature but 
justified evil. Thus, lawmaking was only a mechanism to prevent and punish 
something even worse. To Bentham, law was a reasonable choice which could 
promote morality in the end, but was not necessarily something desirable. 
The theory of legislation was constructed according to both the substance and 
the shape of law. Utility was the ruling principle of legislation, and related to the 
substance of law. To Bentham, the form of law was also important. He believed that 
law was imperfect until expressed in the form of a code.
2
 Codification was therefore 
the key in his concept of legal reform. His ideal codification should achieve four 
conditions: integrity, universality, logicality and synonymy. Integrity required any 
given body of law should be complete before they could form a code. In other words, 
‘it must set forth the whole of the law with such fullness as to need no supplement in 
the form of commentaries or of reported cases’.
3
 Universality demanded law to 
consist of rules stated with the utmost generality attainable in each instance, or of the 
                                                        
1 A connection between law and morality is admitted: law is to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number. Law and morality are therefore connected by the principle of utility. About the relationship between 
utilitarianism and morality, see R.B. Brandt, Morality, Utilitarianism and Rights, Cambridge University Press, 
1992; R.E. Goodin, ‘Political Theory and Public Policy’, Political Science, 1983, p.104; see also L. P. Nucci, The 
Nature of Morality and the Development of Social Values, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.7. 
2 J. Bentham, P. Schofield, and J. Harris, Legislator of the World: Writings on Codification, Law and Education, 




fewest possible rules in which the whole of the law could be expressed. Logicality 
meant rules must be enunciated in a rigorously logical order. Synonymy must be 
achieved through the enunciation of rules using a rigorously uniform terminology, 
‘affording one and only one term accurately defined for everything which there is 
occasion to name in the course of the work’.
1
 The advantages of codification were 
considerable: it assisted the public in knowing the law as well as the legal 
professionals who apply law. A code might remedy the defects of fragmentary 
legislation by ‘extracting the real law from the mass of doubtful or antiquated matter 
in which it lies buried’,
2
 and ‘by stating this real law in a terse, clear and connected 
form’.
3
 Lawyers could at once grasp the law as a whole and referred to a particular 
rule by using a specifically advanced code. Codification should never be regarded as 
precluding the development of law that was promoted by commentaries, judicial 
decisions or further legislation also. According to Bentham, ‘only a code intended to 
be unalterable and worshipped with superstitious veneration can really paralyze the 
growth of law.’
4
 Thus a code should pay more attention to principles rather than 
details and needs periodical revision by legislative authority.  
The formula of happiness in Bentham’s theory was difficult to substantiate 
because there was a ‘hard’ concept, ‘happiness’, which was incompatible with ‘the 
greatest number’. It was unclear whether happiness was an individual’s physical or 
physiological state, or one’s reason or motivation for a conduct. In my view, 
happiness should always refer to a specific person. ‘The greatest number’, however, 
referred to the collective. Hence it was impossible to measure and calculate the 
collective’s happiness. Bentham himself realized this conflict and in his later work he 
ceased referring happiness to the greatest number. The formula was explained in an 
abstract way, that ‘the greatest amount of happiness might take the form of an intense 
happiness enjoyed by a smaller as opposed to a diffused happiness enjoyed by a 
                                                        
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid., p.53. 
3 Ibid. 





 Thus pleasures and pains were calculated basing on an abstract form. 
The calculation took account solely of the quantity rather than quality of pleasures 
and pains. In this way, he made a compromise between ‘happiness’ and ‘the greatest 
number’. The calculation of happiness, however, was fruitless as long as happiness 
was a subjective judgment. Mediating principles including security and equality were 
proposed to substantiate utility: by maintaining security and by favoring equality, the 
legislator could ensure happiness.
2
 ‘The root of the trouble, [however], lies in the 
psychological part of the principle: that is, in psychological hedonism’.
3
 The 
formula referred all human action to the effect of only two causes: desire for pleasure 
and aversion from pain. Such a reductive proposition failed in distinguishing reasons 
from causes of action.
 4
 Psychological hedonism, i.e., the cause of action, could not 
justify the reason of action. The motivation of an action should also be separate from 
the outcome, and in this sense utilitarianism as a consequence-oriented doctrine was 
not the sole foundation of law.
 
 
Apart from the problem of psychological hedonism, another insufficiency of the 
principle of utility existed in a circular reasoning (see figure 5.1 below): lawmaking 
was to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number; happiness, the 
psychological hedonism in turn was the cause for lawmaking. It was therefore argued 
in a cyclical pattern: why were laws made?—because people were happy to make 
law—why were they happy?—because law promoted happiness!  
 
                                                        
1 Bentham, A Fragment on Government, p.34. 
2 Bentham believes that if the claims of security conflict with the claims of equality, the former should always be 
preferred because security is to Bentham the first, the all-important condition of human happiness. The first 
object of the legislator is to preserve and strengthen the feeling of security, but in so far as is consistent with 
security; their second object is to further equality. Ibid. 
3 M.H.James ed., ‘Bentham and Legal Theory’, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, (1973), p.19. 
4 Utilitarianism was the doctrine that focuses on the outcome—the rightness of acts is to be judged by their 





Such a circular argument was caused by confusing an ontological thesis with a 
teleological thesis. Law per se should be different from its purposes or results but the 
circular argument mixed them up. ‘Rule utilitarianism’ emphases that ‘the rightness 
or wrongness of a particular action is a function of the correctness of the rule of 
which it is an instance’, and that ‘it is rules not individual acts that are to be judged 
by their consequences’.
1
 Rule utilitarianism attempted to avoid circular arguments 
by excluding psychological hedonism from reasons for an action. It was still, 
however, misleading because it again focused solely on the consequences—the goals, 
purposes, or achievements of law. We should notice that ‘Law can be unjust in 
themselves, quite apart from their consequences: for instance, laws upholding 
slavery, or enforcing racial religious or sex discriminations. A principle which fails 
to take account of this possibility is surely not a good guide to the legislator.’
 2
 In 
utilitarianism the ontological thesis of law, i.e., law as justified evil, was mixed up 
with its teleological thesis, i.e., the purpose of law as a mechanism to promote utility. 
Utilitarianism developed by Bentham had a great influence on lawmaking. It  
                                                        
1 B. Parekh, Jeremy Bentham: Critical Assessments, Routledge, (1993), p.30. about rule utilitarianism, see R.T. 
Garner and B. Rosen, Moral Philosophy: A Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics, 
Macmillan, (1967), p.70. Rule utilitarianism was also called restricted or indirect utilitarianism. In stead of 
looking at the consequences of a particular act, rule-utilitarianism determines the rightness of an act by finding 
the value of the consequences of following a particular rule. The rule the following of which has the best overall 
consequences is the best rule. Early proponents were J.Austin (The Province of Jurisprudence) and J.S. Mill 
(Utilitarianism), see T. Mautner ed., The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, 
<http://www.utilitarianism.com/ruleutil.htm>. 
2 M.H.James ed., ‘Bentham and Legal Theory’, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, (1973), p.37. 
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was used to justify the legitimacy of governance.
 1
 The reason for democratic 
decision-making was often described as ‘by the people and for the people’. The 
concept of ‘the people’ implied the principle of utility: the greatest interests of the 
greatest number—a new utilitarianism.
 2
 The principle of utility was to justify the 
purpose of law. Law aimed at punishing the disobedient, and it operated by imposing 
a psychological dread on potential wrongdoers.
3
 Law was necessary because it 
enabled the members of a community to be happier than they could be without it.
4
 
Law contributed to the happiness of a community by reinforcing moral and religious 
sanctions against harming other people, and by creating institutions which were 
compatible to utility.  
I found that utilitarianism and consequentialism dominated Chinese lawmaking. 
When the purpose was for the good of the collective (the people and the nation), the 
law was justified. If the result of lawmaking could contribute to the GDP, the 
economic development, lawmaking was justified. The result of lawmaking was more 
important than the procedure per se. Law made by the procedure was not necessarily 
moral in Chinese philosophy. But if it could bring good effects (including social 
control, security, and order) it was tolerable.
 5
 In Chinese perspective, law was not 
                                                        
1 The influence of the utilitarianism, see G. I. Molivas, The Influence of Utilitarianism on Natural Rights 
Doctrines, Utilitas, Cambridge University Press, (1997), pp.183-202; also see J. Rawls’ criticism on utilitarianism, 
A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, (1971); and J. Rawls, ‘The Law of Peoples’, Critical Inquiry, The 
University of Chicago Press, (1993), Vol. 20, pp.363-368.  
2 J. Skorupski, ‘Welfare and Self-governance’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 9, (2006), pp. 289-309; 
D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance’, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, 
(1999), pp. 596-624. 
3 In positivistic point of view, law was nothing but coercive norms. Bentham states that ‘Every law when 
complete is either a coercive or un-coercive nature. A coercive law is a command. An un-coercive, or rather a 
dis-coercive law, is the revocation in whole or in part of a coercive law.’J. Bentham, An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation, Hafner Publishing Co., (1948), p.302. 
4 Bentham wrote that: ‘the greater part of men are neither of sufficient strength of mind nor sufficient moral 
sensibility to place their honesty above the aid of the law. The legislator must supply the feebleness of this natural 
interest by adding to it an artificial interest more steady and more easily perceived’. The Theory of Legislation, 
Tru ̈bner, (1864), p.64. 
5 In ancient Chinese philosophy Taoism,however, law was not necessarily something desirable. The effect of law 
was negative also. In Dao De Jin, Lao Zi believed that ‘the more the law, the more the thieves’: ‘In the kingdom 
the multiplication of prohibitive enactments increases the poverty of the people; the more implements to add to 
their profit that the people have, the greater disorder is there in the state and clan; the more acts of crafty 
dexterity that men possess, the more do strange contrivances appear; the more display there is of legislation, the 
more thieves and robbers there are.’  （以正治国，以奇用兵，以无事取天下。吾何以知其然哉？以此。天
下多忌讳，而民弥贫； 人多利器，国家滋昏；人多伎巧，奇物 滋起；法令滋彰，盗贼多有。故圣人云： 
“我无为而民自化；我好静而民自正；我无事而民自富；我无欲，而民自朴”）.Lao Zi, Dao De Jin, chapter 57. 
The English edition was cited from http://www.ebigear.com/news-479-62356.html. 
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something ‘good’; but rather justified evil. Lawmaking was a mechanism to prevent 
and punish something even worse. This idea was similar to Bentham’s theory of law, 
in which law was to prevent the greater evil.
 1
 Such a consequentialist philosophy, 
however, led to the ignorance of the justice of a rule per se, or the inner morality of 
law. As in Tang Fujun’s case that I discussed in chapter two, the Regulation 
Governing Building Demolition and Resettlement became the local administrative 
excuse to violate particular minority’s right of property. The local administrative 
believed that they could deprive the minority’s property on account of municipal 
construction, local development, or increase of local GDP. The minority’s 
disobedience was defined by them as ‘violent fight against law’. Even worse, a 
reporter who wrote a book to disclose the tragedy of such cases was arrested.
2
 
Chinese consequentialist justification of law and lawmaking caused the ignorance of 
particular minority’s fundamental rights. For the happiness of the abstract concept of 
‘people’, or the unclear majority, law became an instrument to force the particular 
minority to surrender. 
Could codification contribute to the morality of law? In Bentham’s theory of 
legislation, the answer was positive. I would like to examine this argument by 
referring to Chinese legal history. Codification was the major form of Chinese law. 
The codification movement happened early in 536 B.C.. It was the milestone in 
Chinese legal history of the codification tradition. Since then, every Chinese central 
government emphasized unified codes. From the Tang Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty, 
more than one thousand years passed, there were not many substantive differences 
between the codes of each dynasty. The content of law developed in a more 
humanistic direction but the forms of law remained more or less unchanged.
3
 In the 
                                                        
1 The Theory of Legislation, p.60. 
2 Chaoping Xie, was arrested in August 2010 because of his book The Great Migration. He was released on 17th 
September 2010. Details of Xie’s case see Nanfang Weekend, 23 September 2010. 
3 Since the Tang Dynasty, every empire maintained four major forms of statutes, 律 Lu, 令 Lin, 格 Ge, 式 Shi. 
They can be seen as the criminal code, the administrative code, the detailed rules of the administrative law, and 
the common norms. Although the 12 sections were changed to seven sections since Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), 
the changed seven sections were also based on the previous twelve sections but in a more logical way, and more 
related to the ancient Chinese law of Zhou Dynasty (1046-256 B.C.). The seven sections were: (1) general rules, 
名例Ming Li (2) 吏 rules of the officers, Li (3) 户 rules of the registered permanent residence, Hu (4) 礼 rules of 
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end of Qing dynasty, the new codification movement was also the landmark of 
emperor’s desire of transplanting Western laws in favor of making the country 
stronger.  
From 1900 to 1911, during the last empire, the emperor was persuaded by 
scholars to reform the existing legal system by using Western ideas as a reference, to 
escape the fate of being colonized and subjugated. A new legal system was set up to 
replace the traditional classification of laws resulting in branches of law based on a 
modern Western style. New laws were codified in a short period of time to adjust the 
urgent need to ‘learn from the West and be strong’.
1
 Unfortunately, the Qing Empire 
was overthrown rapidly by revolutionists because of the desperate diplomatic 
political situation of the time. Another new legal system was instituted by the 
Nanjing Government in 1927, named as a six-law-system, which contained six major 
branches of law: constitutional law, criminal law, civil law, commercial law, civil 
procedure law, and the criminal procedure law.
 2
 In less than 30 years, in 1949, 
another new government of the whole country announced the abolishment of the six 
codes made by the Nanjing Government. But the Nanjing Guomingdang government 
(1927-1949) and the present CPC government maintained the codification tradition 
of China.  
China absorbed continental law model (especially German law) model in 
modern legal reform but did not choose Common Law as the reference.
3
 A direct 
cause was that Chinese translated Japanese law as a reference for the legal reform in 
late Qing dynasty. And as we knew, modern Japanese legal system was based on the 
study of continental European law specifically represented by German law. Why did 
                                                                                                                                                             
savoir-vivre/proprieties/etiquette, Li (5) 兵 rules of the military, Bing (6) 刑 rules of the penal punishment, Xing 
(7) 工 rules of public works, Gong. 
1 Peng He, 张君劢的宪政主张、努力及其命运，The Constitutional Thoughts, Efforts and Fate of Carsun Chang, 
MA degree thesis of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, (2005), p.5. 
2 After the Qing Dynasty, from 1919-1949 China was controlled by several warlords and there coexisted several 
governments as the Beijing Government, the Nanjing Government, and the Wuhan Government. The Nanjing 
Government ruled by the Guoming Party controlled the whole country later, but was defeated by the People’s 
Communist Party of China. It receded to Taiwan in 1949 and was the leading party of Taiwan in the 1950s and 
1960s. 




China chose German mode of codification? First of all, China had a long history of 
sophisticated codification, so that it would rather accept the German lawmaking 
model rather than the English model. German law was famous for its strict 
classification and definition of notions. It was much easier for Chinese to accept 
German style of lawmaking since it was similar to Chinese way of thinking, 
classification and definition. On the other hand, it was difficult for Chinese to accept 
a legal system constituted by ‘messy’ cases, because to Chinese, case law was in the 
‘un-developed’ lawmaking stage in its own legal history. To Chinese, absorbing case 
law would symbolize retrogression in law.  
English Common Law’s life embedded in its unique historical and social 
context which was totally different from China’s context. It was difficult for Chinese 
to understand the principles behind those cases and even harder to use them properly 
in a Chinese context. Arguably, English Common Law had a ‘loose’ type of 
development and did not allow high-centralized governments (comparing with the 
continent Europe governments) in history. Abundant amount of precedents were 
acceptable in small territories in the early history. Common Law did not focus on 
law’s social control function at the beginning because it did not face a large populace 
and it did not interrupted frequently from the outside legal systems, since it was an 
isolated island from the continent Europe.
1
 In this sense, case law was sufficient for 
England to solve problems. China, however, from the very early era had to value 
‘efficiency’ in administration. It was important for Chinese ruler to solve problems 
quickly because he faced with a huge country which was covetously expected to be 
seized by other ambitious rulers from neighboring countries. Chinese rulers had to 
choose to use clear principles and explicated statutes and codes to solve problems, to 
rule the country. Relying on cases and precedents would add too much burden on 
common people’s comprehensions of law. It would also require more legal 
professionals to spend abundant time on interpreting, debating and defending cases 
                                                        
1 See similar proposition in A. J. Toynbee and D. C. Somervell, A Study of History, Oxford University Press, 
(1957), the part about remarkable achievements of civilization came from hardships and difficulties. 
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in court. Under the urgent requirement of efficiency in dealing with problems in the 
late Qing dynasty, China would not change its codification tradition to transplant or 
study the Common Law. Chinese traditional scholars were like German scholars who 
had higher reputations than judges and other legal professionals in history.
1
 Scholars 
were the ‘motor’, the driving force behind Chinese modern legal reform.
2
 They were 
more familiar with academic discussion on principles, definitions, and classifications 
in law rather than judicial practice. This academic tradition influenced Chinese 
modern legal reform also. China absorbed elements from continental legal systems 
rather than from the Common Law tradition.
3
  
At the beginning of the codification tradition, Chinese scholars discussed the 
morality of publishing law. Shu Xiang denied the morality of publishing law and 
stated that law should not be publicized. Otherwise the common people would be 
able to use their knowledge of law to do wrong and avoid punishment. Zi Chan 
argued that the form of law should be clear and accessible to people, otherwise it was 
impossible for them to ‘live under the law’.
4
 Zi Chan also used the analogy ‘law is 
better to be like fire rather than water’ to discuss the justice of making law public and 
strict.
5
 In this analogy, law should be like fire so that people could see it and feel 
afraid of it. They would be able to avoid being burnt by it. Law should not be like 
water, otherwise people would treat it lightly since it was tender like water. People 
knew not to play with fire, but they did not know if they played with water it could 
also swallow them. After the debate between Shu Xiang and Zi Chan, however, the 
justice of the form of law was not further debated. Chinese thought that law should 
be published and codified because it was the historical tradition. Previous emperors 
codified law, so later rulers should follow them also. There were not any further 
discussions on the morality of the form of law until modern legal reform in late Qing 
                                                        
1 Yinshi Yu, Scholars and Chinese Culture, Shanghai Renmin Press, (2003), p.68. 
2 Peng He, The Father of the Republican Constitution and the Shattered Dream of Establishing Constitutionalism 
in the Republic of China, Chinewe and Western Legal Traditions, vol.7, 2009, pp.530-542. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Hegao Yang, History of Chinese Legal Thoughts, Beijing University Press, (2000), p.24. 
5 Zuo Qiuming, Zuo Zhuan, Zhaogong Year twenty, 《左传·昭公二十年》  Yang Bojun translated, Yuelu 
Shuyuan Press, (1993),p.1486. 
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Dynasty. However, in Qing Dynasty, the question shifted from copying the ancestor’s 
law to use the form of Western law. It was not about the justice of the form of law, 
but about the contributions of Western law to the purpose of developing a prosperous 
country with powerful army force. Consequentialism and utilitarianism dominated 
the discussion of the form of law. In Chinese context, the contribution of codification 
to the morality of law was limited. 
Chinese consequentialism and utilitarianism in lawmaking although was similar 
to and influenced by Bentham’s theory, the premises of two theories were different. 
Chinese lawmaking from the beginning focused on the necessity of forming a strong 
country. The principle of utility in Bentham’s theory, however, was from the 
beginning concerned with human beings’ desires. The purpose of lawmaking in 
Bentham’s theory of legislation was to promote utility. Legislators should aim at this 
ultimate purpose. Therefore the strong country in Bentham’s theory was rather the 
result of utility. The desire of individuals was the premise of utility. Chinese 
lawmaking, however, used to justify its legitimation on the premise of the strong 
country. The desire of individuals became the result, rather than the premise of utility. 
Individual’s desires of happiness were not the starting point of lawmaking; and they 
were not considered as the cause and reason for lawmaking. The cause of lawmaking 
in Chinese legalism (and Chinese Marxism also) was stated as a plain fact of control: 
The ruler’s law was law (as stated in chapter 3, in Chinese Marxism, the ruler 
referred to CPC, the congress, and the working class; and the ruled referred to ‘the 
enemy of the people’ although they were also citizens of the country). It was not 
necessarily moral but was valid de facto. The purpose of lawmaking in Chinese 
legalism was to strengthening the ruler’s control. Chinese Marxism was to promote 
the common prosperity, i.e., the collective good, rather than individual-oriented. 
Pleasure and pains in Bentham’s argument were not vital in Chinese legitimation of 
lawmaking. In this sense, Chinese utilitarianism was based on a state-utility premise. 
Bentham’s utilitarianism, as a contrast, still left space for individuals because the 
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premise was based on individual’s desires. 
From the above two aspects, the purpose and form of lawmaking, I disclosed the 
deep difference between Chinese utilitarianism and Benthamnism. The purposive 
lawmaking in Chinese theories was too much stressed. It turned out to be an 
instrumental lawmaking. The legitimacy of the process and approaches were not 
emphasized and thoroughly debated. In Chinese legalism, injustice in the causes and 
approaches were tolerated for the sake of the justice of the result. As analyzed in 
previous chapters, in reality, the least advantaged group in China did not have the 
national treatment in aspects of medical treatment, education, working and pension 
funds. Chinese lawmaking policy admitted economic inequality caused by laws. 
Morality of law was less concerned because of the recognition of law ( law as the 
justified evil). The ignorance of individuals’ desire in Chinese legalism and Chinese 
Marxism although made a realistic and consistent argument, did not develop the 
purposive thesis of individuals’ requirements. I could not help thinking of these 
problems: why should the individuals be abided by law if the purpose was not for 
them? Why the individuals’ interests were consistent with the collective? Was it a 
slavishly acceptance of law? Chinese literatures did not go deeper into these debates 
of potential conflicts between individuals and the collective; not to speak the 
necessity and possibility of communications between them. 
 
HAYEKIAN LIBERAL LEGISLATION 
It was not until recent 20 years that discussion of liberalism and individualism 
became a centre of interests in Chinese academics. In the sphere of law, the 
translations and interpretations of Friedrich August von Hayek’s Constitution of 
Liberty, The Road to Serfom, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, and The 
Counter-revolution of Science represented Chinese scholars’ high interests in the new 
liberalism and the criticism of socialism. In the sphere of lawmaking, Hayek was also 
a representative Western theorist of liberalism which came from natural law tradition. 
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From a positivistic perspective, the object of lawmaking was to create legislation and 
statutes, which were inside the man-made rule aggregation. Natural law theorists, 
however, separated secular, existing and state law with ‘natural justice’, ‘higher law’ 
and ‘substantive law’.
1
 To a natural law theorist, state law was part of the 










Positive law: Man-made rules 
includes law; law as manmade 
rules
Natural law: Law includes 
some man-made rules; 




Different from the above two illustrations, the liberalistic theorist Hayek’s thesis 
on law and legislation offered an ‘organic law’ perspective. In 1982, Hayek 
published Law, Legislation and Liberty, which was a significant development of a 
legal theoretical study on legislation. It was distinct from the utilitarian lawmaking 
conception, and was unique in its binomial conception of law. To Bentham, law was 
legislation; Hayek, however, renounced a natural law idea that some legislation was 
not law.  
The ‘contest territory’ of the two different paths was provided to understanding 
law: the evolutionary teachings contrast to the rationalist constructivism. In Hayek’s 
last systematic monograph, Law, Legislation and Liberty, he stated a binomial 
concept of law: spontaneous rules versus legislation.
2
 The concepts of law had in 
                                                        
1 About natural law theory see J. Finins, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Clarendon Press, (1980); see also St. T. 
Aquinas, Fathers of the English Dominican Province, S. Theologica trans,. London, 1913-1925, pt. II. 
2 F. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 3 vols., (1982), vol.1, pp.35-37; 51-52. 
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fact been speaking about different things because to some philosopher, law and 
liberty were inseparable, whilst to some others the two were irreconcilable. There 
was an obvious contrast between these two traditional ways of thoughts. One great 
tradition extended from the ancient Greeks and Cicero through the Middle Ages to 
the classical liberals like Locke, Hume, Kant and the Scottish moral philosophers, 
down to various American statesmen of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for 
whom law and liberty could not exist apart from each other. But to Hobbes, Bentham 
and many French thinkers and the modern legal positivists’ law meant an 
encroachment on freedom. This apparent conflict between long lines of great thinkers 
did not mean that they arrived at opposite conclusions, but merely that they were 
using the word law in different senses.
1
  
One of Hayek’s basic arguments aimed to expose flaws in constructivist 
rationalism. Hayek’s proposition on human beings’ limitation of knowledge was his 
starting point to expand his legal theory. Hayek had a final conclusion after forty 
years of thinking, which became the basis of his epistemology:  
‘We ought to have learnt enough to avoid destroying our 
civilization by smothering the spontaneous process of the interaction of 
the individuals by placing its direction in the hands of any authority. 
But to avoid this we must shed the illusion that we can deliberately 
‘create the future of mankind’, as the characteristic hubris of a 
socialist sociologist has recently expressed it. This is the final 
conclusion of the forty years which I have now devoted to the study of 
these problems since I became aware of the process of the Abuse and 
Decline of Reason which has continued throughout that period’.
2
  
The constructivist rationalism was unable to help us up-build a system of 
‘substantive law’ (the ‘real’ law in his theory) in Hayek’s theory; it only made ‘rules 
of organization’ (i.e., legislation), as the opposite. From 1960s, Hayek started using 
pairs of Hellenic terms to differentiate what was real ‘law’ and what was only ‘order’. 
He used the term ‘cosmos’ to define the spontaneous social order or the ‘grown’ 
orders. The word ‘taxis’ was used to describe the rules of organization or the ‘made’ 
                                                        
1 Law, Legislation and Liberty, pp.51-52. 
2 Ibid., p.152. 
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orders. He also used ‘endogenous order’ and ‘exoenous order’, ‘catallaxy’ and 
‘demarchy’, ‘nomos’ and ‘thesis’ to substitute ‘spontaneous order’ and ‘rules of 
organization’.
 1
 All these pairs of terms were specifically used to finally strengthen 
the distinction between the ‘law’ (spontaneous order) and ‘legislation’ (rules of 
organization).  
Such a binomial concept of law, i.e., law and legislation, was a well-illustrated 
theory on the different recognitions upon which the ontology of legislation was based. 
‘Organic law’ or ‘spontaneous law’, as the figure 5.3 illustrates, was in contrast with 
‘man-made legislation’ or ‘artificial law’. A positivist would focus on the artificial 
man-made legislation; a natural theorist in contrast stressed the ‘real law’ idea to 
criticize the limitation of man-made order. They represented two different 
perspectives on the ontology of law. Hayek’s concept of law, however, was different: 





The substantive law was therefore the ‘spontaneous order’, which differed from 
the ‘rules of organization’ or a ‘made order’. Law was older than legislation and had 
never been ‘invented’ in the same sense as legislation, the deliberate making of law.
3
 
The invention of legislation came relatively late in the history of mankind, so  
‘…law in the sense of enforced rules of conduct, on 
the other hand, is undoubtedly coeval with society. To 
modern man, however, the belief that all law governing 
human action is the product of legislation appears so 
obvious that the contention that law is older than 
                                                        
1 Law, Legislation and Liberty, pp.35-37. 
2 Ibid., ‘Thesis: the Law of Legislation’ (chapter six), focuses on artificial legislations and is in contrast with 
‘Nomos: the Law of Liberty’ (chapter five). The rules of just conduct, the ‘nomos’ or ‘law of liberty’, or the 
substantive law in Hayek’s definition, emerge from the judicial process. 












lawmaking has almost the character of a paradox.’
1
  
The idea that all law was, can be, and ought to be, the product of the free 
invention of a legislator, was recognized by Hayek as factually false because it was 
‘an erroneous product of constructivist rationalism’.
2
 This binomial conception of 
law was as a contemporary edition of interpreting the primary difference between 
natural law and positive law theories.
3
 Hayek pointed out a limitation that both 
natural law theorists and positivists shared, that was, the division of natural rules and 
artificial (man-made) rules. He put forward a middle ground between ‘natural’ and 
‘artificial’ to break this natural-artificial dichotomy—customary rules which were not 
‘natural justice’ or ‘artificial design’—the objects which were the results ‘of human 
action but not of human design’.
4
 According to such objects, law was not something 
wholly and perfectly designed by human beings—it was the result of human action 
but not necessarily of human design. Hayek thus attempted to justify customary laws 
as ‘real law’, which was considered by him as better than natural or artificial rules, as 
illustrated by figure 5.4: 
 
                                                        
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Hayek observed that in the second century a Latin grammarian, Aulus Gellius, rendered the Greek terms physei 
and thesei by naturalis and positivus, from which most European languages derived the words to describe two 
kinds of laws. The original Greek terms, physei and thesei, mean ‘by natural’ and ‘by convention or deliberate 
decision’. In this way he differentiated natural law from artificial law. (ibid., p20.) Critics stated that Hayek’s 
theory was neither in the sphere of natural law nor positive law because it was not a simple dichotomy of ‘natural’ 
and ‘artificial’; it taked an ‘evolutionary approach’ which was different from the logic precondition of dimidiating 
‘natural’ and ‘artificial’, to which natural law and positive law theories all obeyed.  See J. Gray, Liberalism, 
Milton Keynes: Open University Press, (1986). The connection of Hayek’s theory with natural law, especially his 
Kantian tradition, however, was obvious. See J. Birner, R. Zijp, and F. Hayek, Co-ordination and Evolution, 
Routledge, (1994), p.297; J.C.W. Touchie, Hayek and Human Rights, Edward Elgar Publishing, (2005), p.218.  
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 ‘Spontaneous orders’ discovered by the judges were differentiated from 
legislation, which originated from the necessity of establishing rules of organization. 
The real law, which was observed by Hayek as the lawyer’s law, emerged from 
spontaneous orders, and did not necessarily need a particular ‘law-giver’.
1
 
Legislatures were primarily concerned with governmental matters rather than with 
giving law as ‘substantive law’, i.e., law of liberty.
2
 He stated that, a ‘thesis’, i.e., 
legislation, however, always presupposed the particular ‘law-giver’; a ‘thesis’, was 
the law that should be ‘executed’ or carried out. 
3
 The original meaning of 
legislature was also traced to state the relationship between legislation and the theory 
of separation of powers.
4
 Hayek pointed out that the term legislature had become 
simply a name for representative assemblies occupied chiefly with directing or 
controlling government rather than as a lawmaking department.  
Based on this differentiation between ‘rules of just conduct’ and ‘rules of 
organization’, Hayek brought forward his division of public law and private law.
5
 As 
an outstanding social observer, he pointed out the tendency of the private law sphere 
gradually transforming into public law by social legislation in modern societies.
6
 
This was recognized as common sense nowadays, but in the age of emphasizing 
governmental positive activities during the economic winter, Hayek’s insistence of 
classical liberalism and his argument against the invasion by the ‘public law’ of the 
‘private law’ showed his unique courage and wisdom.
7
  
The final conclusions on law and legislation in Law, Legislation and Liberty 
were: there was an tendency of the public law to gradually interfere with or invade 
                                                        
1 Law, Legislation and Liberty, p.122. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., pp.128-130. 
5 Hayek’s classification is different from a traditional public law and private law classification. About Hayek’s 
classification of public law and the private law, see ibid., pp.131-144. 
6 About the tendency of private law transforming to public law, see also M. Tatsukichi, Public Law and Private 
Law, China University of Political Science and Law Press, (2003), p.234-251. 
7 In 1950s, Keynesian economics, interventionism and socialism were widely accepted. In this era of new 
liberalism and social democracy, most Western capitalist countries believed that a positive interference was better 
than free market. Hayek recognized the danger of having a blind faith in Keynesian economics and socialism and 
wrote series of books to defend the idea of economic liberty. The representative books were: F. Hayek, The Road 
to Serfom, Routledge, (1944); Constitution of Liberty, University of Chicago Press, (1960); and The Fatal 
Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, Routledge, (1988). 
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the private sphere; that legislation as the rules of organization was the result of 
purposeful invention and was aimed at solving governmental matters; and law 
generated from spontaneous orders and originating from long-standing historical 
practice ought not to be substituted by legislation—the ‘nomos’ should not be 
substituted or violated by the ‘thesis’; otherwise, the individual’s liberty protected 
mainly by the ‘nomos’ would be eroded.  
Comparing the concepts of law in figure 5.2 with 5.4, we could see that Hayek’s 
theory still remained within a positive law debate. Although he emphasized 
differences between ‘results of human design’, i.e., legislation, and ‘results of human 
action’, i.e., spontaneous rules, he put both into the man-made-rule aggregation. His 
conclusion that law was a subset of man-made rules was coincidental to the 
aggregation of positive law. He contributed, however, in his further separation of 
‘human design’ from the unconscious results of ‘human action’ and thus stressed the 
importance of custom in the development of law. 
In contrast with the criticisms on the positivistic monistic definition of law (i.e., 
that law was law), Hayekian binomial concept of law included two systems of laws, 
i.e., law and ideal law.
 1
 The ideal type of lawmaking was derived from the 
Common Law. The anti-rationalism attitude; suspicious perspective on governmental 
rules; rejection of constructivist rational legislation; preference of judge’s law or 
lawyer’s law and
 
the statement that the substantive law (which emerges from 
spontaneous order) could only be discovered rather than designed (because they 
belonged to ‘the results of human action’ not ‘human design’); the explanation that 
legislation was ‘rules of organization’ not ‘rules of just conduct’, ‘thesis’ rather than 
‘nomos’, and was concerned with governmental matters rather than with making the 
law of liberty, all these propositions were emphasized to value Common Law.
 2
 It 
                                                        
1 See previous discussion on Bentham’s theory: only legislation was counted as law, and that law should be 
recognized as the same as legislation. Bentham emphasized the prominent meaning of legislation and states in his 
Of Laws In General that the word ‘law’ was in some extent equal to ‘legislation’. ‘Judging…from analogy, it 
would naturally be expected that the signification given to the word law should be correspondent to that of its 
conjugates legislation and legislative power… ’, J. Bentham, Of Laws in General, Hart ed., Athlone Press, (1970), 
p.9. 
2 In Hayek’s theory, spontaneous orders could only be discovered rather than designed. Law, Legislation and 
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was logical for him make those conclusions because the starting point of his theory 
of liberty is classical liberalism.
1
 An ideology which valued freedom and 
individualism also promoted the constitutionalism of Common Law.
2
 Hayek’s 
preference for classical liberalism was consistent with his choice of Common Law as 
the ideal lawmaking model while finding constructivist lawmaking dissatisfactory. 
The conclusion that law ought not to be substituted by legislation, however, 
strengthened his normative debate, or a preference for ‘ideal law’. It therefore in the 
end became an anti-positivistic debate on positive law.
3
  
However, the limitations of such a liberalistic theory should be noticed. One 
was the de-constructive attitude on existing legislations.
4
 To Hayek, legislations 
were strictly deprived from the ‘ideal law’ category. The real law or substantive law 
should refer to the customs developed over a long period of human practice, such as 
the Common Law. If legislation was understood from this deconstructive attitude, or 
in other words, if the creative work and human design in law was totally excluded 
from the ‘ideal law’ concept, it would become difficult to justify the legality and 
legitimacy of modern legislatures and legislations. The deconstructive thesis, i.e., 
                                                                                                                                                             
Liberty, p.20. 
1 Hayek identified himself as a classical liberal, see F. Hayek ‘Why I am not a Conservative’, The Constitution of 
Liberty, The University of Chicago Press, (1960). S. Horwitz and F. Hayek, ‘Austrian Economist’, Journal of the 
History of Economic Thought, (2005), pp.71-85. 
2 Common law was recognized as grounded in precedent and local tradition as well as reason; it stressed 
community. Liberal political theory was based on abstract, rational principles; it stressed individualism. Common 
law and liberalism both promoted constitutionalism. See J.R. Stoner, Common Law and Liberal Theory: Coke, 
Hobbes and the Origins of American Constitutionalism, University Press of Kansas, (1994); also see the synthesis 
of liberal theory with the common law, in B.P. Wilson and K. Masugi, The Supreme Court and American 
Constitutionalism, Rowman & Littlefield, (1997), p.52; B.Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law, Cambridge 
University Press, (2004). 
3 Anti-positivism as reactions against positivism had two basic forms: the hermeneutic science perspective and 
the mediating or interpretive structuralist perspective. M. Weber introduced the term anti-positivism. He believed 
that sociology should be a ‘science’, able to identify causal relationships—especially among ideal types, or 
hypothetical simplifications of complex social phenomena. As a non-positivist, Weber recognized that the 
selection and construction of ideal types was itself a subjective process, and realized that, unlike the causal 
relationships sought in positivistic science, those found between ideal types were not ‘ahistorical, invariant, or 
generalizable’. See Ashley D., Orenstein D.M., Sociological Theory: Classical Statements, 6th ed,. Pearson 
Education, (2005), pp. 239-241. See also about the summary of positivist and anti-positivist positions: 
<http://www.le.ac.uk/education/resources/SocSci/possum.html>; I. Oliver, ‘The ‘Old’ and the ‘New’ Hermeneutic 
in Sociological Theory’, The Brithish Journal of Sociology, Vol.34, Blackwell Publishing (1983), pp. 519-553; 
J.A. Standen, ‘Critical Legal Studies as an Anti-positivist Phenomenon’, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 72, (1986), 
p.983-988; A. C. Wicks and R.E. Freeman, ‘Organization Studies and the New Pragmatism: Positivism, 
Anti-positivism, and the Search for Ethics’, Organization Science, Vol.9, Informs publishing, (1998), pp.123-140. 
4 ‘Deconstruction’ was central to post-structuralism, which was an umbrella term that came into use in the 1970’s. 
Deconstruction was an attitude that doubts human artificial design, including language and legal doctrines. J.M. 
Balkin, ‘Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory’, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96, (1987), pp.743-786. 
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removing legislation from a normative study of law, ignored common people’s 
understanding of law—‘readers’ response to law’.
1
 Formal legislations could be 
easily recognized as law by people. The legislations, however, were sometimes 
different from the ‘substantive law’ or ‘real law’ interpreted by theorists or judicial 
elites. Even worse, to deny legislations’ normativity was also to reject the fact that 
legislation was a reasonable, and most of the time a ‘just’ choice of the creators and 
the acceptors. If legislation and lawmaking processes were seen as reasonable 




Apart from the de-constructive approach, Hayekian evolutionary perspective on 
law was at a disadvantage in interpreting modern legal systems because it denied one 
of their major characteristics: law as a positive institutional design. As observed by 
Professor Bankowski, ‘For Hayek, societies and social institutions arise by 
evolution’.
3
 Hayek’s cultural evolutionary approach should not be confused with the 
Darwinian species evolutionary theory, but both supposed a similar ‘reverse-order 
linear view’ on the research objects. The linear view (see figure 5.5), as defined in 
this thesis referred to a perspective which saw the present as a determined result from 
the past, and thus excluded diverse possibilities during the process. In figure 5.5, the 
aggregation of Origin in a positive-sequence view should involve more than one 
element: (O= O1+ O2+ O3+… On), although the result (R) was one and only. 
                                                        
1 A reader-response criticism or a reception theory emphasizes the reader and the process of reading rather than 
on the author or the text. About reader-response criticism, see Buckley W.K. and Bracher M., Reader-Response 
Theory, Publications of the Modern Language Association of America, Vol. 101, (1986), pp.250-251; P. 
Harkin,’The Reception of Reader-Response Theory’, College Composition and Communication, Vol.56, (2005), 
pp. 410-425.  
2 It was also different from Waldron’s thesis that I will introduce later. In Waldron’s thesis, the dignity of 
legislation presented in the majority-rule principle, i.e., disagreements and diverse opinions. I believe that it was 
the problem-solving purpose rather than disagreement or diversity that brought dignity to law.  





A reverse-order linear view deduced origin from result, past from present, and 
traced one potential source of the origins while ignoring other possibilities. For 
instance, if stated from this perspective, the proposition that: ‘a human being (R) is a 
member of a species of bipedal primates in the family Hominidae (O)’ would be 
stated like this: ‘only humans (O1) can be developed into wise humans (R)’.
 1
 
Different from this perspective, a positive-sequence view admitted other various 
possibilities—other kinds of primates (O2, O3…On) could develop into wise humans 
(R). If stated from a linear view, Hayek’s proposition that ‘in early history human’s 
unconscious practice (O1) developed law (R)’ was stated like this: ‘only spontaneous 
orders (O1) are real laws (R) because they developed from human’s unconscious 
practice but not human design’ (see figure 5.6). A positive-sequence perspective, 
however, involved human artificial design (O2) and other causes (O3,  O4…On) 
into sources of law (see figure 5.7). 
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As figure 5.6 showed, the reverse-order linear view implied a deterministic 
deduction: only spontaneous rules developed law. The evolution was thus seen by 
him not only as the ‘fact’ but also as the ‘tenet’ that should be obeyed—Hayek 
emphasized the significance of unconscious human behaviours in the historical 
development of law, but exaggerated them as the exclusive ‘tenet’ of the growth of 
law and ignored the fact that human beings’ initiative and creative motivation was 
also an important factor in the development of human civilization. ‘Spontaneous 
rules’ in his theory implied the proposition that law evolved without outside 
interference. Those self-developed laws were the real law according to his 
conception.  
However, law could not grow spontaneously without interference in the 
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transplanted to colonial territories; and as debated previously the development of law 
in China in the last two centuries could also support this argument. Even if the 
spontaneous growth of law were taken as a true proposition, it still could not explain 
the present and future development pattern of law. Would law develop in the same 
way as it did over history? A reverse-order linear view, which always began 
deduction from an existing result, could not ‘predict’ the future because the future 
result had not yet appeared! The reverse-order linear approach was therefore 
deficient for future-oriented deduction. The linear lawmaking perspective failed to 
consider the difference between developments of systematic rules with the 
self-development of a single rule. The idea of spontaneous law could interpret the 
development of rules before they were artificially classified and codified into a 
logical system, but it could not refer to an intended systematic lawmaking 
movement—rules might develop spontaneously; but a legal system could not exclude 
‘artificial’ legislation. 
Although the messy laws seemed to channel down to a straight and narrow 
path from variable path, in Bankowski’s argument for the necessity of living the life 
under rules, ‘de-simplification’ of rules was not necessarily a bad thing.
1
 However, 
he also pointed out that a linear perspective was influenced by rationalism, the 
ideology of seeing the society as a machine-like institution.  
‘The past…is already fixed and can be described without loss 
of meaning in terms of behavioural co-ordinates. This makes us think 
that the future, where it is not past behaviours that are important but 
future actions which have to be described in terms of intention, can 
as well. However, just because you can retrospectively analyze 
behaviour as rule governed does not mean you can predict future 




As we can see in the quote, the prediction of future (the linear perspective) is 
possible when the society was running like a machine. The problem of the 
machine-like rule system was not that behaviours were predictable and controllable, 
                                                        




but that the system tried to get people to react in one particular way.
1
 It was not 
about ‘spontaneous rules’ but ‘spontaneous behavious’. In such a system, people 
acted without thinking about the law. The heteronomous rules made people stop 
thinking about whether their behaviours were wrong or not; they just followed rules. 
Although this displacement of thinking was not necessarily a bad thing—simplicity 
and predictability were positive effects of law, it can lead to bad results. In an organic 
perspective, life is not mechanized. The obedience to law should not be reduced to 
‘following law blindly’. To jump out of the linear and mechanized way of living, we 
should allow the creativity of people. It means people are following rules, but they 
can also make rules. 
In ancient Chinese ideologies, the positive sequence view was stressed. 
Although the reason for wars among states was not justified in favor of the common 
people’s interests, they emphasized the legitimate status of the ruler, who should 
come from the royal pedigree. Otherwise, in Chinese history, if a controller was not 
from the royal family, it could be a sufficient reason for other ambitious nobles to 
start wars to compete for a strongest conqueror for the country.
2
 The new winner of 
the wars therefore would be justified as the legitimate new lawmaker without 
considering the justice of the approach he used. When the order of positive sequence 
was broken, ‘law of the jungle’ would start to rule. Force and art of control would be 
highly required in order to strengthen their de facto conquer. The history would 
become ‘a history of conquerors’, which was not about civilization and justice. The 
legitimacy of law would come from the winners’ de facto victory over the losers. It 
was as much as to say that when a group of mobs robbed common people’s wealth, if 
they succeeded, their immoral behaviors could be justified! In order to avoid this 
jungle rule, Chinese ancient theories emphasized that legitimate legislation should 
always come from the order of positive sequence of the royal perigee, rather than the 
‘law of the jungle’. In this sense, Chinese ancient theories embraced some elements 
                                                        
1 Ibid.,p.130 
2 The famous history of the Three Kingdoms of China (220-265) was solide evidence. Luo Guanzhong, Romance 
of Three Kingdoms, Remin Publishing House, 2008, p.266. 
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of justice (for example, no to conquer by violence).  
In contemporary Chinese theories, however, the reverse-order linear 
justification existed. The development of civilization referred to ‘survival of the 
fittest’ rather than other causes. In Chinese Marxism, for example, the working class 
was recognized as ‘the advantaged class’ and that the Communist Party (hereinafter 
the Party) was the representative of the working class. Therefore the working class 
should be the leading class and the Party should be the leading party. This 
justification was written in Chinese constitution as well: the task of the working class 
was to lead the whole population realize communism. This justification, however, 
was in conflict with two important facts that I discussed in chapter three: during the 
modern legislative reform, the working class was not the only leading class; and later, 
the working class did not have superiorities in reality. The working class in China 
was not strong enough to complete the reform in the past so they had to depend on 
the majority, the peasant. Later on, the working class was not the major party of the 
congress, and the industrial workers were among the weakest group. Therefore the 
working class was not the ‘survival of the fittest’. Although no one would deny that 
the Party (as the nominal represent of the ‘working class’) was the exclusive Chinese 
leading party, the justification of the ‘survival of the fittest’ was not ideal. Another 
problem was that this justification excludes the common and the disadvantaged 
persons’ right of decision-making.  
Hayekian liberal legislation although also held a reverse order liner perspective, 
differed from Chinese consequentialist justification. Hayekian theory did not ignore 
‘common peoples’ understanding but relied on them. If we interpreted Hayekian 
spontaneous law as the law developed by the common people, rather by law itself (as 
Kelsen’s normative theory described), we noticed that Hayek emphasized a contest 
of people’s law against official laws. Professor Bankowski pushed this argument 
further in Living Lawfully. He argued that when someone (common people) had to 
rely on a cadre of experts working for the good of the people, this good gradually 
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became their own good. Hayekian liberal legislation differentiated the people’s law 
and the officials’ law. If we considered them as two different systems, as an outside 
system and an inside system, what we need to do is to ‘bring the outside in’. The 
lawmaking procedure should offer an arena for communications between them. They 
should not be seen as two isolated systems. Thus, we could develop Hayekian theory 
to a communicative theory.      
 
DISAGREEMENTS OF MAJORITY DECISIONS 
Waldron’s justification of majority decision-making was a theory relating to the 
legitimacy of Western lawmaking. The dignity of legislation was justified by the 
structure of legislature and its working progress in Waldron’s argument. He 
concluded that democracy principle was worthy of dignity. Traditional political 
theories were criticized: Legislation and legislatures had a bad name in legal 
philosophy; and we had not developed a normative theory of legislation. More 
importantly,  
‘[W]e are not in possession of a jurisprudential model that 
is capable of making normative sense of legislation as a genuine 
form of law, of the authority that it claims, and of the demands 
that it makes on the other actors in a legal system.’
1
 Normative 
or aspirational models of legislation are insufficient in that 
jurisprudence is pervaded by imagery that ‘presents ordinary 
legislative activity as deal-making, horse-trading, log-rolling, 




Waldron compared two leading ideas of modern legal positivism—‘the sources 
thesis’ (Raz) and ‘the rule of recognition’ (Hart), and criticized that they and their 
predecessors did not have interest in the structure and proceedings of legislatures.
3
 
                                                        
1 J. Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, Cambridge University press, (1999), p.1. 
2 ibid, p.2. 
3 The ‘source thesis’ claimed that the existence and content of law can always be determined by reference to its 
sources without recourse to moral argument. According to this view, the sources of law included both the 
circumanstances of its promulgation and relevant interpretative materials, such as court cases involving its 
application. J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford University Press, (1979), p.47. 
The rule of recognition ‘specifies some feature or features possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a 
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The aspects that Waldron emphasized—size, diversity, disagreement, 
decision-making procedures—were not important to positivists. A strong positivism 
perspective influenced jurists, especially in the Common Law system, to disregard 
legislation as an object for legal research. Legislation was therefore considered an 
object for political science rather than the science of law so that ‘the only structures 




In Law and Disagreement and The Dignity of Legislation, the jurisprudence of 
legislation argued for a wide range of propositions regarding legislation. In the 
former work, the concepts of legislation and legislature in political theory and legal 
philosophy were named as Jurisprudence of Legislation. In the latter, the reputation 
of legislation was restored by focusing on the writings of Aristotle, Locke and Kant. 
The conclusions on legislation were: legislation was a dignified mode of governance 
and a respectable source of law; ‘large numbers’ and the facts of diversity and 
disagreement should be central to the philosophy of legislation. The focus of the 
jurisprudence of legislation was primarily on legislation by assemblies: large 
gatherings of representatives who air their disagreements in adversarial debate before 
making laws by deliberation and voting; voting and majority-decisions were the 
pivotal points of legislation. 
The multiplicity of different views rather than one mind or will was recognized 
by Waldron as the nature of legislation. Disagreement (rather than agreement) over 
the multiplicity of views was at the centre of his study of legislation. The principle of 
majority decision was justified as the basis of democracy. Waldron used Locke’s 
reasoning to defend the argument that majority decision was unrelated to right or 
wrong, but conferred legitimacy or appropriation: 
‘Just as the fact that a person consents to a proposal 
doesn’t make the proposal right or wise, so the fact that 
                                                                                                                                                             
conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts’. See 
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Clarendon Press, (1994), p.92.  
1 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford University Press, (1999) p.9. 
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there is majority support for a proposal doesn’t make it right 
or wise or just either. Consent and majority-support are 
supposed to work in relation to the legitimacy of popular 
decision-making, not at this stage in relation to the wisdom 
of the multitude.’ 
1
  
The majoritarianism behind modern legislation was considered as an effective 
and respected decision-making principle. Although legislation looked arbitrary when 
it was presented as the outcome of majority decision-making, Waldron’s theory 
concluded that when an issue needed a common decision and there existed disparate 
individual views, majority decision-making could insure that the outcomes deserved 
respect rather than an arbitrary political procedure.  
‘In the circumstances of politics, tossing a coin might be a 
way of settling on a common course of action. If the deadline for 
action was near enough and the need for concerted action 
sufficiently compelling, we might adopt any arbitrary method that 
made one course of action more salient. If the matter were 
particularly grave, we might even admire such methods…’ 
2
  
In Law and Disagreement Waldron put forward a jurisprudence of legislation, a 
special jurisprudence. A normative theory about legislation was discovered as: 
discussion of the difference between good and bad laws; attempts at determining the 
limits of legislation (the issues legislatures should address, and the issues that should 
be left to positive morality); and the sorts of things that ought to be taken into 
account when one embarks on the process of lawmaking.
3
 In the two books, a 
central theme was that collective decision making was ‘good’. The quality of the 
decision was likely to be higher the larger the number of individuals participating in 
the decision-making, ‘the wisdom of the multitude’.
4
 
Scholars noticed that Waldron was concerned with developing a vision of liberal 
democracy separated from the legal constitutionalism of the American model.
5
 
Specifically speaking, he disclosed the tensions between legislative authority and 
                                                        
1 The Dignity of Legislation, p.146. 
2 Ibid., p.157. 
3 ibid, p23. 
4 Keith E. Whittington, In Defense of Legislatures, Political Theory, Vol.28, (2000), pp.694. 
5 Ibid.,, pp.690-702. 
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judicial authority and deliberated a profound question: the legitimacy of judicial 
review. He reminded us to characterize liberalism by legislative rather than judicial 
supremacy. By doing so, ‘he upsets our standard assumptions about the inevitability 
and rightness of judicial review and asks us to rethink the foundations of our 
political order’.
1
 Waldron emphasized on the reality of political disagreement and 
the how political life should be conducted in the presence of fundamental 
disagreement. However, Whittington (2000) criticized that Waldron did not consider 
the possibility that different political institutions may serve different functions within 
a coherent political system.
2
 Or as Mendes (2009) argued, why there were 
possibilities and necessities of dialogues among institutions, especially between the 
courts and the legislatures.
3
  
In Michelon’s book (2006), Waldron’s justification for democratic lawmaking 
was insufficient. He pointed out that Waldron put procedural justifications for the 
authority of law, i.e., particular accounts of the value of reasons produced through 
democratic procedures. However, ‘Legal reasons produced by democratic procedures 
are, as a result, insulated from plain moral reasons.’
4
 The rational authority of the 
parliament was put prior to the rational authority of individuals and other sorts of 
groups that can be found in society. Therefore, ‘Waldron’s argument relies on an over 
simplified version of practical reasoning and, moreover, it implied an untenable 
position for practical agents living under the law.’
5
 Michelon emphasized an idea 
that even the procedural justice should enclose moral dimension. We could not 
justify the result by exclusively referring to the procedure of decision-making. 
Majority principle in democratic lawmaking should not be the only reason for the 
authority of law. He reasserted the value of Kantian categorical reasoning and stated 
                                                        
1 Ibid, p.693. 
2 Ibid.  
3
 Conrado Hübner Mendes, Is it all about the Last Word? Deliberative Separation of Powers 1 (2009) 3 
Legisprudence, pp. 69-110. 
4  Clá udio Michelon, Being Apart from Reasons: The Role of Reasons in Public and Private Moral 




that ‘proceduralist accounts of the value of legal reasons, notably those put forward 
by discourse theory, are …not to be able to ground the exclusion of moral reasons 
from neither public nor private decision-making process.’
1
 Michelon disclosed the 
defect of discourse theory represented by Waldron (and Harbermas). They stressed 
‘dialog’ but did not unearth the embedded justice of ‘dialog’.  
The key word in Waldron’s jurisprudence of legislation was ‘plurality’. The 
structure of legislature and the disagreement and deliberation during legislation were 
noticed and justified. Waldorn concluded that modern legislature was a large 
multi-member assembly comprising hundreds of persons with diverse views, 
affiliations and allegiances. Therefore, majority decision-making was justified as a 
dignified way of lawmaking. However, in my view, it was not the pure procedural 
‘majority-decision’, i.e., plurality, diversity and disagreement that justified 
democratic lawmaking, but the value of negotiation and compromise that also 
justified lawmaking. The authority of law, or the legal text, should be respected not 
because it came from ‘messy opinions’ but from people’s effort to come to an 
agreement (I will re-address this point in the next chapter in my discussion of the 
social contract theory. Wintgens’ version of social contract was the exact opposite of 
Waldron’s perspective in this point). Waldron doubted the authority of legal texts and 
stated that the only thing which dignified legislation was its majority-decision 
method.
2
 But if people did not rely upon the authoritativeness of the texts that had 
been passed through deliberate lawmaking procedures, why should legislations (the 
texts; the proof of compromise or agreement; the result of debate) rather than the 
various opinions during lawmaking be the final law? If the result, the texts of law 
were not reliable, was it possible to depend on the authority of legislature? In 
Waldron’s argument, the text gained majority support despite continuing 
disagreement among legislators, and thus the text alone could have the authority of 
                                                        
1  Clá udio Michelon, Being Apart from Reasons: The Role of Reasons in Public and Private Moral 
Decision-Making, Springer, (2006), p. 9. 
2 Waldron wrote that ‘…it strikes me that…‘in a multicultural society, legislators are entitled to insist on the 
authoritativeness of the text and nothing but the text as the only thing that can be sure has been at the forefront of 
each member’s legislative endeavours.’ Law and Disagreement, p.145. 
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law—in contrast to the legislative intent expressed in floor debates or committee 
hearings. He believed that people recognized the authority of legislation not because 
they necessarily agree with its substance but because they respect the ‘conditions of 
fairness in which a common solution was arrived at among those who disagreed 
about what it ought to be.’
1
 
In Austin or Hobbe’s theories, the authority of lawmakers (commanders) was to 
justify the validity of law.
2
 Waldron’s special jurisprudence on legislation as a 
contrast questioned the authority of the institution. He stressed the authority of the 
democratic procedure, which was different from the recognition of the status of the 
authority. Legislature was recognized as a group of people holding multiple 
opinions—it although was worthy of dignity but did not necessarily gain authority 
unless majority’s decision was made. Therefore in Waldron’s theory, neither the 
authority of the institution nor the legal texts per se were considered to have dignity, 
unless they were supported by the majority.  
In Waldron’s special jurisprudence on legislation, the diverse opinions from 
individual legislators were to substitute the authority of the unified decision of a 
legislature. Legislators’ intention was materialized as singular ones. However, from 
another perspective, individual lawmakers’ opinions differed from the formal 
consensus decision of a group of persons, or what we call an institution. Waldron’s 
special jurisprudence focused on the former part of a complex legislative process, but 
overvalued disagreement and diversity. He tried to save the dignity of legislation by 
arguing that disagreement and majority-decision in legislation were necessary and 
respectful. However, he overvalued the factors of ‘plurality’ and ‘diversity’, and 
extended these throughout the whole lawmaking procedure but ignored the fact that 
the later part of the lawmaking procedure, especially the final decision, i.e., an 
agreement rather than various opinions, should be of equal significance.  
                                                        
1 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, p.85. 
2 J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, W.E. Rumble ed., Cambridge University Press, (1995), 
p.166. As Cotterell observed, ‘Austin’s theory is not a theory of the rule of law—of government subject to law. it is 
a theory of ‘rule of men’—of government [and law] as an instrument of power’. R. Cotterell, The Politics of 
Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania Press, (1992), p.74.  
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Waldron avoided the discussion of the part of lawmaking based on negotiation 
and compromise, which promoted a determinate law. As opposed to ‘plurality’ and 
‘disagreement’, a determinate law and ‘agreement’ reinforced the authority of 
legislature also. In Waldron’s theory individual legislators’ disperse will was the 
ultimate source for understanding law. Ironically, the supposed problem-solving 
institution (legislature) became a headache to interpreters of law (courts and judges, 
the judicial), because the judicial and people needed to find out various intentions 
behind the law. It was in conflict with the requirement for legal certainty and 
predictability. In a harsh critique of Law and Disagreement, a Chinese critic said 
that:  
‘[T]he book ignored several thousand years human 
intellectual accumulation and shake a stick to force us to go back 
to the war state, and the original state, where everybody was 
against everybody. Fortunately, there is at least one conception 
that the majority might accept or are reluctant to agree, that is, 
people have to live together…although the society is a net, it has 
gaps…otherwise we would keep wondering, why should we live 
together?! Why should we live together? ’
1
 
 In my view, diversity could describe the nature of a democratic legislative 
process, but it should not influence the expectation of the certainty and predictability 
of the lawmaking institution and the laws it made. After the deliberate discussion of a 
bill, in which various and different opinions had been considered, law should be seen 
as containing a consensus behind it from the moment it was enacted. The dignity of 
legislation was reflected in its ‘institutional way’ of solving problems also. 
Lawmaking was ‘institutional’ and ‘artificial’, which was more than the ‘natural’ 
diversity and multiplicity among individuals. People accepted laws because they 
were derived from a prudent and consensus decision. Although there were many 
different opinions during legislation, law (the result of the procedure) should offer 
people a determinate, final agreement. The dignity of legislation therefore not only 
existed in its majority-decision method, but also in its institutional problem-solving 
                                                        
1 Ge Xiao, A Review of Law and Disagreement, http://book.douban.com/review/3350529/, (June 22, 2010) 
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agreement. Law was not only from diverse opinions but also from a final consensus 
and deliberate procedure.  
Waldron’s theory was therefore not sufficient for the justification of Chinese 
lawmaking. The justification of majority decision-making could not fit into the 
interpretation of Chinese ‘democratic dictatorship’ theory, for example. Waldron’s 
theory would face difficulties in differentiating the means (majority rule) from the 
ends (a just result of lawmaking). It on the contrary would imply a substitution of the 
ends for the means. I disagree with Waldron’s argument that democracy was reduced 
to disagreement. To me, democracy was not simply about majority decision-making 
and multiple different views, it was also a platform for the least advantaged group’s 
opinions and requests being heard, as Rawls argued in A theory of Justice (1971). 
Democracy should be a platform for communications for the sake of agreements as 
well as disagreements. Lawmaking should aim at agreements although disagreements 
were important in the process of reaching to agreements. Disagreements were the 
means and agreements were the ends. Agreement through communication should be 
the principle of democratic lawmaking.  
I agree with the critique that provided in Living Lawfully which argued against a 
simplified theory of majority: ‘what conceptually is a majority?’
1
 The justice of law 
should not be tested by solely relying on ‘the arithmetical sense of the term of 
majority’; because ‘looking at it from the point of view of the minority, this problem 
is insoluble’.
2
 As Professor Bankowski stated in the purpose and means of 
lawmaking:  
‘If we are interested in bringing a society closer together, then 
we will be more interested in coming closer to the unanimity 
principle, whereas if we are just concerned with a decision making 
procedure which will, in a minimal sense, hold, then we will come 
closer to a simple majority system.’
3
  
Therefore ruling by diversity and mathematic majority was not equal to rational 
                                                        
1 Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001,p.17. 
2 Ibid., p.18. 
3 Ibid., pp.18-19. 
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lawmaking, unless certain substantial values were there to ‘back up’ the formalistic 
justice. ‘Love’ in Living Lawfully, ‘mercy’ in Being Apart from Reasons, and 
‘humanity’ in this thesis were different from a pure procedural discourse theory. All 
those concepts emphasized the justice of dialog. Both the unanimity principle and the 
principle of disagreements could reflect rational decision in different contexts. 
Therefore we should not refer the procedural majority principle exclusively to the 
justified dignified principle for lawmaking.
1
  
                                                        
1  I stimulated a role-play discussion of lawmaking in my class of fourty-eight students of Zhongnan University 
of Economics and Law in 2009. The specific situation of my case was stated like this: ‘suppose you were the 
passengers of a week-long ship. Before you got onto the ship, all of you passed the health examination so that you 
were healthy passengers. In the middle of the trip, however, two of you were sick and the only doctor of the ship 
diagnosed that the disease was new and infectious. One of the sick passengers died and five more passengers 
appeared symptoms. There were no medicines in the ship and the nearest shore was a two-day trip away. Now 
you have to decide, what should you do?’ I divided the students into two groups: Group A: those who support the 
decision of throwing the 6 sick passengers into the sea, and group B: those who would take a risk of keep the sick 
until they landed. I let the two groups stated their reasons and then made a decision together. Group A argued that 
the sick passengers already threatened most passengers’ lives and should be killed. It was not a moral decision but 
it in the end could be justified for another moral value: the healthy people’s (the majority’s) lives. It was a right 
decision for the overall situation and also a legitimate defense of the majority (the healthy passengers) against the 
minority (the sick passengers). If this were the situation of a state, the state might make the same decision that 
they had made. In similar dilemmas, a nation always gave up few people for the sake of the interests of the nation. 
Group B argued that the healthy passengers did not have the authority to kill other people’s lives, especially when 
the sick passengers were not guilty for any offences of laws. Killing them in the name of their disease was 
immoral and inhuman. If they killed the sick passengers, they murdered their lives and should be punished by 
law.  
After half hour debate, I let my students to vote. Thirty-eight of fourty-eight students made a decision for 
killing the sick passengers and ten including the six ‘sick passengers’ stood by the minority’s human rights for 
living. Then I asked them whether they all accepted this decision, the majority’s decision? All of them agreed. 
Who would do the execution of the sick passengers? They believed that choosing by lot would be appropriate. 
What if the person who did the execution caught the infectious disease? Students still stood by the rationality of 
the majority decision and believed that if the person were chosen by the majority he did not have excuses of 
disobedience. I further asked them what if the person who did the execution faced with the death penalty of 
murder when the ship landed. Students then argued for a broader vote for the judgment: People should make their 
decisions based on the specific situation rather than exclusively according to legal texts. Those passengers were 
put in an extreme situation so that normal laws should not be used in this case. The majority’s decision in that 
ship was the only justified reason for action. Therefore they should not be punished by normal laws that they 
would face afterwards. 
Then I asked them to shift their roles to do another decision: ‘What if the situation of the case was quite the 
opposite? Let us suppose the minority, the ten students who voted for the sick passengers are healthy passengers 
now; and the majority, the thirty-eight students who voted for the healthy passengers are the sick passengers. 
Now your roles have been changed. What decision will you make?’ They kept silent for a while because the 
reasons they argued for in the previous situation became a big obstruction of their new arguments. I gave them 
another half hour to think and then vote for their decision.   
Ten students again voted for ‘not killing’ and the thirty-eight students again voted for ‘killing’. The result 
was interesting and illuminative. According to the majority’s decision, the minority healthy passengers should kill 
the majority, although the minority was in the beginning against this decision. When the minority did the 
execution, they were against their conscience of justice and would face the strict legal punishment when they 
landed. However, if the majority’s decision was a sufficient reason for legitimate decision-making, like they 
accepted in the first instance, they had to accept this reason and be abided by this majority principle.  
If we have doubts on the legitimacy of majority-decision, we may realize that in the first situation the 
majority probably made a wrong decision. There must be something value in lawmaking except for the majority 
votes, if we all agree that the minority sick passengers deserve to live in the first case, and that the minority 
healthy passengers have a right to disobey the majority’s decision in the second. When we consider the Great 





None of the theories about lawmaking that analyzed in this chapter started from 
a communicative mode. Principles of utility in Bentham’s theory excluded 
negotiations from the least advantage groups. Law was regarded as the unconscious 
discovery rather than active creations of society by Hayek. Therefore in Hayek’s 
theory, lawmaking as administrative behaviors lacked communication. Disagreement 
was the core concept of Waldron’s justification of lawmaking. However, it 
emphasized conflicts rather than co-operations during lawmaking. The principle of 
majority decision in Waldron’s theory excluded negotiations from the minority. Such 
justifications were insufficient for a communicative lawmaking mode.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
be if it was exclusively about the majority’s decision. Multiple opinions of the majority during that era were 
ideological. Even there were different and opposite voices during decision-making procedures, as long as the 
majority’s vote was the final decisive standard, multiple opinions would be an inferior factor. The principle that 
the minority should submit to the majority was not in conflict with the requirement of diversity during the debate 
stage of lawmaking. If the dignity of justice was only connected with numbers, even if the minority’s opinions 
being heard, they were not treated seriously. If on the contrary we accepted that justice was irrelevant to the 






LAWMAKING IN JURISPRUDENCE (II) 
 
 
——A binding duty can appear as a limitation only in relation to 
indeterminate subjectivity or abstract freedom, and to the drives of 
the natural will or of the moral will which arbitrarily determines its 
own indeterminate good. The individual, however, finds his 
liberation in duty. On the one hand, he is liberated from his 
dependence on mere natural drives, and from the burden he labours 
under as a particular subject in his moral reflections on obligation 
and desire; and on the other hand, he is liberated from that 
indeterminate subjectivity which does not attain existence or the 
objective determinacy of action, but remains within itself and has no 
actuality. In duty, the individual liberates himself so as to attain 
substantial freedom…[D]uty is not a limitation of freedom, but only 
of freedom in the abstract, that is , of unfreedom: it is the attainment 





In this chapter, I will introduce another legitimation route developed by 
Professor Luc J. Wintgens. Legisprudence was distinct from the previous theories I 
discussed in chapter five in its deliberations on freedom and the legitimacy of the 
social contract. Bentham and Waldron debated on a collective sense of legislation: 
the principles of utility and the majority decisions were more or less relate to 
‘collective morality’. Hayek debated on a social sense: the customary rules in his 
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theory were the genuine rules. Legisprudence, as a contrast, started from ‘individual 
morality’: a conception of freedom. In legisprudence, freedom, social contract and 
the legitimacy of lawmaking were deliberated inseparably interconnected: Freedom 
was the fundamental basis for ‘an alternative version of social contract’. The chain of 
legitimation of the social contract started from freedom.  
 
LEGISPRUDENCE 
Legisprudence was defined as: ‘… the name for the branch of legal theory that 
deals with legislation from a theoretical and a practical perspective’
1
 and ‘…a 
rational theory of legislation’.
2
 The object of legisprudence was legislation and 
regulation, and it made use of the theoretical tools and the insights gained from legal 




The hermeneutic interpretation was employed to solve the difficulties caused by 
legalism on legislation. By relying on the distinction between the internal and 
external points of view, a legal hermeneutic approach, legisprudence was a theory 
began with a clarification on the distinction between scholars’, judges’ and 
legislators’ points of view.
 4
 These three kinds of groups that influenced legislation 
were introduced to explain the idea of the hermeneutic approach.
5
 An external point 
of view was suggested to break through the limitation of the internal point of view 
presupposed by strong legalism. The theoretical way of showing how law was linked 
with social reality opened an avenue for a legisprudential approach to law, that was, 
                                                        
1 Wintgens ed., Legisprudence: A New Theoretical Approach to Legislation, p.10. About Legisprudence, see  
Wintgens ed., Legisprudence: A New Theoretical Approach to Legislation, Hart Publishing, (2002); and The 
Theory and Practice of Legislation—essays in Legisprudence, Ashgate Publishing Limited, (2005). 
2 L.J. Wintgens, ‘Legisprudence as a New Theory of Legislation’ (presentation for the discussion group of 
jurisprudence at Oxford), (2004), p.10. 
3 L.J. Wintgens ed., Legisprudence: A New Theoretical Approach to Legislation, p.2.  
4 About legal hermeneutics see N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Clarendon Press, (1994); F. 
Atria and N. MacCormick ed., Law and Legal Interpretation, Ashgate Publishing Company, (2003); R. Dworkin, 
‘Law as Interpretation’, Texas Law Review, (1982), pp.527-560. 
5 See Wintgens ed., Legisprudence: A New Theoretical Approach to Legislation, pp.15-39. 
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the study of rational legislation.
1
 The hermeneutic approach, which included the 
external point of view of the observer and the internal point of view of the actor, was 
therefore considered a better precondition to a theory of legislation. The position of 
the legislator as a legal actor is thus articulated.
2
 
Legisprudence started from freedom to justify social contract. Based on the 
classification of conceptions of freedom (hereinafter cof) and conceptions about 
freedom (hereinafter caf), traditional social contract theory provided by Hobbes and 
Rousseau were analyzed: in their theories, concretizations of freedom by the 




‘From the moment of the contract on, subjects primarily act 
on conceptions about freedom. Their consent to the contract 
includes a proxy to the sovereign. On this proxy, they consent to 
abide by any of the sovereign’s external limitations of freedom 
whatever their content may be’.
4
  
Discovering this crisis of the internal recognition of the outside, an alternative 
version of the social contract theory was then provided to re-discover the priority of 
the cof and the necessary justification when the conceptions caf predominated over 
the cof. The discussion on the meaning of freedom implied that, if freedom in the 
moral sense was considered as the general purpose or the leitmotiv of the legal 
system, the social contract could also be regarded in this ‘thinner version’. A 
challenge to the absolute priority of caf referred to an alternative model of the social 
                                                        
1 ‘Legsiprudence has both a theoretical and a practical aspect. The theoretical aspect involves questions on the 
concept of sovereignty, the relation between the legal system and social reality, both from a judicial and a 
legislative perspective (and the similarities between both). This relation, as was argued, is based on a conception 
of coherence of a legal system. The practical aspect of a legisprudential approach of law concerns the 
elaboration of concrete criteria of rational legislation. They are gained from within the legal system relying on its 
own dynamics according to the hermeneutic point of view of authoritative actors.’ ibid., p.39. 
2 Wintgens ed., The Theory and Practice of Legislation—Essays in Legisprudence, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
(2005), p7. 
3 After clarifying the premise of freedom, Wintgens articulated the contours of an alternative version of the social 
contract theory. The social contract model as Hobbes and Rousseau conceived was aimed to solve the problem of 
political integration from individualism. Wintgens concluded that ‘in Razian language, the reason for entering 
the contract is an exclusionary reason. While Hobbes can be read to hold some utilitarian version of rationality, 
Rousseau’s most obviously is of a more purified brand. It is reason itself that unfolds and induces to the 
adherence to the true principle of public law as he calls the social contract.’ ‘Both variants of the contract result 
however in the same: the sovereign’s rules are morally true.’ ibid., p5. 




contract, which Wintgens called the tradeoff model. In this model, subjects did not 
give a general proxy to the sovereign:  
‘On the contrary, the model says that freedom is traded off 
with each and every external limitation. Put differently, the proxy 
model contains a general and a priori trade-off of freedom. The 
trade-off model on the contrary qualifies the proxy character of 
the social contract, in that the subjects do not trade off their 




Therefore, in the moral dimension of freedom, moral autonomy meant that 
acting on conceptions of freedom should have relative priority over acting on 
conceptions about freedom (i.e., cof prior to caf), because in a thinner version of the 
social contract individuals did not signed away all but some of their freedom. The 
morality of freedom should have a priority over law.
2
 The cof and caf and the social 
contract theory were preconditions to interpret ‘the chain of legitimation’.
3
 
Legisprudence was therefore a theory to interpret the existing phenomena 
(lawmaking and lawmakers) as well as the meaning of them.  
Four principles were proposed in legisprudence to further deliberate the reason 
of introducing the chain of legitimation: the principle of alter nativity (PA), the 
principle of normative density (PN), the principle of temporality (PT), and the 
principle of coherence (PC).
4
 PA as a principle of justification was based on the 
subject’s capacity to act on cof. The sovereign could only intervene on the condition 
that due to a failure of social interaction an external limitation was preferable to an 
internal limitation of freedom as a reason for action. PN submitted an external 
limitation to justification as far as the density of the normative impact was concerned. 
It required that the means of realization of the rule’s end, purpose, or goal result from 
a process of weighing and balancing of the alternatives. If the essential connection 
between a rule and a sanction was broken, PN should establish a connection between 
                                                        
1 Ibid., p.10 . 
2 Wintgens ed., The Theory and Practice of Legislation—Essays in Legisprudence, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
(2005), p.9. 
3 Wintgens, Legitimacy and Legitimation from the Legisprudential Perspective, in Wintgens and Thion ed., 
Legislation in Context: Essays in Legisprudence, (2007), p.19. 
4 Legisprudence as a New Theory of Legislation, pp.13-15. 
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the end, goal, or purpose and the means to realize them. PT brought a temporal 
dimension into the legal system. Therefore, on PA, the justification focused on the 
external justification as an alternative for failing social interaction. On PN, this 
normative density of the external justification should be explained. PT on its turn 
stressed the general historical character of any justification.
1
 PT constrained 
normative proposition submitted to justification on PA and PN from the perspective 
of time. PC was a principle of justification of external limitations from the 
perspective of the legal system as a whole.  
Therefore, a legal system was not a static chain of external limitations; it was on 
the contrary a complex and dynamic set of intertwined propositions concerning what 
ought to be done and how it ought to be done. Wintgens compared differences 
between consistency and coherence, and illustrated four levels of coherence. More 
recently, Wintgens further classified the last principle (PC) into four levels. The first 
level was the basic level to differ coherence from non-coherence, the level below 
which nothing made sense. The second level added a time dimension into the first 
level. The third level chose the point of view of the judge especially. In this level the 
meaning of coherence to a judge was that he had to make a systematic interpretation 
of a legal system rather than gave an interpretation of singular unconnected things. 
The fourth level, coherence meant ‘making sense as a whole’. In this level of 
coherence, an external perspective was required while the second and third level of 
coherence referred to the internal rationality. 
2
  
So, ‘legal rules or external limitations of freedom are submitted to 
justification on the principle of alternativity, the principle of celerity 
(the principle of temporality), and the principle of normative density. 
This justification comes to a positive implementation of the moral 
autonomy of the subject. The supplementary justification on the 
principle of coherence underpins the connection between the concept of 




                                                        
1 ibid,, p.15. 
2 Wintgens, The Theory and Practice of Legislation—Essays in Legisprudence, pp.15-20. 
3 Ibid., p.24. 
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The above four principles (PA, PT, PC and PN) could also be read as providing 
four arguments of jurisprudence: 1. why should people follow law, (the morality of 
freedom should have priority over law); 2. If law should be obeyed (the morality of 
the obedience to law), why should people obey legislators’ law (rather than other 
people’s mandates), (conflicts were better to be solved by the agents themselves in 
the first instance);
1
 3. Why should legislations be changed (the historical background 
of lawmaking is depended); and 4. Why should legislations be systematically 
coherent (in order to make the rational understanding of law possible)?  
The chain of legitimation was deliberated to further examine the first two 
questions. In the chain of legitimation, the moment of entering a social contact was 
the starting point of legitimating. From this moment on, the meaning of legislator and 
their legislative behaviors need justifications and the subjects should also be abided 
by their consent to the content of the contract. From an empirical interpretation of the 
authority of the social contract, Wintgens pointed out that in a ‘realistic’ world, 
whatever the legislators rules would be, they were valid.  
‘From the moment of the contract on, subjects primarily act on 
conceptions about freedom. Their consent to the contract includes a 
proxy to the sovereign. On this proxy, they consent to abide by any of 




The proxy model of social contract was to weigh and balance the cof (the 
conceptions of freedom of the subjects) and caf (the law of the sovereignty). The four 
principles were therefore disclosed to justify the other parts of the chain since the 
moment of entering a social contract. The legitimation chain continued to be 
effective, as long as the contract was valid.  
 
 
                                                        
1 This question was initiated in Wintgens, Freedom and Legisprudence—a More Substantial View: a Reply to 
Professor Perju, Boston University Law Review, Vol.89, (2009), p.1804. 




PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
From the above brief introduction of legisprudence, we could see that the 
conflicts of freedom and submission were disclosed. In Legisprudence, the main 
line of argument was formed by the attempt to interpret and harmonize the conflicts 
of freedom and submission. The legitimacy of lawmaking relies on the reason of 
submission to the social contract. However, the social contract should aim at 
realizing freedom. This argument embraced the Aristotelian Rule of Law tradition, 
in which the Rule of Law means obedience to the laws laid down and well enacted 
laws laid down by which people abide. This legitimation chain also differed from 
the one which put the emphasis on the authority’s justification or the sovereignty’s 
legitimacy. It interpreted the core of social contract theory as a theory of freedom. 
Suppose a simplified social contract existed between a nation of laws and a 
subject. The contract was signed before he was born, when long time ago his 
ancestors decided to constitute a community and rule the nation by laws. The nation 
of laws was legitimated from the moment the contract was signed. This simplified 
edition of the modern social contract was different from a classical social contract 
theory which based on differentiation between the State of Nature and civil 
governments; and also different with the alternative version that legisprudence 
supposed (contract on freedom).  
In this simplified social contract, the starting point of legitimation chain was the 
state founding fathers’ agreement (rather than free will of subjects of later 
generations) on signing the contract; the subject had to be abided by the contract 
whatever the content it might be, as long as he was maintaining in this nation of laws. 
If it were the essence of the social contract, a subject as a subordinate member of a 
society, was in nature a dependent rather than the decision-maker of the contract. He 
was thus born non-free, but endowed with limited freedom and equality defined by 
law. In this simplified social contract, the first responsibility of the subject should be 
the duty of observance of the law.  
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Therefore in a simplified social contract, submission rather than freedom was 
the core value of the contract. From the egoistic perspective, individuals’ freedom 
was not the ultimate goal (principium) of the contract because the founding fathers 
made laws for themselves rather than for others. From altruistic perspective, however, 
if the ancestors constituted the contract for the good of later generations, it was not 
for the freedom of contract-makers: their freedom was again not the starting point 
(principium) of the contract. If the contract-maker made the contract for the good of 
both themselves and the successors, the successors’ conceptions of freedom should 
be consistent with their ancestors, otherwise the contract was a violation of their own 
freedom—but when their conceptions were consistent and unanimous with others, 
the individual conception of freedom was identical with a collective sense of 
morality, i.e., liberty of the whole community. In this sense individuals’ freedom (of 
both the contract-maker and contract-accepter) could be the principium of the 
contract but it was in the end identical with the collective morality and the good of 
the society, which became a utilitarian justification and was meaningless to 
differentiate it with the collective morality.   
In contrast to the previous simplified model, a social contract could be justified 
by individuals’ tacit consent to the legal system built by their ancestors; their tacit 
consent lied in the fact of remaining in the society. They had the freedom of 
entering or leaving the society. In this alternative mode, individual rights of 
freedom and equality could gain vital significance.
 1
 In fact, this model attempted 
to rectify the unbalanced right and duty in the social contract by asserting the 
priority of individual’s freedom, which was indeed an alternative version of social 
contract theory. Put differently, it made an attempt to use contract theory, especially 
the doctrine promissory estoppel, which was distinct from a classical social contract 
theory or the reductive version of the modern social contract that discussed 
previously, to re-interpret the legitimacy of lawmaking. Contract theory, as a chief 
                                                        
1 See Wintgens’ version of the alternative social contract, The Theory and Practice of Legislation—Essays in 
Legisprudence, Ashgate Publishing Limited, (2005), p.8 
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cornerstone of the private law, took the principle of the autonomy of will and the 
freedom of contract as the foundation. Relying on this tacit consent model and the 
doctrine promissory estoppel, legisprudence re-built the social contract theory by 




The doctrine promissory estoppel was a legal principle that permits enforcement 
of a promise made without consideration in order to prevent injustice. In 
legisprudence the legitimacy of a social contract was interpreted alike the doctrine 
promissory estoppel. Individuals should not fight against the authority’s law because 
they had agreed to follow the law when they decided to enter into the society. They 
should be abided by any law that the legislature would make although at first they 
would not know the concrete laws that the latter would make. They were bound by 
the social contract they signed. Or in other words, they should be bound by their own 
commitment or promise to the contract. They entered into the society and 
‘abandoned’ their free status and went into a state of ‘slavery’. The decision was a 
‘free’ choice and the contract was made under a ‘genuine’ will. Therefore they should 
not arbitrarily draw back from the agreement (to the Rule-of-Law) once the contract 
was signed. The value of promise, agreement, or commitment could support the 
justice of obeying rules. The doctrine promissory estoppel was employed here to 
interpret the reason (or cause) of submission. Submission was made by a free 
decision of a free will before an individual entering into a social contract. From 
freedom to submission, the subject was bound by his own agreement of entering into 
the society.  
 
                                                        
1 In his reply to Perju’s comment on legisprudence, Wintgens deliberated different layers of freedom and 
supposed that ‘law should act only as a subroutine’ and that ‘law should not a priori determine social relations at 
the price of destroying social interaction’, law should act as a subroutine ‘only interferes when interaction breaks 
down’; ‘law must be kept distant from social interaction’; ‘rules should be constructed so as to leave the priority 
of solving conflicts to the agents themselves’; ‘…(it requires) a legislator to abstain from intervening’; ‘…it 
includes prudence in the intervention of state power in social interaction’. Wintgens, Freedom and 
Legisprudence—a More Substantial View: a Reply to Professor Perju, Boston University Law Review, Vol.89, 
(2009), p.1804. All those expressions were private law ideas which emphasized the individual’s autonomy and 
freedom, and denied the (positive) intervention of the nation. 
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CONCEPTUAL FREEDOM AND CONCRETE FREEDOM  
In Legitimacy and Legitimation, concrete freedom was interpreted as rights. 
Wintgens referred rights to political rights, (equal) participation rights (the right to 
participate in the ruling of the state), the right to resist violence, right to survival, and 
finally freedom as a right.
1
 In contrast with those concrete freedom (or rights), 
freedom was debated in its philosophic and abstract sense also. An interesting 
argument, i.e. freedom as both a terminus ad quem and a terminus a quo, was further 
debated in Wintgens’ reply to Perju’s question about ‘freedom as a starting point’.
2
 
Here freedom was debated in an abstract and conceptual way. In his defense, 
Wintgens described freedom as a starting point, i.e. freedom unlimited in 
legisprudence from a pure conceptual analysis: freedom was a formal and reflexive 
concept and it was indefinite.
3
 ‘The meaning of freedom’, however, ‘is 
subject-related, in that it follows from interaction, not from deduction’.
4
 ‘The 
meaning of freedom’ therefore referred to concrete freedom. This classification of 
different freedom was to interpret that concrete freedom or rights were different from 
a theoretical construction of a social contract theory. ‘Freedom as the starting point’ 
referred to the starting point of a theoretical deduction rather than an empirical 
interaction.  
The emphasis on right (prior to duty) and the deduction from freedom to the 
Rule of Law in legisprudence was impressive. Freedom as a terminus a quo of 
legisprudence was obvious. Even legal positivists would admit that there were some 
purposes that law should pursue. The enterprise of the Rule of Law should aim at a 
purpose: the rule of ‘good’ (good content or good in the form) law in the end. An 
impressive argument that Wintgens made in his conceptual analysis of freedom was 
that freedom ‘does not refer to any ultimate value. On the contrary, it refers to the 
                                                        
1 Luc J. Wintgens, Legitimacy and Legitimation from the Legisprudential Perspective, from Wintgens ed., 
Legislation in Context: Essays in Legisprudence, Ashgate Publishing, (2007), pp.25-30. 
2 Wintgens, Freedom and Legisprudence—a More Substantial View: a Reply to Professor Perju, Boston 
University Law Review, Vol.89, (2009), pp.1796-1805. 
3 Ibid., p.1798. 
4 Ibid., p.1801. 
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absence of ultimate values.’
1
 This perspective differed from an instrumental 
rationalistic perspective which took freedom as a ‘tool’ or ‘media’ to realize other 
values. Utilitarianists and free market economists including F.A. Hayek were 
inclined to agree with the latter debate of freedom. Wintgens apparently disagreed 
with instrumental rationalistic freedom. He also differed from an argument that took 
freedom as an inner independent value, or value-independent freedom that debated 
by Joseph Raz in The Morality of Freedom. Raz argued that if the value of freedom 
depended on other values, then freedom per se lost its value——therefore the value 
of freedom should be independent. In Raz’s argument, freedom has some value, 
although the value was independent.
2
 Wintgens’ argument was different: in his 
argument freedom was value-free. In legisprudence freedom was debated in a sense 
of a philosophical study of ‘being’, rather than in a system of values.  
Freedom in legisprudence was therefore started from a conceptual unlimited 
‘free natural status of human being’, a point of view that classical social contract 
theories held. It also discussed the ultimate freedom. There were two kinds of 
freedom indeed: one at the starting point and the other at the end. Logically, it 
seemed strange to make efforts to pursue something already there (freedom as the 
starting point but also as the end). Freedom as the purpose should not be something 
already existed from the beginning. In other words, ‘freedom as the starting point’ 
should have essential differences when comparing with ‘freedom as the end’. 
However, if we came along this route, we misunderstood Wintgens’ differentiation 
between the starting point and the end of legitimation. 
To understand these two kinds of freedom, we need to notice that there was an 
important stage between the starting point and the end in legisprudence, which was 
the unfree stage (see figure. 6.5). The stage of unfree referred to the reality while the 
starting point and the end were debated in the conceptual analysis. Classical natural 
status or the original status of man in the original stage was recognized beyond 
                                                        
1 Ibid., p.1799. 




question in a social contract theory. But since the man decided to enter into the social 
contract, they were unfree. Freedom as the starting point could be understood as a 
pre-condition of entering the society, that the man’s choice of entering was (or should 
be) based on his free will. Freedom as the end did not mean to deny the justice of the 
social contract, but aimed at a transcendental value: the man did not enter to the 
contract for slavery; he chose to be unfree because of the purpose of realizing a 
‘higher’ freedom, i.e., the freedom beyond a natural being’s original free status. 
Therefore, freedom as the end (purpose, goal) was not the same freedom at the 
starting point. Three different stages were deliberated to justify the reason of entering 
the social contract, while at the same time pointed out the limits of freedom (concrete 
freedom in a political society). The three stages disclosed three levels of freedom: 
freedom in the natural or original status; freedom in a political society; and freedom 




External restrictions including law were limitations to freedom, and were not 
the ultimate purpose (freedom as the end). Freedom as the opposite of law was 
argued in the second sense of freedom. In legisprudence, the argument for the 
conceptual freedom was much similar with Hayek’s epistemological argument for 
the free market. The latter argued that things could only be known through abstract 
categories and therefore there was an infinite amount of facts in the world. This was 
also described as ‘the void of particularity’ in Professor Bankowski’s book.
1
 The 
conceptual freedom in legisprudence was defined by negative freedom (which meant 
                                                        










the absence of limits; or freedom from restrictions); while concrete freedoms (which 
referred to rights) were positive freedom (freedom of what we can do). Unlimited 
freedom as the starting point of legisprudence was therefore not aiming at an 
empirical debate but a philosophic debate. The differences between the two kinds of 
freedom, therefore, explained Perju’s thought that freedom was not sufficient to be 
the starting point of a realistic debate; and Wintgens’ argument that a theory of 
freedom could defend his philosophic pre-condition. They were both right in their 
argument but they discussed freedom in different perspectives. 
In an abstract philosophic debate, individuals were presupposed to be 
conceptual equal. Therefore concrete freedom of specific persons was not in the 
realm of discussion. Wintgens made contributions to develop a theory of freedom 
especially in its conceptual sense. We here turn to Bankowski’s argument of concrete 
freedom to complete the discussion of freedom. The latter pointed out that a 
particular person’s understanding of freedom should also be very particular. 
Bankowski pointed out that ‘conceptual individual’ also appeared in Marx and 
Pashukanis criticisms of capitalistic theories.
1
 Conceptual freedom was sufficient 
when we talked about the abstract bearer of right or ‘the legal person’ in a formal 
equality.
2
 In a substantive principle of equality and a positive conception of liberty, 
however, people should not be treated as conceptual equal individuals because of 
their respective needs: 
 ‘Freedom is not just freedom from, but the freedom positively to 
fulfill oneself. This means we cannot just apply a measure to people and 
treat them equally in respect of it. The rule that everyone is free to go to the 
Ritz is no use. We have to treat each person individually and see whether 
they need to go to the Ritz and what they will gain from it. The implication 
of this is that society is a co-operative venture, where people confront each 
other in all their facets and not as buyers and sellers or bearers of rights 
and owners. The freedom of each becomes the condition of the freedom 
for all and distribution occurs naturally: from each according to his 
                                                        
1 Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, 
p.87-88. 
2 Ibid., p. 88 
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abilities, to each according to his needs.’
1
  
From the above quote we can see that the problem of conceptual freedom and 
equality was that they see a real person as an abstraction. In this reductive 
perspective, the law ignored the complexity of the particular concrete individual. In 
the end, ‘treating unequals equally merely compounds inequality’.
2
 Self also 
disappeared into this conceptual freedom. Relationships among persons were 
transferred to duties and rights rather than love or hate. Freedom thus became 
irrelevant to one’s love of free status, but the right to be distant from others.  
 
VALUES OF/BEHIND FREEDOM 
An obvious difference between legisprudence and other theories appeared: 
Utilitarianism aimed at common prosperity; individualism aimed at individuals’ 
rights; or legalism aimed at the maintenance of a social order. The purpose of 
interaction in legisprudence, however, led to ‘freedom as distance’.
3
 In an extreme 
way of interpretation, ‘freedom as distance’ means others should be kept at a distance 
because they would interfere with a person’s own conception of freedom. Therefore 
the purpose of interaction aimed at non-interaction in the end. Related individuals 
were thus ‘conceptually’ separated for the sake of freedom.  
This edition of freedom, i.e., ‘freedom means distance’ defended the 
individual’s independence and subjectivity. This version of freedom was also 
defended by ‘right-wing’ liberalists. Henry David Thoreau practiced this philosophy 
at the Lake Waldon in late 19
th
 century. He chose to leave the society and live a 
simple life. In the sense of the second freedom that analyzed before (freedom in a 
political society), Thoreau broke the chain of slavery of flourishing life and social 
activities, and in this sense he practiced freedom. This freedom was still practiced by 
                                                        
1 Ibid., p.89. 
2 Ibid., p.95. 
3 Wintgens, Freedom and Legisprudence—a More Substantial View: a Reply to Professor Perju, Boston 
University Law Review, Vol.89, (2009),, p.1801. 
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those who chose reclusion, i.e., a life ‘far from the madding crowd’.
1
  
This ‘distant freedom’ was different from Bankowski’s argument of ‘bringing 
the outside in’. In Bankowski’s theory, the interruption and intervention from the 
society (the outside) could and should be transferred into ‘the inside’. Freedom did 
not mean distance. On the contrary, freedom should not exclude communication and 
interaction. In a ‘left-wing’ liberal camp, freedom (liberty) was for the collective 
(although it could benefit individuals in the end). Communication and cooperation 
were necessary for practicing freedom.    
Therefore we could understand freedom in two folds, a purely conceptual 
freedom which is value-free as defended by Wintgens; or concrete and 
value-dependent freedom defended by Bankowski. When we discuss a question 
about values behind the law of lawmaking, we apparently did not see legitimacy as a 
pure conceptual and value-free topic. Legisprudence was not a pure conceptual 
theory either. It had its normative debates on legislation: freedom should be the basis 
of lawmaking. Even though it did not claim to be a reproduction of reality, its 
normative debate was more than conceptual: freedom should be the beginning and 
the end of the legitimation chain. However, we should notice that the concept of 
freedom per se was defended value-free in legisprudence. It further deduced another 
value-free argument: freedom referred to distance or non-interaction. 
2
  
In legisprudence, heteronmous and autonomous norms were represented by law 
                                                        
1 Recent news disclosed a married Chinese couple who both graduated from Peking University secluded 
themselves in remote mountains for more than ten years. They resisted any pollutions of the outside world and 
depended on themselves. http://news.163.com/11/0417/03/71QFHVM500014AED.html 
2 Here I saw loneliness and isolated ‘free’ individuals. In fact, loneliness and the isolated feeling were exactly 
what I felt when I was living in a Western environment. People were distant because of privacy, freedom and 
independence; those ideas were more valued than interactions. Relations were loose and casual in this 
environment. In a society where relations among family members and friends were closer and the interactions 
were more frequent, a person would not feel happy when he was kept distant from others. On the contrary he 
would feel ignored, disrespecftul, and marginalized. The Western environment for freedom might not bring joy to 
a person who preferred a ‘close-relation’ society. To me, a conceptual freedom was not freedom at all; it was just 
a concept without any meaning and contents. It had a beautiful name but when we attempted to endow this name 
any positive meaning, it should have contents that can be realized: such as ‘when I speak, I have a right to be 
heard and my speech would not be interrupted’ (a freedom to speak); ‘when I stand at the bus station, other 
people will not slap me or kick me if I refuse to donate twenty pounds to a child-saving organization’ (a freedom 
to refuse); ‘when I ask sufficient guidance I can get the information’ (a freedom to get information); ‘when I am 
unfairly treated I can ask a fair hearing and judgment’ (a freedom to have justice); ‘when I am hurt and am 
suffering, I can ask others to stop injury and if they refuse I can fight back’ (a freedom to self-defend). If those 
contents were not in the idea of freedom, the conceptual freedom meant nothing to me. 
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and freedom, an opposition which also reflected in classic Marxist theories and 
liberal theories. In Bankowski’s argument, as a contrast, the social life and its 
institutions were based upon a mixture of principles which were in tension, one with 
the other. ‘Particular social institutions will resolve this tension in different ways. 
They will balance the principles in particular ways in different concrete 
circumstances. But this will not be a compromise in the sense that more of one will 
mean less of the other’
1
. In this line of argument, which I also agree, freedom and 
law were not absolutely isolated but could transform each other commutatively. 
Particular circumstances would decide the nature of law and freedom. I employ 
Bankowski’s ‘particular freedom’ in Living Lawfully here to further support my 
argument against conceptual freedom:  
‘When we come to looking at political institutions we will not 
necessarily justify them by the grand and abstract principle of 
‘freedom’ or ‘welfare’. Thus the market definition of [the] absence 
of coercion will not be the one always applied. Freedom from 
poverty, freedom to organise, etc. will also be in play. These 
particular freedoms will be pursued at particular times and places 
and will be weighed against each other. Likewise with welfare, this 
will mean different things in differing circumanstences and 
differing concepts will be balanced against each other.’
2
 
We thus see the articulation of legalism and love, i.e., the concept of legality. 
Law should not be seen heteronomous and moral autonomous solely but rather law 
and morals should both be seen as a mixture of them.
3
 In this sense,  
‘We need to be dependent upon people, who are beings that 
need other people and cannot live without them. But this 
dependency means that we must not think of ourselves as wholly 
autonomous, dependent upon our will alone. Nor does it mean that 
we have to surrender our autonomy and live a wholly 
heteronomous life. We are neither slave nor lord of all.’
4
  
As defended in legisprudence, which I also agree, the meaning of freedom was 
subjective. Therefore different subjects in diverse cultures would have particular 
                                                        
1 Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, p.107. 
2 Ibid. 




understandings of freedom. In other words, a particular person’s conception of 
freedom was particular. If freedom as distance were Western people’s ideal life, the 
conception of happiness in Western culture was very different from that of China. If 
freedom meant the unavoidable distance from others, it meant unhappiness and 
bitterness in Chinese culture. Thoreau liked to live alone beside Lake Walden; 
Heidegger liked to live alone in the woods; Tao Yuanming’s ideal living place was 
Tao Huayuan; but if freedom meant cutting off connections with a Chinese person’s 
family and friends, he would rather abandon some of his freedom.  
Freedom was interpreted in legisprudence as a formal and reflexive concept 
which had no content and was indefinite.
1
 Therefore in legisprudence freedom 
should not be ‘exchangeable’. Otherwise, if it could exchange with other things it 
was not reflexive. Suppose we were free as the conceptual freedom meant, would we 
sacrifice our freedom for other values? On the one hand, if we could not choose to 
give up our freedom, we were not free at all, because the conceptual freedom meant 
absence of any limitations. On the other hand, however, if we had a choice and we 
did choose to give up freedom for other things, we were exchanging sacrifice our 
freedom for something else, and thus freedom had some content and was not 
‘indefinite’.  
Socrates chose death and sacrificed freedom for his ideal Rule of Law: when he 
made his decision he had a choice to run for freedom, therefore his choice was a free 
choice to give up freedom. Free men chose to become soldiers to fight for their 
country. Un-married persons chose to get married and gave up their freedom of 
living alone. Women chose to have children and gave up their freedom of being 
alone. Parents chose to die for their children and gave up their freedom of life. If we 
admitted that those facts were truly existed, we would agree that a free man would 
sacrifice his freedom for other things—and most of them were about love: love for 
their country, partner, and child. People also exchanged their freedom for desires of 
                                                        
1 Wintgens, Freedom and Legisprudence—a More Substantial View: a Reply to Professor Perju, Boston 
University Law Review, Vol.89, (2009),, p.1798. 
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power, beauty, fame and fortune. Freedom was exchanged not only for positive 
values like love but negative desires too. Therefore freedom was not only conceptual 
without any contents; it had some values and contents and could be exchangeable 
according to different subject’s desires. 
We could argue that when those men exchanged their freedom for other values, 
they were not free because they were in chains of love and desires. But conceptual 
freedom meant no ties and restrictions, so they were actually unfree if they were in 
chains of love and desires. Indeed, a man as a social being was from birth in chains 
of particular culture and was later restricted by his knowledge of the world. I did not 
see any men without desire and love. To me, not only the meaning of freedom was 
subject-related, the concept freedom per se was man-related from the beginning. We 
would not say a mountain was free or a river was free because freedom was 
meaningless to those objective beings. A man-related fact from the beginning was 
delimited.  
In my point of view, the conceptual freedom as principium, which had no 
content, reflexive and absence of any values that defended in legisprudence was 
possible when it referred to God-related things. Only God was free. For man-made 
rules, freedom was not the starting point of legitimation, and should not be the 
exclusive purpose. The ultimate principium should be the value that we could not 
abandon. To me, it was not freedom but love. I would give up my freedom for the 
lives of my loved persons. A society that was formed by persons like me would not 
take freedom as the ultimate principium of lawmaking. Subjectivity, therefore, 
brought the difficulty to the legitimation chain: how could we compare and balance 
different individuals’ different desires?  
I would like to use Bankowski’s analysis of ‘indifference’ and ‘exchange’ to 
further support my argument. In his analysis, liberal theorists tended to describe the 





 In such an indifferent relationship, the connection between persons was 
nothing more than the satisfaction of each other’s wants. Otherwise, interaction was 
un-necessary. A person did not engage with others except in so far as those others 
could satisfy some need of one’s own. Therefore ‘keeping others at a distance’ was 
reasonable because there was no obligation and necessity for interaction. We did not 
need other persons’ interruptions unless we need their assistance. It was a world of 
the principle ‘no use, no discourse’. In such a relationship, people were not interested 
in others requires: ‘in the exchange of A and B I want you A and you want me B but I 
am not interested in whether my B is of real value to you and you are not interested 
whether your A is of real value to me’.
2
 As a contrast, the idea of exchange built 
mutuality of regard into it. Fuller stressed the ‘good’ of the exchange in the idea that 
law was something about reciprocity and connection. Law was no longer something 
outside us, or as restrictions and limitations, but an enterprise that we could 
contribute to. Our freedom was thus shaped by law but at the same time shaping the 
law: the exchange of the inside and the outside.  
‘The Rule of law becomes something more than a one way street 
of norms standing above us and is a shared interaction that not only 
protects and facilitates, but also enriches us through our 
participation in its life, through living lawfully’.
3
  
Therefore we were less under the external control but more open to the outside 
and to the transformation. The separate atomic self was thus transformed to 
interactive and communicative beings. The self should be located and constituted in a 
social context and interactive within it.  
‘For the self is constituted by and is in a continuous process of 
construction by exchange. Like everyone else, I develop by the 
process of giving and receiving in my interaction and encounter with 
others. In the process of giving myself to others I also receive input 
from them and it is in that process that I constitute myself and 
develop and grow. This process of exchange can be characterized 
                                                        
1 Zenon Bankowski 'Bringing the Outside in: The Ethical Life of legal Institutions' in T Gizbert-Studnicki and 






also as the process of encounter. Since it is with the other, an outside, 
that encounter will be unexpected and transformative. This process 
of mutual penetration whereby we develop and grow continues from 
the personal to the social and societal level.’
1
 
I agreed with the argument that freedom makes it possible for an individual to 
communicate with ‘the outside’. If a law tried to control the ‘exchange’ or 
communication between us and the outside, or ‘keeping others in distance’, the law 
as well as our freedom became a closed system—but freedom should never be a 
closed system in its formal sense (see previous discussion about freedom means 
absence of limits). In Bankowski’s discussion of the limits of freedom, he pointed out 
that the fear of exchange and communication further limited our freedom. We might 
not be selfish when we refused to communicate; but we might fear of the return of 
the uncertain consequences that might involve in communication. It was the fear of 
exchange that makes people act selfishly. People were scared of effects and the ways 
that would change and make them different. The reason we chose not to 
communicate might be that ‘we are happy in the worlds we inhabit and do not want 
to leave them.’
2
 When we started to communicate and interact with others, and with 
the law, the outside restrictions start to change; and through interaction we 
transformed the outside into the inside, and vice versa. Thus the supposed two closed 
and clear-cut categories of freedom and law started to have intersection. In an 
interactive theory, law was an essential element of our freedom. According to law we 
connected with people. Through communication and interaction we were truly in 
touch with each other and practice our freedom under the law.  
 
LIMITS OF FREEDOM AND LIMITED FREEDOM 
Man was born unfree and everywhere he was in chains. Oedipus made efforts 
to get off the chain of his fate but failed. He was born unfree. If there were a 
                                                        
1 Zenon Bankowski 'Bringing the Outside in: The Ethical Life of legal Institutions' in T Gizbert-Studnicki and 





destiny of everyone, everyone was unfree. If there were no destiny but plain fact 
of survival, a person was ‘free’, but this freedom was not different from other 
creatures ‘free’ status. It was not a conceptual freedom either because survival 
conditions objectively limited the content of ‘freedom’. Creatures were abided by 
the ‘natural rules’ of birth, growth, age, sickness and death. When we considered 
those ‘natural rules’ as destiny, a person could never be free in the sense of 
conceptual freedom. Destiny imprisons freedom because freedom supposed to be 
absence of any restrictions. If ‘destiny’ and ‘natural rules’ were ‘true’, the 
‘unlimited freedom’ should be ‘false’. 
If freedom was not referred to an objective fact which was in contrast with 
destiny and natural rules, but was a subjective feeling, could freedom be ‘true’? 
A person could claim that he felt free. His statement was the direct proof of his 
will. Freedom in this case could be ‘true’ if his statement reflected his feeling. 
Other external observers’ judgments of this person’s feeling would be more or 
less distant from his true feeling and thus became a bias. Therefore, the most 
credible proof was the person’s own judgment of his free or unfree status. 
However, if the person was imprisoned by any of his desires, his statement of 
freedom was not true because his will was not free. A teleological argument 
defended that a social being’s action was driven by desires. Utilitarianism further 
interpreted such desire or purpose as seeking happiness. The desire of seeking 
happiness was also justified as the principium of lawmaking. In this teleological 
perspective, a person was restricted by his desires. 
We could interpret the tragedy of Oedipus in two senses: objectively, 
Oedipus was not free because he was restricted by his destiny; furthermore, he 
was ‘subjectively’ unfree because of his desires to break up his destiny. The 
unfree Oedipus was tragic in both objective and subjective situation. He faced an 
ironic dilemma: when he was seeking for freedom, his desire for freedom limited 
his freedom in turn. Or in other words, subjective freedom became a restriction 
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of objective freedom.  
Wintgens noticed the difficulty of discussing freedom in epistemology so he 
admitted that the ‘meaning of freedom’ was different. He focused his argument 
on the objective free status. Here I attempt to extend the discussion of freedom 
by introducing the subjective freedom into the argument. Why would an 
objectively free person choose to enter into a political society, or in other words, 
an unfree status? If the ‘objective’ freedom was ‘good’, why did the subjects 
chose to enter into an unfree contract? Or if freedom was absence of any value 
like legisprudence supposed, i.e., it was not good or bad but a plain fact of no 
limitations, why should lawmaking (as a purposeful human activity) aim at this  
ultimate goal? The social contract theory attempted to answer those questions. It 
attempted to justify the moment when a freeman chose to be unfree. In 
legisprudence, Wintgens further attempted to connect the obligation (result of 
social contract) with freedom (the starting point and the goal of the contract), and 
to justify the obligation and social contract through freedom. His theory, in my 
opinion, highlighted two issues: first of all, obligation was temporary; and 
secondly, freedom as right was eternal. He thus proved that lawmaking should 
aim at the ultimate purpose of freedom. Law as the external limitations although 
supported temporary obligation was tolerable.  
Was the argument ‘freedom as the principium of legislation’ in 
legisprudence an objective description of a ‘future’ fact? If it referred to a future 
fact, did it mean that in the future the law and the state would eliminate, as one of 
the conclusions that classical Marxism held? We would notice that in classical 
Marxism, the law and the state were not value-free. They were necessary tools 
for class struggle and control. This recognition of law (law as a tool of control) 
was different from the precondition of lawmaking (law as a contract of freedom) 
in legisprudence. The latter did not attempt to picture or justify anarchism.  
‘Freedom as the principium of legislation’ implied a normative argument, or a 
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moral judgment: freedom was better than constraints.  
Constraints were everywhere in social activities. We were raised in family 
rules. We grew up in a society and should obey the society rules. We were abided 
by the state laws to keep our citizenships. Our status in the family, the society 
and the state restricted our ‘natural’ freedom. In this sense, social contract and 
law were limitations to freedom. When a natural being ‘entered into’ a society, he 
started an unfree life. From that moment on, freedom referred to the political and 
legal right to have free will and make free choice. It was no longer a ‘natural’ 
freedom, the one which was irrelevant to the goal of social communication and 
cooperation. Freedom in the society became an ‘artificial freedom’.  
Therefore, freedom of a natural being changed into the rights of freedom in 
the social contract. The contract was to settle down the rights and duties between 
a social being and the state, i.e., between an individual and the collective of other 
particular persons. In this perspective, an individual’s freedom was his 
compromise with the law which was supposed to represent the free will in the 
collective sense, i.e., the conception about freedom. Here we can see the 
apprehension that Wintgens reminded us, that the conception of freedom would 
be replaced by the conception about freedom. This argument disclosed the fact 
that in such a contract, an individual’s political or legal freedom was grounded 
on his free will as long as it was consistent with the collective’s consensus. This 
kind of free will was not free in nature. 
 
THE OPPOSITE OF FREEDOM 
 The political or legal freedom was limited freedom. We should not disregard 
our limited freedom though, because we spoke for ourselves through it. Although it 
was limited, the restrictions of freedom should be acceptable for us when we signed 
the social contract. Otherwise we were in slavery and the limited freedom became a 
fake freedom. As long as the limited freedom was approved by us when we signed 
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the contract, it could be a genuine freedom. In other words, it was our own decision 
to abandon some contents of ‘natural’ freedom and to accept the limited freedom. As 
analyzed earlier, the promissory estopple doctrine contributed to this legitimation. 
Here I would like to further develop the theory of legisprudence by arguing that the 
opposite of freedom was neither unfree in a conceptual sense, nor law as the external 
limitation, but status in realistic legal contexts. 
In political and legal freedom, the opposite of freedom was status. Or in 
other words, law and contract were reflections of freedom rather than restrictions 
of freedom. In Maine’s Ancient Law, status referred to the relation with the 
collective while contract related with individual free will. The essential nature of 
status was the subordinate relationship between an individual and his (family, 
ethical, religious, political, etc.) group. As long as the individual belonged to a 
group, he was not free. When the group was disassembled, individuals became 
independent. They subordinated to their own (separate and independent) wills 
only. ‘The movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from 
status to contract’
 
was a classical argument for the relationship between 
modernism and individualism.
1
 Since the traditional societies based on status 
transformed to the modern societies based on contracts, collectivism gave place 
to individualism accordingly. The movement from status to contract could also 
be interpreted as a shift from ‘collective morality’ to ‘individual freedom’. In this 
sense, the argument of ‘the movement from status to contract’ was the opposite 
of the argument that ‘the conception about freedom substituted the conception of 
freedom’. The latter argument implied that the collective will would be imposed 
to the individual. The former description, however, disclosed the rise of 
individualism in modern history.  
The movement from status to contract, however, should not be understood 
as an irreversible movement. In modern society, the (social) contract also 
                                                        
1 Henry Maine, Ancient Law, , published by John Murray, 1861,p.165. see last paragraph of Ancient Law, 




authorized new status of individuals. We would defend equality as a 




In ancient societies, individuals got their property through their status; while 
in modern societies, contracts authorized individual’s approaches to get the 
property. Contracts in modern society also established new status. Two parties of 
a contract were unequal: they had different economic status and information 
channels. When a social contract was concerned, an individual’s status was not 
the equal of the other party of the contract. When he was supposed to sign the 
contract with the society, he was either supposed to sign a contract with the 
particular majority or to sign a contract with the state (the state as a persona 
subject as the other side of the contract). Therefore, equality was absent when he 
signed the contract. The other party of the contract was much stronger than him. 
A defense could say that an individual was supposed to sign the contract with 
other equal individuals, a multiple-subject contract. However, we need a further 
debate about the equality of every human being of the multiple-subject contract 
in such a pure fictional situation  
Status was considered as the opposite of the contract in Ancient Law. 
However, status in modern societies could be changed. New status could be 
created by individual’s efforts, and was thus not the opposite of the contract. In 
this sense contract could authorize new status. Therefore status reflected the free 
will (represented by the contract) and was thus no longer a restriction of freedom. 
The contract could also protect the status of the least advantaged group. The 
recognition of status could help the weak to negotiate with the advantaged. If the 
realistic inequality of status was ignored, individuals would be put into a worse 
                                                        
1 As analyzed in chapters about Chinese lawmaking reality and its legitimation by Chinese Marxism and Chinese 
legalism, law established and differentiated status. An obvious example was that city folks’ status were 
pre-supposed to have more privileges than the status of peasants. In China, every city person could get allowance 
from government but peasants could depend on themselves exclusively. Law thus established different status to 
treat people differently.See also similar arguments by domestic famous scholars Shang Jiang and Guodong Xu, in 
Guodong Xu, 徐国栋 Humanistic Spirit of Civil Law, 民法的人文精神 Law Press, (2009), p.109. 
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situation. They would have to compete with those realistic powerful persons in a 
same arena, while the latter’s privileges were not restricted. Such equality 
ignoring different status or situation would lead to unfairness.  
When Maine wrote ‘the movement from status to contract’ in Ancient Law in 
the 19
th
 century, it was ironically the era for the trade union movement. It was 
the age of the first modern trade union law, the Trade Union Act of 1871. It also 
had a successful cooperative society paradigm: the Rochdele Society of 
Equitable Pioneer in 1844.
1
 Status in modern society was different from that of 
ancient societies. As stated in the Humanistic Spirit of Civil Law, ‘In the 19
th
 
century, people enjoyed a very short period of individualism right after the 
dissolution of guilds. They associated several unions and gained new 
contractual status to protect their interests and rights. Modern societies became 
a new status society. However, the status in modern society is essentially 
different from ancient societies. ’
2
 The new status of modern societies differed 
from the old in its source: modern contracts. Different from ancient status which 
was priori decided by others exclusively, modern status could be gained through 
individuals’ own efforts. The ancient status was a statistic and unchangeable 
fact while modern status was a dynamic and changeable fact. Status in ancient 
societies meant that an individual had no choice. The old status was thus a 
restriction to freedom. Modern status, however, could reflect the subject’s free 
will and could be a protection of his freedom. Therefore, the new status as the 
result of a ‘free will’ was reflected in the contract.  
 
A CHINESE CASE 
In the Chinese context, however, status was not a reflection of the free will. 
                                                        
1  About The Rochdale Pioneers see http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/brunel/A2764424; about trade union 
movement see Encyclopadia Britannica International Chinese Edition, Encyclopadia Britannica, Inc., (2007), 
vol.17, p.188. 
2 Guodong Xu, 徐国栋 Humanistic Spirit of Civil Law, 民法的人文精神 Law Press, (2009), p.126. 
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When I was writing this chapter, a piece of news caught my attention. A Chinese 
peasant Mr. Youde Yang built a fortress in his cultivated land to stop the ‘demolition 
workers’. He lit fireworks to frighten them off and in this way to safeguard his land 
and properties.
1
 Mr. Yang said that he was a peasant and his life was on his land. 
He would allow the demolition work if he got his compensation according to the 
law. But he was given no compensation and would lose his land soon, he had to 
steal and rob for survival. The law would punish him then. The demolition 
department did not offer him a negotiation arena but forced him to agree to the 
harsh terms. ‘I do not have any power of discourse.’ He said. He worried that if he 
did not safeguard his land, when his properties on the land were pulled down, and 
when his cultivated land was leveled by the bulldozer, he would lose evidence of his 
rights. He could not apply for any compensation then. ‘Did you try to sue them to 
the court?’ The reporter asked him. ‘I could not pay the costs of litigation as the 
plaintiff. I asked the demolition department to sue me instead. Then they should pay 
the cost first. I could not leave my land just in case they would pull down my house 
and confiscated my land. So I hope they sue me first and let the law give me the 
discourse arena. But they did not sue me, so I had to stay here to safeguard my land 
by myself.’ The reporter asked him whether he still believe in law, he replied yes: ‘I 
believe the law is good. After reading law I have my confidence to fight against 
them.’ The law, however, did not engage in the fights between Mr. Yang and the 
demolition department. Mr. Yang was still staying at his fortress to fight against the 
demolition workers’ ‘invasion’ that happened once a month.  
This case and a similar case that I discussed in chapter 2 (Ms. Fuzhen Tang’s 
case) showed that The Regulation Governing Building Demolition and Resettlement 
2001 (hereinafter the Regulation 2001 城市房屋拆迁管理条例) was in conflict 
with the Property Law and the Constitution. The legitimacy of this law was 
questionable. This law, however, was valid because it was made by the authority. 
                                                        
1 News from http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2010-06-09/044420438816.shtml. 
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According to the argument of a traditional legal positivism, people had to admit the 
validity of the Regulation 2001, although it was not a just law. According to the 
natural law theories, the Regulation 2001 was not a law at all because it violated 
basic rights including the right of living without interruption and the right of private 
ownership. Both positivism and the natural law theory simplified the problem in a 
degree. The Regulation 2001 was a valid legal basis or justification of official 
demolition. However, it injured particular individuals’ rights indeed. It should be 
changed or annulled according to just lawmaking procedures. Either way was not 
enough, to ignore the justice of the law or to ignore the validity of it. How to judge 
Mr. Yang’s self-protection behavior? His intention was to use fireworks to frighten 
the officials rather than to really hurt them. But his behavior endangered their lives 
and that was not right. If he gave up his self-protection, however, he would lose 
everything. Therefore it was not a kind suggestion that he should give up his last 
practical resistance. He was thus pushed into an impasse. 
Lawmaking may solve this dilemma and contribute to both the legitimacy of the 
law and the justification of Mr. Yang’s behaviors. The Regulation 2001 was not an 
appropriate law. But it was law and should be changed through formal procedures. 
The lawmaking procedure should offer a fair discourse arena for interested parties 
including Mr. Yang. In defense of non-interventionism, lawmaking was not necessary 
to Mr. Yang because he could execute his freedom through self-protection and in this 
way he could negotiate with the agent of demolition. The Regulation 2001 was an 
external limitation of Mr. Yang’s freedom of living (it was therefore a conception 
about freedom), Mr. Yang in this case did not give up his conception of freedom. 
Therefore his case was not a situation that ‘conceptions about freedom substitute 
conceptions of freedom’, so that we could not use directly the principles defended by 
legisprudence to justify the Regulation 2001 or other new lawmaking activities. 
When Mr. Yang was fighting against the official demolition, he was not only 
fighting against a hundred demolition workers directly but also the law. He was the 
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absolute minority in his defense. He was thus in the least disadvantage group. In the 
next chapter I will discuss the reason why his request should be involved into 
lawmaking, and how. What should be noticed here was that Mr. Yang’s case was a 
miniature of Chinese peasants’ experience. If Mr. Yang represented them, he 
represented the majority. The legitimacy of Regulation 2001 and the demolition 
official’s behavior could not be justified then. Mr. Yang therefore should have a right 
to question the justice of the law. When justice was absent, his resistance and 
self-protection should be forgivable. Most importantly, people should have the right 
to participate into the progress of changing old unreasonable regulations and creating 
new regulations.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Legisprudence started from the concept of freedom to justify lawmaking. It 
attempted to make freedom the ultimate purpose of lawmaking, and was thus related 
with morality and kept a distance from a pure positivistic tradition. It was an attempt 
to defend the objectivity of legitimation. Although I doubted the practicability of 
such a route in the Chinese context, I agree with the objectivity of lawmaking 
enterprise. I believe that modern lawmaking should aim at providing the public good 
rather than for private desires. If there were some values that lawmaking was aiming 
to, it must be applicable to the commons. However, as I criticized in the previous 
chapter, majority rule was not sufficient either because justice was not exclusively 
about numbers.  
If we connected Waldron’s majority rule with Wintgens’ freedom, we could 
have a new concept: freedom for the majority, i.e., liberty. Or it became what 
Bankowski had discussed in the relationship between the individual and the 
collective, ‘collective individual’: ‘there is no space between the individual and the 





 Professor Bankowski interpreted that ‘collective individual’ was 
discussed in a negative sense. It, however, was a realistic situation in China and was 
also justified by Chinese legalism and Chinese Marxism, as I analyzed previously in 
chapter four. Chinese theories attempted to justify the collective morality, or liberty 
rather than individual freedom or conceptual freedom. The collective sense of 
freedom, i.e., liberty in lawmaking should be justified through a just procedure. 
Otherwise individuals could not recognize what the collective morality was. Chinese 
legalism and Chinese Marxism therefore needed further amendments. Lawmaking 
should safeguard and substantiate participation. Justifications through political 
propaganda were not enough. People should be able to participate in the declared 
democratic lawmaking procedures.  
Since Mr. Youde Yang’s case became typical, and because more people executed 
their natural rights of self-defense, resistance and noncooperation, the discussion of 
civil disobedience became necessary.
2
 Different theories provided different answers 
to the topic of civil disobedience. In Waldron’s jurisprudence of legislation, the 
majority rule substituted the reason of action, and the representative democracy 
procedure was recognized just. Minority’s disobedience was hard to be justified in a 
procedural theory. Traditional positivism, although was persuasive in its discovery of 
the validity of law, did not soften the tension between free will and the external 
restrictions. In legisprudence, the tension between the free will and law was noticed, 
but their opposite status was over-stressed, and possibilities of connections or 
exchanges between them were less discussed. Freedom was deliberated as an 
exclusive individual-related concept so that it was not used in an interpretation of 
collective wills.  
Some laws were created from civil disobedience. Laws made through civil 
disobedience were not the external limitation of freedom. A law created from civil 
                                                        
1 Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, p.22.  
2 Theories of civil disobedience focus on the minority’s disobedience to the majority’s rule. About theories of 
civil disobedience, see J. Rawls, A Theory of Civil Disobedience, from The Philosophy of Law, R.M. Dworkin 
ed., Oxford University Press (1977), pp.89-112 
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disobedience could be a content of ‘the conception of freedom’. It was also a good 
example of a community’s practice of liberty. In Mr. Youde Yang’s case, suppose Mr. 
Yang and other peasants’ noncooperation finally led to a new lawmaking event. 
Suppose a new law was made to substitute the old law. The new law respected Mr. 
Yang’s requests and protected his private ownership. This new law was therefore 
consistent with his will. It was no longer an external restriction. The law became a 
reflection of freedom rather than the opposite of freedom.  
 
In these two chapters I discussed Western theories of lawmaking represented by 
four different legitimation routes. From my analysis we could see that 
communication per se was not necessary in Bentham’s consequentialist moral 
reasoning for lawmaking. If a non-communicative mode can provide utility, it could 
still be justified as an appropriate mode. Therefore the result rather than the process 
of communication in Benthamian legitimation was crucial. Hayek’s theory implied 
the justification of a communicative lawmaking mode, when the ‘spontaneously 
grew’ customary laws were included in the topic of lawmaking. However, in the 
Hayekian mode, the discourse between the official law and social rules was not 
necessary. The exchanges between the two systems of law were not discussed. Both 
Hayek and Waldron deliberated through categorical moral reasoning. Waldron 
pointed out the importance of disagreement during lawmaking and in this sense he 
stressed the dignity of dialogue per se. However, in his procedural theory of 
lawmaking, disagreements were over-valued, and the communication to achieve an 
agreement was not recognized. In my point of view, communication and agreement 
were also the significant content and supporting value of lawmaking. Wintgens 
employed freedom as the ultimate principle to justify democratic lawmaking. He 
contributed to a lawmaking theory in its discovery of the doctrine of promissory 
estopple in social contract, which was different from the arguments of Hayek and 
Waldron. However, as disclosed in this chapter, Wintgens tended to argue for 
 
 209 
‘distant’ and ‘non-interactive’ freedom. In this sense he implied that communication 
was impossible or unnecessary. In the next chapter I would further discuss the 





COMMUNICATIVE LAWMAKING IN CHINA 
 
——By and in himself a man can accomplish very little; he is 
like Robinson Crusoe on a desert island. It is only in society that a 







In this chapter I aim to discuss the possibility and necessity of a communicative 
lawmaking of China. The possibility of Chinese communicative lawmaking relies on 
the recognition and acceptance of Chinese communitarism or republicanism. 
Different from individualism and liberalism, Chinese law and philosophy were based 
on the idea that no one was isolated from others. Chinese people laid much stress on 
the individual’s status in a family, a community and a society.
2
 The status reflected a 
person’s cognition of himself. This cognition depended on his recognition of others 
and his relationship with others. Therefore, in Chinese ideology, independent and 
atomic individuals did not exist. 
                                                        
1 Hongyi Chen: On the top of the rule-of-law there should be a faith; according to which the respect of the value 
of human bengs should be the base of all laws.  
2 In Chinese philosophy, there were Three Cardinal Guides (三纲 ruler guides subject, father guides son and 
husband guides wife) and Five Constant Virtues (五常 benevolence, righteousness, propriety, knowledge and 
sincerity). They were all about a person’s status and relationship with others in the society. See also my 
discussion of Chinese humanism in chapter 3. 
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As a result, the communication in Chinese lawmaking was not mainly about the 
relationship between an individual and another individual, but between an individual 
and a community (society). In legisprudence Professor Wintgens rightly concluded 
that equality was an important principle for achieving freedom. We could also 
speculate that equality was the important pre-condition for communications in a 
liberalistic lawmaking. In an individual-prior lawmaking system, a social contract 
signed between individuals. The principle of equality made communication possible 
and fair in that system. In a community-prior system, however, a social contract 
meant an agreement signed between an individual and a community, the principle of 
equity was significant. The possibility and necessity of communicative lawmaking in 
China therefore depends on the clarification of the relationship between an individual 
and a community.  
 
NECESSITY OF COMMUNICATIVE LAWMAKING  
Communicative lawmaking is necessary for Chinese legal reform. Let me 
explain how my arguments in the previous chapters reach to this conclusion: I start 
from a dichotomous classification between non-communicative lawmaking and 
communicative lawmaking. This dichotomous relationship is designed to highlight 
the exclusiveness nature of non-interactive lawmaking. We should notice that 
neither the top-down nor bottom-up lawmaking mode is non-interactive unless it 
makes communication impossible. A top-down or bottom-up mode could be 
communicative in nature if they tolerate and absorb sources from their ‘external’. 
The top-down lawmaking mode, if welcomed sources of ‘the down’, could be a 
communicative mode. A bottom-up mode, if considered sources from the ‘up’, 
should also be recognized as communicative. Therefore I aim to argue against the 
non-interactive mode represented by Chinese lawmaking rather than the formal 
top-down mode.  
However, there exists an inseparable relationship between the Chinese top-down 
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mode and its non-communicative characteristic. The Chinese one-dimensional 
mode is different from another mode: a bottom-up but communicative lawmaking 
mode. In Western representative democratic theories the possibility of 
communication is embodied in the bottom-up lawmaking. Formal laws and laws 
from the society are not opposed to each other diametrically. One could influence 
and transform to the other. However, in China, hidden rules and laws from the 
society (laws from the bottom) could not compete with the official laws. The 
Chinese top-down mode in this sense is a non-interactive mode, and thus becomes 
the opposite of the communicative mode diametrically.  
Here I reach to the first conclusion: In China, the unidirectional lawmaking 
mode is the opposite of communicative lawmaking mode. (L1) We should notice that 
this proposition depends on Chinese contexts. I used empirical research basis to 
disclose the close connection between the Chinese top-down mode and its 
non-communicative nature. This proposition is proved in Chinese contexts, but not 
necessarily true in other contexts. 
Then a hypothetical syllogism could disclose the relationship between Chinese 
traditional non-communicative lawmaking and contemporary legal reform. Suppose 
the syllogism (I will explain that it is a valid but unsound argument) contains the 
following premises and the conclusion: (1) The non-communicative lawmaking is 
necessary for contemporary legal reform; (2) Contemporary legal reform is 
necessary for the increase of well-being and the protection of human rights; So, (3) 
non-communicative lawmaking is necessary for the increase of well-being and the 
protection of human rights. (L2) In this syllogism, if the first premise were true, the 
conclusion should be true because L2 is a valid syllogism. However, as I analyzed 
in the first four chapters, although the second premise is true, the conclusion is not 
true, therefore the first premise should be false. Therefore L2 is a valid but unsound 
argument. So, the non-communicative lawmaking is not necessary for contemporary 
legal reform (L3).   
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I thus come to the second conclusion: the non-communicative lawmaking is not 
necessary for contemporary legal reform in China. (L3) Combining L1 and L3, we 
have a disjunctive syllogism (L4): (1) Either non-communicative or communicative 
lawmaking mode is necessary for contemporary legal reform in China; (2) 
Non-communicative lawmaking is not necessary for contemporary legal reform in 
China; so, (3) communicative lawmaking mode is necessary for contemporary legal 
reform in China. I thus reach to my last conclusion: The communicative lawmaking is 
necessary for Chinese legal reform  
 
COMMUNICATION UNDER COMMUNITARIANISM 
We may recall Aristotle’s classical question that Bankowski reiterated in his 
argument for the exchange between law and love: how to living righteously. Living 
freely, or living under rules, which equaled living righteously? In the previous 
chapter, I discussed the liberalistic view of living lawfully proposed by Wintgens, 
which was based on the value of individual freedom. In this chapter, I would like to 
discuss another perspective represented by communitarianism, which was concerned 
as the pre-condition of Chinese philosophies and policies. As discussed in previous 
chapters, philosophers debated different pre-conditions. Waldron argued for the 
majority’s decision and was close to utilitarian liberalism; while Hayek and Wintgens 
tended to defend Kantian liberalism and individualism. Communitarianists objected 
to the assumptions of the above two liberalisms. The relationship between an 
individual and a community was well discussed in communitarianism. 
To bring communitarianism into focus, I want first to briefly review the Western 
line of argument. Since 1970s, the common assumptions of liberalism have been put 
into question by philosophers including Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Michael Sandel. Hegel philosophy noticeably influenced many of them, which was 
reflected in their insistence on the social character of humans and on the connections 
between morality and the customs of each society. Aristotle’s ideal of moral life was 
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absorbed into their arguments also, since many of these communitarian philosophers 
defend a conception of the good related to a teleological vision of human nature and 
reflected on a set of virtues.  
Communitarianists pointed out that liberals insufficiently appreciate the social 
nature of persons.
1
 Challenging the liberal stance on individualism and human rights, 
communitarians insisted that ‘we cannot justify political arrangements without 
reference to common purposes and ends, and that we cannot conceive our 
personhood without reference to our role as citizens, and as participants in a 
common life’.
2
 Based on this recognition of self-in-the-community, communitarians 
rejected rights-based liberalism in part because of their interpretation of the liberal 
approach to the self. In Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and in his criticism of 
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, Sandel argued that deontological liberalism 
misunderstood the nature of self because it deracinated persons from the 
community.
3
 Sandel said that the liberal view of freedom was ‘thin’ and ‘devoid of 
inherent meaning’.
4
 MacIntyre also argued that the liberal self was disembodied 
from ‘narrative history’ lacking ‘character’ and ‘social identity’.
5
 Communitarians 
thus stressed a ‘thick self’ conception that the self was not only constituted by society, 




Communitarianism as a school of Western philosophy was new to China. As an 
ethical thought, however, it rooted in Chinese predominant ideologies. In contrast to 
liberal and right-based morality, Chinese philosophies especially represented by 
Confucianism emphasized a person’s responsibilities to the community rather than 
his rights, and the virtues of caring and benevolence rather than freedom. A person in 
                                                        
1 See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1981. See also Michael 
Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, vol.12, (1984), pp.81-95. And 
Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
2 Michael Sandel ed., Liberalism and its critics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, (1984), p.5. 
3 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, New York: Cambridge University, Press, (1982), p.62. 
4 Ibid, p.175. 
5 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, (1981), esp. chap.6, ‘Some 
Consequences of the Failure of the Enlightment Project’. 
6 Ibid., p.172. 
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Chinese philosophy never stood up as a person-qua-autonomous-being, but in 
relationship with other persons and creatures and the nature (Tian Ren He Yi 天人合
一思想).1 Chinese philosophies gave priority to becoming a ‘good’ person (a 
responsible person) over being a right-claimer. Chinese communitarianism built a 
‘thick self’ conception of an individual since it emphasized the social contexts of a 
particular being. In contrast to the liberal concept of freedom (freedom as the 
absence of external limits), Chinese communitarianism focused on the ‘internal 
freedom’. It disagreed about the idea that more options and less interference brought 
up a genuine sense of freedom. One might fail to be free even if open options were 
provided unless one could overcome his inner constraints, i.e., to lower desires.
2
 To 
achieve genuine freedom, one had to overcome conflicts of desires, through 
self-mastery, self-government, self-cultivation and self-realization. Like Mencius 
said: 
‘There is nothing better for the nurturing of the heart than to reduce 
one’s desires. When a man has but few desires, even if there is anything 
he fails to retain in himself, it cannot be much; but when he has a great 
many desires, then even if there is anything he manages to retain in 
himself, it cannot be much.’
3
 
Mencius pointed out that the most important factor that prevented a person from 
being free was not external obstacles but internal ones. The self-overcoming of 
conflicting desires and the cultivation of character would naturally lead one to be free. 
In Chinese communitarianism, a person who possessed virtue was freer than a person 
who lacked it, in the sense that one would act out of one’s significant desires without 
frustration and internal conflicts. Otherwise, a person would become a slave of 
desires.  
                                                        
1 Chinese Tian Ren He Yi, may be literaterly translated as ‘oneness of heaven and man’. The origin of the 
thought of ‘Tian Ren He Yi’ came from Daohism. Literaturely the concept of Tian Ren He Yi expressed in Zhang 
Zai (张载), Zheng Meng (正蒙), ‘儒者则因明致诚，因诚致明，故‘天人合一’，致学而可以成圣，得天而
未始遗人，易所谓不遗、不流、不过者也’Zhang Zai, Wang Fu Zhi (commentary), Zhang Zi Zheng Meng, (张
载撰， 王夫之注，张子正蒙), Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House (上海古籍出版社), (2000), p.239. 
2  Confucians maintained that genuine freedom could be achieved not by securing more options but by 
overcoming one’s lower desires while spontaneously and intentionally internalizing community norms. Analects 
II. 
3 Mencius, Meng Zi, Jin Xin Zhang Ju II, 35, Zhu Hai Publishing House, (2002), p.215 
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Therefore in Chinese communitarianism, the self was related to others, the 
outside, with the other creatures and nature. A person was not an atomic being, but 
connected to the community. The purpose of life contained the self-realization, in his 
contact with others. One should become a person of excellence (Jun Zi 君子), and a 
person of love (Ren Ren 仁人), but first of all he should live in a community. A man 
was a social being. The value of life and self-realization connected with a person’s 
responsibility to his community. Self-realization for the community-being was not 
about achieving non-disturbance or non-interference from others, but maintaining 
harmonious relationships with other members in the community. 
In this perspective, a community was not the means but the end. The community 
was more than a factual existence. It was an ideal life style. A community in Chinese 
communitarianism should be a ‘good’ community, the one that helped its members to 
achieve their personal goals. In a liberal perspective, as a contrast, an individual’s 
right was the premise of the good life and therefore the community was the means 
rather than the end. The group right or the justice of the community was less 
important than the right of an individual in this line of argument. Another extreme 
argument was to reduce the individual right to the community good. As discussed 
previously in Chinese lawmaking reality and problems, I pointed out that a fault of 
Chinese lawmaking was that it ignored individual’s rights and took the individual as 
the means rather than as the end. I believe that both the individual and the 
community should be the end of an ideal life. None of them should be reduced to as 
the means.  
Is communication under communitarianism possible? To answer this question 
we need to discover the relationship between an individual and the community that 
he belongs to. The relationship between the individual and the community in 
communitarianism highlighted the individual’s submission, responsibility and 
sacrifice to the community. It was not much about the right but virtue. In 
communitarianism, the communication thus happened generally between an absolute 
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minority (the one) and the absolute majority (the others; or the community). Without 
virtue, or without the majority’s benevolence, the communication was impossible 
since the two parties of communication were too unequal.  
The possibility of communication was different in liberalism. For liberals, the 
purpose of law was to prevent individuals from harming each other. The purpose of 
morality was to secure options in action and choice by securing a maximum degree 
of non-interference. Therefore as long as one did not inflict harm on others, and one 
did not violate the rights of others, one might do whatever one wanted. We thus saw 
an interesting phenomenon that communication was not necessary in this perspective. 
However, what was lacking in liberalism here was a vision of a good or virtuous life. 
Communitarianism, as a contrast, required that one should benefit others by 
overcoming one’s own selfish desires. Both the liberalism and communitarianism 
might cause bad results. Extreme liberalism would lead to anarchism since it cut the 
necessary connections between a social being and the society; while extreme 
communitarianism would lead to authoritarianism because it tended to change the 
individual’s purpose of a good life into blind submission. In an ideal liberalism or 
communitarianism, we need a coordination of rights and virtues. In the ideal 
communitarianism, communication was possible because there was ‘right’ to protect 
individuals and to restrict tyranny of the majority, and there was ‘virtue’ to promote a 
constructive dialogues between them.    
 
SOCIAL CONTRACT IN COMMUNITARIANISM 
Chinese lawmaking is based on communitarianism. In communitarianism, a 
social contract presupposed the legitimacy of the social contract between a subject 
and a community, and was less concerned with the content of the contract. The 
‘improved social contract’ that proposed by legisprudence started from the free will 
of an individual. Chinese social contract theory started from the ‘will’ of the 
community. These two kinds of social contract theory led to different routes of 
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legitimation. In Chinese ideology, the community’s good was a priority consideration. 
It put the collective morality over individual freedom. The collective good and its 
relation with law were what justifications or legitimations about. It was also a 
utilitarian perspective, in which security and order of the community should be the 
criterion of the validity of law. Freedom and the violation of it were not vital in this 
kind of social contract, as long as the community’s good could be ensured. In this 
sense, the doctrine promissory estoppel could justify either a free or unfree contract 
as long as the promisor keeps his words. 
Therefore we need another doctrine besides promissory estoppel, which is 
Culpa in Contrahendo.
1
 It was about the liabilities for wrongs in conclusion of 
contract and fault in the negotiation process. Relying on the doctrine Culpa in 
Contrahendo, people would be able to escape from the rigid principle promissory 
estoppel, especially when the content of the social contract was no longer just. In a 
social contract that the individual’s good was a priority consideration, freedom and 
right were justified apriori. Therefore if the nation made laws against the original 
purpose of protecting individuals’ freedom and right, for instance, arbitrarily 
increasing taxes, those laws needed ex post justifications. Legisprudence provided 
four principles to support the doctrine promissory estoppel. The doctrine Culpa in 
Contrahendo offered another route to solve the problem. As we know in a contract 
theory, wrongs in conclusion of contract and the breach of the contract could cause 
the contract void, and when a contract became void it could be cancelled. It meant 
that if a contract was made against a person’s good/will/interests, this person (rather 
than the other side of the contract) could claim that he would not be abided by the 
                                                        
1 Culpa in Contrahendo, can be briefly summarized as follows: a party who, through culpable conduct, prevents 
a contract from being formed or causes the contract to be invalid, should be liable for damages suffered by the 
innocent party who relied on the validity of the forthcoming contract. Culpa in contrahendo doctrine has strong 
influence in civil law countries especially Germany and Italy. The doctrine was firstly stated by Rudolf von 
Jhering in his 4 Jahbrucher Fur Die Dogmatik Des Heutigen Romischen Un Deutschen Privatrechts I (1861) 
reprinted in I von Jhering, Gesammelte Aufsatze 327 (1881). See also Bao Anh Thai, Culpa in Contrahendo In 
English Law, 
http://www.baolawfirm.com.vn/dmdocuments/Culpa%20in%20contrahendo%20in%20English%20Law.pdf; see 




contract because it was void.  
Under the doctrine Culpa in Contrahendo, the individual could take the official 
justification of law in consideration; or simply ignore it. He could make a 
complementary announcement further, that whether the social contract was still 
binding. He could choose whether to sign a new contract or re-sign the old one. 
Therefore, it was not about the justification of laws, but the justification of the 
validity of a social contract. If Culpa in Contrahendo was employed, the person 
(rather than the collective, the nation, or the society) could have freedom to admit or 
refuse the justification when the contract was already void. The question of the 
legitimacy of law was therefore transformed into the legitimacy of lawmaking. It 
would be a question of re-confirming the validity of the old (social) contract.  
Therefore, the doctrine Culpa in Contrahendo stressed the appropriate content 
of the contract and the default responsibilities that an ideal contract should include, 
apart from an agreement (or a promise). The agreement or the promise was the 
formal condition, while the content and the default responsibilities were the 
substantial conditions. The binding force of a contract should exist when both of the 
two parties kept their own commitments to the contract. If one party broke the 
contract, the other should have the right to ask for compensation from the 
wrong-doers. The innocent party should reserve a right of cancellation of the contract. 
To apply the doctrine promissory estoppel strictly exclusively would be unfair in this 
situation because it provided no compensation for default, but required a blind 
obedience to law.  
We may argue that the subject did not consent to the content of the contract if it 
were against his free will.
1
 However, this argument would lead to a situation that we 
were not picking up or recover the infringed freedom, but maintaining the situation 
(the four justifications provided by Wintgens in legisprudence were to justify the 
reasons for letting the external limitations dominate the internal one, i.e., why should 
                                                        
1 For example, four principles were discovered to offer justifications in this situation in legisprudence. 
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law substitute freedom). The doctrine promissory estoppel was re-discovered in 
legisprudence. The offer and acceptance of the contract was the starting point of the 
legitimation chain of legisprudence. It was important for the contractor to keep their 
promises. However, the content and the purpose of the contract should also be taken 
in the consideration of legitimacy. The doctrine Culpa in Contrahendo was also 
important. A person would not accept an unfair contract if he had a choice to cancel it. 
If he, however, were born in a society where an unfair legal system were already 
there, under the doctrine promissory estoppel, he could not rectify the content of it 
but to accept the official legitimacy. The only choice for him to preserve his natural 
freedom was then to leave the community.  
‘Take it, or leave it’ was the only freedom a person had in such a situation. He 
had no right or freedom of resisting or changing any contents of the supposed social 
contract. The contents of the social contract were not really negotiable. It therefore 
did not constitute a real agreement that required by a common contract. It was not 
really a free contract at all. Is it possible for a social contract theory to cover these 
topics: liabilities for wrongs in conclusion of contract and fault in the negotiation 
process, i.e., culpa in contrahendo, and other remedies of contract in relation to 
pre-contractual liability, or tort of fraud, or deceit such as misrepresentation, mistake 
and unjust enrichment? I believe those topics should be included into a social 
contract theory. The principle of good faith and the duty of best efforts, the concepts 
of course of dealing and performance, the usage of trade and reasonableness, all 
these conceptions of contract law could be introduced into the social contract theory.
1
 
Lawmakers’ legislative activities were therefore not priori legitimate by the offer and 
acceptance of the contract. The content of the social contract was also important and 
it should be negotiable. The remedies of contract in relation to Culpa in Contrahendo 
or pre-contractual liability could make up for the deficiency of the doctrine 
promissory estoppel. 
                                                        
1 About contract theory and social contract theory, see also 日田贵（Japanese）, QiYue De ZaiSheng (the Revival 
of the Contract), China Legal Publishing House, 2005, p.137.  
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As discussed earlier, in an ideal communitarian social contract, both right and 
virtue are important. The virtue of the community and that of the individual has equal 
importance. The virtue of the community relies on the realization of individual’s 
wellbeing and the community’s good. The virtue of the individual requires him to 
live righteously for himself and for the community. The goal of the community and 
that of the individual should aim at a same direction rather than in conflicts. ‘They 
are in a same direction’ does not mean that ‘they are one thing’. The community’s 
goal and the individual’s purpose can be different but they should not be conflicts. 
Culpa in Contrahendo in an ideal communitarian social contract therefore requires 
that the community should value individual’s rights rather than sacrifice the 
individual for the community. Therefore we need to differentiate an individual’s 
freedom and the collective’s liberty. This differentiation is helpful for us to further 




FREEDOM, LIBERTY AND LAW 
Firstly let us recall the concepts of freedom and law that discussed in 
legisprudence. Formal logic was employed in legisprudence to define freedom and 
law: ‘freedom unlimited logically includes the absence of any limitation’.
1
 ‘[T]he 
concept of freedom allows any action’.
2
 ‘[A]ny rule of the sovereign is an external 
limitation of freedom’.
3









Wintgens noticed that it was unprofitable to discuss ‘freedom unlimited’ in a 
legal society. He stated that ‘freedom unlimited is only a concept’ and must be 
supplemented by a concretization, i.e., a ‘conception’.
4
 Therefore the conceptions of 
freedom (cof) and conceptions about freedom (caf) in his definition were both 
limited freedom. None of them excluded the interference of law. In other words, the 
two conceptions (cof and caf) were homogenous in nature (both of them were limited 
freedom).  
cof and caf were different in the definition: the conceptions of freedom were the 
internal limitations of a person; while the conceptions about freedom were the 
                                                        
1 Luc J. Wintgens, Legitimacy and Legimation from the Legisprudential Perspective, in Legislation in Context: 
Essays in Legisprudence, Ashgate Publishing Limited, (2007), p.23. 
2 Wintgens ed., The Theory and Practice of Legislation—Essays in Legisprudence, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
(2005), p.7. 
3 ibid., p.10. 
4 ibid., p.7. 
Freedom unlimited (S) is the absence of any limitation (M) 
Law (P) is a limitation (M) 




external limitations that were imposed by the sovereign. Therefore they were 
supposed to have no intersections in the definition. However, I discover that the 
relationship between the two conceptions could be more complex (see figure 7.2):  
 
Logically, when they are equal in extension:  
A. cof=caf; or, 
B. cof≠caf;  
Or when they have different extension: 
C. cof ⊃caf (when cof had the broader intension than caf);  
D. cof ⊂caf (when cof had the narrower intension than caf).  
 
 
In legisprudence only situation B was considered, i.e., when the extension of 
two conceptions were equal plus their intension were just opposite to each other (cof
≠caf). In a reply to legisprudence, an interesting question was proposed but not 
elaborated. It was about the situation that in homogeneous cultural groups members 
shared a conception of freedom (Perju, 2009).
1
 This question was about the situation 
A, when the intension and extension of the two conceptions were equal, i.e., cof=caf. 
                                                        
1 Vlad Perju, A Comment on Legisprudence, 89 B.U.L. Rev. 428, (2009), n.8. 
 










Legisprudence excluded discussion about situation A, when the two conceptions 
were exactly equal in extension and intension. In my point of view, the definition of 
caf and cof in legisprudence also neglected the other two possible situations, when 
the extensions of cof and caf were not the same (situations C and D in fig. 7.2). 
Let us suppose that the unlimited freedom of speech meant absence of any 
limitation on speech. A person in a community, however, had to be restrained by 
conventional, cultural, moral, legal rules and other limitations when exercising his 
freedom of speech. Suppose: legal rules were what conceptions about freedom (caf) 
about, while the other factors referred to conceptions of freedom (cof). Let us 
suppose in this community the vocal insult to the sovereign was a crime. If a person 
respected the sovereign sincerely and felt guilty of insulting it, then to him cof equals 
caf (that is situation A). In this situation, caf although was an external limitation, was 
not really against his own conception of freedom. If, however, there were another 
person who hated the sovereign and felt happy of insulting it, then to him it was the 
situation B: cof≠caf. In this situation, caf became a real limitation of freedom. Caf 
became a reason of restricting his temptation of exercising his cof, i.e., insulting the 
sovereign.  
Or if the person did not mean to abuse the sovereign but he spoke of its name 
directly—he thought he was acting according to his cof, but the community’s law 
regulated further in details that directly speaking of the sovereign’s name was also an 
insult. Then in this occasion, the intension of the person’s conception of freedom was 
broader than that of the sovereign, i.e., cof ⊃caf (C). On the contrary, if a person 
believed that speaking of the sovereign was an insult to the sovereign, but the law 
punished negative criticisms only, then the subject’s conception of freedom was 
narrower than the law, i.e., cof ⊂caf (D). 
In situations A and D, the subject’s own conceptions (the internal limitations) 
coincide with law or stricter than the law, therefore the supposed external limitations 
were not really extra limitations. Only in situations B and C the problem of 
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justification of legitimacy existed. In situations B and C, the caf added extra 
responsibilities to the person. In these situations he should abandon his own cof and 
act according to caf. The first principle of legisprudence, the principle of alternativity 
(PA) was a justification of external limitations of freedom.
1
 PA was exactly 
necessary for situations B and C. In the above four different situations (see figure 
7.2), situations A and D were not covered by principle of alternativity (PA). In other 
words, PA was not necessary for them, although a person’s morality was prior to law 
in situations A and D. The justification of external limitations (PA) was needed in 










The above premise, i.e., morality should have a priority over law, needed a 
further justification. The justification could be that freedom should be the starting 
point of action and should be taken as the principium of a political organization, as 
defended by Wintgens. But the justification could be considered in two different 
ways: the specified way or the nonfigurative way. In the specified perspective, every 
lawmaking activity should be legitimate. Therefore the justification or the 
legitimation should apply to each and every law. On the contrary, in the nonfigurative 
perspective, legitimation was applied to the whole lawmaking system. It did not 
require a justification of a law’s specific content or the justice of an activity.  
                                                        
1 Wintgens, Freedom and Legisprudence—a More Substantial View: a Reply to Professor Perju, Boston 
University Law Review, vol.89, (2009), p.1795. 
Morality should have a priority over law 
If not, a justification (PA) is needed 
In some situations (B and C) law is prior to morality 




This premise (morality should have a priority over law) could be an 
‘indisputable’ starting point of a theory, which could avoid further examination. Or it 
could be examined as a true or false statement. I believe that Professor Wintgens 
employed the former way of deduction. Therefore it was sufficient to support his 
argument for freedom. From another perspective, when we consider the facticity of 
the argument, the conclusion could be different. Morality was not always prior to law. 
A differentiation between freedom and liberty was thus useful for a consideration of 
the facticity of this proposition.
1
  
Let us suppose we were talking about an individual’s conception of freedom 
(hereinafter icof), not his conceptions about freedom (hereinafter icaf). They both 
were different from the collective morality (the collective conceptions of freedom, 
hereinafter ccof) or law (the collective conceptions about freedom, hereinafter caf). 
Based on my previous discussion about the relationship between cof and caf that 
showed in figure 7.2, we could see that four basic different logical relationships were 
possible between icof and ccof:  
when they were equal in the extension, icof=ccof, or icof≠ccof; or when they 
were not equal in the extension and the intension of icof was broader than ccof, icof 
⊃ccof. Or on the contrary, when the intension of icof was narrower than ccof, icof⊂
ccof. When law (caf) was added, the results of the three (icof, ccof and caf) were 
more complex (see figure 7.4): 
                                                        
1 About the differentiation between freedom and liberty, see also Hanna F. Pitkin, Are Freedom and Liberty 
Twins, Political Theory, vol. 16, no.4, 1988, cited from Ying Qi ed., A Third Concept of Liberty, Dongfang 
Publishing House, 2006, p.312-345. Freedom in Hanna’s definition is ‘personal liberties’, ‘private liberties’ and 
‘negative liberties’. In this thesis I also use this differentiation between liberty and freedom, to discuss the 
relationship between an individual’s cognition of freedom and a collective consciousness or unconsciousness. 
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Therefore here were at least twenty-eight possible relationships among an 
individual’s conception (icof), collective morality (ccof) and law (caf).
1
 When the 
proposition ‘morality should be prior to law’ referred to individual morality, only in 
the section (a1) did a person’s conception of freedom coincident with the collective 
morality, or in (b2) had it been covered by the collective morality. Therefore in (a1ii), 
(a1iii), (b2ii) and (b2iii), law needed justifications (like PA in legisprudence) because 
law was against morality or had narrower intension than morality. In other situations, 
especially when the individual freedom was against or broader than the collective 
morality, plus the collective morality was coincident with or stricter than law, an 
                                                        
1 In the above 16 possibilities, 12 of them were certain, 4 of them were not certain (b1ii, b1iii, b2ii and b2iv) and 
led to another 16 possibilities, therefore 12+16=28 possibilities in total. 
A.When icof and ccof had equal extension: 
(a1)When icof=ccof, there were four results: 
(a1i) icof(=ccof)=caf;  
(a1ii) icof(=ccof)≠caf;  
(a1iii) icof(=ccof ) ⊃caf;  
or, (a1iv) icof(=ccof) ⊂caf. 
 
(a2)When icof≠ccof, there were four results: 
(a2i) icof=caf but ccof≠caf;  
(a2ii) icof≠caf but ccof=caf; 
(a2iii) icof⊃caf but ccof⊂caf;  
or, (a2iv) icof⊂caf but ccof⊃caf. 
 
B.When icof and ccof did not equal in extension: 
(b1) When icof⊃ccof: 
(b1i) icof=caf, ccof⊂caf;  
(b1ii) icof≠caf, ccof?caf (? Means:in this situation, the relationship between ccof and caf are not 
certain; it means all these following four results are possible: ccof=caf; ccof≠caf; ccof⊃caf; or ccof⊂caf); 
(b1iii) icof⊃caf, ccof?caf;  
or, (b1iv) icof⊂caf, ccof⊂caf 
 
(b2) when icof<ccof: 
(b2i) icof=caf, ccof⊃caf;  
(b2ii) icof≠caf, ccof?caf;  
(b2iii) icof⊃caf,ccof⊃caf;  




individual’s morality should not necessarily be prior to law, as (a2ii) or (a2iii) 
showed.  
We should differentiate collective morality (ccof) from law (caf). A person’s 
own conception was an internal limitation. Collective morality, when coincident with 
his conception, could be regarded as an internal limitation. When it was not, it was an 
external limitation. If ‘morality should prior to law’ meant a person’s own 
conceptions of freedom (icof) should prior to law (caf), it would be difficult to justify 
itself (icof) when the collective morality (ccof) was coincident with law (caf), or even 
stricter than law, as (a2ii) or (a2iii) showed. The proposition therefore needed another 
supporting argument: An individual’s morality (icof) should be prior to collective 
morality (ccof); or freedom should be prior to liberty.  
The argument ‘freedom should be prior to liberty’ therefore would face 
difficulties in defending the rationality of the existence of a community. An 
extremely self-centered person would not agree with the commitment to respecting 
other persons’ opinions and wills. If this person intended to take the convenience of 
the community but rejected inconvenient aspects (for example, other persons’ 
conceptions of freedom), other self-centered persons or the community would not 
welcome him. From a radical liberalistic view, this person would not want to join the 
community because entering the society required him to abandon his freedom from 
the beginning. From a utilitarian communitarianism perspective the collective 
morality should be prior to an individual’s freedom because the society should aim at 
the greatest happiness for the greatest number (rather than the individual).  
The differentiation between freedom and liberty was used here to reflect the 
relationship between the individual and the collective. In a society that individuals 
were supposed to be atomistic units gathering together, each atomistic individual had 
to give up some of its autonomy in order to enter into the society. But as Professor 
Bankowski pointed out, which I agree, and which was also a reflection of the 
Chinese legal system and modern social contracts, an individual was born in a 
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society, where his autonomy was defined and influenced greatly by the society in the 
first place.
1
 The atomistic individual was ‘shaped’ by the society, so that he was not 
came exclusively from the outside of a society— 
‘Thus one cannot think, as in the first case, of his giving up something 
that was previously his and his alone…the individual is viewed not as 
sovereign but as part of the community and it is that 
person-in-the-community that must take into account when working out a 
solution. The fact that I want (or don’t want) something is never 
perceived as the final determining factor.’
2
 
The content of icof and ccof were not identical, therefore the reductive 
proposition that ccof dominated icof was insufficient. More problems appeared: 
When law (caf) was in line with the individual’s conception of freedom (icof), but 
was in conflict with the collective conceptions (i.e., when icof ⊂caf, plus icof≠ccof), 
like situations a2i, a2iv, b2i and farfetched b1iv and b2iv showed in figure 6.4, was 
the law still just? Was the law legitimate? Did such law need justifications? 
Principles debated in legisprudence were unable to answer these questions since they 
focused on the situation when icof⊃caf but ignored the relationships between icof 
and ccof. They did not differentiate various situations a1iii, a2iii, b1iii and b2iii that 
were supposed here in figure 7.4. 
To interpret the possibility of the coincidence of an individual’s conception (icof) 
and the majorities’ (ccof) and their conflicts with the law (caf) further, i.e., a 
possibility that legisprudence did not refer to (icof=ccof≠caf), I would like to use an 
example of the reform that happened in 1990s in China to defend my argument. It 
was about conceptions of ‘private property’.
 3
 Before 1990s, most Chinese including 
me believed that private property was the origin of inequality. This belief was 
formulated since our primary school education about the legitimacy of the socialist 
                                                        
1 Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, p.19. 
2 Ibid. 
3 In China, there is a differentiation between ‘private property’ and ‘public property’. As professor Bankowski 
noticed, it is ‘a vocabulary of the old communist law’. At the same time we should notice that in ancient China, 
all the property belonged to the Emperor but the property was at the same time ‘public property’ because the 
Emperor belonged to the public. Not until the Spring and Autume period, did the private ownership of land 
appear and be admitted. Law was then seemed as the tools for the public rather for the private. Different from the 
Western property concept, in the beginning property was not ‘private’ to the public in China: ‘普天之下，莫非王
土’ (《 诗经.小雅.谷风之什.北山》), about 600 B.C., Shijing, Xiaoya (Gufeng Zhi Shi, Beishan). 
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public ownership. Personally, I did not think it was questionable although at that time 
I did not read the famous theme wrote by Rousseau in his Discourse on the Origin 
and Basis of Inequality among Men.  
My own conception on freedom of possession (icof) was identical with the (old) 
constitution (caf) and the collective conception (ccof). The law said any property 
belonged to the country; the country belonged to the people; thus any property 
belonged to the people. I was very proud of this conception of rights of property and 
satisfied with my right of proportionate possession of the country. Later, however, I 
felt confused, because in the late 1990s the law suddenly changed and it supported 
the transformation of state-owned enterprises to private companies. More than 
twenty-one millions of workers were laid-off from state-owned enterprises and faced 
difficulties in livelihood because of the transformation.
1
 Law was changed to 
persuade us to accept the conception of limited private property (without clarifying 
which groups of the people in society should gain this brand new privilege first).  
The new law (caf) was thus in conflict with my own conception (icof) and 
conceptions of most people (ccof; please notice that our conceptions were greatly 
influenced and formed by the old law). But the new law became valid without 
consent of the people since it already gained the consent of the lawmakers (please 
also understand that the referendum never existed or happened in Chinese history). In 
legisprudence, the new law as the external limitation needed justifications from four 
principles, PA, PN, PT or PC.
2
 None of them, however, could justify the legitimacy 
of the new law, since firstly it was not happened because of ineffective social 
interaction but because of few lawmakers’ decisions (therefore PA failed to justify it); 
secondly it was not consistent with the constitution (the constitution was changed 
later; therefore PN failed to justify it); thirdly it had no historical roots in China 
                                                        
1 According to the report of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security 2000, from 1998 to 2000, there were 
21,370,000 workers became laid-off. See Chang Kai, the Right to Work and its Realization in the Market 
Economy 常凯 论市场经济下劳动就业权的性质及其实现方式——兼论就业方式转变中的劳动就业权保障, 
China Labor, (2004), vol.6, pp.4-9.  




(therefore PT failed to justify it); and fourthly it was not harmonious with the legal 
system; the legal system changed accordingly afterwards (finally PC failed to justify 
it). The four principles all failed in interpreting this Chinese lawmaking. But if we 
simply denied the legality or legitimacy of this law, we ignored the reality: It was 
lawful because the law was passed by the authority and people tolerated this fact. 
Positivism might interpret the validity of law in this case. The conception of freedom 
or individual freedom, however, could not interpret the legitimacy of the new law.  
To interpret the legitimacy of this new law, we need to hold a dynamic 
perspective of lawmaking. The strict opposition between law and freedom needs to 
be softened. Different from a pure logical definition of freedom, Bankowski’s 
argument of law and love discloses an exchangeable relationship between law and 
freedom: law could fulfill freedom, and vice versa. ‘Law and going beyond it are 
inseparable and, …in breaking the law you are fulfilling the law. Truly to follow the 
law implies being able to break it and recreate it anew-in breaking the law you are 
following it’.
1
 In this line of argument, both freedom and restrictions were the base 
of law and lawmaking. Law and freedom were not the opposite of each other. They 
were connected by a reciprocal transformation. 
Bankowski’s theory of the relationship between law and love disclosed the 
relationship between heteronomy and autonomy. It could be used to interpret the 
relationship between right and virtue, and the relationship between freedom and 
liberty in communitarianism. Law was not exclusively about heteronomy; the love of 
law, or the purpose ‘living lawfully’ embedded the requirement of autonomy. Unlike 
freedom in legisprudence which emphasized philosophic autonomy from a formal 
logical perspective, Bankowski described the meaning of freedom (as a combine of 
heteronomy and autonomy) in practical reasoning: ‘[T]he tension between 
heteronomy and autonomy is part of the grammar of practical reasoning and an 
underlying premise of social organization and institutional design-accepting that is 
                                                        
1 Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, p.10. 
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the way forward. That, …is what gives our lives and our institutions integrity and 
unity’.
1
 Both law and love should reflect heteronomy and autonomy. Liberty should 
be a combination of heteronomy and autonomy.  
Lawmaking should reflect both the heteronomy and autonomy. It would be 
partially true if autonomy was exclusively stressed. It would be bias also when a 
compulsory theory neglected the autonomy. Communications and discourses could 
be one of the approaches (if not the only one) to contribute to the articulation of 
autonomy and heteronomy in lawmaking. Unlike contemporary legitimation theses 
in Chinese politics, traditional Chinese legalism, or non-negotiable social contract, a 
discourse thesis would re-emphasize an idea that it was us (people in a real 
democratic legal system rather than hypothetical rational beings in a state of nature 
or behind a veil of ignorance) who could make and change the rules. At the same 
time we (in this realistic context) promised to be abided by them. On the one hand, 
the subjectivity of creating rules should not be substituted by rules—the demand for 
autonomy. On the other hand, we should make a promise to live under the rules—the 
demand for heteronomy. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Communicative lawmaking in China should absorb Western lawmaking ideas 
and experiences, but most importantly it should emphasize the communication 
between the individual and the community within the system. China has a long 
history of communitarianism that the collective interests or the group rights were 
prior to individual’s rights. Chinese lawmaking theories highlighted ‘order’ and 
‘public good’ as the supporting values. It appeared to be the opposite of a liberal 
theory of lawmaking based on freedom. However, Chinese lawmaking might slide 
into a totalitarian justification; therefore I believe that an ideal communication in 
communitarianism should admit the value of right and virtue. When the community 




ignores or sacrifices some members’ rights, the minority can rectify the social 
contract based on the doctrine culpa in contrahendo. An individual’s right and virtue 
should not be detached from that of the community. A free individual and a liberal 




RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT  
 
 
In this thesis I discussed and criticized different legitimation for lawmaking, 
including ancient and contemporary Chinese theories, as well as Western 
representative perspectives on lawmaking. From my previous discussion we saw 
that the reality and popular theories of lawmaking in China were not for 
communicative lawmaking and did not provide mechanisms to build dialogues 
between the top (the legislature, the Party and the rich persons) and the down 
(common people). I also disclosed the links between contemporary justifications of 
collective lawmaking and the essential topics of Chinese legalism. I focused on the 
origin of Chinese top-down lawmaking model: Chinese legalism. Chinese legalism 
was a historic school arguing against Confucianism in its hypothesis of human 
nature. It denied the necessity of ‘loving’ people but focused on punishments. In 
Chinese legalism people were in nature ‘bad’ so that it was better to use harsh 
punishments to control them. In such an instrumentalist philosophy and its political 
design, rights and freedom for individuals were not important.  
I attempted to introduce a communicative structure of lawmaking to balance 
individual rights and state interests, by arguing for a system that individuals’ voice 
could be heard and paid attention to. This structure would go against the grain of the 
traditional top-down legislation that was defended in Chinese theories. I turned to 
Western theories for help. Western theories of lawmaking including Benthamian 
utilitarian lawmaking, Hayekian liberalistic lawmaking, Waldronian democratic 
lawmaking and Wintgensian freedom-priority lawmaking could contribute to 
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Chinese future legal reform.  
However, they would also face difficulties in solving realistic problems in China. 
Utilitarian lawmaking was close to Chinese legalism and Chinese official 
justifications. Its ignorance of the least advantage group, or the persons in the worse 
situation should be criticized. Hayekian liberal lawmaking although stressed the 
necessity of recognition of customary laws, or laws came from the society and from 
common people rather than from official laws, did not say much about the possibility 
of communications between these two kinds of laws, the official law and the laws of 
the society. Waldron re-discovered the dignity of representative democracy, but as 
criticized by Bankowski, which I also agree, he overlooked that democracy was more 
than representation. In cases relating to basic human rights and freedom, the majority 
voting might be against humanity and should not be a sole principle of justice. 
Freedom as the ultimate goal of lawmaking in Wintgens’ theory could contribute to 
Chinese legal reform. But it should be applied cautiously also since it was against 
Chinese dominant ideology for the collective good.  
After my introduction and analysis of these theories, I attempted to escape from 
pure theoretic discussion about law and legality, and try to provide a practical 
application of communicative lawmaking in China. I believe that the top-down 
lawmaking mode in China was insufficient in its justifications for legitimacy; neither 
was it beneficial for increasing the degree of individual freedom and rights. 
Therefore it is better to absorb positive Western lawmaking elements, especial taking 
a shift to a more interactive and cooperative mode. Theories of disagreement and 
individual freedom in this sense have positive contributions to this proposed shift.  
Based on Bankowski’s two arguments in Living Lawfully, that is, the 
relationship between love and law and the procedural design for ‘Bringing the 
Outside in’, I believe that humanity and procedural justice were important values for 
communicative lawmaking. The humanity value emphasized the subjectivity purpose 
of lawmaking while procedural justice contributed to the interactive, reversible and 
 
 236 
cooperative lawmaking. The legislative procedural justice focused on the process 
values, ‘the means’ rather than ‘the results’. It emphasized that apart from the result, 
there were independent values for the legal process per se, including participatory 
governance, process fairness, procedural legality, and procedural rationality. Whether 
or not a procedure could guarantee a good outcome was a result-oriented proposition. 
It was concerned with the ‘good result efficacy’ of the process. The procedural 
justice, however, emphasized a process-oriented theme. The procedural justice 
required that the lawmaking process itself should be publicized. If focusing 
exclusively on substantive justice, it was not necessary to design fair procedures 
because the approach to get the result was not important. A process-oriented theme, 
however, required a just design of the procedure.  
Therefore ‘the law of lawmaking’ should not refer to a code of lawmaking (like 
Legislative Law of China 2000) exclusively, but should contain legitimation 
justifications. For the sake of the procedural nature of lawmaking, the initial rules 
that guiding lawmaker behaviours should design a just and acceptable procedure 
also. Law in general attempted to perpetuate the value of order, justice, equality, 
freedom, convenience or efficacy. Specific laws emphasized different values in light 
of their particular primary reasons for existence. The law of lawmaking in a 
democratic society should aim at promoting harmony in a society and smoothing 
the information exchange between lawmakers and other people. It should secure 
legal equality by offering people a fair chance to present and debate their opinions. 
It should restrict arbitrary lawmaking and safeguard freedom by establishing 
punishments and remedies to legislative misbehaviours. 
Relying on the contributions of Western lawmaking theories, but at the same 
time realizing their difficulties in their application in Chinese contexts, I believe that 
Confucianism and a love philosophy of law could contribute to a discourse theory 
of lawmaking. The core of Confucianism,  Ren (‘仁’ , loving the people) provided 
a possible theoretical background for a discourse theory because it required that we 
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should take the responsibility of our treatments to other people. In Confucianism we 
were not isolated atomic individuals with absolute free will. We were in a 
relationship with others and should consider others. Bankowski’s argument for the 
interplay of law and love, the inside and the outside systems, also initiated a debate 
for communicative decision-making, and could be employed to solve the difficulty 
of applying Western theories into Chinese contexts.  
In the recent thirty years economic reform from 1970s, the Western capitalistic 
political and legal theories were discussed further and deeper in China. However, 
conflicts between Western values and Chinese traditional justifications of the law 
became more obvious. The gap between the ultimate hidden rule in China (i.e., the 
rule of recognition as the CPC’s affirmance) and Western recognitions of democracy 
and the Rule of Law became wider. This gap reflected conflicting values imbedded in 
the Western Rule of Law and Chinese rule-by-law. We could not simply copy the 
West to China. For example, the discourses that I supposed in this thesis were not 
simply about voting for different parties. The Chinese lawmaking system was unlike 
the one that Professor Bankowski described about the decision-making reality.
1
 
Chinese contemporary party system did not offer such different programs among 
different parties since the Communist Party of China was the exclusive leading party. 
Therefore, we could hardly copy Western bilateral and multiple-party system of 
lawmaking directly to China.  
However, elements of Western lawmaking could be introduced into the Chinese 
mode. Indeed, we at least shared those procedural elements in a legislative process 
including: (1) a pre-legislative stage: the process of choosing lawmakers usually 
occurred before making a specific law; (2) a legislative stage, including the process 
of initiating or sponsoring a bill; (3) a process of deliberate consideration and debate 
                                                        
1 ‘We are implicated in the decision-making process because it is the general line of decisions that we approve in 
voting for a particular candidate. If we vote for a socialist party we cannot complain if we are taxed more to 
organize better social welfare provision, even if we do not want to give up our hard earned money. If we vote for 
a conservative party, we cannot be surprised when the return to individuals is given priority over provisions for 
society in general; when privatization is more important than providing public service’. Zenon Bankowski, Living 
Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001,p.16. 
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of a bill; (4) a vote and passing of the bill; and (5) a post-legislative stage: the 
promulgation of law. Besides, China also valued legislative fairness and other 
substantive justice of lawmaking. It is therefore possible for Chinese lawmaking 
absorbing elements of Western lawmaking. 
In the previous chapter I argued for the necessity and possibility of 
communicative lawmaking. I concluded that relying on ‘right’ and ‘virtue’, 
communications between an individual and the community was possible. 
Communicative lawmaking was necessary for Chinese legal reform. Here I would 
like to introduce the recent trend of Chinese reform to support my previous 
arguments. The present leader of CPC and the president of China, Mr. Jingtao Hu 
re-emphasized the importance of Confucian humanity and stated Yi Ren Wei Ben (以
人 为 本 , humanism; people-oriented) principle as the core of ‘scientific 
development’.
1
 People’s subjectivity should be respected and the law should 
promote all around human development. President Hu pointed out that the 
economic and legal reform stressed the socialistic development of the country, but 
the modernization development should work for the people, depended on the people, 
so that all the people could share the fruit of the development. President Hu’s 
statement thus deepened and developed Xiaoping Deng’s theory about the common 
prosperous. It shifted from pure instrumentalism (which focuses only on the 
development) to humanism. It also shifted from opposition to unity (between the 
people and the ‘enemy’). Colors of class struggle and the democratic dictatorship 
were not that intense in President Hu’s interpretation of contemporary Chinese 
Marxism. Under the principle of humanism, President Hu’s report implied that the 
majority, the minority and the weakest group should all be concerned. Chinese 
lawmaking therefore would be based on a solid moral ground.  
The Chinese lawmaking practice also showed the shift from the economic 
                                                        
1 President Jingtao Hu, the Report to the 17th CPC National Congress, 




priority to humanism. Basing on the principle of Yi Ren Wei Ben (以人为本, 
humanism), amendments of the Constitution added contents about human rights, 
protections to legal private properties, and compensations to land expropriation. In 
the policy of investment, sustainable development of environment and resources was 
emphasized; on finance and taxation, the peasants interests were more valued; more 
assistance was given to agriculture; people’s livelihood, health and safety were 
considered prior to economic construction.  
Chinese local legislatures also started to execute communicative lawmaking and 
gained favorable comments. The standing committee of the people’s congress of 
Shanghai invited twenty-one junior students to discuss the Regulation of the 
Protection of Juveniles of Shanghai (上海市未成年人保护条例). During the 
meeting, Gao Jianling, a high school student suggested that the law should forbid the 
schools to randomly publicize students’ transcripts and ranking. Law-drafters did not 
realize the students’ psychological pressure under the prevailing ranking and 
transcript system. The law finally absorbed Gao Jianling’s suggestion. It was the first 
time a regulation absorbed a teenager’s legislative advice into Shanghai’s local 
lawmaking practices.
1
 Before making the Administration of the Leasing of Urban 
Premises of Beijing (北京市房屋租赁管理办法), the local legislators took advices 
through website, and discovered that most people held opposite opinions, so they 
decided to postpone the schedule. It was also a new attempt in Beijing legislative 
practice.
2
  Since September 2005, citizens of An'Hui province could write, email or 
fax to the local legislature of An Hui, to submit their individual opinions of bills. All 
these practices showed a development of communicative lawmaking. 
However, although official laws were created and changed to be more humanity 
by paying attention to people’s voices, those who lacked power, authority, status, 
fortune, and knowledge had few channels and approaches to express their rational 
requirements. The attempts and examples mentioned above were still initiated from 
                                                        
1 News from Xinhua News, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-09/08/content_3460751.htm 
2 News from Sina China, http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2005-04-10/11555609189s.shtml 
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the ‘top’, rather than initiated from the ‘down’, which implied that the channel and 
arena for communication were not ‘communicative’ but still relied on the decision of 
the ‘top’. When the ‘top’ stopped or closed the communicative channel, 
communicative lawmaking would return to unidirectional lawmaking. We therefore 
need to establish and institutionalize a more equal and fair arena for a discourse 
between the ‘top’ and the ‘down’. It should be a long-term goal of Chinese 
construction of the Rule of Law.  
In Chinese lawmaking reality and theories, the means of lawmaking (i.e., the 
top-down and irreversible lawmaking) had conflicts with the ends (i.e., the purpose 
of ‘common prosperity’). An interactive, reversible and cooperative lawmaking mode 
could contribute to the further development of the Chinese legal system and 
improvement of Chinese people’s livelihoods. In this last chapter, I attempted to offer 
possible solutions based on arguments deliberated in previous chapters for the 
contemporary Chinese lawmaking system. I believe two principles could contribute 
to an interactive and cooperative lawmaking: the principle of a fair exchange of 
information between the internal and external systems in lawmaking; and the 
principle of full debate between adversary parties.  
Before I discuss the principle of debate and its meaning to Chinese lawmaking, 
I believe it is helpful for us to read the analogy that Bankowski illustrated in Living 
Lawfully, the debate of the reform of the (fictional) Law school at the University of 
Auchenshuggle.
1
 The Law Faculty itself was not as an overseeing entity, but rather 
as a department or individual administrative unit. A new movement for unification 
arose to abolish all the departments and to have one single Law School, one 
administrative unit, and one department. However, the problem arose in a democratic 
debate of the reform: ‘The individual voices would be lost in the representative and, 
the more one tried to prevent that, the larger that committee would become until it 
became the Faculty as a whole．’2 In order to satisfy the necessity of efficient 
                                                        
1 Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001,p.216. 
2 Ibid.  
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management and control of the Law school without losing concerns with the 
particular requirements and contributions of the average staff, Bankowski offered a 
solution, which claimed that a porous architecture enabled different units of the 
school to be open and exchange with the outside—thereby restructuring themselves. 
Thus the separate different small units of the school ‘drag the outside in’ while at the 
same time ensure their voices being heard.  
Chinese current legal reform was like the reform of the Law School of 
Auchenshuggle. The aim of the current legal reform should establish a principle that 
people’s voices being heard rather than being represented simply. Thus, just as the 
Law School of Auchenshuggle, Chinese lawmaking process might be seen as a 
complex interaction of groups at differing levels, functionally and territorially. 
People interacted with each other through and in different groups in a series and 
family of connections which in the end led to the general identity  
I believe the Western debate mechanism could be a good reference for Chinese 
lawmaking reform. The principle of debate emphasized the respect of diverse and 
even hostile opinions. It is to emphasize a ‘supposed consistent adversary party’ 
throughout the legislative procedure. ‘Adversary parties’ or diverse political opinions 
were common in Western legal systems. But they were not obvious in the Chinese 
lawmaking system. I believe the ‘supposed consistent opposition’ was an essential 
element of a democratic procedure. In a democratic regime, one or more opposition 
political parties promoted fair competition with the ruling party or the government 
because the latter would be more cautious about their policies due to the existence of 
the opposition.  
Democratic lawmaking procedures should consist of negotiations and 
compromises. The Chinese lawmaking system lacked the tense adversarial 
atmosphere. When discussing a bill, Chinese lawmakers represented the whole 
community. They had similar status and task although participants were more or less 
influenced by different interest groups. Legislators considered the overall situation 
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and long-term interests. They valued compromise among diverse parties and attempt 
to reduce conflicts. The first and foremost concern of lawmakers was whether or not 
a bill should be passed as a law. They handled the bill together although they might 
represent different interest groups. Their overlapping work lightened the degree of 
antagonism. Lawmaking was unlike trial: In a trial the appealers were not the 
decision-maker. Lawmakers, however, were ‘representative appealers’ of a bill but at 
the same time ‘the judge’ of it. The dual role of lawmakers, i.e., as both ‘appealers’ 
and ‘the judge’ of a bill, was not distinguished clearly.  
As ‘the judge’ of a bill, whether the representatives of NPC could say ‘no’ to a 
bill reflected the degree of democracy in lawmaking also. In Yan’an times in China 
(1935 to 1948), Chinese peasants put soybeans, green beans, broad beans into a bowl 
to represent their different opinions (because at that time most of them were 
illiterate).
1
 From 1949 to 1966, voting by applause or a show of hands were popular 
approaches. Especially in the Cultural Revolution period, voting by warm applaud 
was the exclusive vote mechanism. From 1979 to 1990, secret ballot and electronic 
voting appeared in Chinese lawmaking, but not until 1980s appeared the negative 
votes in Chinese lawmaking. For the first thirty years of ‘new’ China the applause for 
the solid unanimous vote was the dominant form of voting. Especially in local 
congresses applaud-votes were still a major form of voting. Yujie Wang, a NPC 
representative stated that the absence of negative votes in the fifty years of local 
congresses showed that Chinese lawmaking was abnormal.
2
  
Negative votes started to appear in Chinese lawmaking since 1990s. In 1989’s 
voting for independent legislative power of Shenzhen special zone, negative and 
abstain votes were more than a thousand and was seen as a great development in 
Chinese lawmaking history. In 1997, negative and abstain votes for the report of the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate was also above a thousand, and were about 40.4% of 
                                                        







 Since the development of electronic voting, negative votes 
increased. Siwei Cheng, the previous vice chairman of SCNPC, stated in his speech 
in the New Year 2002 that in the age of applaud-vote, all decisions were almost 
passed without any negative opinions. A representative who applauded for years 
admitted that in the old voting atmosphere, representatives were machines of putting 
up hands. They did not express real thoughts. They were afraid of saying no to a bill. 
They were also ashamed of being a candidate of ‘no’ in front of the whole rostrum. 




The negative votes in NPC, however, were still not common in China. From the 
following figures 8.1 and 8.2 we could see that: In the first session of the 11th NPC, 
the votes for the report of government work were 2885 affirmative, 32 negative and 
12 abstain; the proportion of affirmative votes to the whole vote was 98.5%. The 
votes for the execution of national economy and social development were 2747 
affirmative, 125 negative and 25 abstain; 94.17% affirmative. The votes for the 
budget of local and central governments were 2,462 affirmative, 362 negative, and 
102 abstain; 84.14% affirmative. The votes for the work of NPC and SCNPC were 
2,846 affirmative, 57 negative, and 23 abstain; 97.17% affirmative. The votes for the 
work report of the Supreme People’s Court were 2287 affirmative, 521 negative, 142 
abstain; 78.11% affirmative. The votes for the work report of the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate were 2,270 affirmative, 514 negative, and 142 abstain; 77.58 
affirmative.
3
 In the second session, the affirmative degree was 97.78%, 92.51%, 
84.75%, 94.22%, 75.34% and 76.82%.
4
 From these recent statistics we could see 
that NPC representatives’ votes were harmonious. Disagreements rarely appeared. 
NPC’s lawmaking work was highly approved by NPC representatives especially 
                                                        
1 ibid.   
2 Bifei Zang, Expecting Electronic Voting in ‘Two Congresses’  (期待电子选票早日走进‘两会’), People’s 
Congress Studying 人大研究, (2009), vol.04, pp.37-38. 
3 Statistics from the official report of NPC  (十一届全国人大一次会议闭幕会报告) 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zhibo/zzzb8/node_4306.htm  




when compared with their judgments on the work of the other two legal institutions, 
the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. 
 
fig. 8.1 the rate of affirmative votes in NPC 
issues of 11th NPC sessio
n 
Affirmative  Negative  Abstain affirmative degree 
the report of government 
work 
1 2,885 32 12 98.5% 
2 2,824 42 22 97.78 
the execution of national 
economy and social 
development 
1 2,747 125 25 94.17 
2 2,669 145 71 92.51 
the budget of local and 
central governments 
1 2,462 362 102 84.14 
2 2,440 315 124 84.75 
the work of NPC and 
SCNPC 
1 2,846 57 23 97.17 
2 2,721 99 68 94.22 
the work report of the 
Supreme People’s Court 
1 2,287 521 142 78.11 
2 2,172 519 192 75.34 
the work report of the 
Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate 
1 2,270 514 142 77.58 
2 2,210 505 162 76.82 
 
 












































































































From the Chinese reality we could see that the disagreement and diverse 
opinions that suggested in Waldron’s legitimation of lawmaking were rare in Chinese 
lawmaking. The problem, however, was not about the diversity of autonomic 
individuals, but rather ‘individuality gets lost in the collective’, a problem that 
discussed by Bankowski: ‘The collective life took over in such a way that the 
individual was lost’.
1
 In my previous critics of Waldron’s theory I disagreed with his 
argument that disagreement represented nobility of legislation. As far as Chinese 
situation was concerned, however, absolute harmonious and consistent opinions also 
had problems in justifying a fair lawmaking. Either way was wrong when we 
considered lawmaking as an absolute disagreement or an exclusive agreement. In my 
opinion, Chinese lawmaking put too much emphasis on harmonious opinions. It 
should better absorb some of the Western democratic elements such as a hypothetical 
polarity opposition system. Such a ‘formal’ polarity oppositions could contribute to a 
relatively fair design of the procedure of Chinese lawmaking.   
Lawmakers should try to avoid partisanship also. They should be able to choose 
one of the polar opposites freely. If lawmakers could be divided into two equipollent 
oppositions naturally, they already presented an ideal way of debate. If one party was 
overwhelming the other in number, it was necessary to design a balanced opposition. 
For an important bill, if one party had few supporters or lacked eloquent debaters, it 
could be better to nominate some original cross-bencher to argue for this group. This 
artificial design of two adversarial parties in a lawmaking system might promote a 
thorough and all-sided consideration of a bill. It was especially useful for careful 
deliberation and debate. In other stages of lawmaking, however, lawmakers should 
work together as a team and respect the principles of compromise. 
Another principle, the principle of exchange, emphasized a fair arena to present 
opinions and get information through the legislative process. By increasing publicity 
and transparency of legislative processes, people could have more time and channel 
                                                        
1 Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully-Love in Law and Law in Love, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, p.20. 
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to express opinions from the ‘outside’. The deliberate consideration and debate stage 
in lawmaking was a process of exchange of information among all relevant parties. 
Lawmakers in a democratic system should absorb outside information and opinion to 
estimate the consequences of passing a bill. Externally, relevant groups also needed a 
platform to fully express their will. The discourse between the outside and inside 
system of lawmaking was thus built.  
It would cost more to change a valid but unjust law, and it would denigrate the 
dignity of law and its maker through publishing an unjust law. Therefore it was 
rational to let people express their will and exchanged opinions before a law was 
made. Mr. Youde Yang’s case that analyzed in chapter 6 was an example of 
disobedience to an unjust law. A law related to demolition should consider Yang’s 
opinions and requests and provide discourse channels for him. People should have 
channels to participate into lawmaking that concerns with their rights and interests. 
Otherwise, unjust laws would lead to negative effects like Ms. Fuzhen Tang’s case 
that discussed in chapter 2. If an unjust law were obeyed, people submitted to the 
authority of an unjust law. They could not trust that law. People should have the right 
to disobey unjust laws, but the authority, legitimacy or justice that should be 
represented by the law became uncertain. The law would lose its dignity or efficacy 
in either way, so it was better to avoid these negative effects by communications 
before a law being made.  
I believe that if people were given the opportunity to express and exchange their 
opinions, and if they participated in the procedure, they would feel respected and 
fairly treated. Thus they were more likely to accept the results of the procedure. For 
the sake of argument, it was better to divide lawmaking into two reciprocal systems: 
an internal system and an external one. The internal system referred to lawmakers 
who directly participate in lawmaking. The external system referred to those whose 
interests are affected by this law. In Youde Yang’s case, representatives in the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) was the internal system; while Mr. Yang and other 
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peasants whose lands and properties were demolished was the external system. 
Interaction between the two systems meant that before the law of demolish being 
made, opinions of Yang and other related persons should be heard in the lawmaking 
progress. 





Lawmakers as the ‘internal system’ should be at the same time rule-followers 
rather than using their position to gain a detached privileged status. Unlike the 
‘one-way’ transmission model in Chinese legalism and Chinese Marxism, the 
exchange model depicted the bilateral communications between lawmakers and 
law-accepters. It thus was different from a commanders’ law model or other one-way 
transmission models (figure 8.3).  
 
A people-oriented lawmaking should be the purpose of a communicative thesis. 
The most direct way to understand people’s real request, I suppose, was to listen to 
their discourse. But it was more than an argument for direct democracy. It was for 
deliberative democracy. My argument referred to the legitimacy of 
representativeness of lawmaking. To reframe the question, the argument for 
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people-oriented lawmaking was about the moral ground of representativeness and 
democracy of lawmaking. Why representative lawmaking was legitimate? Why the 
majority’s decisions were prior to a subject’s own judgment? The four justifications 
in Chinese Marxism that I discussed in this thesis were not sufficient to offer 
satisfying solutions to the above questions. I believed that it was better to return to 
the people’s real requests rather than searching for outside justifications.  
How to understand people’s real request in the communication? Deliberative 
democracy was justified when people were provided with a sufficient, equal and fair 
arena to discourse about their law and morality. This fair arena should be provided 
as the first necessary condition to realize real democracy. We therefore come to the 
debate of deliberative democracy against representative democracy. In Chinese 
ideology, the conception of representative democracy was discussed. The concept of 
deliberative democracy, however, did not attract public attention. It was therefore 
especially important for Chinese scholars to pay attention to deliberative democracy 
because democracy was not necessarily with representation. If we misunderstood 
democracy as the majority rules or the representative decision, we might ignore the 
deficiency of democracy. 
The most prominent nineteenth-century advocate of ‘government by discussion’ 
(John Stuart Mill) was rightly considered one of the sources of deliberative 
democracy. But Mill preferred that this discussion be led by the better educated. It 
was not until the early part of the twentieth century that deliberation came to be 
decisively joined to democracy. In the writings of John Dewey, Alf Ross, and A. D. 
Lindsay, deliberation and discussion were regarded as a necessary part of 
democracy, or ‘the essential of democracy’ (Gutmann and Thompson 2004). Jürgen 
Habermas provided deliberative democracy a solid foundation. His theory was 
based on the argument that the fundamental source of legitimacy was the collective 
judgment of the people. Some critics, however, complained that his conception did 
not adequately protect liberal values, such as freedom of religion or human rights; 
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they criticized proceduralism in deliberative democracy. But the bond that held 
deliberation and democracy together was not pure proceduralism. What made 
deliberative democracy democratic was an expansive definition of who was 
included in the process of deliberation—an inclusive answer to the questions of who 
had the right (and effective opportunity) to deliberate or choose the deliberators, and 
to whom did the deliberators owe their justifications.  
In Living Lawfully, Professor Bankowski discussed associative democracy and 
deliberative democracy. Associationist democracy was supposed to promote 
governance through democratically legitimated voluntary associations, and reducing 
the greatest democratic deficit—we had organizations running our lives without 
consent and corporate control and without representation. Representative 
democracy was no longer a mode of constraint or co-ordination, but rather a mode 
of legitimation. Representative democracy concentrated on the Rule of Law above 
everything else and in that sense excluded the voice of the individual.
1
 So that 
associationalism aimed to extend liberalism.  
‘Democracy should be seen as to do with communication 
and not necessarily with representation—all representative 
democracies construct, in some way, ‘the represented. Thus…the 
answer is a system of communicating networks, split across the 
public/private divide, interacting with each other and it is this which 
will be the foundation of co-ordination. It will enable society to be 
organized and goods to be delivered by voluntary associations which 
would be democratic and self-governing…[P]eople need others to 
realize themselves but it would encourage voice since entry and exit 
would be relatively easy. It would cope with the fact of the 
decentralization of political authority and the rejection of the 
sovereign state. It would mean more mutualism.’
2
 
Deliberative democracy was used to describe a mode of decision-making which 
privileged participation in debate or dialogue (as opposed to mere polling or casting 
ballots) as the desirable means for arriving at public judgment. In deliberative 
                                                        
1 Zenon Bankowski 'Bringing the Outside in: The Ethical Life of legal Institutions' in T Gizbert-Studnicki and 





democracy, the collective decisions were taken in arenas where local people took 
part but in so doing must take into account other people in similar situations. 
Gutmann and Thompson, in their focus on deliberative democracy, offered a 
detailed diagnosis and persuasive prognosis of public debate and civic virtue. 
Presenting an alternative theory to the prevailing utilitarian perspective, the authors 
proposed a model for public policymaking that must be taken seriously by citizens 
and public officials alike. In Why Deliberative Democracy, Gutmann and Thompson 
discussed the characteristics of deliberative democracy (Gutmann and Thompson 
2004). Deliberative democracy affirmed the need to justify decisions made by 
citizens and their representatives. Both were expected to justify the laws they would 
impose on one another.  
The first and most important characteristic of deliberative democracy, then, was 
its reason-giving requirement. In deliberative democracy, individuals were offered a 
fair term of cooperation. The reasons required were neither merely procedural (for 
example, the majority decision rule) nor purely substantive (the result promoted the 
greatest good for the greatest number). They were reasons that should be accepted 
by free and equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation. Deliberative democracy 
stressed the idea that persons should be treated not merely as objects of legislation, 
as passive subjects, or the subjects to be ruled, but as autonomous subjects who 
could take part in the governance of their own society, directly or through their 
representatives. In deliberative democracy an important way these persons took part 
in to lawmaking was by presenting and responding to reasons, or by demanding that 
their representatives do so, with the aim of justifying the laws under which they 
must live together. The reasons were meant both to produce a justifiable decision 
and to express the value of mutual respect. 
Secondly, the reasons given in the lawmaking process should be accessible to all 
the people to whom the rules were addressed. Rules should not be simply imposed 
to us. The reasons to make those rules should be comprehensible to us. It was a 
 
 251 
form of reciprocity which meant the reasons given during lawmaking should be 
public. In contrast to Rousseau’s conception of democracy, in which individuals 
reflected on their own on what was right for the society as a whole, and then came 
to the assembly and voted in accordance with the general will, deliberative 
democracy happened in public through open discussion and dialogues among 
individuals. 
Thirdly, deliberative democracy made a dynamic and continuing dialogue 
possible. It meant individuals did care as much about what happened after a 
decision was made as to what happened before. The decision-making process was 
therefore open. It was different with the classical social contract theory which 
denied ‘afterwards changes’. It admitted that some results of lawmaking were 
imperfect and could be changed in the future, if we would realize their defects in the 
future. We therefore understood that the decisions we made today might be wrong 
tomorrow, and the decisions appeared most sound at the time might appear less 
justifiable in light of later evidence. We should remind ourselves that decisions 
justified by the majority rules were not all consensual. Those who disagreed with 
the decision accepted the majority’s decision. But we should tolerate this possibility: 
if they want, they should have a chance to reverse or modify it in the future, by 
persuading the majority to join their camp.  
Therefore in deliberative democracy, lawmaking should not be an exclusive 
top-down and irreversible official procedure, but a fair arena for exchanging 
opinions. In China’s context, it meant the weakest group, the 150 million poor 
population should have a channel to request their rights; the majority of the Chinese 
population, 900 million peasants should discuss their opinions in the lawmaking 
procedures; the 95 million industrial workers at the production line and 145 million 
peasant-labors in the cities should be able to choose their peer representatives to 
discuss their requests at the congress.
1
 The strict unchangeable social contract in 
                                                        
1 Statistics of the poor, peasants and peasant-labors see data resources in chapter 2; statistics of the industrial 
workers were from Peilin Li etc., An Investigation of Contemporary Social Class Classification and Structure, 我
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the Chinese context could only be justified to the real will of the ‘contemporary’ 
people, if the deliberative democracy could be accepted in Chinese lawmaking. 
People’s autonomy could make the second justification, i.e., the people’s congress, a 
reasonable legitimation of Chinese lawmaking.  
An opposite argument, however, was that the common people were not as good 
as the elite in self-government because common people had a lower degree of 
education, lacked financial support, and had deficient ability to make decisions. A 
famous argument ‘political tutelage’ was made by Dr. Yat-sen Sun, (or Zhongshan 
Sun, the Father of the Republic of China 1912-1949) in the Constructive Scheme for 
the Country（国民政府建国大纲）in 1924. In Article 5, the constructive scheme was 
divided to three stages: military administration; governmental tutelage; and 
constitutionalism. In the military administration period, the task of the government 
was to unite China. The political tutelage in Sun’s theory was a temporary stage. 
During this period, the government needed to train the people of the Qing Dynasty 
to be the owner of Mingguo, a new China. When people understood democracy and 
could practice autonomy, the society came to the last period, the era of 
constitutionalism. According to this theory, people needed to be trained to be 
democratic. This argument was alien to Western democratic theorists. However, in a 
state that paternalism and monarchy had the absolute authority for several thousand 
years, democracy was also a totally new life style. It was an enlightenment era in 
China. The Chinese needed to learn to make their own decisions without asking 
permissions of their patriarch, the emperor or officials. In Sun’s theory, the implied 
authorized lawmaking power was returnable since the tutelage period was 
temporary.  
An interesting question that related to autonomy was：if we considered from the 
perspective of the people of the Qing Dynasty, who had a long tradition of 
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paternalism and monarchy, and were used to an arranged life style, we are not 
certain whether they wanted democracy. Why did they want democracy if they had 
never experienced or even heard of it? A social positivist might make an 
investigation questionnaire to discover their real thoughts: ‘If you can choose, 
which is better: democracy or monarchy?’ However, such an investigation was not 
rational, since the people did not have a democratic environment and culture to 
make this choice. Even if they chose monarchy in this circumstance, which might 
be their genuine thoughts, the investigation was still not rational because the 
question per se was irrational. 
 For example, when I worked part-time at the T company in the U.K., I had a 
debate with my foreign colleagues (for the sake of cultural respect I would not 
specify their nationality) about women’s rights of higher education. As a female I 
stated my instinctive idea: women should have the equal right to go to universities. 
My friends, three very kind-hearted male students who were also studying in the 
U.K., disagreed with me and one of their strong arguments were that women in their 
country as far as they knew liked to be housewives rather than career women. I 
could hardly persuade them that education was not just about career; neither could I 
argue that their women really want education (because they supposed that they 
knew their women better than me). After several years, I was still confused about 
their statement: ‘Our women wanted to be housewives rather than go to university’. 
I was wondering what if their woman lived in a totally different cultural 
environment from the beginning? Would they make the same choice? 
The argument therefore shifted from rational decisions to the subjectivity of the 
decision-makers. The argument of the subjectivity met the challenges of the 
objective limits of the subjects, the problem of assimilation. If a subject was 
brainwashed by a tyrannical legal system since he was born, should he be guilty for 
his sincere request of tyranny? If lawmakers were brainwashed by such a system, 
were they responsible for the bad laws that they passed? If the moral ground only 
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referred to the direct and genuine will of persons, we could not find satisfying 
answers to these questions. The representative and the majority’s lawmaking would 
also justify the tyranny of the mass. So the justifications that relying solely on the 
subjectivity were not tenable. 
Could we find any independent values of lawmaking? I answered yes when Dr. 
C M asked me this question in an examination. At that time I thought of the cruel 
stoning penalty I read from the U.K. newspapers and the novel Kite Runner. To me, 
such things were unbelievable and unacceptable. I could not understand why such a 
cruel penalty would ever be created in the world. I should not forget, however, in 
ancient China, cruel penalties like cutting alive criminals into thousand pieces (Ling 
Chi 凌迟), tearing alive criminals apart (Che Lie 车裂), or kill the whole family 
because of one person’s heinous crime (Man Meng Chao Zhan 满门抄斩), were 
also legitimated. If I were born in ancient China, would I question the legitimacy of 
those cruel penalties? I probably would not even think of the problems of those laws. 
I would obey the law just in case I would be punished by it. 
The people’s genuine thoughts might not be rational—I suppose this was the 
major reason of Dr. Sun’s political tutelage. My point was, if people were provided 
with the fair arena of discourse, their genuine thoughts could be rational. If I were 
born in a closed environment and had no chance to learn the benefits of education, I 
probably might not vote for education. But if I lived in a more open environment 
and could compare the two systems basing on my own experience, I could make a 
more rational decision. If I were born in a monarchy state and my understanding of 
right and wrong were already established on the system, I probably might not argue 
for democracy. But if I had a chance to have more freedom, welfare and security in 
a democratic society than a monarch state, I could stand by democracy.  
However, a common person did not have such an open and fair arena to 
compare different choices because he was already assimilated by the system where 
he stayed in. And it would be difficult for him to jump out of the system and make a 
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rational and objective decision concerning other choices. But if he were provided 
with the fair arena, the results might be different. However, in the beginning of new 
China it was difficult to persuade subjects of Empire Qing to vote for democracy. Dr. 
Sun’s Tutelage theory was rational because at that time China lacked the fair arena 
and it was necessary to teach the subjects what democracy was about at that time. It 
did not mean political tutelage was right; it was just rational.  
In the conclusion of this chapter I would like to return to Confucianism to 
search for independent values of lawmaking. Lawmaking should not be a plain fact 
of authority and procedures. It should contribute to the independent values of law, 
law as justice, rather than a plain fact of coercion and control. Here I came back to 
the independent value in Confucianism, the humanity (Ren 仁). I believed it was an 
appropriate conception in Chinese philosophy that could contribute to the thesis of 
lawmaking. Ren (仁, loving the people), was the core of Confucianism. It was not 
about God’s love to the people or vice versa, but the love among people. Loving 
people means we should take the responsibility of our treatments to other people. Ji 
Suo Bu Yu, Wu Shi Yu Ren (己所不欲，勿施于人 do unto others as you would be 
done by; do not impose on others; treat others in the same way as you would like to 
be treated), was the guidance for practice Ren, the humanity.
1
 If we took this 
humanity value seriously, the difficulties of justifying Chinese lawmaking could be 
solved. Even if a subject was brainwashed in a bad legal system, when he made 
decisions he could consider whether he would like to be treated like this by others, 
then he was practicing Ren, humanity. Should cruel punishments and death penalty 
be annulled? In practice, if a subject would accept cruel and death penalties to 
himself and his love, then his choice of passing cruel laws and his obedience to 
these laws could be acceptable. If Chinese lawmakers were thinking this way, they 
might not tolerate ‘bad’ laws. Practicing humanity could be a moral reasoning for 
legitimate lawmaking. 
                                                        
1 The Analects of Confucius, Book XII and XV. 论语颜渊第十二，卫灵公第十五. 
 
 256 
The reality, however, was much complex than practicing a few principles. 
Lawmakers in a real world did not need to consider the humane treatment in the 
representative system of lawmaking. In the Chinese context, the poor and common 
were represented by the elite and successful persons. It was difficult or even 
impossible for the poor to ‘represent’ the successful persons to make decisions. An 
opposite argument might be that the elite and successful persons would help the 
poor, like Bernard Mandeville argued in The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices 
(1732). Or in Confucianism, the elite and successful persons were justified as ‘good’ 
persons. However, the plain fact of the contribution of the elite in The Fable of the 
Bees, or the far-fetched connection between success and morality in Confucianism, 
were different from the principle of ‘peer treatment’. For example, a middle class 
lawmaker might lack understanding of the urgency of curbing housing prices 
because to him the rising price could bring profits of the whole nation. He with 
other middle class lawmakers overruled the bill of restricting the price of the 
property. Poor persons had to struggle to buy or rent a place to live. In this case, the 
middle class lawmaker’s ‘goodwill’ might cause a disaster to the poor. Peer 
treatments therefore only existed when lawmakers were representing the social class 
they belonged to. Representativeness should be interpreted under this pre-condition. 
The value of humanity, and people-oriented lawmaking required that people were 
able to speak for themselves, and their discourses were seriously treated. The value 
of humanity should be safeguarded by law rather than rely on the rich persons 
conscience. 
Our contemporary legal system is supposed to provide people a fair arena for 
exchanging discourses. People should make their own choices, which are rational 
and could be right at the same time. Now it is a best period for China to set up this 
fair arena since science and technology are changing with each passing day, and 
communication among different cultures becomes easier and quicker. With the 
support of communication techniques, we should cherish people’s autonomy. 
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Therefore the period of political tutelage should come to an end. People’s rational 
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Appendix I.   
P H’s Living expenses at W city in China and E city in the U.K. (average cost in 2005-2008) 
1,500 unit income per month 







Rent/month for a 2 bedroom flat 800 53.33 650 43.33 
A McDonald meal 21 1.40 7 0.47 
A 8 inches birthday cake 120 8.00 15 1.00 
A Nike T-shirt 500 33.33 50 3.33 
A Local brand T-shirt 100 6.67 20 1.33 
A Train ticket (for same distance) 200 13.33 90 6 
A Flight ticket (for local; same distance) 300 20.00 100 6.67 
Flight tickets (China-UK return) 7200 480.00 450 30.00 





hospital for one 
month)  
667.00 free 0.00 
coffee 20 1.33 2 0.13 
tea 15 1.00 2 0.13 
film 80 5.33 6 0.40 
3D film 200 13.33 10 0.67 
hotel (double room/per night) 200  80 5.33 












Gallery  free 0.00 12 0.80 
Concert/musicale 400 26.67 40 2.67 
Price of a house/flat 7000/m2 466.67 1000/m2 66.67 
Car (same configuration) 30,000 2000.00 10,000 666.67 
TV (local brand) 3,000 200.00 300 20.00 
College fees per year (for locals) 10,000 666.67 3,000 200.00 









Appendix II  
the official position and occupation of the 11th NPC representatives (from major provincial groups) 
 




Hu Bei Hu Nan Beijing 
Total 114 161 96 181 124 118 58 
Official 71 104 46 149 88 51 29 
% 62.28 65.00 47.92 82.32 70.97 43.22 50.00 
Businessman 35 36 29 27 23 45 7 
% 30.70 22.36 30.21 14.92 18.55 38.14 12.69 
Scholars 7 11 12 3 4 5 14 
% 6.14 6.83 12.50 1.66 3.23 4.24 24.14 
Workers 1 1 5 0 5 1 2 
% 0.87 0.62 5.21 0 4.03 0.85 3.45 
Peasants 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 
% 0 1.24 0 0 1.61 0 0 
Other 0 7 4 2 2 16 6 
% 0 4.35 4.2 1.10 1.61 13.56 10.34 
Male 83 130 63 166 96 91 43 
% 72.81 80.75 65.63 91.71 77.42 77.12 74.14 
Female 31 31 33 15 28 27 15 




吴邦国 中共中央政治局常委，全国人大常委会委员长、党组书记  
方滨兴 北京邮电大学校长，中国工程院院士  
刘振伟 全国人大常委会委员、全国人大农业与农村委员会副主任委员  
刘德培 全国人大常委会委员、全国人大教育科学文化卫生委员会委员，中国工程院副院长、党组成员，
中国医学科学院（中国协和医科大学）院长（校长），中国工程院院士  








程恩富 中国社会科学院学部委员、马克思主义研究学部主任，马克思主义研究院院长    
于一苏(女) 安徽省林业科学研究院用材林研究所所长    
王三运 十七届中央候补委员，中共安徽省委副书记，省人民政府省长、党组书记    
王亚非 安徽出版集团有限责任公司总裁、党委书记    
王秀芳(女) 中共安徽省委常委，省总工会主席、党组书记    
王宏(女) 中共安徽省委候补委员，共青团安徽省委书记、党组书记    
王明胜 淮北矿业（集团）有限责任公司董事长、党委书记    
王金山 十七届中央委员，中共安徽省委书记，安徽省人大常委会主任、党组书记    
王福宏 中共安徽省委委员，安徽省黄山市委书记，市人大常委会主任、党组书记    
王翠凤(女) 安徽省司法厅副厅长    
韦江宏 铜陵有色金属集团控股有限公司董事长、总经理、党委副书记    
方西屏 中共安徽省委委员，安徽省池州市委副书记、市长    
方春明 中共安徽省委委员，安徽省亳州市委书记，市人大常委会主任、党组书记    
孔兆平合九铁路有限责任公司总经理、党委副书记    
孔祥喜 淮南矿业（集团）有限责任公司副董事长、总经理、党委常委    
左延安 安徽江淮汽车集团有限公司董事长、党委书记，安徽江淮汽车股份有限公司董事长    
卢 凌(女) 阜阳师范学院外国语学院副院长、英语应用语言研究所所长    
叶世渠 安徽天大石油管材股份有限公司董事长，安徽省工商联副主席，中国个体劳动者协会副会长    
朱国萍(女) 安徽师范大学生命科学学院教研室主任，博士生导师    
朱勇 中共安徽省纪委委员，安徽省劳动和社会保障厅厅长、党组书记    
朱海燕(女) 安徽省话剧院副院长，安徽儿童艺术团团长，安徽省戏剧家协会副主席    
朱读稳 中共安徽省委委员，安徽省安庆市委书记、市人大常委会主任    
朱维芳(女) 民进中央常委、安徽省委主委，安徽省人大常委会副主任    
朱慧秋(女) 安徽华信生物药业股份有限公司董事长    
任海深 中共安徽省委委员，安徽省人大常委会副主任、党组副书记    
刘庆峰 安徽科大讯飞信息科技股份有限公司总裁，安徽省工商联副主席、博士生导师    
刘健中 共安徽省委委员，安徽省民政厅厅长、党组书记    
刘 惠(女) 安徽省粮食局副局长、党组成员    
刘瑞莲(女) 安徽省砀山县葛集镇人大主席、白腊园村党支部书记    
汤林祥 中共安徽省委委员，安徽省六安市委书记、市人大常委会主任、党组书记    
许戈良 安徽省立医院院长、党委副书记，博士生导师    
许崇信 中共安徽省淮北市委副书记、市长    
孙云飞 中共安徽省委委员、安徽省阜阳市委副书记、市长    
孙兆奇 安徽大学物理与材料科学学院教授、博士生导师    
孙志刚 中共安徽省委常委，安徽省政府副省长、党组副书记    
纪冰中 共安徽省委候补委员，安徽省水利厅厅长、党组书记    
苏学云(女) 九三学社安徽省蚌埠市委主委    
李宏鸣 中共安徽省委委员，安徽省宿州市委书记，市人大常委会主任、党组书记    
李国玲(女) 安徽省合肥市人大常委会副秘书长，农工党合肥市委副主委    
李明 中共安徽省铜陵市委副书记、市长    
李荣杰 安徽丰原集团有限公司董事长、总经理、党委书记    
李修松 安徽省文化厅副厅长，民建中央委员、安徽省委副主委    
李爱青 民革安徽省委副主委，省种子协会秘书长，国家级跨世纪农业学科技术带头人   
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杨亚达(女) 安徽工业大学管理学院院长    
杨剑波 安徽省农业科学院院长、党委副书记    
吴存荣 中共安徽省委委员，安徽省合肥市委副书记、市长    
吴华夏 安徽华东光电技术研究所所长、党委书记，国家特种显示工程技术研究中心主任、博士生导师    
吴旭军 中共安徽省委委员，安徽省宿州市委副书记、市长    
吴明楼 安徽益益乳业有限公司董事长、党委书记    
何帮喜 安徽希玛欧美佳装饰材料工业有限公司总经理，北京安徽企业商会会长，安徽省工商联副主席    
余夕志 中国石化股份公司安庆分公司经理、中国石化集团资产经营管理公司安庆分公司经理    
余的娜(女) 安徽省旌德县白地镇洪川村党支部书记    
余敏辉 民进安徽省委常委、淮北市委主委，淮北煤炭师范学院学报编辑部主任、常务副主编，硕士生导
师    
汪宏坤 北京华威家具制造有限公司董事长，全国青联委员，安徽省青联副主席    
汪春兰(女) 民进安徽省委常委，安徽医科大学第一附属医院整形外科主任医师、教授    
沈卫国 中共安徽省委委员，安徽省发展和改革委员会主任、党组书记    
宋礼华 安徽省科协副主席，安徽安科生物工程（集团）股份有限公司总裁，研究员，博士生导师    
宋国权 中共安徽省巢湖市委副书记、市长    
张庆军 中共安徽省委委员、安徽省国土资源厅厅长、党组书记    
陆亚萍(女) 安徽环亚集团总经理    
陈先森 中共安徽省委委员，安徽省财政厅厅长、党组书记    
陈启涛 中共安徽省委委员，安徽省蚌埠市委书记、市人大常委会主任    
陈树隆 中共安徽省委委员，安徽省芜湖市委书记    
陈章水 民建安徽省委常委，合肥水泥研究设计院副院长，南京工业大学兼职教授    
罗 平(女) 安徽省巢湖市政府副市长，九三学社安徽省委常委、巢湖市委主委，硕士生导师    
金会庆 中国民间商会副会长，安徽三联集团总裁，三联职业技术学院院长    
周溯中 共安徽省委委员，安徽省高级人民法院院长、党组书记，国家二级大法官    
郑永飞 民盟中央委员、安徽省委副主委，中国科技大学地球和空间科学学院副院长，博士生导师    
郑晓燕(女) 合肥百货大楼集团股份有限公司董事长、党委书记    
孟祥瑞 安徽省淮南市政协副主席，民革淮南市委主委，安徽理工大学科技产业处处长，博士生导师    
赵鹏 中国工商银行股份有限公司安徽省分行行长、党委书记    
侯建国 全国人大常委会委员，中国科学技术大学校长，中国科学院院士，第三世界科学院院士，博士生
导师    
姜一勇 安徽庆发集团董事长，安徽三农集团董事长    
姚玉舟 中共安徽省委委员，安徽省铜陵市委书记，市人大常委会主任、党组书记    
姚民和 安徽航佳丝绸集团董事长    
姚桂萍(女) 安徽省黄山市徽州区环卫所督查员    
耿学梅(女) 全国工商联执委，安徽省工商联（总商会）副主席（副会长），民建安徽省委委员、合肥市委
副主委    
夏鹤 武警安徽省总队总队长（少将警衔）、党委副书记，武警部队党委委员    
顾建国 马钢（集团）控股有限公司总经理、党委书记，马鞍山钢铁股份有限公司董事长、党委书记    
钱永言 安徽省明光市永言水产（集团）有限公司董事长、总经理，国家级安徽河蟹原种场场长，安徽省
农村合作经济组织联合会副会长    
钱念孙 民盟安徽省委副主委，安徽省社科院文学研究所所长，安徽省作家协会副主席    
倪永培 安徽迎驾集团总裁    
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徐顶峰 安徽新亚特电缆集团有限公司董事长，安徽省巢湖市工商联副会长，北京安徽企业商会副会长    
徐崇华(女) 安徽省滁州市政协副主席，滁州市工商联（总商会）主席（会长），安徽省第九届工商联常委    
徐景龙 安徽省亳州市人大常委会副主任，九三学社安徽省委常委、亳州市委主委    
高登榜 中共安徽省委委员，安徽省宣城市委书记、市人大常委会主任、党组书记    
郭文叁 安徽海螺集团有限责任公司董事长、总经理、党委书记    
席蔚菁(女) 安徽省盲人职业学校校长    
黄岳忠 安徽省人大常委会原代理主任    
曹杰 安徽古井集团董事长、总裁、党委副书记    
曹金海 安徽省池州黄山岭铅锌矿矿长、党委书记    
崔伟 安徽省人民检察院检察长、党组书记，国家二级大检察官    
蒋厚琳(女) 安徽省监察厅副厅长，农工党中央委员、安徽省委副主委    
韩再芬(女) 中国戏剧家协会副主席，安徽省安庆市文化广电新闻出版局副局长，安庆再芬黄梅艺术剧院
院长    
锁炳勋 安徽金种子集团有限公司董事长、党委书记，安徽金种子酒业股份有限公司董事长    
程迎峰 中共安徽省黄山市委常委，黄山风景区管理委员会副主任、党委书记    
程 静(女) 安徽国家农业标准化与监测中心（安徽国家农副加工食品质量监督检验中心）主任    
鲁中祝(女) 安徽省凤台县真菌协会会长，安徽省凤台县李冲回族乡魏郢村食用菌养殖专业户    
谢力 安徽全柴集团党委副书记，全柴动力股份有限公司董事长    
谢广祥 致公党中央常委、安徽省委主委，安徽省政府副省长    
缪学刚 中共安徽省委委员，安徽省滁州市委副书记、市长    
潘一新 安徽安庆环新集团有限公司董事长、总经理、党委书记，安庆帝伯格茨活塞环有限公司董事长    
薜 颖(女) 安徽工艺贸易进出口有限公司董事长，安徽鑫茂典当有限公司董事长    
戴 敏(女) 安徽中医学院药学院副院长，博士生导师    
檀结庆 民革中央委员、安徽省委常委，合肥工业大学应用数学研究所所长、国际合作与交流处处长，博







































刘宝琦（回族）、中国伊斯兰教协会副会长, 省第五届伊斯兰教协会会长  
刘海程、省新闻出版局（版权局）局长  



























































苗润圃、开封市 政协副主席  





















郝 萍（女）、商丘地区眼科医院 院长  
胡大白（女）、黄河科技大学校长、党委副书记  
南振中、新华社总编辑  
查 敏（女）、建设厅厅长  








































戴松灵、伊川电力集团总 公司董事长  
魏学柱、新野纺织董事长  
卢展工 .河南省省委书记  
郭庚茂.河南省省长  




























































































































































丁玉华     三角集团有限公司董事长、党委书记、总裁，三角轮胎股份有限公司董事长、总
裁     男     汉族     中共 
于晓玉     山东中瑞海产食品有限公司董事长     女     回族     中共 
马平昌     山东省委委员，莱芜市委副书记、市长     男     汉族     中共 
马先富     山东省莒县陵阳镇陵阳街村党总支书记、村委会主任      男     汉
族     中共 
马纯济     山东省济南市人大常委会副主任、党组副书记，中国重型汽车集团有限公司董事长、党
委书记     男     汉族     中共 
王元成     山东省泰安市东方计算机学校校长、泰安市进城务工青年培训学校（民办）校长，泰安
市工商联副主席     男     汉族     九三学社 
王文升     山东省委委员，山东省人大常委会秘书长、机关党组书记     男     汉
族     中共 
王可敏     山东省济南市政协副主席，市农业局副局长，省政协常委，民建省委副主委、济南市委
主委     男     汉族     民建 
王立新     山东省委候补委员、胜利石油管理局局长、党委副书记     男     汉
族     中共 
王   刚     山东金晶（集团）有限公司董事长、总裁     男     汉族     中共 
王廷江     山东临沂华盛江泉集团有限公司董事长     男     汉族     中共 
王守东     山东泰山钢铁集团有限公司董事长、党委书记     男     汉族     中共 
王志中     山东工程机械集团有限公司董事长、党委书记，临沂工程机械集团董事长、党委书记，
山东临工工程机械有限公司总裁、首席执行官、党委书记     男     汉族     中共 
王志民     山东省政协副主席，省社会主义学院院长，山东师范大学副校长，教育部人文社科重点
研究基地齐鲁文化研究中心主任、首席专家，致公党中央常委、省委主委     男     汉
族     致公党 
王   丽     济南大学体育学院综合教研室主任     女     回族     九三学社 
王岐山     中共中央政治局委员     男     汉族     中共 
王启成      山东省临沂市政协副主席、市规划建筑设计研究院院长，民革临沂市委主
委     男     汉族     九三学社、民革 
 
王金富     山东福田雷沃国际重工股份有限公司董事长、党委书记、总经理     男     汉
族     中共 
王法亮     山东省淄博市政协副主席，民建淄博市委主委     男     汉族     民建 
王修智     山东省政协原副主席、党组副书记     男     汉族     中共 
王桂波     山东新郎希努尔集团股份有限公司董事长、党委书记      男     汉
族     中共 
王培廷     山东省委委员，威海****，市委党校校长     男     汉族     中共 
王 银 香      山 东省 曹县 磐 石办 事处 五 里墩 村党 支 部书 记， 山 东银 香伟 业 集团 董 事
长     女     汉族     中共 
王随莲     山东省人民政府副省长，九三学社中央常委、省委主委     女     汉
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族     九三学社 
王新红     山东省东营市政协副主席，胜利石油管理局副总工程师，民盟中央委员、东营市委主
委     男     汉族     民盟 
牛 宝 伟      山 东 省 新 泰 市 新 汶 街 道 孙 村 社 区 党 委 书 记 ， 新 汶 实 业 公 司 总 经
理     男     汉族     中共 
牛惠兰     山东省济宁市政协副主席，民建济宁市委主委     女     汉族     民建 
方才臣      山东冠丰种业科技有限公司董事长、总经理，山东生物柴油集团公司董事
长     男     汉族     中共 
尹中卿      全国人大常委会机关党组成员、办公厅研究室主任      男      汉
族     中共 
尹传贵     山东省临沂市人民医院院长、党委书记     男     汉族     中共 
尹慧敏     山东省委委员，省财政厅厅长、党组书记     女     汉族     中共 
孔 北 华      山 东 大 学 医 学 院 副 院 长 、 山 东 大 学 齐 鲁 医 院 副 院 长 兼 妇 产 科 主
任     男     汉族     中共 
孔   青     山东肥城矿业集团董事长、党委书记     男     汉族     中共 
邓向阳     山东省委委员，滨州****，市委党校校长     男     汉族     中共 
邓宝金     山东省济南市杂技团团长、党支部书记，市文联副主席     女     汉
族     中共 
丛强滋     山东新北洋信息技术股份有限公司总经理     男     汉族     
 
冯怡生     山东鲁北企业集团总公司董事长、党委副书记     男     汉族     中共 
达建文     淄博市政协副主席，中石化齐鲁分公司首席专家、研究院副总工程师，民盟淄博市委主
委     男     汉族     民盟 
吕明辰     山东省委委员，省人大常委会委员、代表资格审查委员会委员，省总工会常务副主席、
党组副书记（正厅级）     男     汉族     中共 
华建敏     中共中央委员，国务委员、国务院党组成员兼国务院秘书长、机关党组书记，中央国家
机关工委书记，国家行政学院院长     男     汉族     中共 
庄 文 忠      山 东 省 农 业 厅 副 厅 长 ， 省 科 协 副 主 席 ， 民 建 中 央 委 员 、 省 委 副 主
委     男     汉族     民建 
刘义发     山东时风（集团）有限责任公司董事长、党委书记     男     汉族     中
共 
刘   凤     山东省滨州市政协副主席，滨州医学院基础学院院长，农工党滨州市委主
委     女     蒙古族     农工党 
刘 兴 亮      中 国 铝 业 公 司 山 东 企 业 协 调 委 员 会 主 任 、 中 国 铝 业 山 东 分 公 司 总 经
理     男     汉族     中共 
刘学景     山东凤祥（集团）有限责任公司董事长兼总裁，阳谷祥光铜业有限公司董事
长     男     汉族     中共 
刘建文     山东省临沭县农业局农经中心农村财务指导站副站长      女     回
族     中共 
刘春红      山东省举重摔跤柔道运动管理中心运动员兼教练员      女      汉
族     中共 
刘 荣 喜      山 东 省 淄 博 市 周 村 区 永 安 街 街 道 灯 塔 民 族 村 党 委 书 记 、 村 委 会 主
任     男     回族     中共 
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刘锡潜     山东省禹城市市中街道办事处北街村党支部书记，山东禹王实业有限公司董事长、总
裁     男     汉族     中共 
刘新国     中国海洋大学数学科学学院教授     男     蒙古族     民盟 
刘 嘉 坤      山 东 省 平 邑 县 九 间 棚 村 党 总 支 书 记 ， 沂 蒙 山 药 业 科 技 有 限 公 司 董 事
长     男     汉族     中共 
江    卫      枣庄矿业集团有限责任公司董事长、党委书记      男      汉
族     中共 
江 林 昌      山 东 省 烟 台 市 人 大 常 委 会 副 主 任 ， 烟 台 大 学 副 校 长 ， 民 盟 **** 主
委     男     汉族     民盟、中共 
 
江保安     山东菱花集团有限公司董事长、党委书记     男     汉族     中共 
汤建梅     山东省菏泽市人大常委会副主任，市科协副主席，民盟省委常委     女     回
族     民盟 
许立全     山东省委委员，潍坊市委副书记、市长     男     汉族     中共 
许振超     山东省委委员，青岛前湾集装箱码头有限公司工程技术部党总支委员、固机（项目）经
理，中国科协常委     男     汉族     中共 
许智慧     中华全国律师协会理事，北京市鼎业律师事务所主任      女     汉
族     
许瑞菊     山东省第一女子劳教所监察室主任     女     汉族     中共 
孙文盛     原国土资源部部长、党组书记，国家土地总督察     男     汉族     中
共 
孙丕恕     浪潮集团有限公司董事长、党委书记     男     汉族     中共 
孙   伟     山东中医药大学第二附属医院生殖科主任     女     汉族     
孙利强     烟台张裕集团有限公司董事长、党委书记、总经理，烟台张裕葡萄酿酒股份有限公司董
事长     男     汉族     中共 
孙   菁     山东省聊城市人大常委会副主任，聊城职业技术学院副院长，农工党聊城市委（筹）
主委     女     汉族     农工党 
纪玉君     青岛喜盈门集团有限公司董事长、党委书记、总经理      男     汉
族     中共 
麦康森     山东省青岛市政协副主席，中国海洋大学教授，民革中央委员、省委副主委、青岛市委
主委     男     汉族     民革 
苏寿堂     山东省德州市政协副主席，山东华乐集团董事长、总经理，全国工商联常委、省工商联
副会长、德州市工商联会长     男     汉族     中共 
杜   波     青建集团股份公司董事局主席、首席执行官     男     汉族     中
共 
李小鹏     中国华能集团公司总经理、党组书记     男     汉族     中共 
李天军     山东省人大常委会委员、代表资格审查委员会主任委员     男     汉
族     中共 
李 长 顺      济 南 钢 铁 集 团 总 公 司 （ 济 南 钢 铁 总 厂 ） 原 总 经 理 （ 厂 长 ） 、 党 委 书
记     男     汉族     中共 






丁克美    女    汉族     湖北省仙桃市剅河镇黄桥村党支部书记  
卜仿英    女    汉族     湖北省襄樊新襄棉纺织有限公司布机车间喷气织机帮接工  
马国富    男    汉族    中国航天科技集团公司四院 42所特种橡胶事业部（车间）主任  
王月娥    女    汉族    湖北省阳新县王英镇希望小学教师  
王文童    男    汉族    湖北省地方税务局局长、党组书记  
王玉芬    女    汉族    翔宇教育集团董事长  
王利明    男    汉族    第十一届全国人大法律委员会委员，中国人民大学法学院院长  
王金初    女    汉族    湖北省英山县温泉镇百丈河村党支部书记  
王建鸣    男    汉族    湖北省黄石市委副书记、市长  
王 玲    女    汉族    湖北省荆门市委副书记、市长  
王 涛    男    汉族    东风汽车有限公司商用车总装配厂调试三车间工人  
王祥喜    男    汉族    湖北省荆州市委副书记、市长  
王 静    女    汉族    湖北省武汉市公交集团有限责任公司五公司 578路驾驶员  
毛宗福    男    汉族    武汉大学公共卫生学院院长，民革中央委员、湖北省副主委  
仇小乐    男    汉族    湖北省政协副主席，省社会主义学院院长，民建中央委员、湖北省主委  
邓秀新    男    汉族    华中农业大学党委常委、校长，民盟中央常委  
邓崎琳    男    汉族    武汉钢铁（集团）公司总经理、党委副书记  
叶 青    男    汉族    湖北省统计局副局长，民进湖北省副主委  
叶昌保    男    汉族    湖北省洪湖市新堤办事处洪林村党委书记、湖北洪林集团董事长兼总经理  
田玉科    女    土家族  华中科技大学医科管理委员会副主任，九三学社中央委员、湖北省副主委  
冯志高    男    汉族    中国航天科工集团第九研究院（中国三江航天集团）院长（总经理）、党委副书记  
吕忠梅    女    汉族    湖北省高级人民法院副院长，农工党中央委员、湖北省副主委  
朱汉桥    男    汉族    湖北省潜江市委副书记、市长  
朱弟雄    男    汉族    湖北凯乐新材料科技股份有限公司党委书记、董事长  
朱建华    男    汉族    湖北省监利县新沟镇交通村八组农民  
任建国    男    汉族   中国保监会湖北监管局党委书记、局长  
刘丹丽    女    汉族    湖北省歌剧舞剧院一级演员  
刘顺妮    女    汉族    湖北省武汉市副市长，市政协常委  
刘雪荣    男    汉族    湖北省黄冈市委副书记、市长  
刘道明    男    汉族    名流置业集团股份有限公司董事长、湖北美标汽车制冷系统有限公司董事长  
刘锡汉    男    汉族    中国长江航运（集团）总公司总经理、党委副书记  
池 莉    女    汉族    湖北省文联副主席，武汉市文联主席  
汤文全    男    汉族    湖北省电力公司总经理、党委副书记  
许健民    男    汉族   第十一届全国人大环境与资源保护委员会委员，原国家卫星气象中心总工程师  
阮成发    男    汉族    湖北省武汉市委副书记、市长  
孙友元    男    汉族    湖北京山轻机集团公司总裁、湖北京山轻工机械股份有限公司党委书记、董事长  
孙应安    男    汉族    湖北孝棉实业集团公司董事长、总经理、党委书记  
李传卿    男    汉族    国家质量监督检验检疫总局党组书记、副局长  
李红云    男    汉族    湖北省随州市委副书记、市长  
李红锦    女    汉族    湖北省荆州市乾盛纺织有限公司工人  
 
 296 
李怀珍    男    汉族    中国银行业监督管理委员会湖北监管局党委书记、局长  
李国璋    男    汉族    湖北省兴山县兴发集团有限责任公司董事长、党委书记  
李 茵    女    汉族   武汉外国语学校副校长、武汉实验外国语学校校长  
李宪生    男    汉族    湖北省委常委，省政府副省长  
李培根    男    汉族    华中科技大学校长、党委常委  
李鸿忠    男    汉族    中央候补委员，湖北省委副书记、省长  
李 磐    男    汉族    湖北省归国华侨联合会主席、党组书记，省政协港澳台侨和外事委主任  
杨云彦    男    汉族    武汉市人大常委会副主任，中南财经政法大学副校长，民盟中央委员、湖北省副主委、
武汉市主委  
杨永良    男    汉族    湖北省人大常委会原主任、党组书记  
杨先龙    男    汉族    湖北省荆州市荆州区拍马村党委书记，拍马纸业集团公司董事长、骏马股份有限公司
总经理  
杨泽柱    男    汉族    湖北省人民政府国有资产监督管理委员会主任、党委书记，湖北省能源集团有限公司
董事长  
杨 威    男    汉族    湖北省体育局体操运动管理中心副主任  
杨继学    男    汉族    中国葛洲坝集团公司党委书记、总经理  
肖红娟    女    汉族    湖北省黄冈市文化局（新闻出版局、版权局）局长  
吴少勋    男    汉族    湖北黄石劲牌有限公司党委书记、董事长、总裁  
吴秀凤    女    汉族    湖北省政协副主席，台盟中央常委、湖北省专职主委  
吴恒权    男    汉族    人民日报社社长  
何少苓    女    汉族    中国水利水电科学研究院副总工程师  
余卓民    男    汉族    武汉铁路局局长、党委副书记  
辛喜玉    女    汉族    湖北省丹江口市丹赵路办事处茅腊坪村三组农民  
汪爱群    男    汉族    武汉商联（集团）股份有限公司董事、总经理、党委委员，武汉中百集团股份有限公
司董事长、党委书记  
张召平    男    汉族    中国石化集团江汉石油管理局局长、党委副书记  
张柏青    男    汉族    中南建筑设计院院长，致公党湖北省副主委  
张晓山    男    汉族    中国社会科学院学部委员，农村发展研究所所长  
张爱国    男    汉族    湖北省天门市委副书记、市长，市政协主席  
张 琼    女    土家族  湖北省五峰土家族自治县教育局副局长  
张富荣    男    汉族    湖北省黄麦岭磷化工有限责任公司董事长、党委书记、总经理  
张 静    女    汉族    中国人民银行武汉分行党委书记、行长  
陈义龙    男    汉族    武汉凯迪控股投资有限公司董事长、党委书记  
陈天会    男    汉族    湖北省十堰市委副书记、市长  
陈吉学    男    汉族    湖北省仙桃市委副书记、市长  
陈 勇    男    汉族   湖北大学中药生物技术研究中心主任  
陈晓燕    女    土家族  湖北省恩施州政协副主席、州工商联会长  
陈鼎常    男    汉族    湖北省黄冈市人大常委会副主任，黄冈中学校长，国际数学奥林匹克竞赛国家集训队
教练  
苗 圩    男    汉族    中央候补委员，湖北省委常委，武汉市委书记，市人大常委会主任、党组书记  
范锐平    男    汉族    湖北省鄂州市委副书记、市长  
罗清泉    男    汉族    中央委员，湖北省委书记、省人大常委会主任  
罗群辉    男    汉族    中国航空工业第一集团公司航宇救生装备有限公司董事长、总经理、党委副书记  
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周先旺    男    土家族  湖北省商务厅厅长、党组书记 
周坚卫    男    汉族    湖北省人大常委会副主任  
周宝生    男    汉族    湖北省咸宁市嘉鱼县官桥镇官桥村八组组长，湖北田野集团党委书记、董事长，武汉
大学东湖分校董事长  
周建元    女    汉族    湖北省襄樊市农业科学院副院长，民进襄樊市副主委  
周洪宇    男    汉族    湖北省人大常委会副主任，民进中央常委、湖北省主委  
周家贵    男    汉族    湖北省钟祥市金汉江纤维素有限公司董事长、总经理  
郑少三    男    汉族    湖北省高级人民法院院长、党组书记  
郑心穗    男    汉族    湖北省政协副主席，民革中央常委、湖北省专职主委  
赵发所    男    汉族    武汉谦森岛庄园有限公司党委书记、董事长、总经理  
胡茂成    男    土家族  湖北民族学院党委书记  
姚绍斌    男    苗族    湖北省鹤峰县八峰村党总支书记，湖北八峰药化股份有限公司副董事长  
秦顺全    男    汉族    中铁大桥局集团公司总工程师  
夏菊花    女    汉族    中国文联执行副主席，中国杂技艺术家协会主席  
顾海良    男    汉族    武汉大学党委书记  
钱远坤    男    汉族    湖北省神农架林区党委副书记、区长  
徐世友    男    汉族    湖北省襄樊市市政管理处泵闸管理所襄城下水道班班长  
徐 平    男    汉族    东风汽车公司总经理、党委书记兼东风汽车集团股份有限公司董事长  
徐 德    男    汉族    湖北省齐星汽车车身股份有限公司董事长、党委书记  
郭生练    男    汉族    湖北省政府副省长，民盟中央常委、湖北省主委  
郭有明    男    汉族    湖北省宜昌市委副书记、市长  
郭粤梅    女    汉族    湖北省武汉市政协副主席，九三学社武汉市主委，武汉市建筑设计院院长  
唐良智    男    汉族    湖北省襄樊市委副书记、市长  
黄有根    男    汉族    中国证监会湖北监管局党委书记，局长  
黄 俊    女    汉族    湖北省广水市俊华养猪合作社理事长、市妇女养猪协会会长  
黄楚平    男    汉族    湖北省咸宁市委副书记、市长  
曹建明    男    汉族    中央委员，最高人民法院副院长、党组副书记（正部长级）  
章治安    男    汉族    湖北省云梦富思特集团党委书记、董事局主席、总裁 
梁惠玲    女    汉族    湖北省孝感市委副书记、市长  
彭明权    男    汉族    中湖北中烟工业公司总经理、党组书记，武汉烟草（集团）有限公司董事长、总经理、
党委副书记  
彭清华    男    汉族    中央委员，中央香港工委书记，中央人民政府驻香港特别行政区联络办公室副主任  
彭富春    男    汉族    武汉大学美学研究所所长 
敬大力    男    汉族    湖北省人民检察院检察长、党组书记  
辜胜阻    男    汉族    民建中央专职副主席  
程理财    男    汉族    湖北山河建设集团有限公司董事长  
童国华    男    汉族    武汉邮电科学研究院院长、党委书记  
谢圣明    男    汉族    全国工商联常委、湖北省总商会副会长，武汉红桃 K药业股份有限公司董事长  
谢明亮    男    汉族    华中电网有限公司总经理、党组副书记  
路甬祥    男    汉族    中央委员，十届全国人大常委会副委员长、党组成员，中国科学院院长、党组书记  
路 钢    男    汉族    湖北省教育厅厅长、党组书记，省政府教育督导室主任、主任督学  
蔡宏柱    男    汉族    湖北稻花香集团董事长、湖北稻花香酒业股份有限公司董事长  
蔡其华    女    汉族    长江水利委员会主任、党组书记  
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廖仁斌    男    汉族    湖北省电信有限公司董事长、总经理、党组书记，省实业公司董事长  
谭功炎    男    汉族    湖北省汉川市沉湖镇福星村党委书记，湖北福星集团总裁、党委书记，福星科技股份
有限公司董事长  
熊德荣    男    汉族    中国建筑第三工程局党委书记、董事长  
戴茂荣    女    汉族    湖北省黄冈市龙感湖管理区（农场）茂荣食品厂厂长  

































































































































秦希燕：秦希燕联合律师事务所主任   
王阳娟(女)：湖南省湘剧院院长助理、国家一级演员  
王志英(女)：常德市安乡县人民医院副院长、主任医师     
代朝霞(女)：常德纺织机械有限公司摇架制造部冲二车间弹簧测压女工 
朱雪琴(女)：中冶集团长沙冶金设计研究总院项目总设计师、高级工程师       
许菊云：长沙市玉楼东酒家副总经理兼总厨师长，湘菜大师         
杨绍军：常德阳光孤儿院院长    
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肖利琼(女)：衡阳电业局客户服务中心班长                 
陈晓琼(女):郴州市第一人民医院妇产科主任、主任医师  
 
卓新平(土家族)：中国社会科学院世界宗教研究所所长、基督教研究中心主任          
胡伟武：中科院计算所研究员、龙芯 CPU首席设计师     
祝学军(女)：中国航天科技集团一院型号总设计师   
姚媛贞(女，土家族)：张家界市人民医院副院长        





1 月 26 日，北京市人代会选出全国人大代表 58 名，现将他们的职位和是否是北京市人大代表做一展示，
（按姓氏笔划排列）： 
  于均波：北京市人大常委会主任，北京市人大代表 
  马文普：中联部副部长，不是。 
  马宗林：华北电网有限公司总经理、党组副书记，不是。 
  王小珂(女，回族)：中国国际鞋业博览会组委会秘书长，不是。 
  王天佑：中华医学会胸心血管外科学会委员（曾任副主任委员），不是。 
  王云峰：北京市通州区委常委、书记，是北京市人大代表 
  王文京：用友软件股份有限公司董事长兼总裁，是北京市人大代表 
  王为政：齐白石艺术研究会副会长，不是。 
  王 伟：北京市政府副秘书长。第 29届奥运会申办委员会秘书长。第 29届奥林匹克运动会 
  组织委员会秘书长、副主席，是北京市人大代表 
  王安顺：中央候补委员,中共北京市委副书记、市委政法委书记,中共北京市委党校校长、 
  北京行政学院院长，是北京市人大代表 
  王蓉蓉(女)：国家一级演员，北京京剧院张派青衣主演，不是。 
  毛桂芬(女)：北京市东城区副区长，民进中央委员、民进北京市委委员 51岁，不是。 
  方 新(女)：中国科学院党组副书记,研究员,博士生导师 53岁，不是。 
  田 雄：北京韩村河建筑集团总公司任党委书记、总经理 62岁，是北京市人大代表 
  冯乐平(女)：北京市劳动模范，是北京市人大代表 
  冯 坤(女)：中国女排队员 29岁，不是。 
  吉 林：北京市副市长 46岁，是北京市人大代表 
  朱继民：北京首钢股份有限公司董事长 62岁，不是。 
  刘长瑜(女)：京剧花旦，不是。 
  刘忠军：北医三院主任医师 50岁，不是。 
  刘 淇：北京市委书记 66岁，是北京市人大代表 
  刘新成：北京速记协会高级顾问，民进中央副主席，北京市社科联副主席、首都师范大学 
  校长，是北京市人大代表 
  闫傲霜(女)：北京市科学技术研究院副院长、研究员，不是。 
  关阔山：北京市崇文区环境卫生服务中心三队党支部书记，是北京市人大代表 
  池 强：北京市高级人民法院院长，是北京市人大代表 
  许智宏：北京大学校长，不是。 
  孙安民：全国工商联副主席、北京市工商联会长，北京市副市长 60岁，不是。 
  牟新生：海关总署署长 65岁，不是。 
  纪宝成：中国人民大学校长 64岁，不是。 
  杜德印：北京人大常委会主任 57岁，是北京市人大代表 
  李志坚：北京市委副书记，不是。 
  李昭玲(女)：中国侨联副主席、北京市侨联主席，是北京市人大代表 
  李福成：燕京啤酒董事长，是北京市人大代表 
  杨德安：武警部队副参谋长兼北京市总队总队长，不是。 
  肖建国：北京大学教授，不是。 
  吴碧霞(女)：著名歌唱家，不是。 
  邱苏伦(女)：北京外国语大学亚非语系教授，不是。 
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  宋鱼水(女)：北京市海淀区人民法院知识产权庭庭长，不是。 
  宋贵伦：北京市委社会工作委员会书记，是北京市人大代表 
  张 工：北京市发改委主任，是北京市人大代表 
  林毅夫：北京大学中国经济研究中心主任，不是。 
  欧阳泽华：中国证监会市场监管部副主任，不是。 
  罗金保：北京铁路局党委书记，是北京市人大代表 
  图娅(女，蒙古族)：中医药大学教授，不是。 
  金生官：北京市人大常委会副主任，是北京市人大代表 
  赵久合：北京市人大常委会副主任，是北京市人大代表 
  赵凤山：北京市人大常委会副主任，是北京市人大代表 
  柳传志：联想集团总裁，不是。 
  索连生(满族)：北京市人大常委会副主任，是北京市人大代表 
  贾庆林：全国政协主席，不是。 
  高丽朴(女)：北京市农林科学院蔬菜研究中心副研究员，不是。 
  郭金龙：北京市市长 61岁，不是。 
  黄燕明：中央国家机关工委副书记，不是。 
  梅宁华：北京市文物局党组书记、局长，是北京市人大代表 
  谢维和：清华大学校务委员会副主任，不是。 
  慕 平：北京市人民检察院检察长，是北京市人大代表 
  漆小瑾(女)：北京铜牛针织集团有限责任公司总工程师，不是。 
  魏 刚：北京邮政投递局宣武区永安路邮政投递部投递员，不是。 
 
  分析构成： 
 
  一，行政和司法官员，12 名，占 21% 
  王 伟：北京市政府副秘书长。第 29届奥运会申办委员会秘书长。第 29届奥林匹克运动会 
  组织委员会秘书长、副主席 
  毛桂芬(女)：北京市东城区副区长，民进中央委员、民进北京市委委员 
  吉 林：北京市副市长 
  池 强：北京市高级人民法院院长 
  孙安民：全国工商联副主席、北京市工商联会长，北京市副市长 
  牟新生：海关总署署长 
  宋鱼水(女)：北京市海淀区人民法院知识产权庭庭长 
  张 工：北京市发改委主任 
  欧阳泽华：中国证监会市场监管部副主任 
  郭金龙：北京市市长 
  梅宁华：北京市文物局党组书记、局长 
  慕 平：北京市人民检察院检察长 
 
  二，执政党成员，11人，且主要是高官，占 19% 
  马文普：中联部副部长 
  王云峰：北京市通州区委常委、书记 
  王安顺：中央候补委员,中共北京市委副书记、市委政法委书记,中共北京市委党校校长、 
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  北京行政学院院长 
  方 新(女)：中国科学院党组副书记,研究员,博士生导师 
  刘 淇：北京市委书记 
  关阔山：北京市崇文区环境卫生服务中心三队党支部书记 
  李志坚：北京市委副书记 
  宋贵伦：北京市委社会工作委员会书记 
  罗金保：北京铁路局党委书记 
  贾庆林：中共政治局常委，全国政协主席 
  黄燕明：中央国家机关工委副书记 
 
  三，北京市人代会高官，6人，占 10% 
  于均波：北京市人大常委会原主任 
  杜德印：北京人大常委会主任 
  金生官：北京市人大常委会副主任 
  赵久合：北京市人大常委会副主任 
  赵凤山：北京市人大常委会副主任 
  索连生(满族)：北京市人大常委会副主任 
 
  四，董事长总经理、商人、企业主，7人，占 12% 
  马宗林：华北电网有限公司总经理、党组副书记 
  王小珂(女，回族)：中国国际鞋业博览会组委会秘书长 
  王文京：用友软件股份有限公司董事长兼总裁 
  田 雄：北京韩村河建筑集团总公司任党委书记、总经理 
  朱继民：北京首钢股份有限公司董事长 
  李福成：燕京啤酒董事长 
  柳传志：联想集团总裁 
 
  五，大学校长和研究院长，5人，占 9% 
 
  刘新成：首都师范大学校长，北京速记协会高级顾问，市社科联副主席，民进中央副主席 
  闫傲霜(女)：北京市科学技术研究院副院长、研究员 
  许智宏：北京大学校长 
  纪宝成：中国人民大学校长 
  谢维和：清华大学校务委员会副主任 
 
  六，基层教授、科学家、艺术家、运动员、普通劳动者，15人，占 26% 
  王天佑：中华医学会胸心血管外科学会委员 
  王为政：齐白石艺术研究会副会长 
  王蓉蓉(女)：国家一级演员，北京京剧院张派青衣主演 
  冯乐平(女)：北京市劳动模范 
  冯 坤(女)：中国女排队员 
  刘长瑜(女)：京剧花旦 
  刘忠军：北医三院主任医师 
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  肖建国：北京大学教授 
  吴碧霞(女)：著名歌唱家 
  邱苏伦(女)：北京外国语大学亚非语系教授 
  林毅夫：北京大学中国经济研究中心主任 
  图娅(女，蒙古族)：中医药大学教授 
  高丽朴(女)：北京市农林科学院蔬菜研究中心副研究员 
  漆小瑾(女)：北京铜牛针织集团有限责任公司总工程师 
  魏 刚：北京邮政投递局宣武区永安路邮政投递部投递员 
 
 
 
 
